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SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
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REFUSAL OPERATED TO PERPETUATE VILLAGE'S SEGREGATED CHARACTER

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Height4
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, a nonprofit corporation
organized for the purpose of developing low and moderate income housing in the
Chicago area, entered into an agreement with a Catholic religious order to purchase 15 acres of land in the Village of Arlington Heights. The agreement provided that the land was to be developed for low-income housing with financing
arranged under § 2361 of the National Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968.2 These 15 acres and all of the land surrounding the property was zoned
R-3, for single family residences; accordingly, the property would have to be rezoned R-5, for multi-family residences. The existing "comprehensive plan" of
Arlington Heights provided that an area should be zoned R-5 only if it represents
a "buffer zone" between single family areas and commercial, industrial, or other
high intensity uses."
Metropolitan Housing prepared studies showing what it conceived to be
the benefits of the project, such as an increased tax base and, in response to objections, made several changes in its proposals in an attempt to obtain rezoning from
the Board of Trustees of the Village. After public hearings, however, the Plan
Commission recommended against the zoning change and the Board of Trustees
followed this recommendation, maintaining that permitting this use would violate
policy by placing the project in the middle of a completely single
the buffer zone
4
family area.
" The Supreme Court recently gave a strong indication of its sentiments toward Arlington
Heights. In Washington v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976), the Court upheld
a test of verbal skills used by the Washington, D.C., police department which 57% of black
applicants failed as opposed to only 13% of white applicants, on the basis that, standing alone,
a showing of a discriminatory effect on blacks does not warrant a conclusion that a hiring test
was discriminatory. Rather, a discriminatory intent or purpose must also be indicated. In so
holding, the Supreme Court cited with disapproval a number of contrary lower court decisions,
including Arlington Heights. Id. at 4793 n.12. The propriety of the inclusion was challenged
by Justice Brennan who stated in his dissent that "[i]f the Court regarded this case only a few
months ago as worthy of full briefing and argument, it ought not to be effectively reversed
merely by its inclusion in a laundry list of lower court decisions." Id. at 4796 n.1. Cf.
Justice in Arrears, Tiasa, June 21, 1976, at 48, 49.
1 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970).
2 12 U.S.C. § 1715z et seq. (1970). In January of 1973 both § 236 '(which provided for
low income rental housing) and § 235 (providing for low income home ownership) programs
were suspended, and have since been effectively terminated.
See telegraphic message from George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, to all regional administrators, all area directors, and all insuring office directors, .Tanuary
8, 1973 (copy on file at Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights, Notre Dame Law School).
3 See Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation v. Village of Arlington Heights,
517 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1975).
4 Id. at 411.
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Metropolitan Housing then instituted suit on behalf of itself and "individual
plaintiffs who seek to represent moderate income minority members who work
or desire to work in Arlington Heights but cannot find decent housing there that
they can afford." 5 The complaint alleged that the refusal to rezone had the effect
of perpetuating segregation and prevented Metropolitan Housing from using its
property in a reasonable manner in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, §
1981 and § 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,6 § 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act,7 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.8 The complaint requested a declaratory
judgment invalidating the zoning ordinance as applied to the plaintiffs' property,
and an injunction preventing the individual trustees of Arlington Heights, as
defendants, from interfering with the development of the proposed project.9 The
district court" held for the defendants, finding that good faith reasons existed for
the rezoning refusal and that the action did not have a racially discriminatory
effect." The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that
assessing the Board action in "its historical context and ultimate effect," ' 2 the
action had "the effect of perpetuating both... residential segregation and Arlington Heights' failure to accept any responsibility for helping to solve this problem."" Arlington Heights has appealed the case to the United States Supreme
Court,:' where a decision should be rendered later this term. The appeal gives
the Supreme Court its first opportunity to examine a variety of issues in recent
housing discrimination cases, which were presented by plaintiffs before the
Seventh Circuit.
Plaintiffs submitted three arguments, the first being that they had been
denied equal protection in that the Arlington Heights zoning policy had been
administered in a discriminatory manner. Relying on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 5
they maintained that had the project been one which would not have brought
low income minority groups into the area, the requested zoning change would
have been granted. A similar contention was recently accepted in United Farmworkers of FloridaHousingProject, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach. 6 Delray Beach
involved a refusal by city officials to give permission to a proposed housing project planned for black, Puerto Rican, and Mexican-American farmworkers to tie
into the city's existing water and sewer systems. City officials had claimed this
would have violated the city's annexation and land use plans. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the facts clearly indicated that the Delray Beach
city officials had made previous exceptions to both its annexation and land use
plans for whites, yet refused to make such exceptions for the black or brown farmworkers. Thus the court concluded that although the city was under no initial
5

Id.

6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
8 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).

9
10
11

517 F.2d at 411.
373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
Id. at 210.

15

118 U.S. 356 (1886).

12 517 F.2d at 413.
13 Id. at 414.
14 Cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 560 (1975).
16 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
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obligation to make exceptions to its established policies, "once it begins to do so,
it must do so in a racially non-discriminatory manner."'" Delray Beach is one
of the few housing cases applying the "discriminatory as administered" standard
of Yick Wo. Generally the level of proof required for such a finding is extremely
difficult to obtain, and most courts, as did the Seventh Circuit in Arlington
Heights, turn to other arguments.
In Arlington Heights the Seventh Circuit concluded from the facts that the
Village "buffer zone" policy had not been administered in a racially discriminatory fashion." Although the record indicated several instances where the
"buffer zone" policy may have been violated, 9 the court declined to find clearly
erroneous the district court's holding that in acting on the request, the defendants
were concerned with "the integrity of the Village's zoning plan."2
Plaintiffs next contention was that even if the zoning policy had not been
administered in a racially discriminatory manner, the refusal to rezone had a
racially discriminatory effect and thus "perpetuates Arlington Heights' segregated
character."'" Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority," the Seventh Circuit noted that "[r]egardless of the Village
board's motivation, if this alleged discriminatory effect exists, the decision violates
the equal protection clause unless the Village can justify it by showing a compelling interest.""s
The principle of requiring a finding of a racially discriminatory effect rather
than a racially discriminatory motive has been generally accepted by the courts.24
Due both to the reluctance of courts to find such a motive or purpose, and to the
difficulty in proving such a claim, courts have typically adopted the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in Burton" and required a showing only of a racially discriminatory result in order to gain relief from local actions.
In United States v. City of Black Jack, Missouri," an originally unincorporated community reacted to the proposed construction of a low income housing
project by incorporating and enacting a zoning ordinance banning the construction of multiple family dwellings. In discussing the plaintiffs' burden of proof
17 Id. at 808.
18 517 F.2d at 412.
19 An expert witness for the plaintiffs had testified that of 60 zoning changes, 15 violated
the buffer zone policy. The Seventh Circuit found that only four of these claimed violations
were genuinely violative of the policy. Defendants' evidence further indicated that prior to the
Metropolitan Housing rezoning request, at least two proposed changes were denied on the
basis of the buffer zone policy and several other denials partially grounded on this basis, thus
indicating the buffer zone policy was a viable part of the Village's program.
20 517 F.2d at 412.
21 Id. at 412-413.
22 365 U.S. 715 (1965).
• . no state may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or
by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be. It is of no consolation to an individual denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in
good faith.
Id. at 725.
23 517 F.2d at 413.
24 See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974);
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton,
425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); SASSO v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970);
Norwalk GORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968).
25 See note 21 supra.
26 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
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in the case, the Eighth Circuit maintained that no showing of a racially discriminatory motive was necessary. Expressing their concern about the ease with which
racially discriminatory motives may be concealed, and the fact that harm can
result from simple thoughtlessness' as well as intent, the court concluded that
"effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone.... 2
Although less of a burden than that of establishing a racially discriminatory
motive, the use of the effect principle has not avoided other procedural difficulties
in situations where housing projects have been blocked by local community
action. Government sponsored housing projects are of course mainly for low
income groups, which inevitably contain a disproportionate number of racial and
ethnic minorities. Courts have, however, generally viewed these community actions as related to wealth classifications, and held that although "traditionally
disfavored," 2 classifications based upon wealth do not rise to the same level of
constitutional significance as do those based upon race or ethnic origin. 9 Thus
the burden on fair housing advocates has remained that of showing a discriminatory effect on minorities, not the lesser burden of proving a discriminatory
impact on the poor generally.
Repeated attempts to broaden the scope of "suspect criteria" to include
classifications based upon distinctions in wealth, and efforts to include housing
as a "fundamental right" protected under the Constitution have thus far failed,
largely as a result of two Supreme Court decisions. In Lindsay v. Normet,0 the
plaintiffs attempted to elevate the desire for particular housing to the status of a
"fundamental right" under the Constitution, thus subjecting actions affecting
this right to "strict scrutiny" by the courts in ruling upon equal protection violation claims. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that "... the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.
We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
access to dwellings of a particular quality."sL Although Lindsay dealt with the
rights of a tenant under the Oregon Forcible Entry Statute, and is thus distinguishable from the typical housing discrimination case,32 lower courts have
generally accepted the Supreme Court's analysis and have declined to extend the
list of fundamental rights to include housing. 3
In James v. Valtierra"4 it was argued that the provision of the California
Constitution singling out housing projects for low income groups and requiring
27 Id. at 1185.

28 Harper v. Virginia Board of Election, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
29 See note 36 infra.

30 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
31
32

Id. at 74.
See Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1970).
Lindsay v. Normet contains language to the effect that there is no constitutionally
protected right to a certain quality of housing, but this case does not involve racially
discriminatory site selection (or non-selection). Lindsay u. Normet, moreover, is
essentially a case dealing with procedural due process . .. . rather than the equal
protection claim here.

Id. at 1077.

33 See Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1975) ...
it is well established that
the right to housing is not a fundamental interest which would require the more stringent
'compelling state interest' test"); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1240 (4th Cir. 1973)
("Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution").

34 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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them to be approved by a local referendum violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against the potential residents
of the housing project. Although relying on specific factors present in the case
such as a long history of referendums in California on a variety of subjects, the
Supreme Court indicated that classifications based upon wealth do not rise to the
level of "suspect criteria," and thus are not subject to "strict scrutiny" by the
7
courts.3 5 Most courts, s" including the Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights,"
have interpreted James to mean this, and have instructed plaintiffs in housing
cases they must show a racially discriminatory effect and not merely an economically discriminatory effect.
Failing in direct efforts to have wealth distinctions declared constitutionally
suspect, attempts have been made to show that actions which affect low income
groups are in effect actions against racial minorities, since low income groups are
generally composed of a high proportion of racial and ethnic minorities. Although
perhaps more successful in the equal employment area," this argument has been
recognized as valid in at least one housing case. In Citizens for FaradayWood v.
Lindsay, 9 the Second Circuit found that termination of a housing project for
low and middle income families "did not have an unconstitutionally racially discriminatory effect because 80 percent of the units in the project were reserved
for middle income families and thus the brunt of the project's termination was
borne by those families." ' The court suggested, however, that this conclusion
would be altered if the composition of the group involved changed. "Unlike the
case where low income families are involved, there is no reason to assume that a
disproportionate number of the middle income families affected would be nonwhite."'" Thus the court indicated that had the project been strictly for low income persons, this might have been sufficient to declare the action violative of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.42
In Arlington Heights the Seventh Circuit ruled that the fact racial minorities
make up a large percentage of low income groups does not make decisions which
35

The Article requires referendum approval for any low-rent housing project, not
only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority, and the record here
would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed
at a racial minority.
Id. at 141.
36 See Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250,
253 (9th Cir. 1974); English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971); Mahaley
v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1245, 1249, 355 F. Supp. 1257
(N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974).
37 517 F.2d at 413.
38 See Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971); Gregory v. Litton
Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972).
39 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974).
40 Id. at 1067-68.
41 Id.
42 Several courts have, however, explicitly rejected efforts to show income discrimination is
actually racial discrimination. In Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, the Ninth Circuit denied
a challenge to the constitutionality of a large lot zoning ordinance and stated that, ". . . discrimination against the poor does not become discrimination against an ethnic minority merely
because there is a statistical correlaton between poverty and ethnic background." 503 F.2d
250, 253 (9th Cir. 1974). See also English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319, 324 (2d
Cir. 1971).
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affect these groups racially discriminatory governmental actions.4" They did indicate, however, that at some undefined point the correlation between being poor
and being black or brown would be so great that courts could no longer ignore
it. Stating a tentative principle, however, that "governmental actions having a
disproportionate impact on a class composed of an extremely high percentage of
racial minorities might be classified as discriminatory .

..

,""

the court then

proceeded to nullify this suggested approach. Relying on James v. Valtierra, the
court said that even though in that case the briefs indicated that the rejected
housing projects would likely have been inhabited by a disproportionately high
minority population, the Supreme Court nevertheless "explicitly rejected the
contention that the provision created a racial distinction that is subject to strictest
scrutiny."45 This may constitute an unwarranted extension of the Supreme
Court's opinion in James, particularly in light of the fact that the "disproportionate impact" argument was never specifically discussed in that decision, and additionally, the implicit recognition of this argument by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4
Although the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Arlington Heights zoning
policy had not been administered in a racially discriminatory manner,4 and
further, that the probability that a higher percentage of minority groups than
others would be adversely affected does not constitute a racially discriminatory
effect for equal protection purposes,4 the court argued that the analysis of racial
discrimination must "extend further."4 Relying on previous decisions,5" the court
stated that the effect of the refusal to rezone "must be assessed not only in its
immediate objective but its historical context and ultimate effect. '"51' This standard was first expressed in Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna52 and subsequently expanded upon in later decisions.
In United Farmworkers of FloridaHousing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray
Beach," the Fifth Circuit found that the city had discriminated in the administration of its annexation policy and master land use plan. 54 The Fifth Circuit
then continued its analysis with an examination of the "historical context and
43

517 F.2d at 413.

44 Id.
45 Id.
46 401 U.S. 424 '(1971). Griggs involved a company policy requiring a high school education or the passing of general intelligence test as a condition of employment. The Court of
Appeals had ruled that although these requirements operated to exclude a disproportionate

number of blacks from employment, this did not make the tests unlawful under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Supreme Court stated that the Act proscribes "Practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431. Although relying in part upon the fact past discriminatory practices existed in the company, the court did recognize that black people were
adversely affected by the company policy in holding for the plaintiffs.
47 See notes 14-19 & accompanying text supra.
48 See notes 39-42 & accompanying text supra.
49 517 F.2d at 413.
50 Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, New York, 436 F.2d 108, 112
(2d Cir. 1970). See also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir.
1974); United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799, 810 (5th Cir. 1974).
51 517 F.2d at 413.
52 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970).
53 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
54 Id. at 808.
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the ultimate effect of the city's action.... " 5 Examination of Delray Beach's
past practices with respect to low income housing revealed not only that an
extremely small number of housing units were presently available for low income
persons, 6 but also that on at least one previous occasion the city council had
blocked a housing project similar to the farmworkers' present effort.57 The court
further concluded that the "ultimate effect" of the city action was highly discriminatory:
First, the confinement of low income housing construction to the segregated area of the city; second, a further reinforcement of segregation in the
city because minority citizens in disproportionate numbers live in low income
housing; and third, a frustration of efforts to construct housing which farmworkers can afford. 58
The Fifth Circuit's analysis is significant because it looks beyond the circumstances
of the specific action taken by the city and complained of by the plaintiffs, and
examines in broader terms past practices and attitudes of the community and
what the action means for the future development of the area.
In Arlington Heights, the Seventh Circuit examined the history of housing
patterns in Chicago and concluded that there had existed "a high degree of racial
residential segregation."5 9 Citing statistics showing that of 64,884 residents in
Arlington Heights, only 27 were black," the court concluded that Arlington
Heights was racially segregated, even though "no direct action attributable to
Arlington Heights"' 6 1 causing this result could be pointed to.
The ultimate effect of the refusal to rezone, said the court, was that no low
income housing would probably be built in Arlington Heights, thus denying
blacks an opportunity to live in the area. 62 The court found that there was no
other feasible site for the project in Arlington Heights,6' and that the Village had
no other plans ongoing or planned for the future which would aid in "easing the
problem of de facto segregated housing. ' 6' The court concluded that the refusal
to rezone to permit the project to be built had the effect of "perpetuating both
this residential segregation and Arlington Heights' failure to accept any responsibility for helping to solve this problem."6 5

55 Id. at 810.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 810-811.
59 517 F.2d at 413. See also Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. 501 F.2d 324, 334-35 (7th
Cir. 1974).
60 Id. at 413-14. The use of statistics in housing discrimination cases has been increasingly
relied on. See Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1263
(N.D. Ohio 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Bogen and
Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in FairHousing Cases, 34 Mi. L. REv. 59 (1974).
61 517 F.2d at 414.
62 Id.
63 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fairchild disputed the finding by the court that no other
site was available for the project. Noting that the district court found that some properly zoned
land was still available to the plaintiffs (373 F. Supp. at 211), Judge Fairchild declined to hold
this finding clearly erroneous. 517 F.2d at 461 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 414.
65 Id.
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In specifically pointing Out the lack of efforts on the part of the Village to
bring in low income residents, the Seventh Circuit went beyond other courts
applying the "historical context and ultimate effect" analysis. In Delray Beach
the Fifth Circuit had made a finding that on at least one other occasion the City
had acted to block construction of a low income housing project for racial reasons." No such finding was made in Arlington Heights by the Seventh Circuit.
Rather the court concluded that even though the Village had not taken positive
actions to keep out low income groups prior to this refusal to rezone, neither had
it acted affirmatively to bring them in. The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on one
of its own earlier decisions, Clark v. UniversalBuilders, Inc."' In Clark the court
had held it was a violation of § 1982 for a seller of new housing to take advantage
of a racially segregated housing market situation by demanding from black buyers
"prices and terms unreasonably in excess of prices and terms available to white
citizens for comparable housing." ' "The builder could not exploit the situation
even though he was in no way responsible for the discrimination that created
the problem." 69 Clark marked a break from the "traditional" view of racial discrimination which held liable only those direcly responsible for discrimination.
This "new" theory expressed in Clark holds liable parties who may not themselves
discriminate in the traditional sense,"0 but who "exploit" a situation created by
71
"social or economic forces tainted by racial discrimination."
In Arlington Heights the Seventh Circuit extended its holding in Clark and
held that a community not only cannot exploit or even ignore a racially discriminatory situation created by others, but must act affirmatively to end this situation. 2 Arlington Heights, stated the court, has been "exploiting" a situation
similar to the way the builders did in Clark. By refusing to rezone to permit low
income groups to reside in Arlington Heights, the Village rejected an opportunity
to reverse the trend of residential racial segregation. The court therefore held
that "under the facts of this case Arlington Heights rejection. . . has racially discriminatory effects." 7
Although never expressed before in such specific terms, other decisions have
spoken of an "affirmative duty" to act in a manner which will alleviate residential
segregation. It has been the opinion of several courts that the fair housing legis-

66 See note 53 supra.
67 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).

68 Id. at 334.
69 517 F.2d at 414.

70 In Clark it was shown that the defendant builders charged both blacks and whites the
same amount when either race attempted to purchase in a particular market. Thus the builders
maintained they were not guilty of any form of racial discrimination, but rather that their
pricing policies merely reflected the relative availability of housing in different areas of the city.

71 Comment, Curbed Exploitation in Segregated Housing Markets: Clark v. Universal
Builders, Inc., 84 HAgv. Civ. RI;GRTs-Or. LiB. L. REv. 705, 707 (1975). For complete analy-

ses of the controversial Clark decision, see Note, Housing and Section 1982: The Advisability of
Extending the Statutory Mandate Beyond Acts of TraditionalDiscrimination, 1975 Duxn L.J.
781; Comment4 Section 1982 Prohibits Exploitation of Racially Segregated Housing Market,
28 RUTGERs L. Ray. 1009 (1975).

72 517 F.2d 414-15.
73 Id. at 415.
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lation imposes an affirmative duty on federal74 and local7" housing authorities to
act to eliminate residential racial segregation. In Otero v. New York City Housing
Authority,"8 the court stated that the legislation requires housing authorities "not
merely to follow a policy of color blindness, but literally to act affirmatively to
achieve fair housing, that is not merely to desegregate, but to integrate housing."7
In SASSO v. Union City"8 the Ninth Circuit believed this affirmative duty to
integrate housing extends at least to a community's own residents:
Given the recognized importance of equal opportunities in housing, it may
well be, as a matter of law, that it is the responsibility of a city and its planning officials to see that the city's plan as initiated or as it develops accommodates the needs of its low income families, who usually-if not alwaysare members of minority groups.7 9

As mentioned, the court's language appears to extend only to a community's own
residents, and not to groups wishing to move in.
It should be no surprise that not all courts have felt comfortable imposing
an "affirmative action" program upon an entire community. In Acevedo v.
Nassau County,"0 plans for the construction of low income housing on an Air
Force base were abandoned by the county in favor of the construction of a federal
office building. In rejecting plaintiffs' demand that the housing plans be reinstituted, the court stated that:
Here appellants seek not to remove governmental obstacles to proposed
housing but rather to impose on appellees an affirmative duty to construct
housing. This is clearly not required by any provision of the Constitution.8 '

Although distinguishable from Arlington Heights, since Acevedo involved what
was essentially the county's own project, while Arlington Heights concerned a
refusal to permit an independent housing contractor to construct the project, the

principle of an affirmative duty to act in some manner to bring in minority groups
is the same in both cases. This presents a question as to the broadness of 'he
74

See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (1970).
Read together, the Housing Act of 1949 and Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968
show a progression in the thinking of Congress as to what factors significantly contributed to urban blight and what steps must be taken to reverse the trend or to
prevent the recurrence of such blight.... By 1964 he [the Secretary of HUD] was
directed, when considering whether a program of community development was workable, to look at the effects of local planning and to prevent discrimination in housing
resulting from such action. In 1968 he was directed to act affirmatively to achieve
fair housing. Whatever were the most significant features of a workable program
for community improvement in 1949, by 1964 such a program had to be nondiscriminatory in its effects, and by 1968 the Secretary had to affirmatively promote
fair housing.
Id. at 816.
75 See Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788
(5th Cir. 1972); Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
76 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
77 Id. at 943.
78 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
79 Id. at 295-96.
80 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974).
81 Id. at 1081.
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"affirmative duty." Did the Seventh Circuit intend for it to extend, as in Arlington Heights, only to the situation in which a community is presented with an
opportunity to permit low income housing to be built, or does it extend further,
as in Acevedo, to actually requiring a community to construct such housing?
Should the Seventh Circuit be upheld in Arlington Heights by the Supreme
Court, this distinction would offer a basis for limiting the holding.
It should be apparent that Arlington Heights is the most explicit statement
yet by any court of an affirmative duty to correct a racially discriminatory situation which may exist in a community. Not only does Arlington Heights extend
the "historical context and ultimate effect" standard beyond simply looking for
past discriminatory practices to examining whether the community had ever acted
affirmatively to correct de facto segregation, but further imposes this duty not
merely upon local housing authorities, but also upon the entire community
through its local elected zoning officials.
The finding by the Seventh Circuit that the Village's action had a racially
discriminatory effect led the court to the final step in its equal protection analysis.
Having such an effect, the action could be upheld only if a "compelling state
interest" 2 could be shown to have required the action. The Village argued that
at least two interests rose to the level of compelling state interest; the desire to
maintain the integrity of the zoning plan, and the desire to protect surrounding
property values. 8 In dismissing the first of these contentions the court noted that
changes in the zoning policy had previously been adopted by the Village,8" and
more importantly, that the project was to consist of townhouses very similar to
the neighboring single family residences.85 Thus the court found that the "planning rationale behind the buffer zone policy has only a minimal applicability to
this type of... development."86 As to the contention that property values would
be decreased as a result of the housing project, the court questioned whether a
purely monetary consideration could ever be a compelling state interest, 7 and
further stated that the property owners who may suffer a loss in the value of their
property due to the variance should not have expected that no changes would
ever be made in the zoning plan. 88
Since on only one occasion has the Supreme Court ever found a state interest
compelling enough to justify action having a discriminatory effect,89 it seems a
mere formality for the Seventh Circuit to even address the Village's claims. It
may be suggested, however, at least in the area of zoning policy, that as communities continue to grow and expand in rn-planned and often haphazard fashions,
pressure will grow for courts to look upon zoning ordinances which are truly for
82

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).

See also Bates v. Little Rock, 361

U.S. 516, 524 (1960), Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
83 517 F.2d at 415.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.

87 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633 (1969).
88 517 F.2d at 415.
89

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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legitimate purposes with more favor 0 Certainly a zoning policy which attempts
to order growth and preserve legitimate facets of a community should not immediately be declared suspect. As the Supreme Court stated in Village of Belle
Terre v. Borass:9
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor Vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to family
needs.... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench,
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the place a
sanctuary for people.92
This serves to point out the growing conflict between two social policies;
open housing programs and environmental concerns expressed through zoning
regulations. As communities adopt zoning ordinances designed to slow and order
growth in neighborhoods the result is often an increase in the cost of housing in
those neighborhoods, thus effectively shutting out lower income persons. 93 This
of course has been the background for numerous lawsuits, including cases previously discussed in this comment. Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hill?' involved
a challenge to the constitutionality of a large-lot zoning ordinance which, plaintiffs alleged, discriminated against low income and minority groups. The Ninth
Circuit rejected the contention that there was a racially discriminatory effect
and further declined to find wealth a suspect criterion. Thus the court held that
the town need only show that the ordinance bore a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest.9 5 The court concluded that on the facts "the
ordinance is rationally related to preserving the town's rural environment," 9 6 and
thus did not violate the fourteenth amendment.
Both Belle Terre and Ybarra provide examples of objectives courts have held
to be legitimate governmental interests: "the preservation of quiet family neighborhoods (Belle Terre) and the preservation of a rural environment (Los Altos
Hills) ."" Although it is unlikely these objectives will be viewed by courts in the
near future as state interests compelling enough to permit discriminatory actions
of a racial or ethnic nature, the recognition of such objectives as legitimate governmental goals at least suggests the increased importance aesthetic and environmental concerns are playing in judicial decision-making.
A further example of this growing importance was provided by the Ninth
Circuit in Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma.5 The city of Petaluma had instituted a plan designed to limit the growth
90 See Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250'(9th Cir. 1974).
91 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
92 Id. at 9.
93 For a discussion of this problem, see Note, Exclusionary Zoning: A Question of Balancing
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Environmental Concerns, 8 SUFFOLK L. Rxv. 1190 (1974).

94 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
95 Id. at 254.
96

Id.

97 Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897,
907-08 (9th Cir. 1975).
98

Id.
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of the city by placing a ceiling on the number of dwelling units to be constructed
in a single year, and by requiring a 200 foot "greenbelt" around the City which
would serve as a boundary for expansion. Although denying the plaintiffs' standing to present possibly their strongest argument,99 that of interference with the
right to travel, the court concluded that "the concept of the public welfare is
sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town character,
its open spaces and low density of population, and to grow at an orderly and
deliberate pace."'0 0
Although recognizing the possible rise in housing costs the Petaluma Plan
might result in, the court suggested that such a plan need not necessarily result
in the exclusion of low income persons. Indeed, noted the court, Petaluma's
plan was designed in such a manner as to possibly result in increased numbers of
low income persons moving into the area. Since the plan required housing
permits to be evenly distributed between single family and multiple family units,
and additionally required that 8 to 12 percent of the units be constructed for low
and moderate income persons (as contrasted with the pre-plan practice of issuing permits mainly for middle income groups), the court noted that the plan
could even be termed "inclusionary."''
Balancing the desires of a community to grow in an orderly fashion and yet
avoid excluding low cost housing in areas of job availability is one of the most
urgent problems facing metropolitan areas today. Although revitalizing the inner
city where minority members are heavily concentrated should be of great concern, minority groups cannot simply be told to stay where they are and wait for
downtown areas to be rebuilt and jobs to reappear. A chance to move outside
the inner city areas where opportunities appear greater and more immediate
must be provided. Although to speak of an "affirmative duty" on the part of
communities to bring in these minority groups seems an overstatement of what a
community's responsibility should be, care certainly must be taken to avoid
metropolitan areas with ". . . the racial shape of a donut, with the Negroes in
the hole and with mostly whites occupying the ring."' 0 2
Jon R. Robinson

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEx

DISCRIMINATION-CLASSIFICATION'BASED
SOLELY ON SEX VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION ABSENT A RATIONAL JusTmCATION ALTHOUGH IN CONTEXT OF TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT REGULATION
OF LIQUOR DISPENSING ESTABLISHMENTS

White v. Fleming
Section 90-25 of the Milwaukee Code of Ordinances prohibits female employees, except members of the immediate family or household of the licensee, of
Class "B" taverns from standing or sitting at or behind the bar or from sitting
99 Id. at 904-05.
100 Id. at 908-09.
101 Id. at 908, n.16.
102

Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (ND.

Ohio 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974).
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with any male patron anywhere on the premises.' Following her arrest by the
Milwaukee Police Department for violation of § 90-25, Dorothy Ann White
brought suit in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin,
against the Milwaukee Police Department, the Milwaukee City Attorney, and
the state judge before whom her prosecution was pending, alleging that the gender
classification contained in the ordinance rendered it invalid on its face as a violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.2 Although the
charge against Mrs. White was subsequently dismissed on the testimony of the
arresting officer, the district court retained jurisdiction over the claim for injunctive and declaratory relief, denying defendants' motion for summary judgment
based on mootness.5 Ruling on the merits, the court then granted summary judgment in favor of Mrs. White,4 declaring the ordinance in question unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement against her.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Tone, Circuit Judge, affirmed
the district court's holding that the Milwaukee ordinance violated the equal
protection clause since its classification was based solely upon sex. 5
While the result in White v. Fleming was dictated by the Constitution's
equal protection clause, the decision represents a victory over a historical acquiescence to legislation and governmental action which has denied the women of
the United States the equal protection of the laws. The case must be considered
in light of the judiciary's traditional acceptance of sex-based classifications, an
acceptance resulting from its protective attitude toward women in general and
its particularly paternal approach when ruling upon discriminatory regulations
affecting women in the context of liquor dispensing establishments, the twentyfirst amendment providing the justification. White v.Fleming will therefore be
examined first in its historical setting. Inquiry into the appropriate constitutional
standard applicable to sex-based classifications and the Seventh Circuit's approach
to this problem will then be made.
Historical Acquiescence to Sex-based Classifications
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, adopted in
1868, provides that no State "shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States... nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' Five years later,
1

90-25. FEMALE EMPLOYEES BEHIND BARS. Any female entertainer, waitress,
or female employee of any Class "B" intoxicating liquor licensed premises who shall
at any time stand or sit at or behind the bar, except for the specific purpose of receiving food or drink orders for delivery to patrons who are not at the bar, or any female
entertainer, waitress, or female employee who shall sit at any table or in any booth
or elsewhere on the premises with any male patron, shall be punished by a fine not
to exceed twenty-five dollars, or in default of payment thereof be committed to the
county jail or house of correction of Milwaukee county for not to exceed sixty days or
until such fine and costs shall be paid....
The provisions of this section shall not
apply to female employees who are members of the immediate family and household
of the licensee.
White v. Fleming, 344 F. Supp. 295, 296 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
2 White v. Fleming, 344 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Wisc. 1972).
3 Id.
4 A motion to dismiss as to the Milwaukee Police Department was also granted.
5 White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975).
6 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
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however, the celebrated opinion of Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. State7 reflected
an attitude toward women which for many years effectively denied them the
status of "persons" for purposes of fourteenth amendment protections.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to
say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband.
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.8
While this outspoken paternalism is no longer popular, the sexual discrimination resulting therefrom persists. Indeed, until 197110 the Supreme Court
had never held that discrimination against women violated the equal protection
clause. 1 In a 1973 opinion joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall,
Justice Brennan noted the pervasive nature of sexual discrimination throughout
the history of the United States:
As a result of notions such as these [e.g., "romantic paternalism"], our
statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotypical distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could
hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married
women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children. And although
blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even
that right...
until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century
12
later.
A popular rationale for approval of sex discrimination developed in the
context of liquor dispensing establishments," courts relying on the twenty-first
7 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 130 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 141.
9 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1972) [footnotes omitted]:
It is true, of course, that the position of women in America has improved markedly
in recent decades. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of
the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at
times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market
and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.
10 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
11 W. LOCKHART, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1308 (1975).
12 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
13 The Court has not limited its approval of sex discrimination to situations involving
liquor dispensing establishments. As recently as 1961, the Supreme Court condoned unequal
treatment based on sex when it sustained a law which placed women on jury lists only if they
made special requests, noting that women were "still regarded as the center of home and
family life." Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). Hoyt has been effectively overruled, however, by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), which held that a similar statute deprived
the defendant of the right to a fair and impartial jury. While the decision was not based on
equal protection grounds, the Court noted that "[Ilt is untenable to suggest these days that it
would be a special hardship for each and every woman to perform jury service or that society
cannot spare any women from their present duties." 419 U.S. at 534-35.
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amendment to support the validity of statutes which afforded unequal treatment
to women. 4 In 1948, the constitutionality of a Michigan statute which required
bartenders to be licensed in cities having populations of 50,000 or more, but
which prohibited females from being so licensed unless "the wife or daughter of
the male owner" of a licensed liquor establishment was upheld. 5 In the majority
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, the power of a state to treat men and
women differently was accepted without question, particularly in matters involving liquor traffic regulation, an area to which fourteenth amendment protections
were not believed to extend:
The Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots, and the
regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of
legislative powers. Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from
working behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and
legal position of women. The fact that women may now indulge in vices
that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a
sharp line between the sexes, certainly, in such matters as the regulation of
the liquor traffic.... The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect
sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires
them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards.' 6
Yet, while recognizing that the Milwaukee ordinance challenged in White v.
Fleming also involved a liquor dispensing establishment," the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals further recognized that society's recently changed attitude
toward women has been reflected in both court decisions"3 and Congressional
action. 9
While the Supreme Court has not yet overruled Goesaert v. Cleary, the
judicial and social climate has changed since that case was decided ...
Thus, while we would not be free to disregard Goesaert in a case from which
it was indistinguishable, . . . neither do we feel bound to extend its holding
20
in light of the developments of recent years in the law of equal protection.

See White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 1975):
State courts and lower federal courts before and after Goesaert u. Cleary sustained
without much critical examination and usually based upon the traditional sex-role of
women (see Women's Liberation Union of Rhode Island v. Israel, 379 F. Supp. 44,
50-51 (D.R.I. 1974)), statutes which forbade the sale of liquor to women, the employment of women, and even the presence of women in liquor dispensing establishments.
15 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
16 Id. at 465-66.
17 Indeed, in 1963, the same Milwaukee ordinance was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. City of Milwaukee v. Piscuine, 18 Wis. 2d 599, 119 N.W.2d 442 (1963).
18 Two recent district court decisions holding state regulation of the conduct of women
in liquor establishments invalid were cited as examples: Daugherty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp.
338, 340-41 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (three-judge court); Women's Liberation Union of Rhode Island
v. Israel, 379 F. Supp. 44 (D.R.I. 1974).
19 The court cited as examples the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1970),
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e et seq. (1970), omitting
reference to the Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. REs. No. 208, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972),
because it has not yet been ratified. 522 F.2d at 732.
20 522 F.2d at 732-33.
14
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Acknowledging that the Supreme Court in California v. LaRue" had reaffirmed the state's broad power under the twenty-first amendment to regulate
traffic in liquor, Judge Tone pointed out that LaRue had not held that all other
constitutional provisions were thereby superseded in that area. 2 Indeed, Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in LaRue -specifically addressed this issue:
This is not to say that the Twenty-first Amendment empowers a State to
act with total irrationality or invidious discrimination in controlling the distribution and dispensation of'liquor within its borders. And it most assuredly
is not to say that the Twenty-first Amendment necessarily overrides in its
allotted area any other relevant provision of the Constitution.23
Thus, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon LaRue in noting
that while the Milwaukee ordinance under review involved liquor dispensing
establishments, this was only one circumstance entitled to weight in determining
the constitutional validity of the ordinance: "It is still necessary to consider and
apply the appropriate equal protection test ....,,21

The Appropriate Standard of Review: Rational Basis, Strict
Scrutiny, or an Intermediate Test?
The "appropriate equal protection test" to be applied in a situation involving gender classification, however, is problematic. The Supreme Court has
traditionally made use of two separate standards for determining 'the constitutionality of a state's actions -under the equal protection clause. The older stan2 5 requires that
dard, expounded in McGowan v. Maryland,
a rational relationship exist between the state's legitimate objective and the classification used to
attain such objective.
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.26
-

Thus, development of the "rational basis" standard was largely a result of
the Court's belief that substantial deference should be given to legislative judgment even in those areas in which fourteenth amendment protections were at
stake. The burden was placed on the "one who assails the classification" to show
that it was essentially arbitrary, with no rational relationship, to any legitimate
21 409 U.S. 109 (1972). The Court upheld a regulation prohibiting explicit sexual entertainment in bars.
22

522 F.2d at 733.

23 409 U.S. at 120.

24 522 F.2d at 733.
25 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

26 Id. at 425-26.
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governmental purpose, whether or not articulated." If a permissible purpose
could be hypothesized, and if the classifications drawn bore some rational relation to such purpose, the statute in question would survive attack under the equal
protection clause.
Alternatively, the Court has applied a "strict scrutiny" test whenever an
alleged discrimination interferes with the exercise of "fundamental rights,"2 or
in situations in which the government has employed a "suspect classification,"
that is, a classification based upon a person's status resulting from accident of
birth." Application of the strict scrutiny test requires the state to show a compelling interest to justify its use of the inherently suspect classification.30 The
classification must be necessary and not merely reasonably related to the accomplishment of the statute's purpose, a purpose which must be so compelling as to
outweigh the constitutionally protected rights thereby impinged."'
Classifications which have been recognized as inherently suspect by the Supreme Court include those based on race, " alienage, 3 and national origin.3 '
Although a person's gender is also an accident of birth and is equally immutable as the aforementioned characteristics, the Court has been reluctant to categorize gender classifications as suspect. In view of the Court's long-held aversion
to recognizing sex discrimination as violative of equal protection under any
standard, 5 such reluctance is not surprising. It has, however, caused considerable
confusion in the lower courts when issues involving gender classifications arise.36
Until 1971, the lower courts could safely have held such classifications valid,
since there was no Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. In 1971, in Reed
v. Reed,"' the Court held invalid an Idaho statute which gave preference to male
applicants over female applicants for appointment as administrators of decedents'
estates. Discarding the contention that the statute was a reasonable measure
aimed at reducing the workload of probate courts by eliminating one class of contests-those resulting when persons of equal qualification but of different sex
applied for the appointment-and implicitly rejecting the rationale that "men
[are] as a rule more conversant with business affairs than women," the Court
held that administrative convenience, even though a legitimate interest, did not
justify discrimination between the sexes.3 8 The Court thereby reversed the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding and departed from the ten-year-old McGowan formulation that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
27 Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
28 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
29 See notes 32-34.
30 See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Kramer v. Union School District, 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
31 Id.
32 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964): Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
33 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
34 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
35 See text accompanying notes 7-15 supra.
36 See text accompanying notes 48-52 infrta.
37 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
38 1Td.
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reasonably may be conceived to justify it."39 The Reed Court recognized that the
Idaho statute "provides that different treatment be accorded to the applicants on
the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause."4 So, while the Court acknowledged that the statute
"established a classification subject to scrutiny," it did not characterize the classification as "suspect" or the scrutiny as "strict." The Court did not say that strict
scrutiny was an inappropriate test to apply to sex-based classifications, but neither
did it approve such a standard. Moreover, since the more lenient rational basis
test, as modified, was not even satisfied, the Idaho statute's validity under the
strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test was never addressed. It was the
Court's determination that unless a statute's objective, in that case administrative
convenience, was advanced in accordance with the command of the equal protection clause, the relationship between the legitimate objective and the statutory
classification could not be considered "rational."
The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to
States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons
placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." Royster Guano Co. v. Vir'1

ginia. [253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)

.]4

The Court's use of a standard more stringent than the traditional rational
basis test when reviewing a sex-based classification laid the foundation for the
second major Supreme Court decision involving sex discrimination, Frontiero v.
Richardson.42 The Court there considered a statute which allowed a serviceman
to claim his wife as a "dependent" for purposes of increased housing, medical and
dental benefits whether or not she was in fact dependent on him for support,
while a servicewoman could not claim her husband as a dependent unless he was
in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support. The statute was
held unconstitutional, a plurality43 of the Court agreeing that classifications based
upon sex were inherently suspect and required application of the strict scrutiny
test.
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by accident of birth, the imposition of special
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would
seem to violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility .... ",44
According to the plurality, the Court's unanimous decision in Reed v. Reed
lent implicit support to its decision, the plurality's reasoning apparently progress39

366 U.S. at 425-26.

41
42

Id. at 75-76.
411 U.S. 677 (1973).

40 404 U.S. at 75.
43
44

Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall.
411 U.S. at 686-87.
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ing in the following manner: Because the Court in Reed recognized a legitimate
legislative purpose and because the classification utilized would rationally promote
such purpose, the Court must have been applying something other than the rational basis test as traditionally espoused; until Reed, the only other standard
by which to measure statutes for equal protection purposes had been the strict
scrutiny test. Moreover, the plurality's reasoning continued, an intermediate
approach had not explicitly been adopted in Reed. If, then, a strict scrutiny
standard had not been expressly sanctioned in Reed, neither had it been rejected,
leaving open the possibility of its application in an appropriate case.
While the concurring justices agreed with the plurality that the result in
Frontierowas controlled by Reed, they did not agree that Reed had, implicitly or
otherwise, categorized sex as a suspect criterion. Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, noted that because the Equal Rights
Amendment, if adopted, would "resolve the substance of this precise question,"4 "
the Court should defer to the state legislatures for resolution of the issue. 7 Thus,
Justice Powell would apparently prefer to continue, at least for the several years
necessary to determine the success or failure of the Equal Rights Amendment,
this country's checkered history of sexual discrimination. To categorize a constitutional right as a "political" issue to be deferred to the legislature is at best an
anomalous approach.
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Reed and Frontiero, a number
of lower courts began to apply an intermediate standard in sex discrimination
cases. The "fair and substantial relation" language of Reed, coupled with the
willingness of four members of the Court to consider gender classifications "inherently suspect," seemed to support a less deferential approach. The Fourth
Circuit, for example, postulated that "[a] classification based upon sex is less
than suspect; a validating relationship must be more than minimal."4 9 Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit viewed Reed and Frontiero as employing "an alternative to
both strict and minimal scrutiny.""0
The Court there indicated that sex classifications are to be tested on the
basis of strict rationality, a standard of review requiring the government
(state or federal) to produce evidence that the challenged classification furthers the central purpose of the classifier. 51
Accordingly, the Second Circuit, ruling on a mandatory maternity leave require45 Justice Powell's concurring opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment in a separate opinion.

46 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).

47 Id.
48 After Reed and before Frontiero, the First Circuit upheld a statute which imposed
different prison sentences for men than for women, but noted that "the state must do more
than allow a court to speculate and must in fact demonstrate a substantial relation to a legitimate state objective." Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.4 (Ist Cir. 1972).
49 Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1973) (South Carolina senate
resolution permitting females to be employed as clerical assistants but not as pages held unconstitutional).
50 Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1974)
(use of higher admission standards for female than for male applicants to Lowell High School
held violative of equal protection).
51 Id.
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ment, noted that "the Court's definition of what constitutes the necessary rational
relationship between a classification and a legitimate governmental interest seems
to have become slightly, but perceptibly, more rigorous .... ""
A majority of the Supreme Court has not, however, explicitly supported an
intermediate standard. Yet its use of the rational relationship test has not always
led to reasonable results. In Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur 3 the
Court found no rational relationship between the valid state interest of preserving
the continuity of education and the mandatory maternity leave policies of the
public schools. The Court subsequently held, however, that California's disability
insurance program which exempted work loss resulting from pregnancy was not
violative of equal. protection. 4 Exempting coverage for pregnancy was thought
to be a rational means of maintaining the solvency of the disability fund at a one
percent level of contribution. The dissenters noted the invidious nature of the
discrimination so practiced:
[B]y singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability
peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard for disability
compensation: a limitation is imposed upon the disabilities for which women
workers may recover, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities
their sex, such as prossuffered, including those that affect only or primarily
tatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia and gout.55
Comparing Geduldig with Reed, one finds a legitimate government interest
in both situations as well as an effective method of promoting such interest. In
Reed, the method employed, although effective, was held irrational because it
was inconsistent with the equal protection clause, while in Geduldig, California's
legitimate interest apparently outweighed the obvious fact that the method employed was discriminatory against one sex. Perhaps the Court is engaged in an
unarticulated balancing test by which it characterizes the government action as
"rational" when the interest it promotes outweighs the resulting harm, and "irrational" when the discrimination suffered is so invidious that the action causing
it is considered insubstantial by comparison. While such a "sliding scale" approach may be the most viable escape from the present judicial quandary, the
wisdom of the Court's determination in Geduldig, that the state's interest outweighed that of the persons denied insurance benefits solely on the basis of their
sex, is questionable. Surely a less objectionable alternative method of controlling
the cost of California's disability insurance program could have been devised. 6
In the face of the relative state of confusion in this area of the law, the
Seventh Circuit in White v. Fleming noted that
52

53
54
55
56

Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973).

414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Marshall, J.J.).
The Court's most recent decisions dealing with gender classifications reveal a willingness

to find such classifications unconstitutional when rationalized by generalizations of the typical
or stereotypical roles of either sex in our society. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) (struck down Soc. Sec. Act § 402(g), which allowed payment of benefits to the wife,
but not to the husband, of a deceased wage earner with minor children); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, (1975) ("nothing rational" in Utah law which extended period of minority for
males to age 21, but for females only to age 18, for purposes of child support).
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whatever formulation the Court may ultimately adopt, it can at least be
divined .
that we may not accept a classification based solely on sex without further inquiry as to whether the differences between men and women
rationally justify the classification. 57
The interest sought to be promoted by the statute being the "protection of employees, customers and society generally against promiscuous sexual activity that
is thought likely to follow from contacts between men and women where liquor
is sold by the drink,"5 " the gender classification could be justified as promoting
such interest only if it were shown that a female employee would be more likely
than a male employee to engage in promiscuous sexual activity with persons of
the opposite sex. The court found no support for such broad assumptions about
all or most women who work in bars or "the relative proclivities of men and
women who work in, or are patrons of, bars."' 9 The court concluded that "it is
impermissible under the equal protection clause to classify on the basis of stereotyped assumptions concerning propensities thought to exist in some members of a
given sex."" 0
Pointing out that the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether sex is an
inherently suspect classification, the Seventh Circuit declined to make such a
determination. It did, however, feel justified in applying an intermediate test:
the result in this case certainly would have been different had the original rational
basis test been used. Moreover, other courts have found similar classifications to
bear a "fair and substantial relationship" to the state's interest.6 " The Seventh
Circuit commendably held otherwise, notwithstanding the inadequate guidance
provided by the Supreme Court.
It is unfortunate, however, that the court did not elaborate on its final
passage:
There are anatomical and physiological differences between the sexes that
may justify classification for certain purposes. But these differences
62 hardly
include a greater or lesser propensity for a given kind of conduct.
While this may be a valid statement, its validity cannot satisfactorily be analyzed
without an explanation of which "anatomical and physiological differences" and
which "purposes" the court may have had in mind. Indeed, according to th
dissent in Geduldig, "dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of
physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex
discrimination." 6 The statement in White that there may be differences between
57 522 F.2d at 736.
58 Id. at 736-37.
59 Id. at 737.
60 Id.
61 See Occhina v. Ill. Liquor Control Comm., 28 11. App. 3d 967, 329 N.E.2d 353, 355
(1975), in which a statute and local ordinance permitting revocation of liquor licenses for the
solicitation of beverages by female employees was upheld:
A classification based upon sex will suffice as a basis for legislation if that classification
is based upon a rational difference of situation or condition found to exist in the
persons or objects upon which the classification rests.
62 522 F.2d at 737 (emphasis added).

63

417 U.S. at 501.
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the sexes which justify sex-based classifications is restricted only by the subsequent
sentence asserting that propensity for a given conduct is not one of the justifying
differences. A lower court less rational than the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
could conceivably rely on this final passage in White v. Fleming in upholding
government action resulting in invidious sex discrimination.
Leslie L. Clune
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MmNuM

DuE PROCESS

REQunES A

STATE-

MENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF PAROLE

United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff
The Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff' joined the
ranks of an increasing number of courts which impose minimum due process requirements upon parole release proceedings.2 In Richerson the court concluded

that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment s requires, at a minimum,
a written statement of reasons for denial of parole.' The Richerson court also
examined the sufficiency of the statement of reasons given to the petitioner for
denial of his application for parole, and concluded that the minimum due process
standard was satisfied.5
The application of due process protections to parole hearings is a relatively
recent development. Until recently, the courts endorsed a "hands off" approach

to all types of parole proceedings.' Several policy reasons were consistently advanced in support of the judiciary's refusal to review parole procedures. First,
it was contended that the complexity of factors entering into the parole decisional
process required the courts to totally defer to the expertise of parole boards. The
courts feared that judicial review would unduly inhibit the parole board's necessary exercise of its unfettered discretion." Secondly, the courts characterized
1 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975).
2 See, e.g., Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974); Franklin v. Shields,
399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Stassi v. Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Soloway v. Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D.
Minn. 1974); Craft v. Attorney General of the United States, 379 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa.
1974); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C.), modified 511
F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Candarini v. Attorney General of the United States, 369 F.
Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole,
363 F. Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.) vacated as moot, 419 U.S.
1015 (1974); Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973); In re Sturm, 11 Cal.3d
258, 52 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974); Beckworth v. New Jersey St. Parole Bd., 62 N.J.
348, 301 A.2d 727 (1973); Monks v. New Jersey St. Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193
(1971).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 525 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1975).
5 Id. at 805.
6 Comment, The Necessity for Written Reasons For Parole Denial: Two Approaches, 44
U. CIN. L. REv. 115, 116 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Written Reasons]. See, e.g., Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Menechino v. Oswald, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1023 (1971). The "hands off" approach is also discussed in Comment, Parole
Release- Federal Circuit Courts Conflict On Applicability of Due Process & Administrative
Procedure Act to Parole Release Decisions, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1257-58 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Parole Release- Conflict], and Note, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L. J. 810, 815 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Parole and Sentencing].
7 Parole and Sentencing, supra note 8, at 815-21.
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parole as a "privilege" or "act of legislative grace." Judicial refusal to review
parole decisions was grounded on the belief that the parole board could grant or
withhold the privilege of parole at will.8
The availability of judicial review in parole matters was initiated by the
Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer There, the Court held that minimum
due process requirements apply to parole revocation hearings.10 The Court noted
that the right/privilege distinction is no longer viable as a method of analysis in
the area of constitutional protections." The proper test for determining whether
due process applies is the extent to which an individual will suffer "grievous loss"
as a result of governmental action. 2 The Court concluded that since revocation
of parole inflicts a grievous loss terminating a parolee's continued liberty,
minimal due process protections are applicable.' The Court acknowledged that
the full panoply of procedural rights are not constitutionally required because
revocation of parole is not part. of a criminal prosecution.' 4 However, the Court
employed a more flexible concept of due process which allows balancing of an
individual's interests against the government's interests in determining the proIn a parole
cedural protections that are required in a particular situation.'
revocation hearing, the Court balanced a parolee's interest in his continued
liberty against the government's interest in returning the individual to prison
without the burden of a new adversary trial if in fact he has violated the conditions of his parole. 6
Although the Morrissey decision brought the general area of parole within
the ambit of judicial review, the applicability of due process requirements to
parole release procedures remained undetermined; the Morrissey holding extended
due process protections only to parole revocation hearings. Initially, the applicability of the Morrissey due process requirements was narrowly limited to parole
revocation hearings by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Scarpa v. United
States Board of Parole.'" The Scarpa court held that due process requirements
8 See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 '(1965); Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d
995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Wiley v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 380 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Godoy v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 345 F. Supp. 1292, 1295 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Simon v. United States, 269
F. Supp. 738 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 397 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1968); Berry v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 266 F. Supp. 667, 668 (M.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp.
184, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). A more detailed discussion of theories is found at Comment, The
Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. Rvy. 284, 286-97 (1971).
9 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
10 Id. at 481.
11 Id. A full discussion of the demise of the right/privilege doctrine is found in Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. Rv.
1439 (1968).
12 408 U.S. at 481.
13 Id. at 482.
14 Id. at 480. The term "panoply" of procedural rights is a term of art which was first
coined by the Supreme Court in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). It connotes the
traditional array of trial-type procedural protections associated with criminal prosecutions.
15 Id. at 481.
16 Id. at 482-83.
17 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated for mootness, 414
U.S. 809 (1973). The Scarpa court's decision was based primarily upon the rationale of an
earlier pre-Morrissey case, Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), in which the
Second Circuit rejected the applicability of due process to parole release proceedings on two
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do not apply to parole release proceedings. The court in Scarpa applied the
"grievous loss" test of Morrissey and concluded that the denial of parole works no
deprivation upon the prisoner since it simply continues the sentence originally
imposed."' The Scarpa decision rejected the application of due process requirements to parole release proceedings on two additional grounds. First, the court
observed that denial of parole results in the loss of only the possibility of conditional freedom. The court contrasted this with parole revocation which results
in the loss of the right to conditional freedom. Therefore, the court concluded
that there was no "liberty" or "property" right to which due process rights could
attach. 9 Secondly, the court found that the granting of parole is not an adversary proceeding; consequently, due process rights do not apply.2"
The Seventh Circuit refused to follow the Scarpa decision, finding an alternate basis to infuse procedural protections into parole release hearings. In King
v. United States,2 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act22 (APA) were applicable to the
United States Board of Parole proceedings for the granting or denial of parole.23
Under § 555(e)24 of the APA, the Board was required to furnish a brief statement of the grounds for denial of parole." Although the King court succeeded
in circumventing Scarpa, and in bringing minimum procedural protections to
parole release hearings, its effectiveness was, limited. Since the APA is a federal
statute, the brief statement requirement adopted by King is applicable only to
federal parole boards, leaving the vast number of state parole proceedings without procedural protection requirements." Another shortcoming of the King
approach is that the precise nature of the "brief statement" requirement of §
grounds: (1) that parole release hearings are nonadversary, and (2) that the prisoner has no
presently enjoyed right to which due process can attach. However, the Scarpt court's adher-

ence to Menechino and narrow interpretation of the Morrissey decision were not followed by
subsequent courts, and Scarpa came to represent a minority view.
18 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1973).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 282-83.
21 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
22 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1970).
23 The King decision was the first to disregard the long-standing holding of Hyser v. Reed,
in which the court, held that the APA was not applicable to parole boards because of their
unique functions. 318 F.2d 225 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 '(1963). As the Richerson opinion notes, a number of courts followed the King decisions: Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d
396, 397 (9th Cir. 1974); See also, Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1286
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (Levanthal, J., concurring); Beard v. Johnson, 391 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Ill.
1975); Mitchell v. Sigler, 389 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Reed v. United States, 388
F. Supp. 725 (D. Kan. 1975); Snyder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 1153 (D.
Colo. 1974).
In Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the United States Board of Parole is an
agency" within the meaning of the APA. The court held that the board is subject to the
APA requirement that its informal rulemaking be accompanied by advance notice to the public
and opportunity for comment by interested, persons. In compliance with the court's holding,
the United States Board of Parole followed the notice and comment procedures of § 553(c)
of the APA, and were adopted in their final form at 40 Fed. Reg. 41332 (1975).
24 U.S.C.A. § 555(e) (1967) (presently codified as 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970)).
25 492 F.2d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1974).
26 The Richardson court noted this limitation at 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975). The
preferability of a due process approach over an APA' approach because of this limitation on
King is discussed in Parole Release-Conflict, supra note 6, at 1273-74.
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555(e) of the APA is unclear.2 The King court did not clarify the requirement
except for its reference to the recommendation of the Administrative Conference
of the United States that
there should be "at least a sentence or two of par28
ticularized explanation.1
Although the King decision was based upon the APA, the court's dictum provides the framework for the Richerson decision. The King court stated that "....
a substantial argument can be made that some modicum of due process should
attend the denial of the expectation of conditional freedom on parole inasmuch
as its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' of a 'valuable liberty.' . . ."2 Finally,
in United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff,"0 the Seventh Circuit squarely faced
the issue and held that minimum due process requirements in the form of supplying reasons for a denial of parole attended the Parole Board's release hearings.
The Richerson Court's Analysis: Minimum Due Process Is
Applicable to Parole Release Proceedings
In the Richerson case, the petitioner had been sentenced to a term of six to
twelve years for three counts of attempted murder and one count of aggravated
assault."' Approximately twenty-eight months later, the Illinois Parole and
Pardon Board denied the petitioner's application for parole. 2 In accordance
with Illinois Code of Corrections § 1003-3-5(f), s8 the Board gave the following
written statement of the reasons for the denial:
It is the opinion of the Board that an early parole on this offense where
police officers were wounded while doing their duty, would deprecate the
seriousness of such an offense and would not deter others from committing
such crimes. The Board recognizes your excellent institutional adjustment
and well conceived parole plans and recommends that you continue in your
excellent adjustment in the institution. 4

The petitioner on a writ of habeas corpus contended that the statement of reasons
for denial of his application for parole was "vague and uninformative," and did
27 Comment, Applying the Administrative Procedure Act to Federal Parole Decision
Making, 6 ST. MARY'S L. J. 478, 489 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Federal Parole Decision
Making]. Another major criticism of the use of the APA is that the APA could deprive the
Parole Board of its desirable administrative flexibility in decision making, and that other
requirements of the APA such as the right to counsel in all agency hearings, or a right to public
examination of all Board files, could unduly burden the Parole Board's administrative system.
Parole Release-Conflict, supra note 6, at 1271-73. The King approach has also been criticized
because the "brief statement" requirement of the APA may be satisfied by such a short and
general statement that without further elaboration could result in an ineffectual and summary
hearing. Furthermore, since § 555(e) does not even require a "brief statement" when the
denial is "self-explanatory," it is possible that most parole decisions could be characterized as
such, and no reasons at all for denial would be required under the APA. Written Reasons, supra
note 6, at 122-23.
28 492 F.2d 1337, 1340 (7th Cir. 1974). The full text of the recommendations of the
Administrative Conference of the United States in the area of parole denial is found at 25
ADMIN. L. REV. 459 (1973).
29 492 F.2d 1337, 1343 (7th Cir. 1974).
30 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975).
31 Id. at 798.
32 Id. at 800.
33 ILL. REv. STATS. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(f) (Smith-Hurd 1973).
34 525 F. 2d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 1975).
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not satisfy requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
The Richerson decision initially resolved two major issues: Whether minimum due process requirements are applicable to parole release proceedings; and
if the due process clause applies, then what procedural protections are required.
The court affirmatively resolved the first issue, holding due process protections
applicable to the parole release hearings in question. 6 Since the case involved a
state board of parole, the court was unable to rely directly upon the King rationale, although the court did cite King's supporting dicta." Instead, the Seventh
Circuit found support for its position in two leading cases: United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole,"' and Childs v. United
59
States Board of Parole.
The Richerson court merely relied upon the holdings in these cases that due
process is applicable to parole release hearings, but did not elaborate upon the
rationales of those decisions.40 Yet the reasoning which underlies Johnson and
Childs and is implicitly adopted by the Richerson court is significant because it
refutes one of the central propositions relied upon by the Scarpa' court. Both
Johnson and Childs rejected the contention of the Scarpa court that a prisoner
has no liberty or property interest to protect in a parole release hearing. The district court in Childs agreed with the Scarpa court's contention that the Morrissey
decision concerning parole revocation hearings presents a different situation:
there is a difference between one's justifiable reliance in maintaining freedom on
parole so long as the parolee does not violate its terms and the mere anticipation
of parole status." 2 However the Childs court asserted that:
When we examine the nature of the interest of the parolee facing revocation
and that of the parole applicant in light of the Parole Board's determination,
it appears obvious that the difference is not enough to exclude the applicant
from due process protections. This 4is3 simply because the stakes are the same,
incarceration or conditional liberty.

Both the Johnson and the Childs courts disagreed with the Scarpa court's
assertion that a prisoner suffers no "grievous loss," as defined in Morrissey, when
parole is denied."' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, affirming
35
36
37
38

Id. at 797.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 799.
363 F. Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419

U.S. 1015 (1974).

39 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C.), modified, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
40 525 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1975).
41 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1972); rev'd, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
42 371 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (D.D.C. 1974).
43 Id. (emphasis added). In the Second Circuit's opinion in Johnson the court similarly
rejects the contention that a prisoner does not have an interest protected by due process. The
Johnson court remarked that it viewed this contention as having been superseded by the
Supreme Court's rejection of similar reasoning in its recent decision in Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Johnson court added that the fact that parole involves only a
possi'bility of conditional liberty it does not preclude due process application because . . . the
average prisoner, having better than 50% chance of being granted parole before the expiration of his maximum sentence, has a substantial 'interest' in the outcome." United States ex rel.
Johnson v. New York St. Bd.of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1974).
44 Childs v. United Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974).
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in part the district court's decision in Childs, observed:
The Board holds the key to the lock of the prison. It possesses the power to
grant or deny conditional liberty.... The result of the Board's exercise of
discretion is that an applicant either suffers "grievous loss" or gains a substantial liberty.45
Thus the Richerson court, in implicitly affirming the reasoning of Johnson and
Childs, effectively refutes the central contentions of the Scarpa decision.
The Richerson court also explicitly rejects the Scarpa court's reasoning by
citing from the Childs court of appeal's opinion. The Richerson court specifically
recognized the existence of prisoners' substantial rights in parole release hearings
which are protected by the due process clause. The Richerson court quoted from
the Childs opinion and affirmed the right of a prisoner to equal treatment with
all other prisoners in determinations of parole, and to protections from arbitrary
or capricious parole decisions by the Board.4
The district court in Johnson asserted further that a prisoner's conditional
right to parole becomes a legally cognizable right when there is a "manifest cor'
respondence between the prisoner's situation and the parole statute."47
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Richerson, in its implicit as well as
explicit reliance upon Johnson and Childs, clearly rejected Scarpa by holding
that minimum due process protections attach to these substantial rights of prisoners in parole release proceedings.
The Richerson court found further support for its position in a recent Supreme Court decision, Wolff v. McDonnell.4 In Wolff, the Court held minimum due process requirements applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings in
which charges of serious misconduct resulted in a forfeiture of prisoners' goodtime credits. The Wolff Court rejected the proposition that prisoners in state
institutions are wholly without protection of the Constitution.
But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the
institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisoners of this country. 49
Although the Wolff decision applied due process in the context of prison
disciplinary proceedings, the Richerson court found much of the Court's language
applicable by analogy to parole release hearings." The Wolff Court acknowledged a quantitative and qualitative difference between the Morrissey situation,
45 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
46 525 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1975). The Richerson court cited the following excerpt
from the Childs circuit court opinion:
Just as the [Supreme] Court found in Wolff that the State, having created the
valuable right to good time, must act according to constitutional safeguards when it
withdraws the right, so here, where the federal government has made parole an
integral part of the penological system, I believe it is also essential that authority to
deny parole not be arbitrarily exercised.
511 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
47 363 F. Supp. 416, 417-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
48 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
49 Id. at 555-56.
50 525 F.2d 797. 799-800 (7th Cir. 1975).
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parole revocation, and disciplinary procedures. 5 However, the Supreme Court
determined that a prisoner is entitled to protection against arbitrary action in
withholding good-time credits, and due process is necessary to provide such protection.52 The Richerson court's reliance upon this language from Wolff is well
founded since protection against arbitrary governmental action is equally applicable in the parole release context.5" Certainly the necessitr of protections against
arbitrariness is actually more important in a parole release situation such as
Richerson, where the denial of parole has an immediate and direct impact upon
the prisoner. In a disciplinary situation such as Wolff, the prison authority's
action results in the possible future postponement of release on parole. While
denial of release on parole immediately results in the prisoner serving a longer
term in prison, forfeiture of good-time credits does not necessarily lengthen the
amount of time served. Thus, arguments in favor of procedural protections required in Wolff are substantially more compelling in a parole release context.
The Richerson court's reliance upon the Wolff decision is also analytically
consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Morrissey;" there the Court
premised its application of due process protections on the belief that the whole
process of parole is critically important since "the practice of releasing prisoners
on parole before the end of their sentence has become an integral part of the
penological system. '"
Required ProceduralProtections: A Written Statement of Reasons
The Richerson court, having properly determined that due process is applicable to parole release hearings, next resolved the issue of what procedural protections are required in the parole release context. However, the Richerson court
did not actually divide its analysis into two separate issues, but rather came to
the simultaneous conclusion that due process was applicable and required a
statement of written reasons by the board for denial of parole.5" Although the
Richerson court noted preliminarily that the petitioner's pro se brief sought to
broaden the scope of his due process argument to include issues of a right to a
hearing, right to counsel, right to access to the parole file, and the right to rehabilitation, 7 the court never considered these contentions. The Richerson court
addressed itself instead to the more limited issue of whether due process requires
the giving of reasons for denial of state parole release,5" which was raised in the
district court and was discussed in amicus curiae briefs by the Prisoners Legal
Assistance, and the American Civil Liberties Union. 9 The Richerson court prob51

418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974).

52

Id. at 557-58.

54

Parole Release-Conflict, supra note 6, at 1274.

53

Childs v. United States Bd.of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

55 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
56 525 F.2d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 1975).
57 Id. at 797-98.
58

Id. at 798.

59 It must be noted that it was not strictly necessary for the Richerson court to address this
issue of whether due process required a statement of reasons for the denial of parole. A statement of reasons was actually given to the petitioner pursuant to an Illinois statute. ILL. Rzv.
STATS. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(f) (Smith-Hurd 1973).
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ably viewed the case as an opportunity to extend the King decision and firmly
establish that the written reasons requirement should rest upon due process
grounds, and is therefore applicable to state parole board decisions. 60
While the Richerson court never explicitly rejected the possibility that due
process may impose additional requirements on parole release proceedings, the
court seemed to exclude all other forms of protection by implication. Throughout
its opinion, the Richerson court consistently equated due process with a written
statement of reasons requirement. Presumably, the Richerson court's exclusion of
these other due process issues is a result of the court's reliance upon Johnson and
Childs for its holding due process applicable in the first instance. In Johnson,
the Second Circuit concluded that due process requirements are satisfied by a
statement of reasons for the board's denial of parole.6' The Johnson court elaborated on the content of the written statement requirement but did not consider
any additional due process requirements. This is probably due to the fact that
the petitioner applied only for limited relief in the form of an order directing the
parole board to intorm the petitioner of the reasons for denial of parole; the
petitioner did not raise any additional issues of due process. 2
In Childs" the petitioner did raise additional issues of due process. In a
memorandum opinion, the district court ordered: (1) a written statement of
reasons for the denial of parole by the board; (2) the board's promulgation of
regulations governing prisoner access to information used by the board in its
determination; and (3) the board's promulgation of explanatory guidelines
specifically indicating criteria used by the board in its evaluations which must be
conveyed to the prisoners.64 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
in Childs modified the lower court's decision by affirming orders one and three
but vacating order number two.65 The circuit court noted that the recent decision
66
of Pickus v. United States Board of Parole,
which held the United States Board
of Parole to be an "agency" under the APA, could result in the application of
the Freedom of Information Act provisions of the APA to parole release proceeding. The Childs court stated that it would await further developments from
Pickus, since the applicability of the APA could moot any requirements under
the Childs court's second order with respect to access by prisoners to information
in the board's files.6 7
The Johnson court, then, focused primarily upon the written statement of
reasons aspect of due process, to the exclusion of any consideration to other procedural protections. However, the Richerson court's refusal to entertain the
petitioner's additional due process contentions was not similarly justified. Unlike
the Johnson case, the Richerson case contained a broad petition for relief which
included additional due process protection claims.6 The Richerson case also
60 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra, which discuss the limitations of the King
approach in contrast to a due process approach.
61 500 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir. 1974).
62 363 F. Supp. 416, 417 (E.D.N.Y.1973).
63 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1974).
64 Id. at 1247-48.
65 511 F.2d 1270, 1281 '(D.C.Cir. 1974).
66 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C.Cir. 1974). See note 23, supra.
67 511 F.2d 1270, 1284-85 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
68 525 F.2d 797, 798 (7th Cir. 1975).
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could not dismiss the petitioner's claim to a right of access to the parole board's
files on the basis of the Pickus decision, as did the Childs court, since the APA
is inapplicable to state parole board decisions.69 Thus, the Richerson court's
failure to address the petitioner's other due process claims cannot be justified on
the basis of the Johnson or Childs decisions.
Other courts which have extended the due process clause to the area of
parole procedures have considered a number of procedural protections in addition
to a requirement of a written statement of reasons. The most extensive requirements in the area of parole to date were established by the Supreme Court in
Morrissey.7 0 The Court held that minimum due process requirements for parole
revocation procedures included: a) written notice of the claimed violations of
parole; b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; c) an opportunity
to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; d) the
right to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, unless the
hearing officer specifies good cause for not allowing confrontation; e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers; and f) a written statement by the fact-finders as to
the evidence relied upon and reasons for revoking parole.71 The Morrissey Court
did not rule on the issue of representation by counsel,72 but in a subsequent case,
Gagnon v. Scarpelli7 the Supreme Court stated that presumptively counsel
should be provided for every parole revocation hearing. This requirement applies
where the parolee, after being informed of his right, requests counsel, based on
either a timely and colorable claim that he has not committed the alleged violation, or a contention that there are substantial reasons in justification or mitigation that make revocation of parole inappropriate."'
Clearly all of these procedural protections have not been adopted by courts
in the area of parole release proceedings. The Richerson court cites the Wolff
opinion for the proposition that the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey are not required in circumstances other than parole revocation."' In Wolff"6
the Court endorsed a balancing test of the private individual's interests against
the governmental concerns in arriving at a determination of what procedural
protections are required. ".... [T]here must be mutual accommodation between
the institutional objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of
general protection."7 " The Wolff Court applied the right to advance notice of
the claimed violation, a written statement of fact-finding as to the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the action, and the right to present testimonial and
documentary evidence within reasonable administrative limits to prisoner disciplinary proceedings.' The Wolff Court refused to apply the right to cross-exami69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 799.
408 U.S. 271 (1972).
Id. at 489.
Id.
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Id. at 783-91.
525 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1975).
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 563-65.
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nation and the right to representation by counsel. 9
A majority of courts have followed the Wolff Court in refusing to apply the
full procedural requirements of Morrissey to parole release proceedings.80 But a

number of courts have gone beyond the bare minimum of a written statement
of reasons requirement adopted by the Richerson court. A substantial number
of courts require the Parole Board to formulate and make available to prisoners
written standards which explain the general criteria used by the board in evalu-

ating parole applications."' Other court requirements include a personal hearing
before the prisoner, 2 access to board files by the prisoner,"' and the establishment

of an institutional appeal mechanism for adverse parole decisions.8 " Most courts
squarely rejected the applicability of a right to produce evidence,' a right to
cross-examine, 6 and a right to counsel.8 7 The principal objection to these latter
procedural protections is that they will unduly burden the parole administrative
process, and the resulting delays will not be in the best interests of either the prisoners or the prison authorities.8 8
Thus, although the Richerson court's adherence to a written statement of

reasons requirement is not substantially inconsistent with most other judicial
decisions on the subject, this limited approach has met with considerable criticism

from courts and commentators. In particular, the absence of articulated standards or guidelines for parole board decisions has been singled out as a major
79 Id. at 567-70.
80 See Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir.
1974); Candarini v. Attorney General of the United States, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y.
1974); Beckworth v. New Jersey, 62 N.J. 38, 301 A.2d 727 (1973). See also Franklin v.
Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Stassi v. Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141, 145 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974); Craft v. Attorney General
of the United States, 379 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1974); In re Sturm, 11 Cal.3d 258, 521
P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
81 See, e.g., Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Cooley v. Sigler,
381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974); Craft v. Attorney General of the United States, 379 F.
Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246
"(D.D.C.), modified, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
82 Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975).
83 Id.
84 Candarini v. Attorney General of the United States, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
85 Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Beckworth v. New Jersey, 62
N.J. 38, 301 A.2d 727 (1973). However, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, the
Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974), acknowledged a procedural
right of prisoners to present witnesses and documentary evidence within reasonable administrative -limits.
86 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-68 (1974); Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp.
309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Beckworth v. New Jersey, 62 N.J. 38, 301 A.2d 727 (1973).
87 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974). The Supreme Court has accorded
a presumptive right to counsel in parole revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 '(1973); see text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
88 One commentator stated that since the United States Board of Parole makes over 12,000
parole release decisions annually, reform of procedural protections must take into account its
potential administrative burden.
...
[I]mposition of due process rights that could overturn the Board's administrative machinery may prove counterproductive -by resulting in serious delays in delivery
of parole decisions. Therefore, recognition of mandatory rights of counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination, compulsory attendance of witnesses, or complete discovery
of Board files would seem problematic in the administrative burdens they would
impose.
Parole Release-Conflict, supra note 6, at 1277.
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cause of the inconsistency and apparent unfairness in parole release decisions.89
As the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia noted in Stassi v.
Hogan," "... if there is to be respect for the parole system, the appearance of
fairness is second in importance only to fairness in fact."'9 This apparent lack of
standards and consistency in parole decisions has also been cited as a major cause
of prisoner anxiety and frustration, which serves to defeat the rehabilitative purposes of the correctional system. 92
A second major criticism of Richerson can be based upon its failure to provide the prisoner access to information in parole board files which is used in
making parole release determinations. Without this protection, the prisoner is
subject to the danger that parole decisions may be based upon untrue, inaccurate,
or outdated information contained in the Board files.9" Access to such information
would give the prisoners an opportunity to rebut untrue or misleading information, or to present evidence in mitigation of the data on file.94 In Franklin v.
Shields,9" the District Court for the Western District of Virginia imposed the
requirement that prisoners have access to parole board files. Although the Franklin court recognized that such a requirement would impose a substantial administrative burden upon prison authorities, the court concluded that, on balance, the
interests of the prisoner in receiving such protection outweighed the burden on the
government.9 6
How Detailed a Statement of Reasons Does Minimum
Due Process Require?
The Richerson court's holding due process applicable to parole release hearings represents a substantial step forward by the seventh circuit. But the significance of its holding is limited by the fact that a written statement of reasons
requirement was the only procedural protection that was even considered by the
Richerson court in its analysis of due process requirements. The Richerson holding is further limited by the court's resolution of a third issue in its decision, the
sufficiency of the reasons given to the petitioner for denial of parole. The Richerson court's analysis of this issue illustrates that the written statement of reasons
requirement is easily satisfied by little more than pro forma language, diluting
further the protection which due process provides in parole release hearings.
The Richerson court held that the reasons given to the petitioner for denial
of parole satisfied minimum due process requirements. The Board's statement
of reasons for the denial rested on three major observations: (1) that petitioner's
offense resulted in the wounding of police officers who were doing their duty, (2)
89 Parole Release-Conflict, supra note 6, at 1276.
90 395 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
91 Id. at 145.
92 United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 932 '(2d
Cir. 1974).
93 Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 316-17 (W.D. Va. 1975); Parole Release-Conflict,
supra note 6, at 1276.
94 Id.
95 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975).
96 Id. at 317.
97 525 F.2d 797, 805 (7th Cir. 1975).
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that early parole would "deprecate the seriousness of such an offense and would
not deter others from committing such crimes," and (3) that petitioner is commended for his excellent institutional adjustment and is encouraged to continue
such conduct.9"
The Richerson court began its analysis of the sufficiency of these reasons by
noting that both the Illinois Code of Corrections and the Rules of the United
States Board of Parole specifically authorize denial of parole on the ground that
release at that time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense.99 The court
then attempted to distinguish a series of cases in which the board's stated reason
for denial of parole, that it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, was
held to be insufficient by the courts."'0 The Richerson court stated that these
decisions had turned upon the fact that the United States Board of Parole had
failed to follow its own statutory guidelines and that due process requirements
were not even considered."0 ' The United States Board of Parole had enacted an
elaborate set of guidelines and procedures which governed the board's decisional
process.0 2 Since the parole board in the instant case was subject to quite different
98 Id. at 801. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
99 525 F.2d 797, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1975). The Illinois Code of Corrections provides in §
1003-3-5(c) that the Parole Board shall not grant parole if it determines that: "(3) his release
at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law.
." ILL. REv. STATS. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (Smith-Hurd 1973).
Section 2.13 of the Rules of the United States Board of Parole similarly provides for denial
of parole where: "(1) Release at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed and would thus be incompatible with the welfare of society." 40 Fed. Reg. 41332
(1975).
The provisions of the Illinois Correctional Code and the United States Board of Parole are
nearly identical, although Illinois uses the word "deprecate," while the U.S. Board Rules use
"depreciate." The Richerson court noted this distinction and commented:
Whereas Illinois seeks to avoid deprecating the seriousness of the offense, the
Federal Parole Board seeks to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. In
the sense used, "deprecate" and "depreciate" have come to be synonymous.
The Richerson court notes further that the correct definition of "deprecate" is to pray against
or disapprove (rather than to lessen in value which is the correct meaning of depreciate);
however, the meaning of "deprecate" has been corrupted to mean "depreciate." 525 F.2d 797,
802 (7th Cir. 1975).
100 525 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 1975). The Richerson court attempted to distinguish the
following cases: Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn. 1974); Grasso v. Norton, 371
F. Supp. 171 (D. Conn. 1974); Diaz v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1974); Battle v.
Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn. 1973).
101 525 F.2d 797, 802 '(7th Cir. 1975).
102 In response to severe criticism of its procedures, the United States Board of Parole
began a series of Pilot Programs in parts of its regions, in which new guidelines were established for parole decision making. The first of these Pilot Programs was begun in the Northeast region in October of 1972. The cases cited in footnote 100 supra were decided under the
guidelines imposed in that first pilot program. Ultimately the board adopted these guidelines
which are no longer experimental, and which apply to all five of the board's regions.
These rules which govern federal parole decision making are very complex, and differ
sharply from most state parole board rules. Essentially, the rules require the use of a "Guideline Table." The Guideline Table is composed of two basic indices on which prisoners are
scored: the "Offense Severity Index," and the "Salient Factor" index. The Offense Severity
Index indicates the parole board's subjective evaluation of the gravity of the prisoner's prior
criminal behavior. The Salient Factor Index attempts to predict the likelihood of a prisoner's
success on parole in taking into account nine personal characteristics of the inmate. These
two indexes form the axes of a matrix which is used to locate the appropriate range for a
prisoner. The range represents the prisoner's expected incarceration period. Although the
board generally follows the guideline tables in making parole decisions, the rules provide for
release at an earlier or later time than the guideline time indicated where a number of discretionary factors are present. An excellent discussion of the intricacies of this system is found
in Parole and Sentencing, supra note 6, at 817-39. The guidelines and rules governing their
use are published at 38 Fed. Reg. 31942-45 (1973), as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 20028 (1974).
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Illinois Correctional Code procedures which had been followed in the Richerson
case, the court concluded that the cited cases were inapplicable." 3
The Richerson court is correct in its conclusion that these decisions are not
relevant in the sense that the court was determining the sufficiency of the reasons
given under a federal statutory standard; these cases adhered to the position that
due process is not applicable to parole release hearings."' However, while these
decisions were based upon different statutory grounds, the courts acknowledged
the actual inadequacy of the reasons given for denial of parole. In Battle v.
Norton, the District Court for the District of Connecticut stated:
Obviously, specification of the single reason given to the petitioner is not
satisfactory. It is neither a complete representation of the Board's decision
nor a stimulus to further rehabilitation on the part of the petitioner ...
It would be helpful insofar as practicable, to have the inmate understand
how his offender characteristics are rated.105
Thus while these cases are not controlling on the issue of minimum due process
requirements, they indicate a strong policy argument in favor of a more detailed
statement of reasons for denial of parole. Although the courts in these decisions
limited their holdings to bare statutory requirements, it noted that as a matter of
general policy, a more detailed statement of reasons would produce a more accurate explanation of the board's decision and would further rehabilitation by giving
a prisoner a greater understanding of the bases of the denial.
The Richerson court also attempted to distinguish a number of cases in
which the court applied a standard of minimum due process and found the stated
reason, that release would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, to be insufficient."' The court in Richerson interpreted these cases as holding that while
mere pro forma language that release would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense is clearly insufficient, the specification of additional factors peculiar to the
petitioner's case satisfies minimum due process requirements. The Richerson
court pointed out that the petitioner was given two additional facts beyond the
seriousness of the offense and deterrence of further offenses:
First, he was told . .. that it was the seriousness of his commission of the

particular crime, not the seriousness of the attempted murder generally which
was delaying his parole. He was also told to continue
10 7his "excellent institutional adjustment and well conceived parole plans."
103 525 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 1975).
104 Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156, 157 (D. Conn. 1974); Battle v. Norton, 365 F.
Supp. 925, 927 (D. Conn. 1973).
105 365 F. Supp. 925, 930 (D. Conn. 1973). The court further noted that since the statutory guidelines were only imposed as part of a pilot program, the project is subject to less
judicial scrutiny since the board is entitled to wide latitude in developing and applying its
new procedures. Id. at 931. This explains why the court, although obviously dissatisfied with
the actual inadequacy of the reasons given for denial of parole, was reluctant to hold that the
board had acted unlawfully.
106 525 F.2d 797, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1975). The cases which the Richerson court distinguishes here are Soloway v. Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Billiteri v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Craft v. Attorney General of the
United States, 379 F. Supp. 538 '(M.D. Pa. 1974); Candarini v. Attorney General of the
United States, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
107 525 F.2d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Although the statement given to the petitioner in Richerson did not literally
contain a "boilerplate" reason for denial, it actually contained very little meaningful or useful information. The Richerson court asserted that the two additional facts given petitioner were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process. However, this conclusion is not supported by the language of the cases
relied upon in Richerson. In Candarini v. Attorney General of the United
States,'"5 the District Court for the Eastern District of New York enunciated a
minimum due process standard for the sufficiency of reasons given for denial of
parole. The court stated:
What is required is that the Board set forth sufficient facts and reasons to
enable a reviewing court to determine whether an abuse of discretion has
been committed and to enable the inmate to know why he has been denied
parole and what he can do to better regulate his future conduct. 1 9
The Candarinicourt then added that the format now used by the New Jersey
State Parole Board, an example of which appears in Beckworth v. New Jersey," 9
should serve as a guide."' The written statement of reasons for denial of parole
in the exemplary Beckworth case is considerably more comprehensive and detailed
than the statement given to the petitioner in Richerson. The Parole Board's
statement in Beckworth, which was six paragraphs, noted specific psychological
findings made on the basis of enumerated facts from the prisoner's life history,
specific events during the prisoner's history of imprisonment, as well as details of
the prisoner's specific offense to support the denial of parole." 2 In contrast, the
108
109
110
111
112

369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
Id. at 1137.
62 N.J. 38, 301 A.2d 727 (1973).
369 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D.N.Y.1974).
The statement given to the prisoner for denial of parole in Beckworth was as follows:
After consideration of the circumstances of your present offense, and in the
absence of any statement by the sentencing court tending to indicate the contrary, the
Board has concluded that there are certain punitive and deterrent aspects to your
sentence. In the absence of any special or equitable circumstances or any affirmative evidence that you can avoid criminal behavior, and since your minimum sentence
has not yet expired, the Board feels that the punitive and deterrent aspects of your
sentence have not been fulfilled and that, therefore, your release would not be compatible with the community welfare.
After consideration of all records relevant to your confinement, treatment and efforts
towards self-improvement while in the N.J. State Prison System, the Board is unable
to conclude that there is reasonable probability that you will return to society without violation of law.
The Board feels that you have had an excellent institutional adjustment with the
exception of your escape from Leesburg in May of 1970. Your receipt of a BED
certificate is also noted, as is the fact that you have served almost 8 years in prison.
The Board would note certain elements which might be construed as "situational" in
your murder of a friend's wife with whom you were emotionally involved. However,
the Board finds strong indications of a longstanding hostility to females in your history
and a potential for violence or aggressive reaction. These indications include your
attempted suicide in 1950, your unstable marriages to three different women, your
continuing projections of blame on them for marriage failures and the various reports
of professional treatment staff.
Moreover, your escape from prison, your prior attempt at self-destruction, your
reported excessive use of alcohol and the circumstances of the present murder, cause
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statement given to the petitioner in Richerson is devoid of any specific details
about the offense committed, the prisoner's personal history, or his psychological
analysis.' 3 Certainly if the Beckworth statement is the applicable standard for
due process, the statement given to the petitioner in Richerson is fatally deficient.
The Richerson court rejected the standard adopted by the Candarinicourt
by asserting that no detailed statement of reasons for denial of parole is constitutionally required." 4 The Richerson court relied upon excerpts from three district
court opinions to support this conclusion." 5 However, such reliance is misplaced.
The decision in Wiley v. United States Board of Parole".. provides little support
for Richerson since the Wiley court seemed to suggest that due process is not applicable at all to parole release proceedings. The Wiley court specifically relied
upon Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole.. in rejecting the applicability of a
number of due process protections to parole release hearings, although the court
stated that it would not consider whether there was a right to a written statement
of reasons for denial of parole."' The Wiley court also indicated that it adhered
to the right/privilege doctrine rejected by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v.
Brewer;"9 the Wiley court stated that release on parole is a matter of legislative
grace not of right.'
These statements indicate that the Wiley court implicitly
rejected the applicability of due process to parole release hearings. Since the
Richerson court explicitly holds minimum due process applicable to parole release
hearings in an earlier part of its opinion, its later reliance upon the reasoning of
the Wiley court appears inappropriate.
The Richerson court's reliance upon the other two district court opinions,
deVyver v. Warden'" and Franklin v. Shields 2 is similarly inappropriate because the factual circumstances of those cases are significantly different. In
deVyver, the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania was considering the sufficiency of the reasons for denial of parole in terms of statutory guidelines. The deVyver court was addressing the specific question of whether the reasons given were sufficient to support confinement beyond the maximum period
suggested by the parole board's guidelines.' 2 3 Since the parole board in the Richthe Board concern that you still have the potential to react to not unusual situations
where your concepts of masculinity are threatened with impulsive behavior.
There is nothing which affirmatively indicates that you can refrain from serious

aggression and parole is therefore denied.

Beckworth v. New Jersey St. Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 353, 301 A.2d 727, 729-30 (1973).
113 The petitioner was told that the wounding of police officers on duty was significant, but
no further details about the crime he committed were given. 525 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1975).
114 Id. at 803-04.
115 The Richerson court relies upon Wiley v. United States Board- of Parole, 380 F. Supp.

1194 (M.D. Pa. 1974); deVyver v. Warden, 388 F. Supp. 1213 (M.D. Pa. 1974); and Franklin
v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975). 525 F.2d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 1975).
116 380 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D.Pa. 1974)
117 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
118 380 F. Supp. 1194, 1200 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
119 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See text accompanying note 11 supra.
120 380 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
121 388 F. Supp. 1213 *(M.D.Pa. 1974).
122 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D.Va.1975).
123 388 F. Supp. 1213, 1219-20 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
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erson case is not subject to the exact same complicated guideline rules followed
by the United States Board of Parole, deVyver is not applicable.'24 The Franklin
case is also distinguishable from Richerson on a factual basis. Under the procedures applicable to the parole board in Franklin,a prisoner who is denied parole
is entitled upon request to a fuller explanation from the parole board of the reasons for denial of parole.'25 In the Richerson case, the petitioner was not entitled
to this additional mechanism but was only entitled to the brief statement which
was before the court. Therefore, the deVyver and Franklin cases are factually
dissimilar to Richerson since they involve a greater amount of procedural protections which are guaranteed to prisoners upon denial of parole.
The Richerson court's approach in analyzing the sufficiency of the reasons
given to the petitioner is largely negative. The court rejected the necessity of a
detailed statement and added: "[W]e believe that the measure of how much due
process is required may very well be made by the APA standard of a 'brief statement.' "126 A better approach would focus on the policy reasons behind a requirement of a written statement of reasons. A minimum standard of the sufficiency
of reasons must implement the purposes which underlie the imposition of the requirement. The Richerson court, in evolving a standard, should attempt to
achieve two primary purposes behind a written statement of reasons requirement:
furnishing an adequate record for judicial review to ensure that the parole board
does not abuse its discretion in making its determination,' 27 and fostering rehabilitation by informing the prisoner of the reasons for the decision and what if anything he can do to adjust his conduct in the future. 2
The court in King v. United States" articulated the first of these policy
reasons:
From a legislative standpoint, requiring a statement of reasons makes it possible to check abuse of error. There is no way to discover if the Board is
denying 3parole
for an unconstitutional or improper reason if it never gives
0
reasons.'
Thus, in part, the sufficiency of a parole board's statement of reasons should
depend upon the extent to which it will permit a reviewing court to determine
124

See note 102 supra.

125 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975).
126 525 F.2d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 1975).
127 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
930 (2d Cir. 1974); King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1340 (7th Cir. 1974); Craft v.
Attorney General of the United States, 379 F. Supp. 538, 540 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Monks v.
New Jersey State Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971); Written Reasons, supra note
6, at 122; Federal Parole Decision Making, supra note 27, at 486; Parole Release-Conflict,

supra note 6, at 1276.
128 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925,
932 (2d Cir. 1974) ; King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1340 (7th Cir. 1974) ; Stassi v.
Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1975) ; Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385
F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd.
of Parole, 363 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851, 857
(D. Colo. 1973); United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Monks v. New Jersey State Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1973); Written
Reasons, supra note 6, at 122; Federal Parole Decision Making, supra note 27, at 486; Parole
Release-Conflict, supra note 6, at 1276; Note, Parole and Sentencing, supra note 6, at 850.

129
130

492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1340.
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whether the board followed proper criteria, and did not decide arbitrarily, capriciously, or on impermissible grounds.13 1 Certainly a very brief or uninformative
statement of reasons will not serve this purpose. The Richerson court should have
determined whether, on the basis of the parole board's statement, it could have
concluded that the board considered all relevant and no irrelevant factors, and
followed appropriate, rational, and consistent criteria in reaching its decision. 32
The parole board's statement in Richerson suggests that the decision to deny
parole may have been based upon an impermissible consideration; the board
based its decision primarily upon the fact that release would deprecate the seriousness of the prisoner's offense. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States ex rel. Johnson v. New York State Board of Parole'33 (a decision which
the Richerson court relies upon in the first part of its decision) labeled the following reason for denial of parole as highly questionable, if not impermissible:
(4) denying parole where, because of the type of the offense for which he
has been committed, the prisoner has not yet served an "appropriate period"
of incarceration that satisfies unarticulated and possibly inconsistent views of
Board members regarding community retribution, incapacitation, or general
deterrence, despite the prisoner's readiness for the community and lack of
need for further institutional control.13 4

The statement of reasons for denial of parole by the board in Richerson indicates that the decision could have been made upon such a questionable consideration. The board's statement may well have been based upon completely proper
considerations and all relevant factors if, in fact, the board's decision was based
upon a consideration of the individual factors of the prisoner's case and not just
the general offense for which he was convicted. However, the board's brief statement is insufficient to enable a reviewing court to make that determination. Thus,
the court in Richerson should not have held such reasons to be sufficient to satisfy
due process.
The second policy reason behind a written statement of reasons requirement
relates to the rehabilitative purpose of the correctional system. A statement of
reasons is designed to relieve the chronic frustration suffered by inmates which
results from a lack of knowledge of how they are being evaluated.' 35 It is also
intended to communicate to the inmate how he might, by improving his institutional conduct or by taking steps with respect to some other factor in doubt (such
as prospective employment or housing), better his chances for release on parole.'s3
The Richerson court did recognize the rehabilitative purpose behind a written
reasons requirement. The court articulated this policy by quoting from Professor
131

United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 929

Cir. 1974).
132 Id. at 929-30.

(2d

133 500 F.2d 925 "(2d Cir. 1974).
134 Id.at 931.
135 Federal Parole Decision Making, supra note 27, at 486.
136 United States ex tel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 932 (2d
Cir. 1974). See also, Stassi v. Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141, 145 (N.E. Ga. 1975); United States
ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp. 416, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 1973);
United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Written
Reasons, supra note 6, at 115; ParoleRelease-Conflict, supra note 6, at 1276.
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Johnson's report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, which
identified one of the pitfalls inherent in a written reasons requirement: "
The reasons must be reasonably specific. It does no good to tell a prisoner
he is being denied parole because he is a danger to society unless he is told
why he is so regarded, and whether there is anything he can do to convince
the Board otherwise. 1 8
The Richerson court concluded that this standard was met in the case at
hand because the petitioner was told "why he is so regarded and whether there
is anything he can do. . . .""9 However the brief statement provided by the
board in Richerson does not actually further the rehabilitative purpose. The only
reason given to the petitioner for being regarded as a danger to society was the
fact that police officers were wounded during the commission of his offense. 4
That is not reasonably specific, and it leaves the petitioner to speculate as to why
he was denied parole. As the Second Circuit in Johnson noted, "[d]ue to the
apparent inconsistencies in Parole Board decisions '[c]orruption and chance are
among the favorite inmate speculations.' ,,i' This in turn may breed despondency and hopelessness, leading the prisoner to abandon any further efforts to
improve his institutional conduct.' 42 The King court asserted that a prisoner may
feel less resentful of a negative decision if he clearly understands the reasons for
it." In Richerson, the petitioner was given very little information in the board's
statement. He may well have been confused since the board commended him for
his excellent institutional conduct, but did not sufficiently elaborate on the negative factors which resulted in a denial of parole.'44 A fuller explanation of the reasons for the denial in the Richerson case would avoid this uncertainty and hopefully prevent a hostile reaction on the part of the prisoner.'
137 525 F.2d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 1975).
138 25 ADmIN. L. Rav. 459, 485 (1973).
139 525 F.2d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 1975).
140 Id. at 801.
141 500 F.2d 925, 932 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Written Reasons, supra note 6, at 122.
142 United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York St. Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 933 (2d
Cir. 1974).
143 492 F.2d 1337, 1340 (7th Cir. 1974).
144 525 F.2d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 1975).
145 The Richerson court advanced one last argument in support of its conclusion that minimum due process does not require a detailed statement of the reasons for denial of parole.
The Richerson court said that the petitioner was in effect seeking reasons explaining reasons
already given. Id. at 804. The Richerson court cited Dorzsynski v. United States, 418 U.S.
424 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that a district court is not required to give
supporting reasons for its "finding" under the Federal Youth Correctional Act that the offender
would not benefit from treatment under the Act. The Richerson. court analogized the
Dorzsynski case to the present case; in Dorzsynski situations, the Richerson court noted, the
"finding" was not required to be supported by reasons. Likewise the "finding" of the parole
board in Richerson that release would deprecate the seriousness of the offense need not be
supported by additional reasons. 525 F.2d at 805.
However, the Richerson court's analogy is inappropriate. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia rejected a similar argument in Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511
F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Childs court concluded that "the ruling in Dorzsynski is
not to be taken as a constitutional precedent for rejecting the need, under the Due Process
Clause, of a written statement of reasons for Board denial of parole." Id. at 1283-84. The
Childs court distinguished Dorzsynski because it involved a sentencing, rather than a parole
question. The court observed that sentencing is made -by a judicial officer who is presented
with legislatively delineated alternatives within which to exercise his discretion. In contrast,
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Finally, the court's decision in Richerson must be viewed in the context of
its overall effect. The Seventh Circuit took a commendable and significant step
forward in applying minimum due process requirements to parole release hearings. The court's reasoning is entirely in accordance with the spirit of the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court in the area of parole; the Richerson court's decision is also in line with an increasing number of federal circuit and district court
opinions. The Richerson court's use of due process to afford protections in parole
release hearings is an improvement over the Seventh Circuit's prior use of the
"brief statement" requirement of the APA. However, the Richerson court unnecessarily restricted its consideration of due process to a written reasons requirement. While the full panoply of procedural rights is not appropriate in a postconviction proceeding, many courts have applied minimally burdensome protections such as a right of access to the parole board's files in parole release proceedings. The Richerson court was also unduly narrow in its evaluation of the sufficiency of the reasons given to the petitioner for denial of parole. Although the
court was properly concerned with preventing an unreasonable administrative
burden on the parole board, it gave insufficient consideration to the policy reasons behind the requirement itself. Hopefully in future cases, the Seventh Circuit
will develop a broader standard for evaluating due process requirements which
focuses on the goals of effective judicial review to prevent the board's abuse of
discretion, and rehabilitative guidance for the inmate denied parole.
Joanne M. Frasca
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DUE PROCESS-SCHOOLS-A PROBATIONARY

CONTRACT WITH A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
CONTINUED

EMPLOYMENT DURING

GIVES HIM A PROPERTY INTEREST IN

THE TERM

OF HIS

CONTRACT REQUIRING

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS BEFORE
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT.

Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515
While plaintiff Hostrop was serving under contract as president of the defendant junior college, he circulated a memorandum on the school's ethnic studies
program which made recommendations for changes in the program and was
critical of the administration. When he was discharged without a hearing shortly

thereafter, he brought a civil rights action alleging that the termination of his
contract violated his contract, free speech, and procedural due process rights. The
parole considerations are made by a board possessing broad but legislatively undefined discre-

tion. In order for the Board to function properly, it must exercise its discretion fairly and
knowledgeably, and rational means and considerations must attend its functioning. The Childs
court observed that: "By requiring the Board to advise the applicant in writing of the reasons
his application is denied, due process goes a way to ensure rationality. . . ." Id. at 1284. The
Childs court acknowledged that although the same argument could prevail under sentencing
under the Youth Correctional Act since it also involves rehabilitative factors, Congress specifically indicated that such a statement was not required. However, in the context of parole,
Congress left open the question of whether the due process clause may require a statement of
reasons. Id. Therefore, the Richerson court's reliance upon Dorzsynski is improper to support
the conclusion that a further explanation of reasons for denial of parole cannot be required.
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district court found no constitutional infirmities, particularly from the standpoint
of the first or fourteenth amendment, and dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.1 On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, the court in Hostrop 12 found that the plaintiff's allegations that dismissal
was predicated upon his expression of views in the ethnic studies memo stated a
first amendment cause of action,' and that he had also shown potential fourteenth
amendment deprivations of liberty4 and property' as proscribed by Board of
Regents v. Roth6 and Perry v. Sindermann.7 On remand, the district court
found no actionable constitutional violations." In Hostrop I, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the facts would not ground a
first amendment violation" nor a deprivation of liberty claim. 1 It did find, however, that the Board's failure to accord the plaintiff procedural due process protections by providing him a fair hearing on termination 2 amounted to a deprivation of a property interest within Roth and Sindermann. For this fourteenth
amendment violation, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
damages against the Board, but not against the individual member defendants
who were protected by the doctrine of official immunity.'
Roth and Sindermann
In Hostrop I, the Seventh Circuit held that the procedural due process rights
traditionally accorded public school teachers were equally applicable to college
presidents such as Dr. Hostrop. 4 The court in Hostrop H agreed but reached
a different conclusion as to the thrust of Roth and Sindermann, the premier 1972
decisions in this area. While Hostrop H is adequately grounded on these two
cases, a more effective understanding of the Seventh Circuit's decision can be
gained through a brief analysis of the law as it existed before 1972.
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court, in Weiman v. Updegraff,5
1 Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515, 337 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
2 Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
3 Id. at 491-94.
4 Id. at 494.
5 Id.
6 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
7 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
8 Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515, 399 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Even
assuming arguendo that the facts showed a deprivation of liberty or property sufficient to require
a fourteenth amendment procedural due process hearing, the district court found that the
plaintiff had waived his rights by his failure to attend the July 23, 1970, board meeting at
which he was discharged. Id. at 610. This is discussed further in the text accompanying notes
61-64 infra.
9 Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3399, 3439 (U.S. Dec. 29, 1975; Jan. 21, 1976) (No. 75-917, 75-

1035).
10 Id. at 573.
11 Id. at 573-74.
12 Id. at 574-75.
13 Id. at 576-78. For a discussion of federal jurisdiction in civil rights suits against school
boards, see Bodensteiner, Federal Court jurisdiction of Suits Against "Non-Persons" For
Deprivation of Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. Rxv. 215 (1974). For a discussion of individual board member liability, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
14 471 F.2d at 491-93.
15 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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dealt with the constitutionality of the summary dismissal of state college teachers
during the term of their contracts for refusals to take a loyalty oath. While the
Court did not specifically classify the interest of the teachers in continued state
employment, it did state that their summary exclusion during the term of their
contracts violated their fourteenth amendment rights.1 6
7
the Court again conIn a 1956 decision, Slochower v. Board of Education,"
continued
state
employment. There
character
of
a
teacher's
interest
in
sidered the
the Court voided the summary dismissal of a tenured professor for his invocation
of the fifth amendment in response to questions regarding his membership in the
Communist Party. Justice Clark, writing the majority opinion for a sharply
divided Court, noted that the professor did not have a "right" to public employment, but found that the professor had tenure under state law and that this interest could not be destroyed by arbitrary state action. Since this interest was entitled to procedural due process protections, " the Court ordered the case remanded for a hearing at which both sides could present their arguments.' "
Weiman and Slochower have been uniformly interpreted to require a procedural due process hearing before removing a teacher whose relationship with
the state is supported by either tenure 0 or contract." These decisions were, however, subject to conflicting interpretations by the lower courts regarding the
extent to which a hearing was required when the employment relationship was
ended through mere expiration of the contract.2 In 1972 the Roth and Sindermann decisions largely resolved this particular conflict. Those cases provided
that an aggrieved party was entitled to a procedural due process hearing only if
his dismissal or nonretention deprived him of his interest in liberty, " deprived
24
or was predicated upon the exercise of a conhim of his interest in property,
25
right.
protected
stitutionally
In Roth the plaintiff received a statement that his appointment to the state
university as an assistant professor of political science covered the period from
September 1, 1968, through June 20, 1969, but he had no formal contract. 6
When informed in February of 1969 that his appointment would not be renewed
upon its expiration, he brought suit in federal court claiming, inter alia, that the
Board's failure to provide him with a pretermination hearing violated his fourteenth amendment procedural due process rights.2 The Supreme Court succinctly
16 "It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 192.

17 350 U.S. 551 '(1956).
18 Id. at 555.
19 Id. at 559.
20 For an analysis of the different types of tenure, see Developments in the Law -Academic Freedom, 81 HARv.L. Rnv. 1045, 1096-1105 (1968).
21

Shultz, Nontenured Faculty: Current Legal and PracticalProblems in Connection With

Nonrenewal of Such Appointments, 1 .T.COLL. & UNIv. L. 74, 75 (1973).
22 Compare Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Drown v. Portsmouth School
Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (lst Cir. 1970); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970);
Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969); and Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist.,

405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
23 See text accompanying notes 26-35 infra.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 408 U.S. at 566.
27 Roth v. Bd.of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972, 974 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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phrased both the issue and its answer:
The only question presented to us at this stage in the case is whether the
respondent had a constitutional right to a statement of reasons and a hearing
on the University's decision not to rehire him for another year. We hold
that he did not.28
In defining the parameters of a claim based upon a deprivation of liberty,
the Court noted that the college made no charge against the plaintiff:
that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the community.
It did not base the non-renewal of his contract on a charge, for example,
that he had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality. Had it done so, this

would be a different case. For "[w]here a person's good name, reputation,
honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." . . . In such a
case, due process would
accord an opportunity to refute the charge before
University officials 9
In similarly defining the property interest in continued state employment
requisite for a claim to a hearing, the Court made clear that the complaint was
insufficient:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral

expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it. It is the purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be

arbitrarily undermined. . . . [R]espondent surely had an abstract concern
in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require

the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew

his contract of employment. 3

The Court in Sindermann elaborated upon this notion of a property interest
or expectancy of reemployment and enunciated the third situation triggering procedural due process. The plaintiff, a professor of government and social science,
had been employed for four years at a state college under a series of one-year
contracts. During his employment, the plaintiff had been a frequent critic of the
college administration. When his contract was not renewed, he brought suit in
federal court claiming that the Board's failure to provide him with a pretermination hearing violated procedural due process, and further, that the decision
not to renew his contract was based on his criticism of the college administration
and therefore sanctioned his exercise of first amendment rights. In its opinion
ordering a remand, the Court enunciated the third general set of circumstances
under which a party is entitled to procedural due process protections. Justice
Stewart, writing for a five-man majority, stated that the question of whether a
28 408 U.S. at 569.
29 Id. at 573. The Court points out in footnote 12 of its opinion that the purpose of this
hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name and that once this has been
done, the employer remains free to deny future employment for other reasons.
30 Id. at 577.
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party has been penalized for the exercise of his constitutional rights is independent from consideration of a party's liberty or property interest in reemployment:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not act.
It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to "produce a result which [it] could not command directly." 8'
In finding that the summary judgment against the plaintiff was improper,
the Court elaborated upon the concept of a property interest in continued employment requisite for due process protection. While maintaining that a mere
expectancy of reemployment was insufficient, the Court found that the plaintiff
had alleged facts which, if proven, would constitute a property interest. The
fact that there was nothing specific in the plaintiffs contract to justify his claim
of entitlement to reemployment was not considered dispositive. The plaintiff
argued that in view of his long period of service as a teacher in the Texas school
system and in light of "the policies and practices of the institution," he had a
"de facto tenure";2 this claim was predicated upon a provision in the faculty

handbook:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The administration
of the college wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure
so long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a
cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as
he is happy in his work. 3
In view of the plaintiff's legitimate expectations, the Court ruled that he should
be given the opportunity to show that his interest in reemployment was a property
interest."4 To further guide the district court and to clarify what had been said
in Roth, the Court stated that property interests
subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid,
technical forms. Rather, "property" denotes a broad range of interests that
are secured by "existing rules or understandings ..... " A person's interest
in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if there are
such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of
entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.3 5
31 408 U.S. at 597. The Court stated that the plaintiff's allegations presented a bonz lide
constitutional claim which precluded summary judgment, but was quick to point out that the
mere assertion that college officials based their decision on constitutionally impermissible
grounds was insufficient to require a due process hearing. Id. at 509 n.5.
32 508 U.S. at 600.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 602-03.
35 Id. at 605. Again, the Court was quick to point out that proof of such a property interest
would not entitle the plaintiff to reinstatement, but merely obligate the college officials to grant
a hearing at his request where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and
challenge their sufficiency. Id. at 603.
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With these cases and the principles they enunciate as a backdrop, disposition
of the procedural due process issues in Hostrop 11 was routine.
ProceduralDue Process in Hostrop II
As discussed above Roth, Sindermann, and their progeny require that removal of school personnel be accompanied by a due process hearing if any of the
following conditions are met: (1) the removal is predicated upon the exercise
of constitutionally protected activity; (2) the removal will in some manner impinge upon the party's good name or reputation (his interest in liberty); or (3)
the party has a property interest in continued employment. While the plaintiff
in Hostrop 11 was ultimately successful on only one of these, the court considered
each factor.
1. The First Amendment Claim
In the trial court, the plaintiff alleged that he was fired because of the
memorandum he wrote on the ethnic studies program which criticized his superiors.36 In discussing his case, the district court assumed arguendo that his dismissal was motivated by Hostrop's views as expressed in the memorandum, but
7 so as to insulate the Board from
interpreted Pickering v. Board of Education"
8
liability. The Seventh Circuit in Hostrop I, however, stated that the district
court drew too great a distinction between teachers and administrative personnel. 9 While acknowledging that under Pickering an employee's first amendment rights may be restricted if their exercise substantially impedes the functioning of the public entity, the court nevertheless found that Hostrop's remarks did
not so interfere with his working relationship with the Board."0 When the district
court considered this issue on remand, it concluded that there were seven other
factors which accounted for Hostrop's dismissal; therefore, there was no first
amendment violation.4 On appeal the Seventh
Circuit in Hostrop II routinely
42
upheld these findings as not clearly erroneous.
2. Interest in Liberty
Hostrop's amended complaint also alleged that he was deprived of his liberty
by reason of the attacks made upon his character by the Board in its list of charges
justifying the dismissal. The Board had accused him, inter alia, of making mis36

337 F. Supp. at 978.

37 391 U.S. 563 '(1968). In Pickering the Court held that the teacher's interest as a
citizen in making public comments must be balanced against the state's interest in promoting
the efficiency of its employees' public services. Id. at 568.
The court quoted extensively from Pickering in determining that it did not require full
first amendment protection when the party had a close working relationship with those he
criticized. 337 F. Supp. at 978-79.
39 471 F.2d at 491-93.
40 Id. at 492-93.
41 399 F. Supp. at 611. See also, Fragier v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149 '(8th

Cir. 1974).
42

523 F.2d at 573.
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representations and false statements regarding his non-college activities, and withholding certain financial reports from the Board.48
Inasmuch as the trial court's decision was pre-Roth and pre-Sindermann,
it did not have the previously described analytical framework within which to
make its decision. While it did note that Hostrop's career could be harmed by the
dismissal, it found that his interest was outweighed by the Board's interest in
harmonious operation.44 In remanding, the Seventh Circuit assumed without
discussion that Hostrop had stated a cause of action for a deprivation of liberty
within Roth.4" In Hostrop II, however, the circuit court agreed with the findings
of the lower court46 that the Board itself had done nothing to damage Hostrop's
reputation in the community."' Since it was the plaintiff who had publicized the
dismissal charges, this decision was entirely proper. In answer to the plaintiff's
claim that he had to disclose the reasons to quell the rumors that were circulating,
the court replied that the Board could in no way be deemed responsible for
Hostrop's own decision to publish the Board's reasons for dismissal.4 8
Other decisions support the propriety of this determination." Judge, now
Justice, John Paul Stevens, in Shriek v. Thomas, 50 dealt with a similar claim and
reached the same result. The teacher involved in Shriek claimed that the stated
reasons for her nonretention deprived her of liberty by imposing a "stigma" which
made her less attractive to prospective employers. Judge Stevens acknowledged
that nonretention might make one less attractive to other employers, but cited
Roth for the proposition that nonretention alone is not a sufficient deprivation of
liberty to merit due process protections. 1 Furthermore, the adverse impact of the
nonretention is not aggravated by the fact that a statement of reasons is given
to the teacher involved,5 in contrast to the public at large: "There was no public
'posting' of plaintiff's name which might have created the kind of 'stigma' upon
her 'good name, reputation, honor or integrity' such as the Court condemned in
Wisconsin v. Constantineau .... ,3 The holding in HostropII is clearly in accord.
The Board attempted to prevent injury to Hostrop's reputation by maintaining
silence as to its reasons for dismissal with reference to all but Hostrop himself.5
3. Property Interest
To understand the court's holding in Hostrop 11 that the requisite property
interest in continued employment was established, one need only appreciate that
43 471 F.2d at 494.
44 337 F. Supp. at 980. Relying again on Pickering, the court found that the fourteenth
amendment had only a limited application to Dr. Hostrop's situation. Id.
45 471 F.2d at 494.
46 399 F. Supp. at 610.
47 523 F.2d at 574-75.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
50 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973).
51 Id. at 493.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 492. In note 3, Stevens points out that the liberty portion of the Roth opinion
is largely based upon Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). At the end of his
opinion, Stevens states that even if the reasons were divulged to the public, there would have
been no deprivation of liberty because of the nature of the reasons given. Id. at 693.
54 523 F.2d at 573.
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Hostrop had a contract with the state at the time of his termination. The original
contract covered the period from July 1, 1969, through June 30, 1971. Prior to
the new board election in April of 1970, the existing Board purported to extend
this contract until June 30, 1972 (from July 1, 1970). While the discharge on
July 23, 1970 would appear to be a clear breach of contract, the Board offered
two arguments to justify a finding that no contractual relationship existed between the parties.55
First, the Board argued that the second contract was void because Hostrop
had deleted from the renewal form which he submitted a clause contained in the
earlier contract requiring him to devote full time to his position as president. The
court, however, stated that even if the renewal contract had not been made, the
earlier contract covering the period from July 1, 1969, through June 30, 1971
would have been in existence.5" Alternatively, the court found that the new contract was not void, but at most voidable for fraud." Hostrop's contractual right
to continued employment was a claim of entitlement amounting to a property
interest within Roth and Sindermann5
The court devoted more analysis to the Board's second claim that the contracts were void because their terms exceeded one year. Even if there were a
one-year limitation, the court indicated that a contract entered into for a longer
period would not be void in its entirety, but only for the period in excess of one
year.5 9 In any case, the court ultimately determined that a one-year limitation did
not exist under Illinois law.6"
In short, the court in Hostrop II found that the plaintiff's contract gave
him a property interest which could not be infringed without a procedural due
process hearing.
Anticipating such a finding, the district court had previously found on remand from Hostrop I that even if Hostrop did possess interests requiring a hearing, he had waived his rights by his refusal to attend the July 23, 1970 hearing
at which he was discharged. 6 ' It also expressly found that the Board was prepared at that time to undertake an impartial hearing into its complaints against
him.62 After reading the record, the court in Hostrop II upset this finding because it determined that the Board had already decided to terminate Hostrop on
July 23, 1970, and had in fact made a commitment to another person to hire
him as interim president.6" Since the Board had prejudged the plaintiff's case
before the July 23, 1970 hearing, it was not "a tribunal possessing apparent impartiality" as required in Hostrop I; the plaintiff therefore did not waive his
right to a fair hearing by absenting himself from that meeting.64
55 523 F.2d at 574.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 574-75.
61 300 F. Supp. at 610-11. In support of its position, the district court cited Birdwell v.
Hazelwood School Dist., 491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974). Birdwell, however, contains no finding
that the board lacked impartiality, as here.
62 Id. at 611.
63 523 F.2d at 575-76. Regarding impartiality, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).

64 Id.
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Hostrop's cause of action withstood a dismissal judgment solely by reason of
his contractual relationship with the state. Roth and Sindermann unquestionably
contemplate the existence of such a contractually established property interest,
and, to this extent, the disposition in Hostrop 1 is consistent with precedent.
In view of the court's finding that Hostrop's dismissal was justified, it is
clear that the only harm done him was the deprivation of his procedural due
process right to notice and a hearing. This was expressly recognized in both
Hostrop I and Hostrop I1. As cogently stated in the earlier decision:
The fact that plaintiff relies upon his employment contract to establish a
property interest worthy of protection through the due process clause does
not mean that his only remedy is a contract action in state court. A civil
rights action based on the deprivation of due process and a contract action
to recover damages for a breach are independent remedies. The civil rights
action .. . seeks vindication for the arbitrary manner in which the contract
was breached. A "garden variety" contract action seeks damages only for
the losses caused by the breach... There will be occasions when one action
will lie but the other will not, as when the state has grounds to break an
employment contract, but does so by violating an employee's due process
rights to notice and a hearing.65
A procedural due process hearing must accompany the removal of a teacher
whose relationship is grounded in either tenure or contract; if there was any doubt
6
it was removed with the definias to this position after Weiman and Slochower,"
tive holdings in Roth and Sindermann. At the other extreme are "removals"
which involve the mere nonretention of a teacher after the expiration of his contractual term. It is here where Roth and Sindermann are most vigorously argued,
albeit usually unsuccessfully,6" for the finding of a property interest in continued
employment. One can be reasonably certain, for example, that Hostrop could
have been removed without a hearing and without any apparent reason, if the
Board had awaited the end of his contractual term.6 This assumes, of course,
that the school had a fairly predictable tenure system which was grounded on
written rules and regulations.
Finally, Hostrop IFs treatment of fourteenth amendment liberty interests
only confirms the policies laid down in Roth and Sindermann. These cases contain no general mandate requiring explanation for nonretention; rather, they require a procedural due process hearing only if the reasons given damage the
teacher's reputation in the community. Accordingly, and as noted in Hostrop
II,9 the best course legally available to colleges and universities is to give no reason at all for the dismissal. Alternatively, a school which decides to give the reasons for its decision should restrict them to the faculty member involved.
Timothy J. McDevitt
65

471 F.2d at 494 n.16 (emphasis added).

66 A Judge Stevens opinion, Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4
(7th Cir. 1974), supports the claim that Hostrop II could have been grounded on Weiman. and

Slochower alone.
67 See, e.g., Cusmano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir, 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. at.
48 '(1975).
68' Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974).
69 523 F.2d at 474.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL

RIGHTS-STATE PRISONER'S ALLEGATIONS
CONCERNING THE IMPOSITION OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, THE CONDITIONS OF
THAT CONFINEMENT, AND THE FAILURE OF PRISON OFFICIALS TO RETURN IS
DIAMOND RING WERE EACH SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Kimbrough v. O'Neil
On March 9, 1972, Cleveland Kimbrough, while awaiting trial on federal
charges, was placed under the custody of the Sheriff of St. Clair County, Illinois,
and committed to the county jail for a period of 25 days.' On March 25th,
according to Kimbrough's complaint, he was placed in solitary confinement for
a period of three days after demanding the use of a telephone to contact his
attorney concerning an emergency situation. The court's opinion best portrays
the alleged subsequent, 72-hour ordeal:
Plaintiff alleges that the cell had "no toilet; no water for drinking or washing; and no mattress, bedding, or blankets." He further claims that for that
period of time he was "forced to eliminate on the floor, and water was
brought at the whim of the guard, which was infrequent." He states that
he was denied "rudimentary implements of personal hygiene such as toilet
paper, soap, washing water and towels"; and that "[t]hroughout the nights
the Plaintiff was subjected to water being thrown upon him by unknown
guards after requesting drinking water, and did eventually cause Plaintiff
to suffer a severe cold and fever and denial of any semblance of medical
treatment." He alleges that during this period of confinement he was denied
the right
to communicate with his attorney, family and friends by mail or
2

visits.

Kimbrough further averred that upon his release to federal authorities, his
diamond ring, self-appraised at approximately $2,500, was not returned to him.
Basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331' and 1343, 4 Kimbrough filed a
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983- in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Illinois, seeking injunctive and pecuniary relief against the sheriff and
his two deputies. The complaint claimed that the defendants had "acted deliberately, maliciously and with the motive and intent of punishing Plaintiff be1 On April 3, 1972, the prisoner was released to federal custody.
2 Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir. 1975).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1970) states:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970) provides:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, custom
or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulations, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
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cause of his Race, social, political, religious and moral views"' s in violation of the
eighth7 and fourteenth' amendments. The district court, however, granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. It held that the "restrictive" conditions encountered by the plaintiff
during solitary confinement, even if proven, could not offend the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, since they had lasted only
three days. The court further noted that the loss of the ring was not a deprivation
of "property" within the meaning and protection of the fourteenth amendment.
The district court later denied the plaintiffs motion to vacate the prior judgement; on appeal, the Seventh Circuit unanimously reversed citation.
In an opinion written by Judge Cummings, the court summarily concluded
that based upon its prior decision in Haines v. Kerner,' the transfer of Kimbrough
to solitary confinement without just cause could be so disproportionate in severity
as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, the court held that
the harshness of the conditions which allegedly existed within the "isolation" cell
satisfied the eighth amendment standard as established by the court's earlier
decision in Adams v. Pate;' it added that exposure to those conditions for a
period of three days could be violative of the Constitution, citing for support
the decision of the Second Circuit in LaReau v. MacDougall." Finally, the court
reversed the lower court's finding that the defendant's failure to return the prisoner's diamond ring was outside the fourteenth amendment's scope of protection.
Although the court based its decision here on the rationale it had recently
expressed in Carroll v. Sielaff,"2 its succinct disposition of the inmate's property
claim prompted Judges Swygert and Stevens to file separate concurring opinions
dealing with this developing area of federal tort jurisdiction.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
1. Prison Conditions
The court first addressed Kimbrough's contention that the conditions of
solitary confinement he encountered for a three day period violated the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The scope of
6 523 F.2d at 1058.
7 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII states:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.
8 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV provides in part:
[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
9 492 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1974). In this case, a prisoner was placed in solitary confine-

ment for 15 days after hitting a fellow-inmate over the head with a shovel. The court held
that the punishment was not disproportional to the conduct for which it was imposed.
10 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971 ). Here the court held that a cell equipped with a radiator,
running water, commode, and artificial light, although it may have been dirty and dusty, did
not constitute conditions so foul and inhuman as to violate basic concepts of decency.
11 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972). In this case a prisoner was placed in an isolation cell
for a period of five days and was exposed to the following conditions: absence of running water,
a hole for human waste, total darkness except at meals, silence and inability to communicate
with others except by letter, and inability to exercise. But the cell was heated, a mattress was
available, and prisoner was properly clothed. These conditions were held to be unconstitutional.
12 514 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975). Here, state prison officials failed to return a typewriter
and currency belonging to an inmate. The Seventh Circuit held that this intentional deprivation of personal property stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. note 5 supra.
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this clause has been at issue ever since its adoption by the first Congress in 1789.3
The Supreme Court, although never precisely deciding what constitutes an
unconstitutional form of punishment, has provided a conceptual framework
which lower courts can use when faced with eighth amendment claims.
The basis concept underlying the eighth amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man.... The amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of human decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.1 4
While the Seventh Circuit has frequently been asked to determine whether
the eighth amendment is violated by a trial court imposing a sentence authorized
by statute upon a criminal defendant,"5 only recently has it been faced with
determining what protection is afforded by that amendment with regard to
prison conditions.' These prior cases, however, do not provide an adequate
13 The debate surrounding the adoption of the cruel and unusual punishment clause,
although brief, focused upon the ambiguity of that clause. The entire discussion follows:
Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words "nor cruel and unusual
punishment;" the import of 'them being too indefinite.
Mr. Livermore: The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on
which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I
do not think it necessary. What is meant -by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be
the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine. No cruel or unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary
to hang a man, villains often deserve whippings, and perhaps having their ears cut
off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because
they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from
the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature
to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to
be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.
I Annals of Cong. 754 (1789) [1789-1791].
14 Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954) (deportation of alien not
punishment within meaning of eighth amendment); United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899
(7th Cir. 1946) (defendant sentenced to seven years for each of three counts of possessing,
selling, and transferring counterfeit reserve notes, not cruel and unusual); United States v.
Ragen, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1945) (199 year sentence for murder not cruel and unusual).
16 Federal judicial intervention into state prison disciplinary procedures via the eighth
amendment is a relatively recent development. Historically, that amendment, originally aimed
at prohibiting such punishments as pillorying, decapitation, disemboweling, and drawing and
quartering, remained lifeless and ineffective until the beginning of the twentieth century. See
Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv.
L. Rav. 635, 636-37 (1966). In 1910, the Supreme Court held in Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910), that a sentence imposing 15 years of hard labor, civil interdiction, and
surveillance for life, all for the crime of falsifying an official public document, was cruel and
unusual punishment. The Court stated: "[Ti be vital, [the eighth amendment] must be capable of wider application than the mischief that gave it birth." Id. at 378. For approximately
the next 50 years, convicted felons unsuccessfully attacked the constitutionality of the statutes
under which they were sentenced. In response, courts paid little attention to these arguments,
developing a rule-still viable today-that a sentence imposed by a legislative enactment for
an offense will ordinarily not be regarded as cruel and unusual punishment. See Akers v.
United States, 280 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1960); Martin v. United States, 100 F.2d 490 (l0th
Cir. 1939). But see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973).
Then in 1958, the Supreme Court decided Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), wherein
it held that a statute requiring the loss of citizenship for desertion from the armed services in
time of war to be an unconstitutional form of punishment. The Court expanded somewhat on
the nature of the eighth amendment, stating that its underlying purpose is the preservation
of human dignity as defined by contemporary society. This concept of human, dignity, however, is not limited to the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
It is a value which the Supreme Court has implicitly protected in other constitutional contexts.
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (eighth amendment-cruel and unusual
punishment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) '(fourteenth amendment-due pro-
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guideline for resolving the prison-related issues. The sentencing decisions, unlike
the prison cases, do not involve independent judicial determinations of the current standards of human dignity. Rather, the court in those cases yielded to the
Legislature's perception of those standards by focusing merely upon whether or
not the punishment was within the prescriptions of the statute. This analysis is
of no value where the constitutionality of prison conditions is at issue, since a
court must determine for itself the meaning of human dignity without the
assistance of a Legislature.
In 1971, the Seventh Circuit in Adams v. Pate" examined for the first time
the sufficiency of a prisoner's complaint alleging unconstitutional living conditions
in an isolation cell at the Illinois State Penitentiary in Joliet, Illinois. The plaintiffs, unable to buttress their claim for relief with authority from the Seventh
Circuit, maintained that the Second Circuit's decision in Wright v. McMann s
and the Tenth Circuit district court decision in Jordan v. Fitzharris9 supported
their contention that conditions within their cells violated the eighth amendment.
Speaking for the court in Adams, Judge Casle distinguished the cases relied upon
by the plaintiffs on the basis of the relative severity of conditions encountered by
cess) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (commerce clause-right to travel) ; United
States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (thirteenth amendment-involuntary servitude). Cf.
Note, Race Relations and Supreme Court Decision-Making: Jurisprudential Reflections, 51
NoTRE D mE LAwYER 91, 99-105 (1975).
Before the 1960's, federal judicial review of the internal affairs of state penitentiaries was
uncommon. Respecting the doctrine of abstention, and bowing to the knowledge and expertise
of prison officials, federal courts intervened only where exceptional circumstances existed. The
Seventh Circuit found such exceptional circumstances in Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273
(7th Cir. 1957) (deprivation of essential medical care), but not in Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d
165 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 387 U.S. 546 (1964) (denial of privileges based on religious
beliefs); United States v. Radio Station WERN, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953) (racial discrimination); Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950) (conspiracy by officials to deny
prisoners certain rights and privileges); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944) *(denial
of Bible).
The 1958 Tropp decisions was followed by a series of cases in which the Supreme Court
expanded the application of the amendment to state governmental action. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), resolved a serious conflict among the circuit courts as to whether
or not the eighth amendment was binding- on the states, answering in the affirmative. Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), held that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 created a cause of action for
deprivations of constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of state law and Cooper
v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), construed the term "person" within that section to include an
individual confined in a state prison.
Thus, it was not until 1964 that the legal principles surrounding a state prisoner's ability
to gain access to federal court to redress infringements upon his constitutional rights became
firmly established.
17 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971).
18 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). In this case, a state prisoner at the Clinton State Prison
in Dannemora, New York, was twice confined to a punitive "strip cell," the first time for a
period of 33 days and the second for a period of 21 days. It was alleged that each day from
7:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. the prisoner was forced to stand at military attention in the front
of his cell, which contained a broken sink and commode covered with the human wastes of
prior occupants. The inmate also stated he was forced to eliminate on the floor and was denied
toilet paper, soap, and a toothbrush. Furthermore, during winter nights the windows of Wright's
cell were opened, thereby exposing him to subfreezing temperatures wiihout any clothing or
blankets to protect himself. The conditions wer6 held to be violative of the eighth amendment.
19 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). Here, the plaintiff alleged that upon his arrival
to an isolation cell, the floors and walls were covered with the bodily wastes of previous inmates. There being no commode or running water in the cell, the plaintiff was forced to eliminate on the concrete floor. Further, he averred that he was denied a toothbrush, tooth paste,
and toilet paper, and was forced to sleep absolutely naked on a stiff canvas mat approximately
4.5 by 5.5 feet during his entire 15 day stay in the cell. Although the confinement was held
to be unconstitutional, the court refused to grant the plaintiff's demand for monetary relief.
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the prisoners in each case. The court held that, unlike the facts presented in
Wright and Jordan,the allegations of plaintiffs in Adams-il0 to 15 days of confinement in a cell equipped with a properly functioning radiator, sink, and commode-neither offended the human dignity of the inmates nor posed a threat to
their health. Thus, although the Adams plaintiffs alleged the cell to be "inhuman, filthy and foul," the conditions were held not to be "so foul, so inhuman,
and so violative of basic concepts of decency"2 ° as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
Approximately three years later, the court in Thomas v. Pate"' applied the
Adams standard to conditions of confinement allegedly existing at the same
Illinois prison. The prisoner Thomas maintained that:
[Hie was confined in cells housing ten to eleven prisoners with dimensions
of 21' x 10'; that the cells are made of rough, cold and damp concrete, that
the cells have no hot water and only one toilet; that in winter it is so cold
that ice forms on the cell's inner walls; that there are "roaches, ticks, millipedes, spiders, silverfish, centipedes, louses, and mice in the cells; .

.

. and

that the cell is enclosed by22 both a steel gate door and a wooden window
shutting out air and light.

The court held that, based upon these allegations, Thomas might be able to show
a set of facts supporting his claim that conditions in these cells were violative of
the eighth amendment. Judge Fairchild, writing for the Thomas majority, distinguished the case from Adams on the basis of the relative harshness of the circumstances alleged by the plaintiffs. In Thomas, the specific averments of degrading and unhealthy conditions went beyond the mere unpleasantness and
inconvenience experienced in Adams. These particularized allegations were sufficient to allow Thomas an opportunity to show that the conditions may have
been offensive to contemporary standards of decency and potentially injurious
to the mental and physical well-being of the inmates.
A reading of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Thomas and the Second Circuit's decision in Wright reveals some of the determinative factors of a valid
eighth amendment claim. The courts have interpreted the mandates of that
amendment to require penal institutions to provide inmates with those basic
elements of personal hygiene which are consistent with current standards of
human decency. Thus a heated cell containing a properly functioning commode
and sink, and which provides adequate space, light, and sleeping accommodations
will not infringe upon a prisoner's eighth amendment rights. The absence of
these factors, or any combination which sufficiently offends contemporary standards of decency, will allow an aggrieved party the opportunity to present his
claim in a federal forum.
The Seventh Circuit, on the basis of these cases has expressly recognized that
human dignity is the value being ensured by the eighth amendment, yet the court
has not specifically addressed the "time" factor in an eighth amendment claim:
How long must a prisoner be exposed to degrading conditions before the confine20

387 F.2d at 526.

22

Id. at 159.

21

493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1974).
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ment impinges constitutional protections? The 15 days of exposure to the conditions encountered in Thomas represent the shortest time interval from which
the court has had an opportunity to examine the relationship of duration of contact to conditions existing within a cell. The time element in that case, however,
drew no discussion from the court; it proceeded on the assumption that approximately two weeks of exposure to the allegedly debasing conditions were sufficient
under then-current standard of human decency to state a claim for relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although in a less punitive context, the Seventh Circuit has
also recognized that 77.5 hours of exposure to conditions which offend contemporary concepts of decency were sufficient to state a cause of action under the
1871 Civil Rights Act. In Wheeler v. Glass,23 a parent and a next friend of two
mentally retarded youths, institutionalized at the Children and Adolescent Unit
at the Elgin State Hospital in Elgin, Illinois, brought a class action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging cruel and unusual punishment by hospital officials in their treatment of the children. The
complaint specifically averred that the children were summarily bound to their
beds in a spread-eagle fashion and placed in a public area of the hospital for
77.5 hours following allegedly homosexual acts. The court focused its attention
upon the nature and severity of the hospital practice and current public opinion
regarding that form of punishment; the length of time the children were bound
to their beds received only passing mention. The court found the hospital's
method of discipline to be "unusual" and inconsistent with the "'evolving
standard of decency' in a humane society. ' 24 Since contemporary society would
disapprove of the utilization of this form of punishment upon defenseless retarded
children, the Wheeler court found it unnecessary to elaborate upon the time element.
It can be drawn from Wheeler that time of exposure to impermissible conditions cannot be determinative of an eighth amendment claim without an examination of the conditions themselves. Wheeler intimated that shocking conditions
encountered for a brief period of time may be as violative of the eighth amendment as less shocking conditions endured for a long period of time. Thus, the
shorfer the duration the more closely will courts scrutinize the conditions of confinement; but clearly it cannot be said that a limited exposure to conditionsregardless of their nature-will automatically preclude an eighth amendment
violation.
The district court in Kimbrough apparently determined that it was governed
by precedent and could not extend the eighth amendment to a time period
shorter than those encountered in prior cases. The lower court, however, erroneously construed the precedents when it viewed "exposure time" as an automatic
"cut-off" date to be mechanically applied to every eighth amendment claim,
irrespective of the nature or severity of the alleged punishment. The district court
applied a bifurcated approach, first looking at "exposure time," and then at the
conditions of confinement. Since the plaintiff had not endured those conditions
for the requisite period of time, the complaint was dismissed without examination
23 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
24 Id. at 987.
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of the underlying basis for complaint. However, the Seventh Circuit, in reversing
the decision, reaffirmed the approach taken in Wheeler and other cases that time
is but one factor which must be considered in relationship with the nature and
gravity of the alleged unconstitutional activity.
Other circuit courts have also perceived the eighth amendment to require
the protection of human dignity from unwarranted governmental action, and
have utilized a "totality of the circumstances" approach similar to the Seventh
Circuit's in Kimbrough to determine the sufficiency of a claim alleging an impermissible form of punishment. However, a review of these decisions reveals
that although courts have encountered periods of confinement ranging from 2.5
to 55 days, the primary focus has been placed not upon the time element but
upon the gravity of the conditions alleged by the prisoner.
. The first case to hold unconstitutional the conditions obtaining
in the use
of a punitive cell in a state prison was the 1966 Tenth Circuit district court decision in Jordan v. Fitzharris.2' There, a prisoner at the California Correctional
Training Facility at Soledad was placed in solitary confinement and exposed to
inhuman conditions for a period of 11 days. The court, while mentioning the
period of confinement, was predominately concerned with the nature of the conditions, stating, "When... it appears... prison authorities... have abandoned
elemental concepts of decency by permitting conditions to prevail of a shocking
and debased nature, then courts must interfere. 2 6
The following year, the Second Circuit decided Wright v. McMann,17 where
in it was held that conditions encountered by an inmate in an isolation cell for a
period of 55 days constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court here
elaborated somewhat on the time element, stating, "Civilized standards of human
decency do not permit a man for a substantialperiod of time to be denuded and
exposed to the bitter cold of northern New York State and to be deprived of the
basic elements of hygiene. . . ." The court's approach in Wright makes it clear
that the length of time an individual withstands a degrading environment is not
by itself determinative of the eighth amendment claim. Rather, what constitutes
a "substantial period of time" must be defined in relation to the nature and
severity of the conditions to which the prisoner is exposed. In Wright, the time
of confinement, 55 days, was definitely substantial, since the complainant was
adversely affected both physically and mentally by the segregation confinement.
Two years later, in Hancock v. Avery," a Sixth Circuit district court examined the conditions within a punitive isolation cell at the Tennessee State Penitentiary at Nashville. The court held the conditions to be unconstitutional without even stating the duration of confinement. Hancock's eighth amendment
formulation of the time element was as follows: "Confinement under the condi25 257 F. Supp. 674 '(N.D. Cal. 1966). For the facts of this case see note 19 supra.
26 Id. at 680.
27 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). For the facts of this case see note 18 supra.
28 Id. at 526 (emphasis supplied).
29 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). In this case, the prisoner was placed in a concrete cell which measured 5 x 8 feet. At the rear of the cell there was a hole for bodily wastes
which only a guard on the outside of the unit could operate. The prisoner was denied the
use of soap, towels, toilet paper, and other essential elements of hygiene, and was forced to
sleep on a bare concrete floor wiihout any clothing or blankets. These conditions were held
to be violative of the eighth amendment.
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tions of harshness and cruelty reflected by the present record should not be tolerated for any length of time, however brief.""0
Consistent with this view is Knuckles v. Prasse,3 decided in 1969 by a district
court in the Fourth Circuit. The court held there that confinement within a
primitive-type cell for a period of 2.5 days was cruel and unusual punishment.
The court referred to the passage in Wright that an individual should not be
exposed to degrading conditions for a "substantial period of time," and concluded
that 60 hours of confinement in a damp, foul smelling cell without soap, towels,
or toilet paper was a length of time sufficient to deprive an individual of his personal dignity within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
In 1972, the Second Circuit, which had earlier denounced the prison conditions in Wright (55 days), held in LaReau v. MacDougall32 that exposure for
a period of five days to conditions which offend contemporary standards of
human decency was within the proscription of the eighth amendment. Although
the time of exposure was substantially less and the graity of the conditions did
not approach the level of severity encountered in Wright, the court held nevertheless that "[C]ausing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in close confines with
his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be permitted.... In
order to preserve human dignity of inmates and the standards of humanity embraced by our society, we cannot sanction such punishment.""3 Thus the harshness
of the conditions encountered by the inmate in LaReau foreclosed any need for
the discussion of time. The LaReau court's approach is entirely consistent with
its earlier application of the eighth amendment in Wright. The time element
remains as a factor in the court's formulation, which must be considered together
with surrounding facts and circumstances; it cannot be viewed as the sole determinative criterion of an eighth amendment claim.
This review of the applicable case law reveals that, in Kimbrough, the
Seventh Circuit has expressly recognized the prevailing view among the circuit
courts that the parameters of the protection afforded by the eighth amendment
are not static, but are rather continually evolving. This perception is crucial to
the continued viability of the, eighth amendment's underlying purpose of protecting the ever-developing concept of human dignity.
2. Solitary Confinement
Besides examining the conditions the prisoner was exposed to, the Seventh
Circuit also considered the constitutionality of Kimbrough's transfer to solitary
confinement. It concluded that the imposition of this punishment, which folId. at 792.
31 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Here, the two plaintiffs were confined to a punitive
cell which had no windows or artificial light, only one bed, and a commode which overflowed
when it was used. The prisoners were also denied the use of soap, towels, toilet paper, and
other hygienic elements.
Although the court concluded that 2.5 days of exposure to these conditions was cruel and
unusual punishment, it limited the plaintiffs' remedy to injunctive relief, denying the prisoners'
demand for monetary damages.
32 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
33 Id. at 978.
30
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lowed the plaintiff's repeated demands for permission to contact his attorney,
could also constitute punishment so cruel and unusual as to violate the eighth
amendment. The court stated, "Such allegations would permit the plaintiff to
prove that his confinement violated the Eighth Amendment... for being grossly
out of proportion to the conduct for which punishment was imposed. 3 14 This
standard of "proportionality" was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in
Weems v. United States35 as a permissible means by which to define the nebulous
terms "cruel" and "unusual."
The cases which have adopted and applied this "proportionality" standard
can be classified into two broad categories. The first includes cases which focus
upon whether state prison officials had any justification to impose punishment;
the second includes cases where the inquiry is directed towards the severity of
the punishment imposed where some justification for the official's action originally
existed. The distinction is important, since courts will not tolerate the imposition
of any punishment upon a prisoner who has not encroached upon a prison regulation. However, where wrongful conduct has occurred, courts will generally
yield to the discretion of prison officials unless the disciplinary measures are grossly
disproportionate to the misconduct, a finding which is quite infrequent. 6
Kimbrough falls within the former category of cases; it represents the first
decision in which the Seventh Circuit has applied the "proportionality" standard
to a factual setting wherein prison officials have taken disciplinary action against
an inmate known to be innocent of any prison violation. The standard itself,
however, had been previously adopted and applied by the court to the second
category of cases involving inmate misbehavior.
In 1973, Adams v. Carlsons ' expressly recognized the rule that punishment
must not be disproportionate to the conduct for which it is imposed. Judge Swygert, writing for the majority, commented:
Disproportionality ... is partly a question of fact and wholly one of degree.
An inmate who refuses to shave his beard does not ordinarily deserve solitary
confinement. Conversely, a mastermind of a large-scale escape attempt ...
may justly receive more than a few days in isolation. 38
The court was cognizant that prison officials must be accorded a wide degree
of latitude in the administration of prison affairs and that prisoners are subject
to reasonable rules and regulations. However, where prison officials exercise their
power and discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, the prisoner's eighth
amendment guarantees will allow him to seek redress in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. In Adams, however, the court was unable to apply the standard
because state prison officials had not precisely stated the violations allegedly committed by each prisoner which had given rise to the imposition of the disciplinary
measures.
34 523 F.2d at 1059.
35 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
36 See, e.,., Sostre v. MrGinnin, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (indefinite isolation);
Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967) '(isolation for more than two years);
Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (over 400 days of isolation, no visitation ri'hts).
37 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
38 Id. at 636.
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The first case to determine the merits of a prisoner's claim alleging disproportionality between conduct and punishment and to apply the "proportionality"
standard was Nelson v. Heyne3 9 This case was a class action instituted by the
next friends of two children incarcerated at the Indiana Boys School in Plainfield,
Indiana, alleging that certain practices employed by school officials amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, the complaint stated that as a
means of corporal punishment the defendants had beaten the children on the
buttocks with a "fraternity paddle," causing bleeding and great pain. The record
revealed several instances wherein 160-pound juveniles had been hit five times
with the paddle by a 285-pound man (in one case with such force that it had
caused a child to sleep on his face for three days). Another child reported that,
although he was suffering from blisters on his buttocks from prior beatings, the
guards persisted in using the paddle on him. The plaintiffs alleged that as another
means of corporal punishment the officials had employed the use of dangerous
tranquilizing drugs. Expert medical testimony given before the district court
revealed that the drugs could cause
...the collapse of the cardiovascular system, the closing of the patient's throat
with consequent asphyxiation, a depressant effect on the production of bone
marrow, jaundice from an affected liver, and drowsiness ....40

The children, while admitting they were guilty of escaping from the school and
assaulting other children, maintained that the severity of the punishment was
disproportional to the offenses committed. Both the district and appellate courts
agreed. The Seventh Circuit stated that the beatings had the result of producing
animosity between the boys and the school, thereby frustrating the rehabilitative
purpose of the institution. As for the administration of the drugs, the court held
that their use was "punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amendment
which attained the degree of severity offensive to the Constitution. It noted that
the potential danger flowing from the use of the drugs went beyond the school's
authority to promulgate and enforce regulations which rationally relate to the
permissible state interest of returning maladjusted juveniles to society.
In 1974, the Seventh Circuit again faced the question of "proportionality"
between conduct and punishment in Haines v. Kerner;41 here, however, it disallowed the prisoner's complaint. The prisoner in Haines had been confined to
"isolation" at the Illinois State Penitentiary for 15 days after he had hit a fellowinmate over the head with a shovel. His complaint alleged that the disciplinary
action constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court upheld the dismissal
of the complaint, saying that the use of solitary confinement was not per se unconstitutional, but rather a legitimate and permissible means of maintaining order
within the prison. Since the plaintiff had engaged in conduct "which had a substantial likelihood of causing serious bodily harm,"' -" the 15 days of confinement
imposed by prison officials was held not to be an abuse of their authority to
maintain peace and order within the prison.
39

491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).

40 Id. at 357.
41 492 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1974).
42 Id. at 942.
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Thus, Nelson, Adams, and Haines, represent the extent of the court's discussion of "proportionality" as a means of giving substance to the words of the
eighth amendment."3 They fall, however, into the second group of cases where
the punished party was involved in some wrongdoing. In such cases, the complainant must show that prison authorities have abused their discretion by employing a form of punishment which constitutes an unreasonable means of reprimanding certain misbehavior. Prisoner Kimbrough, on the other hand, was
transferred to a punitive cell for attempting to exercise his constitutional right to
communicate with counsel. There was no indication that his conduct was unreasonable, destructive, or potentially harmful to anyone. Under such circumstances,
the plaintiff need merely show that some form of disciplinary action was taken
against him.
Although the Seventh Circuit had never before encountered such wholly
arbitrary action on the part of state officials, other circuit courts have had occasion to examine such allegations. For example, in Thomas v. Brierly" a state
prisoner filed a claim alleging that the defendant's denial of visitation rights was
an impermissible form of punishment under the eighth amendment as well as a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Third
Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint by the district court, which had
found the complaint to be "frivolous." The court stated: "[I]t is conceivable
that the denial of visitation privileges without a reasonable justification might
amount to cruel and unusual punishment."45 To support this conclusion, the
court cited the Fourth Circuit's 1973 decision in Almond v. Kent.4 6 There, a
prisoner at the Augusta County Jail in Virginia filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that the sheriff and guards at the prison had arbitrarily placed
him in "isolation" and denied him visits from his wife and family. The plaintiff,
claiming to be innocent of any wrongdoing, believed that the punishment imposed upon him was both in contravention of the eighth amendment and sufficient to state a cause of action under the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Although the
district court disagreed, on appeal it was held that the allegations were sufficient
to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Thus Kimbrough can be added to a growing list of cases which have held
that punishment without justification may be cruel and unusual. The severity of
the disciplinary action need not be great where state officials act in a totally
arbitrary and capricious manner. The circuit courts are not willing to tolerate
any intentional and discriminatory action on the part of governmental authorities
directed against innocent prisoners which serves to deprive them of any rights or
privileges enjoyed by the general prison community.

43 In Potter v. Cloch, 497 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1974), the court, although not expressly
mentioning "proportionality," held that where a prisoner was placed in isolation on four different occasions totaling eight days for damaging security cameras within the prison, the action
was administrative in nature and not a form of punishment.
44 481 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1972).
45 Id. at 661.
46 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
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Deprivation of Property
Having resolved the eighth amendment issues in favor of the plaintiff, the
court then addressed Kimbrough's final contention-that the defendant's failure
to return his diamond ring was a deprivation of property without due lprocess as
mandated by the fourteenth amendment. Judge Cummings, with Judges Swygert
and Stevens agreeing only in the result, 7 summarily concluded that the allegation
was both sufficient to state a claim for relief under Illinois tort law and, relying
on the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Carroll,4" sufficient to state a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The majority's brief disposition of the plaintiff's claim accurately reflects
the current approach being taken by other circuit courts confronted with similar
claims.4 9 Under the prevailing rule, the inquiry is directed towards the nature
of the defendant's conduct. If the loss of property is the result of the intentional
or grossly negligent behavior of prison officials, as opposed to their mere negligence, the prisoner's claim will (1) satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1343," ° and (2) constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. This rule applies without
regard to the property's value. Thus, the action may be brought in federal court
pursuant to § 1983.
This principle, fashioned at the appellate level, has met with considerable
disapproval by district court judges who have found themselves adjudicating
prisoners' complaints demanding the return of, or reimbursement for, seven
packages of cigarettes,"1 a pair of shoes,52 $3.52," s $4.00,"4 $206.00,"5 and
47 The entire court agreed that on remand the district court should exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state property claim. Judges Cummings and Swygert believed that the claim
presented a cause of action under § 1983. Judge Stevens, on the other hand, found that the
claim failed under that section, but concluded that it was pendent to the eighth amendment
issues presented by the plaintiff.
48 514 F.2d 415 "(7th Cir. 1975).
49 See cases cited in notes 50-55 supra.
50 Before 1972, however, such property claims would have been dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds if they did not satisfy the $10,000 requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). To
illustrate, the Fourth Circuit in Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 436 F.2d 342 (4th
Cir. 1972), denied a complaint by a state prisoner which sought the return of, or reimbursement for, certain personal property valued at $3.52. The court, noting an apparent overlap
between 28 U.S.C. §9 1331 and 1343 (3) (1970), adopted the rationale of Justice Stone in
Hague v. CIO,307 U.S. 496 (1939), that § 1343(3) applied to fourteenth amendment deprivations of "liberty," and § 1331 to deprivations of "property." Since the claim in Weddle
failed to satisfy the jurisdictional amount of the latter statute, it was dismissed.
The prisoner appealed the dlecision to the Supreme Court, 405 U.S. 1036 (1972), which
reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
In that case, Household Finance garnished a consumer's savings account upon her failure
to make payments on a promissory note. Lynch brought an action in federal district court
under § 1983, alleging that the state's garnishment procedure was unconstitutional. The court
dismissed for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970); the Supreme Court
reversed.
The Court held that there is no distinction between personal liberties and proprietary
rights under the jurisdictional statute of § 1343(3), and that the jurisdictional amount of §
1331 need not be satisfied in a civil rights action.
51 Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973).
52 Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
53 Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1972).
54 Montana v. Harrelson, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975).
55 Cruz v. Cardwel, 486 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1973).
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$426.00. " The lower courts' initial response to this demand on their judicial
resources was to dismiss such actions on jurisdictional grounds. However, this
effort proved fruitless as circuit courts, bound by the Supreme Court's decision
in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,5" would reverse, at times reluctantly,"
the dismissals.
The district court in Kimbrough, recognizing the futility of dismissing on
jurisdictional grounds, took a more novel approach. It held that although the
loss of the ring was arguably a deprivation of property without due process of
law, the fourteenth amendment was not designed to protect such a loss. Although
this holding was reversed, it had the effect of shifting the focus of Judges Swygert
and Stevens from the firmly established jurisdictional issue to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Their concurring opinions argued that an
inherent weakness with the prevailing rule is its failure to explain why a state
which provides an inmate with a means of postdeprivation relief can still deny
the plaintiff the due process of law. The concurring opinions sought to provide
that answer. Judge Swygert, agreeing that the plaintiff had been denied due
process, sought to resolve the constitutional ambiguity in terms of substantive due
process.5 9 Conversely, Judge Stevens concluded that the availability of a state
procedure allowing for recovery of property damage against state authorities
satisfied due process requirements.
In his concurring opinion,"0 Judge Swygert expressed the belief that a person
acting under the color of state law who intentionally confiscates, damages, or
destroys the personal property of a prisoner violates the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of substantive due process, regardless of the procedural safeguards
made available by the state. He concluded, "[I]f under all the circumstances,
the State could not possibly justify the action taken by its agent, the action violates due process and the agent is liable under section 1983. '' 61 Thus, in Kimbrough, since the state could not justify the continued deprivation of the ring by
the sheriff and his deputies, the misconduct was a denial of substantive due
process, sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983.
56
57
58
of the

Demps v. Wainwright, 522 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1975).
405 U.S. 538 (1972). For the factual setting of Lynch see note 50 supra.
Judge Adams of the Third Circuit expressed bewilderment in the Russell court's reversal
district court, stating:
This result may well be expected to come as a surprise to the district court judge
who dismissed the complaint. It will also no doubt generate a certain amount of
disbelief in those taxpayers and citizens generally, not to mention judges and lawyers,
who will ask how federal courts have come to be concerned with a case in which a
state prisoner alleges simply that his constitutional rights were violated when a prison
guard took his seven packages of cigarettes from him. I have yet to answer the
question satisfactorily for myself.
489 F.2d at 282.
59 Substantive due process may be defined as the guarantee that no person shall be deprived
of his life. liberty, or pronerty by arbitrary or capricious legislative action. See Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 '(1934).
60 Judge Swygert found it necessary to distinguish Kirnbrough from the Seventh Circuit
decision in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975). In that case, state prison
guards allegedly had left the plaintiff's cell door open, allowing others to enter and remove
his trial transcript. In writing for the court, Judge Stevens held that the misconduct, although
attributable to the state, was not without due process of law since the state provided a means
of adeauately compensating the plaintiff for his loss. Thus, since the court in Kimbrough did
not overrule or limit its prior decision in Bonner, Judge Swygert reconciled the two cases by
limiting the rationale expressed in Bonner to negligence actions.
61 523 F.2d at 1062.
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However, Judge Stevens cautioned that adoption of the notion of substantive due process in civil rights actions "may have two different meanings." 2
It may mean that deprivations of property motivated by the defendant's racial,
social, political, religious, or moral prejudices will be violative of due process, or
it may refer to deprivations of property by state authorities which the state cannot
adequately justify. The distinction is important, since both the burden of proof
and the doctrine of federalism will be significantly affected by the interpretation
ultimately chosen. First, under the "motivational" theory, the plaintiff Will have
the onerous burden of establishing the defendant's motive and intent; however,
the burden is tranferred to the defendant under the "justification" theory. Under
this latter theory, the plaintiff need simply allege a deprivation of property by
an agent of the state. The defendant will then have the burden of establishing
sufficient justification for his conduct; otherwise, liability will arise.
Furthermore, under the "justification" theory, whenever a state does not
adequately justify the reasons for its conduct, the federal court would have authority to interfere. It would appear that damage to or loss of property resulting
from the simple negligence of state authorities would then have constitutional
ramifications. Such an interpretation would seriously undercut the prevailing
general rule among the circuit courts that mere negligence by state public officials
is insufficient to bring a claim within § 1983.6" Moreover, as Judge Stevens
observed, "It is this... version of substantive due process that has... generated

criticism that the federal judiciary is wont to arrogate to itself powers not granted
'
by statute or by the federal Constitution."64
Hence, the ambiguity and the potentially adverse consequences surrounding
the use of the substantive due process approach appear to outweigh its utility as
a guide to establishing the parameters of § 1983. The doctrine, although supplying an underlying constitutional theory, actually provides more form than substance. It places a "denial of due process" label upon each intentional deprivation of property caused by the state, but it fails to satisfactorily explain the due
process clause in relation to the availability of state remedies. Judge Stevens, on
the other hand, directly faced this issue in his concurring opinion; he concluded
that the availability of a state procedure which allows the plaintiff full compensation for the negligent's or intentional harm to his property by state officials
does satisfy due process requirements. Thus, he would have dismissed the prisoner's cause of action based on the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
Judge Stevens recognized that the conduct of the defendants in Kimbrough
may have violated the prisoner's property rights guaranteed by the fourteenth

62 Id. at 1063.
63 Complaints alleging inadequate medical treatment have drawn most of the discussion
that mere negligence is insufficient to state a cause of action under the § 1983. See, e.g.,

Robinson v. Jordan, 494 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1974) ; Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.
1974); Jones v. Lochhart, 484 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974); Campbell v. Patterson, 377 F. Supp.
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also 523 F.2d at 1067.
64 Id. at 1064.
65 In Bonner, Judge Stevens expressed his belief that where the negligent harm to property may be redressed in a state court, the deprivation is not without due process of law. See
also Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "'Background"of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 23 (1974).
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amendment.66 There being no question that the loss of the ring was a deprivation
of property attributable to the sovereign under that amendment, his opinion,
then, was primarily focused upon whether or not the deprivation was "without
due process of law." The inquiry began with a review of some "elementary"
aspects of the due process clause. Without citing authority, Judge Stevens recognized that due process is not an inflexible or static concept, but is rather a safeguard, the protection of which varies according to the nature and gravity of the
deprivation suffered. 7 Thus, where an individual is deprived solely of property,
under the fourteenth amendment it is well-established that due process merely
requires "a meaningful hearing at an appropriate time."" Although notice and
hearing prior to the state's taking of property are generally required, the Supreme
Court has held on several occasions that, under certain circumstances, a citizen
may be constitutionally denied a prior hearing."
Applying these principles to the facts in Kimbrough, Judge Stevens concluded that the state provided the prisoner with due process of law. It was first
recognized that, as a practical matter, a hearing subsequent to the taking was the
only "appropriate time" in which the merits of the case could have been adjudicated. Since the state could not have anticipated the alleged unauthorized misconduct of the sheriff and his deputies, it could not have provided the plaintiff
with any form of procedural safeguards prior to his loss.
Judge Stevens then turned to the question of whether a state procedure
allowing full recovery for property damage is a "meaningful hearing" within the
ambit of the due process clause. This determination involved not only a review
of the adequacy of the state remedy available to the plaintiff, but also a determination of the standard of care the Constitution requires of the defendant.
Assuming that Illinois would permit full recovery by the plaintiff, Judge Stevens
advanced the proposition that the phrase "without due process of law" should
be then analyzed in terms of the precise constitutional obligation allegedly
breached by the defendant. In other words, Judge Stevens incorporated into
actions brought under § 1983 the notion that the protection afforded by the due
process clause is directly related to the nature and gravity of the deprivation
suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, the standard of care required of the defendant
is not a constant, as is generally assumed by federal courts today, but rather is a
variable which depends upon the particular harm suffered by the plaintiff.
In order to develop this system of constitutional standards, Judge Stevens
66 It was also recognized that the defendant's conduct may have been violative of the
plaintiff's first, fourth, thirteenth, and fourteenth (equal protection) amendment rights. The
discussion, however, was limited to deprivations of property under the fourteenth amendment,
in order to provide an alternative to Judge Swygert's suggestion that substantive due process
be utilized in such cases.
67 Supporting this proposition are Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1970); joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 '(1951); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
68 523 F.2d at 1066. See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ("meaningful
hearing at a meaningful time").
69 Cases cited by Judge Stevens included Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594
(1950) (seizure of misbranded articles in commerce); Fahey v. Mallone, 332 U.S. 245 (1947)
(appointment of conservator of assets of savings and loan association); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503 (1944) (setting of price regulations); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931) (collection of tax); North Am. Cold Storage Co., v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (seizure of food unfit for human consumption).
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suggested that a variety of federal interests must be considered and judicially
balanced. In Kimbrough, he believed that the availability of a state remedy

ensured the federal interests in redressing deprivations of property and preserving
federal judicial resources for significant issues of law, and that the importance
of these two concerns outweighed the federal interest in preventing intentional
harm by state authorities. As a result, Judge Stevens would hold that a state
that adequately compensates an intentional deprivation of property by its agent,
absent a fourth amendment violation, provides the plaintiff with due process
of law."0

It is important to note that the approach taken by Judge Stevens was not
an attempt to establish a system of hard and fast rules in civil rights litigation.
For example, he did not discount or limit the continued viability of Carroll v.
Sielaff7' a Seventh Circuit decision which also involved an intentional deprivation
of property. Recognizing the balance to be a fine one, he noted that other federal
courts may place more significance upon the prevention of intentional misconduct
by prison guards and may thus conclude that such misconduct will be actionable

under § 1983. Furthermore, there may be situations in which federal interests
already secured by a state remedy will be overridden by other federal concerns,
70 Judge Stevens concluded, however, that the property claim was pendent to the plaintiff's eighth amendment contentions, and thus agreed with the majority's decision that the
district court should entertain the property claim on remand. Without citing authority, he
stated:
Our interest in efficient judicial administration, as well as petitioner's interest in
having his right to compensation for the loss of his ring adjudicated in a straightforward manner, both dictate that his property claim be tried in the same proceeding
as his claim based on the conditions of his confinement.
523 F.2d at 1057.
*judge Swygert, however, disagreed with this conclusion. He referred to the Supreme
Cour's analysis of pendent jurisdiction in United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
In that case, the Court held that where the state and federal claims evolve from a "common
nucleus of operative facts" id. at 725, such that the claims present one constitutional "case,"
the federal court may exercise jurisdiction over the state claim.
Applying this language to the facts in Kimbrough, judge Swygert concluded:
I simply do not see such a relationship between the claim under the Eighth Amend-

ment relating to conditions . .

.

of solitary confinement, and a state cause of action

based on the unlawful conversion of a diamond ring. Proof of the federal claim

will do virtually nothing towards establishing the state claim, which has an entirely
separate factual basis.
523 F.2d at 1062 n.9.
Such a restrictive application of Gibbs, however, would fail to effectuate the underlying
purposes of pendent jurisdiction. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court enumerated the purposes of
that doctrine, stating:
It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion. . . . Its iustification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to
exercise jurisdiction over state claims.
383 U.S. at 726. Furthermore, the Gibbs Court observed that the federal policy embraced by
the state claim and the likelihood of jury confusion are additional factors a court should consider in basing its determination. Id. at 727.
Cognizant of this inconvenience to the litigants, the absence of substantial problems of
proof accompanyinz the state claim, the federal interest in redressing deprivations of civil
rights, and the unlikelihood of a jury confusing the underlying legal theories of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments, Judge Stevens decided to apply the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. The decision does not appear to be an incorrect application of Gibbs, nor an abuse of
judicial discretion as suguested by judge Swygert.
See also Parrent v. Midwest Rug Co., 445 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Moor v. Madigan,
458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972); Lomax v. Armstrong Cork Co., 433 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir.
1970); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction,81 HAcv. L. REv. 823 (1967); Note,
Pendent Jurisdiction, 13 LOYOLA L. Rav. 167 '(1967).
71 Carroll v. Sielaff, 514 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975).
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such as the protection of liberty, the prevention of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the protection of
the freedoms of speech and religion. This approach would help reconcile and provide a sound justification for cases which have allowed plaintiffs, alleging negligent deprivations of liberty72 and exposure to cruel and unusual punishment,"3
to proceed in federal court under § 1983.
Hence, Judge Stevens maintained that whether or not the availability of
an adequate state remedy satisfies due process should depend not merely upon
the nature of the defendant's conduct, but also upon both the constitutional right
which has been allegedly impinged and the accompanying standard of care
mandated by the Constitution. This approach appears to be more appropriate
than that of substantive due process as a guide to establishing the parameters of
§ 1983. The former protects the ability of a prisoner to recover damages from
the state and its agents, and helps to conserve federal judicial resources for cases
presenting substantial federal questions. The application of substantive due
process maintains the current discontent of district court judges who must
adjudicate every claim of intentional deprivation of property by state officials.
Under Judge Stevens' formulation, this burden would be transferred to the state
courts. Moreover, unlike substantive due process, Judge Stevens' suggested alternative is based upon the firmly established constitutional premise that the protection afforded by the due process clause is commensurate with the nature and
severity of the harm incurred.
Conclusion
In summarizing the Seventh Circuit's disposition of the constitutional issues
presented in Kimbrough, it is clear that the court soundly resolved the eighth
amendment questions, but failed to adequately justify its handling of the prisoner's property claim under the fourteenth amendment.
The eighth and fourteenth amendments require a balancing of several competing interests in order to ascertain the outer limits of their protections. The
eighth amendment necessitates that a balance be achieved which recognizes the
state's concern of autonomy, the legitimate discretion and expertise of penal authorities, and the constitutional mandate prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.
Although the court in Kimbrough rendered its decision in a summary fashion,
its brevity in no way detracts from its sound underlying policy. The court went
no further than to interpret the eighth amendment to require the protection of
an inmate's dignity and physical well-being from the gross indifference and intentional misconduct of prison guards and officials. The holding is thus entirely
consistent with other courts which have recognized and expressed appreciation
for the delicate balance which must be preserved under the eighth amendment.
However, the maintenance of this balance is dependent upon the ability
of federal courts to accurately determine and apply "current standards of
72 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968) (prolonged detention in prison).
73 Gutierrez v. Department of Pub. Safety, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973) (failure to
prevent one inmate from harming another).
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decency." But is it likely to presume that a federal judge is capable of such a
determination? Although there is no clear answer to this question, there appears
to be no reason to conclude that federal judges as a whole are not cognizant of
the current thoughts and trends of society. To date, the slow maturing and
sophistication of society and its accompanying concern for prison reform have
been reflected in the opinions of the federal courts. Thus, the problem may only
be tangential and remote.
Similarly, the protection afforded by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment also involves a balancing of personal and governmental interests.
However, the federal courts have failed to utilize this approach in civil rights
actions. As a result, their opinions have created both theoretical and practical
difficulties. First, the federal courts have failed to explain why a state providing
an aggrieved party with an adequate hearing subsequent to official misconduct
has denied the party due process, even though the Supreme Court has stated
that in certain situations such a procedure satisfies the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, the practical problem now faced is that district courts must adjudicate
every intentional deprivation of property, regardless of its value.
In Kimbrough, although Judge Cummings ignored these problems, Judges
Swygert and Stevens attempted to provide the answers. Judge Swygert's utilization of substantive due process provides a solution for the theoretical problem,
but fails to alleviate the increasing "small-claims" litigation in federal court. However, under Judge Stevens' formulation of the due process clause, both the theoretical and the practical difficulties would be effectively eliminated.
Although it is uncertain if either of these approaches will eventually become
an acceptable principle of law, it is clear that as the number of property claims
under § 1983 increases in the federal courts, the divergent viewpoints expressed
in the Kimbrough decision will receive the attention of other courts, and will
hopefully offer a starting point for the resolution of the inherent difficulties presented in civil rights litigation.
Thomas Stalzer
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
TO THE DISCHARGE OF PATRONAGE EMPLOYEES

Burns v. Elrod'
The Seventh Circuit in Burns v. Elrod2 ruled that patronage dismissals can
violate the first amendment's protection of an individual's freedom of association.
This holding resulted even though the Seventh Circuit did not find any of the
traditional elements of a first amendment violation of freedom of association.'
1 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975).

2 Id.

3 See Kusper v. Portikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); U.S. Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) ; Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1
(1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Communist Party of America v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 "(1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 523
(1960) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) ;
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958): United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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The plaintiffs in Burns, members of the Republican Party who worked in the
Office of the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, until December 7, 1970, held noncivil service, patronage jobs and, therefore, had no statutory, protection from
summary dismissal.4 Richard J. Elrod, a Democrat, took office as Sheriff of Cook
County, Illinois, on December 7, 1970 and immediately dismissed the plaintiffs
from their jobs.
In the United States District Court, the dismissed employees sought a declaratory judgment as to their rights, compensatory and punitive damages, and
injunctive relief restraining Sheriff Elrod and others' from ".

. conditioning

.

plaintiffs' employment on constitutionally impermissible grounds, restraining further dismissals on such grounds and ordering reinstatement.... ." The gravamen of the complaint alleged that dismissal was predicated upon party affiliation,
and upon refusal to pledge work for the Democratic Party.' The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.'

The injunction was also denied on the theory, ".

.

. that loss of

employment did not constitute a sufficient showing of irreparable injury and
plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law."9
Yet Burns was reversed by the Seventh Circuit based on a prior unique decision rendered by that same court in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis."
4 In Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1975) cert. denied,
410 U.S. 943 "(1973), the Seventh Circuit explained that
[t]he General Assembly had provided an elaborate system regulating the appointment to specified positions solely on the basis of merit and fitness, the grounds for
termination of such employment, and the procedures which must be followed in
connection with hiring, firing, promotion, and retirement.
Id. at 567. The Civil Service Code of employment for Illinois is embodied in Illinois Personal
Code, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 63b101-63b119 (1967). Patronage employees are not protected in this Code, and they serve at the "will" of their superiors. Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (1951).
5 The defendants included Richard J. Elrod, Sheriff of Cook County, at whose direction
the dismissals are claimed to have been made, and Richard J. Daley, President of the Democratic Organization of Cook County and Chairman of the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County. Plaintiffs charged that Mr. Daley and the Democratic Party organizations
were also responsible for the dismissals of plaintiffs, alleging that Mr. Elrod effected the dismissals "under the direction and control of and in conspiracy with these defendants." 509 F.2d
at 1135.
6 509 F.2d at 1135.
7 Sheriff Elrod, a Democrat, dismissed the plaintiffs who were members of the Republican
Party.
8 The district court relied upon the decision in Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.
1971), which held that there were no constitutional problems involved in the dismissal of
patronage employees because of their political affiliation. This holding in Alomar is followed
by a majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals. See note 10 infra.
9 509 F.2d at 1135.
10 The Seventh Circuit had held in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973), that the dismissal of a non-civil service
employee based on political affiliation was violative of the first amendment. This holding is
diametrically opposed to the position of the majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974); Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972). Norton v. Blaylock, 490 F.2d 772 '(8th Cir.
1969). See Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political Justifications, 41 U.
CHS. L. Rav. 297, 307 (1974). The author of this note recognizes that:
Challenges to dismissal from public employment are not new. The courts, however, generally have refused to treat the patronage dismissal as a problem of free
expression or equal protection. Their decisions instead either hold that the patronage
employee has no constitutionally protected interest or conclude that whatever protection the First Amendment affords against dismissal for reasons of political affiliation
is waived by acceptance of a patronage job.
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The court in reversing Burns, held, per Judge Campbell, that the plaintiffs had
stated ".... a legally cognizable claim entitling them to an opportunity to prove
their case."' 1 Indeed, the broad holding in Burns was that: ".... dismissal of a

public employee, not otherwise protected by civil service, because of his or her
political association or beliefs violated the First ... Amendment of the United
States Constitution."' 2 Thus, a Democratic government official could not dismiss
patronage underlings simply because they were Republicans. Such a dismissal,
according to the Seventh Circuit, resulted in punishing an individual because of
his choice of political affiliation and therefore violated the first amendment's
guarantee of freedom of association. The court did not elaborate on the rationale
for this holding, but rather deferred to the "scholarly and persuasive reasons articulated [in Lewis]."'

This comment will maintain that: (1) neither the purpose nor effect of a
mere dismissal of a patronage employee curtails, inhibits or infringes first amendment rights of association, but rather rewards individuals who have worked assiduously for the election of an official with patronage power; and (2) the discharge of a patronage employee even when based on political affiliation is constitutionally permissible if it is motivated by a desire to change personnel and is not
intended to destroy or to curtail, through economic reprisal, first amendment
associational rights. Accordingly, petitioners in Burns failed to allege a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and the Seventh Circuit, in reversing the lower
court, misapplied first amendment protection to these petitioners.
Bailey v. Richardson: Previous Challenges to the PatronageSystem
The patronage system has endured a long history of challenges brought by
displaced officeholders." As early as 1838, the United States Supreme Court,
confronted with the question of whether a United States District Court judge had
the authority to remove one clerk and appoint another, 5 held:
All offices, the tenure of which is not fixed by the Constitution or limited by
law, must be held either during good behavior, or (which is the same thing
in contemplation of law) during the life of the incumbent or must be held
at the will and discretion of some department of the government, and subject
to removal at pleasure. It cannot for a moment be admitted that it was the

.intention of the Constitution that those offices denominated inferior offices
should be held during life. And if removable at pleasure, by whom is such
removal to be made? In the absence of all constitutional provision or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule to consider
the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment.' 6
Originally, in determining the rights an individual had, the courts undertook to determine
whether the individual was enjoying a right or a privilege dispensed by the state.
11 509 F.2d at 1135.

12

Id.

13 Id.
14 See Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227
(1880); Ex parte Herman 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 223 (1839); Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349
(4th Cir. 1974); Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973); Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 "(2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1020; Norton v. Blaylock, 409 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1969).
15 Ex parte Hennan 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 223 (1839).
16 Id. at 259 (emphasis supplied).
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This position was reaffirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court in Bailey v.
1 where a discharged non-civil service employee claimed
Richardson,"
that her
".... dismissal impinged upon the rights of free speech and assembly protected
by the First Amendment, since her dismissal was premised upon alleged political
activity.""8 The Supreme Court approved the lower court's position, that:
. . . so far as the Constitution is concerned there is no prohibition against

dismissal of Government employees because of their political beliefs, activities
or affiliations. That document standing alone does not prevent Republican
Presidents from dismissing Democrats or Democratic Presidents from dismissing Republicans."
The lower court as well as the Supreme Court did not believe it to be the proper
province of the judicial system to determine job criteria. Indeed, it is clear from
political reality that the state legislature's approval is necessary for the continuance or creation of all state agencies and departments, and that consequently the
function, responsibilities and duties of the myriad governmental agencies are within the peculiar knowledge and understanding of the legislature. Armed with this
reality, it is apparent, as the lower court proffered and the Supreme Court concurred in Bailey, that the political branches of government (the executive and
legislative) are better suited for determinations of which jobs should or should
not be civil service positions.2 0
The Seventh Circuit, however, stated its belief 2' that the theory of public
employment expressed in Bailey2 had been "universally rejected." 2 Yet there
is no support for this contention, since no case decided by the United States
Supreme Court expressly overrules Bailey. 4 It is true, as the Seventh Circuit
noted, that the right-privilege distinction in government benefits has met its
demise,2" and that the government is charged with the duty of fairly administering
17 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
18 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (1950).
19 Id.
20 The Constitution did not write political miscellany into the structure of the executive
branch; Congress has done that. The first amendment guarantees free speech and assembly,
but it does not guarantee government employ. Id.
21 Judge Campbell in the instant case does not proffer any reasoning for the Seventh Circuit's belief that the dismissal of patronage employees based on political affiliation infringes
first amendment rights, but rather relies upon the reasoning of a prior Seventh Circuit case of
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
928 (1973). Therefore, the discussion of the instant case necessitates analyzing the reasoning
posited in Lewis.
22 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
23 See Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 at 568 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
24 Several editors have commented that the Seventh Circuit's position is a departure from
the accepted rule. See Note, supra note 10, at 316-17; Note, Public Employees-Freedom of
Association-Dischargeof Non-Policy-Making Public Employee's Freedom of Association, 26
VAND L. REV. 1090, 1097 (1973).
25 See Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions Upon Public Employment: New Departures in
the Protection of First Amendment Rights, 21 HAsTINos L. J. 129 (1969); Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1439
(1968). Originally, in determining the rights of an individual, the courts undertook to determine whether the individual was enjoying a right or a privilege dispensed by the stated. Justice
Holmes carried in "store" the distinction between right and privilege in McAuliffe v. Mayor,
155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1872) by stating: "The petitioner may have a con-
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its largesse." However, continued acceptance of Bailey does not turn upon the
adoption of the old right-privilege distinction but rather upon adopting Bailey's
definition of the term and scope of non-civil service patronage employment.
Unlike the qualifications required for state certification of a doctor, lawyer,
teacher or mechanic, under Bailey the patronageemployee only brings his party
affiliation to his employment. He serves at the discretion of the appointing authority, individual, or department." As long as the exercise of that discretionary
power to remove is not abusive,2" the patronage employee cannot be heard to
complain, no matter who exercises that discretion in discharging him. Indeed,
it would be unthinkable to impose stricter standards upon an incoming officeholder than required for the original appointing officer. The power of removal
is properly only an incident of any job;9 an instrument primarily designed to
effect changes in personnel and not to curtail associational ties.
Thus, contrary to the announced belief of the Seventh Circuit, the purpose
of the dismissal of the patronage employee is not necessarily to restrain the political affiliation of that employee, but rather to enable the incoming executive to
surround himself with those with whom he believes he can work."0
Moreover, it is unlikely that the discharged patronage employee would
prevent removal even if he were to refrain from participating in the activities of
his political party or to change his party affiliation"' since the patronage system
is a mechanism used to reward party workers who have already contributed
money or effort to a successful candidate or where some personal or professional
connection exists between the patronage employee and the appointing official.
Finally, although patronage employment has no statutory protection,32 the
Seventh Circuit's position that public employment cannot and should not be
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." This
position has since receded and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that constitutional protections
are available to individuals irrespective of right or privilege. The Court has imposed upon
government the duty to administer its largesse fairly.
26 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 "(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
27 See note 14, supra.
28 See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); McLaughlin v. Tilendis,
398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Birnbaum v. Trussel, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966); Johnson v.
Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947).
29 See note 14, supra.
30 Even the Seventh Circuit recognizes the constitutional permissibility of "the public
executive's right to use political philosophy as one criterion in the selection of policy-making
officials." Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 567 (1972). The permissibiity of using political affiliation as the basis of hiring and firing turns upon whether an
individual holds a policymaking job or a non-policymaking job. This court, however, has great
difficulty in making the necessary determinations concerning job criteria to apply its remedy.
31 The dismissed petitioners in the instant case did not allege that they were promised
continued employment if they changed their political party. The petitioning employees alleged
only that they were fired because
they were either members of the Republican rather than the Democratic Party, did
not have the requisite political sponsorship from the Democratic Party or because they
failed to pledge their political allegiance to work for or contribute to the Democratic
Party.
509 F.2d at 1135.
32 Non-civil service employees are not protected against discharge for patronage reasons
by any state or federal statutory provision. Civil service employees are governed by state or
federal law outlining the procedures and grounds for a dismissal. See note 4 supra.
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conditioned by unconstitutional conditionss3 applies equally to patronage and
civil service jobs; dearly, public employees do not shed their constitutional right
to freedom of association at the gates of public employment 4 However, in the
Seventh Circuit's analysis, the first amendment's protection to the discharge of
these Republican employees in Burns was too readily applied," especially since
the complaint did not allege any attempt by the state to restrict or to inhibit the
freedom to join or to continue in the Republican Party.
The United States
Supreme Court has determined that there must be evidence of official inhibition
or inducement to surrender an individual's exercise of the right of association in
order to constitute an infringement of a first amendment right necessitating protection. 7 Thus, the discharge alone is not of a constitutional dimension, nor is it
proof of an effort to deter the employees from engaging in any constitutionally
protected conduct of association.
United Public Workers v. Mitchell: Some Restriction on First
Amendment Activity
Indeed, public employees must bear an additional burden in establishing a
first amendment violation since it is recognized that in the sphere of public employment not all rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens are enjoyed in the same
manner by public employees. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,"' which

upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act's proscription on active partisan
political activity by federal civil service employees, the Supreme Court stated
that ". .. Congress may regulate the political conduct of government employees
... even though the regulation touches to some extent upon unfettered political
action." 9 Likewise, the discharge of a Republican patronage employee by his
Democratic superior may touch obliquely upon the political association of that
Republican, but the motivation of that discharge is not a constitutionally impermissible desire to control or influence the political association of the displaced
Republican. Significantly, the Court in Mitchell upheld this objective of political
33

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was best stated by Justice Sutherland:
It would be palpable incongruity to strike down an act of State legislation which,
by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the
federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished
under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which
the state threatens otherwise to withhold.... If the state may compel the surrender
of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel
a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution
of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 217 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). This doctrine
has much judicial support. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
34 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
35 The petitioners simply alleged that they were fired
because they were either members of the Republican rather than the Democratic
Party, did not have the requisite political sponsorship from the Democratic Party or
because they failed to pledge their political allegiance to work for or contribute to the
Democratic Party.
36 Id. See note 30 supra.
37 See note 3 supra.
38 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
39 Id. at 77.
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neutrality, a desired end of a statutory enactment 0 in a civil service context. In
Burns, on the other hand, there was no statutory enactment mandating political
neutrality; the petitioners were non-civil service employees.4" Thus, while public
employees already run the risk of suffering some political infringement, it is at
least arguable that this risk is greater in situations where there is no legislative
mandate of political neutrality of the employment, as with patronage.
Bolstering this concept that there are some political overtones in public employment is the principle that the choice between political neutrality and political
partisanship is truly a matter of legislative designation and not judicial fiat.42 As
previously noted, the legislative branch is better able to determine what is acceptable or permissible job criteria for the various positions within state government;
it is the legislature which authorizes and establishes the various employments
within the state. Mitchell clearly indicates that political partisanship is the
norm.43 Therefore, in the absence of a legislative mandate of political neutrality,
as with. a patronage situation, it must be presumed that political partisanship
would be sanctioned."
Despite these considerations the Seventh Circuit attempted to bolster its
determination45 by offering dicta from Mitchell as proof:
Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by the Bill of Rights
and Congress may not enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew
or Negro shall be appointed to federal office.... None would deny such a
limitation on Congressional power ....46
However, this use of dicta actually obfuscates Mitchell's meaning of the patronage
system. That system does not prohibit all Republicans or all Democrats from
holding public employment. While the Seventh Circuit may have found that
these non-civil service employees lost their jobs at the hands of a state official,
that loss, in itself, is not of constitutional dimension. The government may constitutionally discharge individuals from their employment for a number of reasons."7 Moreover, since the discharge was from only one job within the government it did not carry with it an attendant foreclosure of all other employment
possibilities with the government. 8 Plaintiffs were not precluded from immediately obtaining other similar government employment. Indeed, if, in the future,
the Republican Party is successful in an election, the displaced employees may
again occupy their former positions.

40

The Court upheld the Hatch Act's provision 9 which restricted federal employees' par-

tisan participation in election campaigns.
41 See note 4 supra.
42 See note 14 supra.
43 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
44 Id.
45 The reasoning being analyzed is that developed by the Seventh Circuit in Illinois State
Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 at 570 '(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943
(1973), because Judge Campbell relied upon that reasoning in the instant case.
46 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (emphasis supplied).

47
48

See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
Id.
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United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of
Letter Carriers: Shared Enjoyment and Responsibility
The Hatch Act was again upheld4 9 in 1973. The Supreme Court reasoned
similarly as in Mitchell:
The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan
activities.... Nor do they seek to control political opinion or beliefs, or to
interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls. 50
This is equally true in the patronagesituation, in general, and in the Burns situation in particular. The patronage system applied to the petitioners in the case at
bar did not impose restrictions or consequences aimed at only a particularpolitical party. The rewards and burdens of the patronage system ". . . apply equally
to all partisan . . .""'groups. This element of shared enjoyment and shared
responsibility of the "spoils" is ignored by the Seventh Circuit's analysis.- The
court contended that the discharge here resulted in punishing the constitutionally
protected conduct of the petitioners and, therefore, was impermissible." Nowhere,
however, did the court develop or explain how the constitutional right of freedom
of association was infringed. The court invoked the phraseology of the "right of
association" and "political affiliation" without focusing on any prior Supreme
Court cases which had proclaimed and charted that right.5 4
The Supreme Court's Application of the First Amendment's
Right of Association
The circumstances in Burns did not reveal that the dismissals had any adverse effect upon the discharged employees or upon their political party. The
ability of both to engage in collective activities to promote their political beliefs
remained unchanged. Apparently the dismissals did not intimidate or dissuade
others from joining the Republican Party.5" An individual's ability to engage in
concerted activities has been an integral part of our democratic society. The
49

(1973).

United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548

50 413 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).
51 Id.
52 See note 10 supra.
53 This finding is despite the fact that the allegations of record do not indicate any curtailment, infringement, or state-induced surrender of the right of association. The allegations of
the petitioners in the instant case are simply that they were fired because:
. . . they were members of the Republican rather than the Democratic Party, did not
have the requisite political sponsorship from the Democratic Party or because they
failed to pledge their political allegiance to work for or contribute to the Democratic
Party.
509 F.2d at 1135.
54 See note 3 supra. The Seventh Circuit relied upon Supreme Court cases which did not
directly involve the first amendment right of association: Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972) (untenured teacher charged that his dismissal was based on his vocal criticism of the
school administration); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), (a teacher dismissed for speaking out on a matter of public concern was an infringement of the first
amendment).
55 See note 34 supra.
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underlying rationale for protecting an individual's freedom of association is the
desire to provide a "market place of ideas"56 in a free society.
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association .... It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
57 liberty assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Cases best demonstrating attempts at infringement of the first amendment's
freedom of association are those taking the form of loyalty oaths,"8 or statutes requiring disclosure of membership lists,"s or state requirements compelling individuals to reveal previous associational ties as a condition of public employment,"0
all of which tended to intimidate the individual from exercising the first amendment right of association.
1. The Loyalty Oath and Infringement on the Right of Association
The loyalty oath mechanism is really a prior restraint to compel individuals
to pledge they will not cleave unto certain "subversive ideas" which are traditionally espoused by groups such as the Communist Party6 or the Ku Klux Klan.6 2
One such attempt to control the political association of Arkansas teachers was
illustrated in Shelton v. Tucker.6" There a statutory requirement compelled every
Arkansas teacher, as a condition of employment in any state-supported school, to
file annually an affidavit which listed every organization to which the affiant
teacher had belonged or regularly contributed to within the preceding five years.
The petitioner teachers contended that this provision deprived them of their
rights to personal, associational, and academic liberty, protected from invasion
by state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court, in analyzing the situation, found there were two
countervailing interests which required balancing: The legitimate government
interest in insuring that those teaching within the State of Arkansas were fit and
competent, and the individual teacher's right to free association. Here, the Court
had no difficulty in finding for the teachers since "... . even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties where the end can be
more narrowly achieved."6
The Supreme Court noted that requiring a teacher to list "...
every con56 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
57 Id. at 460.
58 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958);
Weiman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
59 See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.

449 (1958).
60 See Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).

61 See Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203 "(1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
62 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

63 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

64

Id. at 488 (emphasis supplied).
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ceivable associational tie-social, professional, political, associational, or religious .. .'"
was too extensive because "many such relationships could have no
possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational competence or fitness." 5 Substantial fear of public disclosure and state action of stifling and restraining personal liberty were significantly present. On the other hand, Burns presented no
situation in which the dismissed employees were required through compulsion
to reveal their political associational ties.66 There was no evidence of fear of
public disclosure." There was no attempt by Sheriff Elrod or the Democratic
Party to stifle or to control the associational ties of the petitioners.
Loyalty oaths have also been used to control and restrict the political associational ties of public employees. The impact of such a loyalty oath required of
state employees as a condition of employment was examined by the United
States Supreme Court in Weiman v. Updegraff.68 In Weiman, Oklahoma labelled
individuals, desirous of state employment, "disloyal" if they failed to take the state
loyalty oath. On the basis of this characterization of disloyalty, the individuals
so labelled were denied all state employment. The Supreme Court held that such
a denial of all state employment, with an attendant pinning of an "unsavory
label" on an individual by the state, violated the formal requisites of procedural
69
due process.
The Seventh Circuit read the decision in Weiman to suggest that the United
States Supreme Court would be unlikely to consider the interests of patronage
employees, openly associating with members of the political party of their choice,"'
"less worthy of protection than the Oklahoma employees' interest in associating
with Communists or former Communists.""1 Again though, the petitioners in
Burns were not hindered in openly associating with the Republican Party. They
had the ability to engage in all political activity with impunity. They have not
been labelled with an "unsavory label" and on the basis of that characterization
denied state employment. The petitioning employees in Burns remained constitutionally whole. Oklahoma's loyalty oath in Weiman was used as a means of
discouraging public employees from joining or continuing in association with the
Communist Party; whereas, the patronage employees in Burns were not threatened with discharge or discharged in order to discourage their associational habits.
The discharge of these Republican employees in the instant case did not have as
its purpose, nor did it have as its result, the abridgment of the associational
rights of the dismissed employees.

65
66
67

Id.
See note 34 supra.
Id.

70

See note 21 supra.

68 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Oklahoma loyalty oath required all state employees to swear
that they had not and would not subscribe or pledge allegiance to any group espousing the
violent overthrow of the government.
69 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
71 Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 at 570 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
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2. Compulsory Disclosure of' Associational Ties: An Infringement of
The First Amendment
The United States Supreme Court has hammered out the fundamental right
of association in contexts other than loyalty oath situations, but again none are
similar to the type attempted by the Seventh Circuit."' The landmark disclosure
case decided by the United States Supreme Court, NAACP v. Alabama,"' presented the issue of whether the State of Alabama, consistent with the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment which embraces freedom of association, could
compel the NAACP to reveal to the Alabama Attorney General the names and
addresses of all its Alabama agents and members. The United States Supreme
Court answered in the negative and emphasized that disclosure here was an infringement of freedom of association.
Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank and file members has exposed these members
to economic reprisal,-loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and

other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think
it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is

likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue
their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right

to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association
and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their association and the consequences of this exposure.7

The plaintiffs in Burns failed to present similar evidence or allegations. 75
The dismissals of the Republican patronage employees did not "affect adversely"
their ability to pursue "their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate.""6 The displaced employees were not faced with
threats, public hostility, physical coercion, or economic reprisals because of their
political affiliation. The power of a patronage discharge is an incident of the
office77 and not a weapon of destruction wielded arbitrarily and maliciously by
one political party against another, attempting to eliminate the latter from effective participation in the advocacy of ideas.
Again, while it is true that these non-civil service employees in Burns were
no longer employed in their former capacities, they were not precluded from
seeking similar employment within the state government.' Their employment
was concluded at the natural end of their terms of employment. There was not
an unconstitutional summary discharge" aimed at hindering or discouraging these
petitioners in the exercise of their first amendment rights.. Not all deprivations
suffered by an individual at the hands of the state can be raised to a constitutional
72

See note 3 supra.

73 357 U.S. 449 "(1958).

74 Id. at 462 (emphasis supplied).
75 See note 34 supra.
76 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).

77 See note 14 supra.

78 See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
79 See note 14 supra.
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level.8 0 In the areas of individual action, these petitioners remained entirely free
of any governmental regulation or interference or threat of interference. Access
to the political arena was readily available to the Republican Party and its members. The employees in Burns were not compelled to do or to relinquish anything.
They were not denied employment as the Seventh Circuit suggested because they
were Republicans, but rather because their right to employment terminated with
the change of administration."' These patronage agents had no more right to
their employment than their principal's right to his. Their dismissal was certainly
not a designed effort undertaken by state officers to thwart the advocacy of ideas
or to destroy a political group from influencing people and their votes. Without
the elements of restraint, 2 compulsion,"3 or control 4 exerted by the state over
associational ties, there can be no valid claim that first amendment rights of
association"5 have been violated."
80 See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra.
81 See note 14 supra.
82 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) ; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
83 See Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1973); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
84 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
85 See note 34 supra.
86 The inviolateness of political association was upheld once again by the Supreme Court
when evidence was presented of: compulsion, harassment and public hostility directed against
a particular group with the design of obviating that group's existence, of making that political
association a nonfunctioning entity within a particular state. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960), involved two municipal ordinances. One imposed a vocational or occupational tax on all firms, persons, or corporations engaging in any trade, business, or calling
within the city limits. The other ordinance required that all those entities subject to this occupational tax had to submit a membership list to the city clerk which was open to public inspection. The petitioners in this case were the custodians of the records of two local branches
of the NAACP who refused to supply these membership lists. They were convicted of violating
the city ordinance. The Supreme Court found this compulsory disclosure of membership had
no nexus to the collection of the occupational tax and concluded that:
. . . compulsory disclosure of membership lists of local branches of N.A.A.C.P.
would work a significant interference with freedom of association of their members.
There was substantial uncontroverted evidence that public identification of persons
in the community as members of the organizations had been followed by harassment
and threats of bodily harm . . . evidence that fear of community hostility and economic reprisals that would follow public disclosure of the membership lists had discouraged new members from joining the organizations. . . . This repressive effect,
while in part the result of private attitudes and pressures, was brought to bear only
after the exercise of governmental power had threatened to force disclosure of the
members' names. N.A.A.C.P. v. Ala., 357 U.S., at 463. Thus, the threat of substantial
governmental encroachment upon important and traditional aspects of individual
freedom is neither speculative nor remote.
361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) (emphasis added).
The record in the instant case does not present any evidence of substantial, uncontroverted evidence of harassment or threat of bodily harm or community hostility. There was no
repressive effect reported. There was no official discouragement of their political affiliation
or encroachment upon traditional aspects of individual freedom. In discharging the Republican
patronage employees, the newly elected Elrod did not accomplish a significant interference
with the freedom of association of those employees. Sheriff Elrod exercised the same power
which his predecessor Sheriff had the power to use. The power of discharge is an incident
of the office and not a weapon of destruction wielded arbitrarily and maliciously by one political party against another political party with the aim of eliminating that party from effective
participation in the advocacy of ideas. Unlike the petitioners in Bates and NAACP, the petitioners in Burns did not allege: (1) that community harassment has been directed at them or
their party by state officials; (2) that public threats of bodily harm have been hurled at them
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Certainly, then, the constitutional protection of freedom of association does
not undertake to safeguard all individuals from all harm or adverse consequences
which might befall them because of their associational ties. The Supreme Court
did not intend the invocation or incantation of the phrase "freedom of association" as a talisman or panacea for all possible wrongs. The Seventh Circuit's
application of the first amendment lacks support and should have yielded before
the precedents of the Supreme Court.
Burns v. Elrod: A Misapplication of the First Amendment
It would be incorrect to state that the Seventh Circuit believed that the
first amendment could always be invoked in the dismissal of any patronage employee. Political affiliation, according to the Circuit, could be validly used in
determining the fitness of individuals filling policymaking patronage positions.
Judge Campbell in Burns stated that the defendants"7 could defeat the petitioners'
claim if the former could factually prove that the dismissed petitioners held policymaking positions.88
The Court of Appeals, therefore, created a distinction in treatment between
policymaking and non-policy making patronage employees.89 Yet such a differentiation raises murky definitional problems as well as more unsettled issues than
it supposedly resolves. Litigation could greatly increase and the courts, absent
any legislative guidelines, would have to fashion a case by case determination.
Inherent in such a judicially fashioned approach is a lack of uniformity with its
implicit inequality of treatment. Judge Campbell appreciated the difficulty of
imposing this dual standard upon the courts: "It is simple enough to say that
as a result of their political association; (3) that they have been prosecuted or threatened with
prosecution because of their political affiliation; (4) that they have in any way been prevented
from promoting ideas in association with a political group, or (5) that the viability of their
political association has been threatened with destruction because of state action. Having failed
to allege any of the enumerated infringements of association, these petitioning employees have
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the curtailment of the first amendment right of freedom of association.
The Seventh Circuit in Burns points to no situation in which the dismissed employees of
the instant case are required or compelled to reveal their associational ties in order to enable
state officials to manipulate hostile public sentiment against them. There was no evidence in
the record of fear of public disclosure, nor was there an attempt by Sheriff Elrod or the Democratic Party to stifle the petitioners in their associational ties. There were no state prohibitions
imposed upon petitioners from engaging in any kind of traditional political behavior or in associating with the Republican Party for the advancement of their political ideology. In fact, in
the areas of individual action, these petitioners remained entirely free of any governmental
regulation or interference or threat of interference. Access to the political arena was readily
available to the Republican Party and its members. None of the traditional elements of restraint,
compulsion, curtailment, reprisal, or attempts to hinder the effective advocacy of an association were present in Burns. Certainly, the constitutional protection of freedom of association
does not undertake to safeguard all individuals from all harm or adverse consequences which
might befall them because of their associational ties. The Supreme Court did not intend the
invocation or incantation of the phrase "freedom of association" as a talisman or panacea for
all possible wrongs. The Seventh Circuit's application of the first amendment lacks support
and must yield before these precedents of the United States Supreme Court.
87 See note 5 supra.
88 Judge Campbell stated: "The issue of whether plaintiffs were policy-making employees
who may be dismissed for partisan political reasons is a matter of factual defense...." 509
F.2d at 1336.
89 This distinction was first enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in Illinois State Employees
Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
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janitors, clerk-typists and elevator operators are 'non-policy making' employees,
but how far up in the bureaucratic echelon can the distinction be judicially
drawn?"'9
The Seventh Circuit's treatment would compel the courts to become minicivil service commissions, a matter clearly not appropriate for judicial determination. This issue of patronage employees suggests some of the elements of a
political question,9 unfit for judicial determination. 2 It lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards93 for reaching a decision. 4 On the one hand the
Seventh Circuit has difficulty in ".... justifying the validity of political association
as a criterion for a janitor, school teacher or elevator operator,"95 but on the
other hand, admits:
We cannot properly differentiate between teachers and highway maintenance
workers, pilots, law clerks, driver's license examiners or janitors on the basis
of mere judicial assumptions about the circumstances attending their respective employment 9
If any distinctions about patronage jobs are to be made, it would seem more
prudent to commit those determinations to the legislature which is better able to
make these internal policy decisions. These distinctions are better left to nonjudicial forums as witnessed by the civil service statutes now in force in Illinois97
and throughout the United States.
The concurring opinion in Burns illuminated an additional problem with the
Seventh Circuit's encouragement of judicially assuming this responsibility:
If we must judge whether or not an employee may be discharged for exercising his First Amendment rights of free political association on the basis
of his job classification, we are not saying that some employments are entitled
to greater protection than others. Are the constitutional rights of an individual to be defined solely with reference to the nature of his employment?
I know of no precedent in our system for imposing a "sliding scale" of importance upon the constitutional rights of individuals according to their rank,
title, job, description or duties, whether in or out of govermnent9 s
This sliding scale effect is the necessary consequence of the Seventh Circuit's
finding of an infringement of first amendment association rights in the discharge
of a Republican patronage employee by his Democratic superior. No such elusive and discriminatory practice is needed if the court viewed the patronage dismissal as a means of encouraging political association rather than discouraging
political association. The objective of dismissing the Republican patronage employees was to reward Democratic Party contributors. The result of dismissing
the Republican patronage employees did not diminish their ability to associate
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 578 (concurring opinion).
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1972).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id.
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d at 573.
Id.
See Illinois Personnel Code, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 63b101-63b119 (1967).
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 578 (n4).
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with the Republican Party and to engage in all of the activities connected with
political party association. They were unfettered and unencumbered in pursuing
their political beliefs through association with the Republican Party in hopes of
being successful at the voting polls. The discharge of the patronge employees was
not used as a weapon to compel individuals to relinquish or to refrain from the
exercise of their first amendment rights. There were no efforts by the state or
its agents to destroy the effectiveness of a political organization99 or to focus community harassment0 0 on a political group or to prohibit the existence of a particular political group altogether. 1T The first amendment protects individuals
from any state action which abridges, restricts, constrains or demands relinquishment of the right to exercise freedom of association, a situation not present in
Burns.
Susan Finneran
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT - AvAILIUm
Y OF A
CONFESSION IS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERmISSrBLE PRETRIAL DELAY

United States v. Lockett
In United States v. Lockett,' the Seventh Circuit encountered a fundamental constitutional right the scope of which has been difficult to delineate; the
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Lockett, in expanding the current
Supreme Court test for evaluating violations of this right, represents a departure
from past Seventh Circuit adherence to the basic Supreme Court test, as exemplified by United States v. Fairchild.' Curiously, this dichotomy in the approach

taken by the Seventh Circuit developed on the same day.' To understand the
Lockett fork of the dichotomy, it is necessary to understand the traditional approach of Fairchild, and requisite to understanding both approaches is an
examination of the recent history of the speedy trial right. Additionally, such an
examination is useful in implementing the main tenet of this comment; evaluating the desirability of an adoption of the Lockett corollary.

History of Speedy Trial Determination
The Supreme Court first enunciated the current test for exposing speedy
trial violations in Barker v. Wingo.4 The comparatively late development of a
99 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

100 See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
101 See Communist Party of America v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1

(1961).

1 526 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1975).

2 526 F.2d 185, 187 (7th Cir. 1975).
3 Both cases were decided Nov. 25, 1975. 526 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1975), 526 F.2d

185 (7th Cir. 1975). In fact, in his opinion in Fairchild,Justice Stevens referred to the fact
that Lockett had been decided the same day. Curiously, Stevens went on to cite Lockett for
identifying the four factors set forth by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) relevant to the

adjudication of the speedy trial right. U.S. v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185, 187 n.2 (1975).
4 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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Supreme Court test for such a right is explained by the tardy recognition by the
Supreme Court of the fundamental constitutional nature of the speedy trial right.
Only as recently as 1967 has the speedy trial right been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right, applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.' Between 1967 and the 1972 Supreme Court delineation of guidelines for guaranteeing the speedy trial right, the judiciary was in an uncomfortable position. While they were charged by Klopier v. North Carolina6 to recognize and protect the fundamental constitutional nature of this right, they were
bereft of any corresponding Supreme Court guidance as to what means were to
be used to discern violations.' Considering the desperate nature of the courts
charged with protecting this right, it is remarkable that only two tests were
formulated to fill the void of Supreme Court leadership. Both approaches were
characterized by their rigidity of application; neither made provision for the
exigencies of each specific case.
The first, commonly known as the "specified time period" approach,' literally required that the defendant be brought to trial within a specified period of
time. This approach was formalized by either state statutes or court rules.9 As a
test, it had the advantage of simplicity of application.1" If a defendant were held
past the specified time limit without being brought to trial, his right to a speedy
trial was deemed to have been violated. The difficulty with the approach was its
attempt to quantify an amorphous guarantee. More specifically, in one case, a
longer length of prosecutional delay might be justified by the difficulty in obtaining evidence. Conversely, a period of time shorter than the specified time limit
might be unduly arduous to a defendant in a particular factual setting. In short,
the specific time limit was deemed too rigid by the Supreme Court; it failed to
provide for the exigencies of each individual case. 1
The second approach was the so-called "demand rule."' 2 This test resulted
in an automatic waiver of the right to a speedy trial for the period prior to a
defendant's demand for a speedy trial.'3 Once again, the test for speedy trial violation was easy to apply; the court merely need look for a defense demand for
prompt prosecution. Failure to find such a demand would relieve the court from
considering any claim of speedy trial violation raised by the defense for the
period of time prior to a demand. This approach was in turn rejected by the
Supreme Court. Again, the Court cited the rigidity of application. 4 There was
no provision accommodating the defendant who had a justifiable reason for
5

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 407, 213, 222-23 (1967).

6

Id.

7 Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 1376
(1972).
8 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972).
9 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1382 (West Supp. 1975) (15 days from date held to
answer to filing of information; 60 days from filing of information to trial); ILL. Rev. STAT.
ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1965) (120 days from arrest); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781
(1964) (6 months from commitment). Source: ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS sOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL 14 (1968).
10 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
11 "The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise." Id. at 523.
12 Id. at 524.
13 Id. at 525.
14 The Court referred to the approach as"... this rigid approach." Id. at 525.
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failing to demand the guarantee of a speedy trial. More importantly, the Court
declared the demand-waiver rule to be inconsistent with prior constitutional
doctrine concerning the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.15 In prior
cases, the Court required waiver of fundamental constitutional rights to be
intentional; given freely with an understanding of what the defendant was
waiving. 6 Every presumption was to be directed away from the waiver of such a
fundamental right." The Court refused to presume the acquiescence of a defendant to loss of such an important and fundamental right.
Thus, the Court dismissed both the existing guidelines for discerning speedy
trial violations because of their rigid natures.' 8 In failing to quantify or clearly
define such a fundamental right as that to a speedy trial, the Court, with consternation, noted: "It is . . .impossible to determine with precision when the
right has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate."' 9 Consistent with the recognition of the vague outlines of this guarantee, the Court advanced a new approach which took the nature of a balancing test that attempted to recognize
and weigh conflicting factors related to the nature of the speedy trial right.2" In
this weighing process, the Court specifically mentioned four factors to be considered: length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion by the defendant of
his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice arising from the delay.2' In enunciating
these factors, the Court rejected any talismanic qualities for the four, noting:
We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of a speedy
trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with
such other circumstances as may be relevant.2"
Despite this reservation by the Court, these four factors were seized upon by
lower courts and used as the sole criteria for determining a violation." However,
a minority of courts did employ the "such other relevant circumstances" phrase
as a fifth factor in the Barkerweighing process.
This minority can be further divided into two schools. The first cites Barker
language describing the weighing process in its entirety, then decides the case in
contention on the four basic Barker factors. 4 That is to say, these courts cite
"such other relevant circumstances" as a perfunctory requirement for applying
15 "Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights." Id. at 525
(footnote omitted).
16 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).

17

Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 '(1937).

18 "We, therefore, reject both of the inflexible approaches. . .
19 Id. at 521 (footnote omitted).
20 Id. at 530.

."

407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972).

21 Id. at 530.
22 Id. at 533 (emphasis added).

23 Case comments and law review articles reflect this attitude on the part of these courts
by describing the Barker weighing test exclusively by its four elements without regard to the
"such other relevant circumstances" phrase. See, e.g., Uviller, note 7 supra; Young, How to
Decide Whether a Trial Is Speedy, 58 A.B.AJ. 1095 (1972); Comment, 51 N.C. L. REv. 310

(1972).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Morse, 491 F.2d 149, 157 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v.
Cabral, 475 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1973).
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the four Barker factors. In substance, this school is the same as the majority, in
that both decide speedy trial violation by utilizing the four Barker factors as the
sole criteria by which such a violation is to be determined.2 5 It is only in phraseology that this minority differs from the majority view, inasmuch as it pays lip
service to "such other relevant circumstances" as a fifth factor to be weighed in
determining violations of the speedy trial right. The only explanation for such an
approach would seem to be that such courts see a pro forma citation of the entire
Barker phraseology as a requisite to applying the four basic Barker factors.
The second minority school employs the "such other relevant circumstances"
phrase as a vehicle for expanding the factors to be considered in the weighing
process.26 This trend originated in the Fifth Circuit and is confined in application
to that circuit.2 Within the auspices of the "such other relevant circumstances"
vehicle, the Fifth Circuit has enumerated several factors, including: "The gravity
of the charged offense and the likelihood of repetition, the number and complexity of legal and factual issues involved, the availability of evidence. ...""
Despite this verbal commitment by the Fifth Circuit to develop the Barker catchall phrase into an effective vehicle for expanding the weighing process, the Fifth
Circuit has failed to exercise this vehicle in practice. Cases purportedly expanding the Barker weighing test predicate their decisions on only the four considerations specifically enumerated in Barker.29 Thus prior to Lockett, no court had
actually applied any factors other than the four of Barker. Therefore, Lockett
will be examined for evidence of an effective expansion of the constitutional test
laid down by the Supreme Court in Barker.
Lockett was arrested on January 18, 1973, for possession of checks stolen
from the mails.2 Subsequent to receiving his Miranda warnings, Lockett voluntarily confessed to the crime."' On January 23, 1975, the grand jury returned an
indictment against him."2 In February, Lockett moved for a dismissal of the indictment, alleging a violation of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial."3 This
motion was denied on April 8, 1975, by the district court.3 4 Lockett waived a
jury trial, and the case was tried on a written stipulation of the facts.35 The only
error that Lockett raised on appeal was that of an improper denial of his speedy
25 After mentioning and discussing the four Barker factors, the Cabral court stated: "In
balancing all of the factors discussed above in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in denying the appellant's motion to quash the indictment." United States v. Cabral, 475
F,2d 715, 717-20 (1st Cir. 1973). The Morse court, after examining the defendant's claims
of prejudice and undue delay stated: "Taking all these factors into consideration, we conclude that the taxpayers' sixth amendment claim must fail." United States v. Morse, 491 F.2d
149, 157 '(1st Cir. 1974).
26 "Several other considerations are also inherent in the ad hoc approach which the
Barker decision requires... ." United States v. Dyson, 469 F.2d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 1972).
27 United States v. Palmer, 502 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Perez, 489
F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dyson, 469 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1972).
28 United States v. Dyson, 469 F.2d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
29 United States v. Palmer, 502 F.2d 1233, 1237-38 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dyson, 469 F.2d 735, 739-41 (5th
Cir. 1972).
30 United States v. Lockett, 526 F.2d 1110, 1111 "(7th Cir. 1975).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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trial motion." Despite an application of the four-pronged test of Barker which
indicated that Lockett has been denied his speedy trial right, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the conviction.37 The court felt that Lockett's voluntary confession constituted such other relevant circumstances as to determine that Lockett's right to
a speedy trial had not been abridged." In so holding, the Seventh Circuit became
the first court to give substance to the Supreme Court's language of "such other
relevant circumstances" as a factor to be weighed in determining violations of
the right to a speedy trial; heretofore this Supreme Court terminology had only
been treated in a perfunctory fashion. The post-Barker cases had weighed only
the four factors definitively enumerated in Barker. In evaluating Lockett's interpretation of the Barker guidelines, it is necessary to determine whether Lockett
truly stands as a corollary or whether it disregards Lockett's speedy trial right
because of the evidentiary circumstances of the case.
Analysis and Criticism of Lockett
In Lockett, the Seventh Circuit determined that an application of the
four Barker factors would indicate a denial of the defendant's speedy trial right.
However, the Court found Lockett's voluntary confession to be an additional
relevant factor permissible of consideration under the "such other relevant circumstances" phraseology. 9
Initially, this approach would appear consistent with the Fifth Circuit's
determination that "other relevant circumstances" included the "availability of
evidence."4 Since a confession is but a peculiar specie of evidence, the Seventh
Circuit in taking notice of the availability of the confession was in fact echoing
the Fifth Circuit and taking note of the availability of evidence. However, two
distinctions can be drawn between the series of Fifth Circuit cases and Lockett.
These distinctions serve to destroy the applicability of the Fifth Circuit decisions
as precedent for the decision in Lockett.
The first distinction has been alluded to in a previous section. As noted, the
Fifth Circuit, though espousing attention to other relevant factors, has in practice
applied only those factors specifically prescribed in Barker."1 Lockett not only
recognized but applied a fifth factor; Lockett has, in practice, expanded the
Barker weighing process.
36

Id.

37 Id.at 1112.
In short, the weight we have given the first
three factors (delay, failure to
explain, and no reason to require assertion of the right) would tend to favor defendant's position. Normally, defendant's failure to show prejudice, standing alone,
might be insufficient to overcome the 'other factors. However, in this case, there is
the added point that defendant has voluntarily confessed to the crime of which he
stands convicted. This compels the conclusion that his Sixth Amendment, speedy
trial right has not been violated. As the Supreme Court stated in Barker, "[the four
factors] are related . . . and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at
2193. Lockett's confession is such a "relevant circumstance." We are persuaded
that no constitutional rights have been violated in this case.
Id. at 1112.
39 Id.
40 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
41 See note 29 supra.
38
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More important is the second distinction between Lockett and the Fifth
Circuit cases. The Fifth Circuit noted availability of the evidence as an additional factor, while Lockett focuses on the weight of the evidence. This Fifth
Circuit reference to available evidence is consonant with the accepted nature of
the speedy trial right; one reason for requiring a speedy trial is to preserve evidence.42 Additionally, the length of the permissible pretrial delay is judged in
light of the time required to collect the evidence. Restated simply, the availability
of evidence is to be considered in what constitutes a permissible delay. Thus, the
Fifth Circuit's additional factor is merely a recognition of a factor already understood to be involved in the weighing process; that of the prejudice arising from
the delay resulting from the possible destruction of evidence.
Lockett, on the other hand, actually does introduce a new factor-that of
the weight of the evidence. By emphasizing the availability of a confession, the
court is not emphasizing the availability of evidence as related to preservation of
evidence and permissible time delay. A confession is a type of evidence whose
preservation is not at all linked to permissible pretrial delay. Rather, it seems that
the court is citing the existence of the voluntary confession because of the enormous weight that this specie of evidence carries. That Lockett is truly espousing a
"weight of the evidence" approach is noted by the court's declaration: "Defendant voluntarily (after receiving Miranda warnings) confessed to the crime.
He has never repudiated this confession."" This emphasis by the court on the
existence of the confession indicates the importance that the court places on this
confession. As noted before, the significance of a confession when compared to
other evidence is its weight. Upon the establishment of the corpus delicti, that is,
the fact that a crime has been committed by someone,44 a confession is sufficient
for a conviction.45 Therefore, when the court emphasized the existence of a
confession, it was undoubtedly commenting on the factor that distinguishes a
confession from other evidence; the evidentiary weight of a confession.
With its reliance on this important specie of evidence, Lockett arguably
declares that the constitutionally allowable period of pretrial delay is longer for
defendants who are opposed by a heavy amount of evidence. Under the rationale
employed in Lockett, the length of permissible delay increases correspondingly
with the probability of the defendant's guilt. It is with this prospect that issue
must be taken.
To link the constitutionally allowable pretrial delay with the amount of
evidence confronting the defendant emasculates the presumption of innocence.
By introducing the weight of the evidence as a relevant factor, the court is arguing
that the drastic remedy of dismissal is decreasingly called for where there is increasing certainty of the defendant's guilt. This is effectually a pretrial adjudication of the defendant's guilt. Regardless of the subsequent determination of guilt,
at the time of the abridgement of his speedy trial right, Lockett was presumed to
42 Comment, Constitutional Law-Right to Speedy Trial-State Imposed Five-Year
Delay Does Not Abridge Right to Speedy Trial When Accused Has Not Asserted His Right and
No Prejudice Is Shown. 26 VAND. L. REv. 171, 172 (1973).
43 526 F.2d at 1111 (emphasis supplied).
44 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 4, at 17 (1972).
45 MCCORMACK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Evmmcn, § 158, at 347-48 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
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be innocent of any wrongdoing. By allowing a longer delay for Lockett because
of his voluntary confession, the court was calculating the odds of his subsequent
conviction; such would appear completely inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence. The court should be viewing the alleged speedy trial violation in
light of a defendant's contemporary presumption of innocence rather than the
likelihood of subsequent conviction.
But had Lockett not confessed to the crime, he would not now be criminally
incarcerated."6 The Seventh Circuit distinguished among defendants on the type
and weight of evidence available against an indicted party. In so doing, the court
not only disregards the presumption of innocence, but also creates two classes of
defendants. The classes are distinguishable only by the court's decision that the
weight and type of evidence in cases similar to Lockett warrant a longer pretrial
delay. These two classes are accorded different degrees of protection with regard
to a fundamental constitutional right; a difference permissible only when there
is a compelling state interest."' It is difficult to see that such an overriding interest
is present.
This classification of defendants according to probability of conviction denies
those in Lockett's classification equal protection. At least in those cases where the
defendant has made a confession, the prosecutor is now afforded an extended
period of time within which he can commence his action without denying the
defendant his constitutional right to a speedy trial. This classification is necessarily arbitrary since there are no standards by which the members of the two
classes are to be differentiated. The determination of a sufficient probability of
conviction to warrant longer pretrial delay than allowable under Barker rests
upon the individual discretion of the trial court judge. This distinction will
naturally vary with each trial and each judge, resulting in little more than an
ad hoc surmise of the probability of conviction. Therefore, Lockett discounts the
speedy trial right accorded the class of the more probably guilty defendants
rather than ensuring a uniform guarantee, extraneous of any considerations of
conviction.
Thus, the classifications created interfere with a fundamental constitutional
right bereft of a compelling state interest. As noted above the only reasons for
such an interference, the requirement of additional preparation time for the
prosecutor or the interest of the prosecutor in trying the "easy" cases at his leisure,
hardly constitutes a compelling state interest. Lacking a more compelling
state
48
interest the classification violates a fundamental constitutional right.
46 526 F.2d at 1112.
47 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
48 State regulation or interference either with a fundamental constitutional right or through
a suspect criteria triggers a strict scrutiny of that interference by the courts. Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (suspect criteria); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (fundamental right). Strict scrutiny demands cessation of the state's regulation or
interference unless there is a compelling state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
Some of the rights that have been determined by the Court to be fundamental constitutional rights include: the right to a jury in criminal cases, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); the right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); the
right to vote in a state election, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
the right of privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); right to travel, Aptheker

v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); the right to counsel in a criminal trial, Gideon
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In support of the Seventh Circuit test, it may be argued that a confession of
guilt divides defendants into classifications no more than any of the other four
Barker factors. However, there is a distinction in the nature of the Barker elements and that factor proposed by Lockett. The Barker factors are procedural in
nature, that of Lockett is substantive in nature. Barker determines whether the
circumstances, the procedure involved in bringing the case to trial, deny the
defendant his constitutional right. Lockett, based on the substance of the case,
i.e., the probability of conviction, determines if the constitutional guarantee of a
speedy trial is to be adjusted to allow a longer period of pretrial delay.
The Barker factors do not declare that because of the circumstances of the
case the defendant is to be afforded a different degree of constitutional protection; rather, these circumstances determine the criteria by which to determine a
constitutional violation." Lockett takes those cases that have breached the constitutional guarantee as determined by the Barker factors and determines if the
violation should be allowed because of the substance of the case. In short, the
Barker factors classify defendants by the procedural aspects of their case. Violations of a procedurally based constitutional right necessarily involve evaluating
the procedural circumstances of each case. Lockett seeks to evaluate violations of
this procedural constitutional right by the substance, the amount of evidence,
against the defendant. Such an approach is not an application of a uniform
constitutional right to each case; rather, it is a variance of this constitutional right
extended to each defendant.
Speedy Trial Act of 1974
Although it is clear that Lockett is viewed in this quarter as dangerous
precedent, it is necessary to ask, in light of recent legislation, the practical effect
of this precedent. The Speedy Trial Act of 197450 was enacted by Congress for
the purpose of reducing crime and recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by
increasing the supervision over persons released pending trial." The focus of the
Act was to establish a time limit within which a criminal prosecution had to be
commenced. Contemplating a five-year acclimation process,52 the time allowed
the prosecution to commence the trial is reduced each year to an ultimate time

v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); the right to a trial transcript in a criminal case, Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); the right to marry and procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942).
49 407 F.2d 514, 523 (1972).
50 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (Supp. 1976).
51 H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
52 For the first 12 calendar month period following the effective date the allowable
pretrial delay is 240 days, for the second 12 calendar month period the delay is 165 days, for
the third 12 calendar month period the delay is 115 days, for the fourth 12 calendar month
period the delay is 100 days. This period of allowable delay is subdivided into allowable delay
between arrest and arraignment and arraignment and trial. As such, the figures listed above
are the sums of these two periods in each calendar year. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (b), (c), (f),
(g) (1974).
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limit of 100 days after arrest." In short, this Act implements an administrative
standard that must be met if a case is not to be dismissed for tardiness of disposition. It is not a standard that, if breached, would result in dismissal upon constitutional grounds. The defendant may still raise constitutional objections even if
the trial is brought within the legislatively prescribed period for prosecution, since
§ 3173 of the Act provides: "No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted
as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of
'
the Constitution."54
Consistent with this provision, the act should have no effect on Barker and
its interpretive progeny. The Barker standard remains the gauge for constitutional
violations of the right to a speedy trial. In practice, however, the Speedy Trial
Act may supplant the Barker test in cases of federal prosecution. The additional
guarantee extended to the defendants in a federal prosecution makes it doubtful
that a defendant will be constitutionally denied a speedy trial by the delay administratively allowed prior to trial by the Act. By past examples of unconstitutionally long pretrial delays,55 it is unlikely that a delay of less than 100 days
would be considered violative of constitutional standards. Still, a defendant is
free to allege a denial of his speedy trial right even where the prosecution has
complied with the legislative timetable. In such an event, the Barker standard is
to be utilized.
In state prosecutions, the Barker standard is also the governing constitutional
test. However, the states are free to follow the example of Congress and extend
to the defendant a shorter allowable period of pretrial delay. Such a provision,
like the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, is an administrative test; it does not pre-empt
the constitutional test. However, it may have the practical effect of conferring
even more obsolescence on the constitutional test. Consequently, while cases interpreting the constitutional test retain considerable theoretical applicability, it
remains to be seen how much these administrative codes will diminish the
vitality of Barker and its progeny.
It may well be that justice would be better served by an expansion of the
Barker balancing test for the speedy, trial right. Indeed, it is clear that the
Supreme Court has left an avenue open for an expansion with the use of its
"such other relevant circumstances" phraseology. It is just as clear that such a
suggestion has not, prior to Lockett, been adopted. Nevertheless, it is the tenet of
this comment that the Lockett expansion was neither required, nor justified. The
inclusion of a voluntary confession as a relevant factor results in a judicial determination of the likelihood of conviction in regard to preference of cases for
trial. Such a pretrial determination challenges the presumption of'innocence.
53 The effective date of this phase in program is July 1, 1976. In the interim, each district
court is required to institute an interim plan offering priority in trial dates for: (1) detained
persons held in custody awaiting trial and (2) released persons awaiting trial designated as
high risk by the attorney for the government. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3163, 3164 '(Supp. 1976).
54 18 U.S.C.A. § 3173 (Supp. 1976).
55 United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1973) (3-year delay not excessive);
United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 322 (1st Cir. 1973) (25-month delay not excessive); United
States v. Cabral, 475 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1973) (23-month delay not excessive); United States v.
Phillips, 477 F.2d -913 (5th Cir. 1973) (2-year delay not excessive); United States v. Saglimbene, 471 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1972) (6-year delay not excessive).
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Additionally, it categorizes defendants by an arbitrary standard and improperly
distinguishes the fundamental constitutional rights to be afforded two classes of

defendants. Such categorization is improper because of its interference with a
fundamental constitutional right without a compelling state interest. This
categorization denies equal protection to those defendants whose substantive
circumstances fail the Lockett test.
Thus it appears that Lockett is a dangerous precedent; varying as it does
the degree of constitutional protection to be afforded a defendant because of the
probability of conviction. An expansion of this doctrine to other procedural
constitutional rights could render this guarantee responsive to an individual
judge's surmise of the probability of a particular defendant's conviction. It is
hoped that Lockett will remain isolated to the particular facts of this case.
William J. Brooks, III

II. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-ABSTENTION-RULE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL

GROUNDS FOR ABSTENTION IN CASE INVOLVING
UNCONSTRUED STATE STATUTE-Younger ABSTENTION EXTENDED TO

CONSTRUCTION

USED AS

PENDING CIVIL LITIGATION

Boehning v. Indiana State Employees Association, Inc.
Horvath v. City of Chicago
Indiana State Employees Association, Inc. and Phyllis A. Musgrave, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brought an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the termination of her employment. Musgrave
had been dismissed for cause from her position with the highway commission
after her request for a pretermination hearing had been denied.
Plaintiffs alleged that they had been denied due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment by the policy and practice of the Indiana Highway Commission of discharging employees summarily and denying them a prior hearing to
determine whether such employees were being discharged in accordance with
the provisions of the Bipartisan Personnel System Act.' They contended that §
6 of the Act gave Musgrave a due process right to a predischarge hearing to
determine whether cause for her dismissal existed.2
The district court noted that the Act was silent on the question of whether a
hearing was required before dismissal for cause, and that no Indiana court had
previously had the opportunity to construe the Act in order to resolve the uncertainty.' The court further noted that no Indiana court had previously considered whether the Indiana Administrative Adjudication and Court Review
1 IND. CODE § 8-13-1.5-1 (Burns 1971) [hereinafter cited as the Bipartisan Act].
2 IND. CODE § 8-13-1.5-6 (Bums 1971).
3 Indiana State Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Boehning, 357 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (S.D. Ind.
1973).
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Act, 4 establishing not only the right to a predischarge hearing but also setting
forth the procedures for such administrative hearings and providing for judicial
review in the Indiana courts, 5 was applicable to the Bipartisan Act. The court
held that if the Administrative Act was construed as applicable to the Bipartisan
Act, the plaintiff would have a right to a predischarge hearing as a matter of
Indiana law. It therefore abstained until construction of the Indiana statutes
had been sought in the state courts.6
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
abstention was not appropriate where the state statutes involved were not
arguably subject to a construction that would support a claim for a pretermination hearing and thereby avoid the federal due process question.7 The court held
that the motion and hearing provisions of the Administrative Act did not apply
to the Bipartisan Act; therefore, an employee discharged for cause under the
Bipartisan Act was not entitled, as a matter of state law, to a hearing or a remedy
for lack of one.' In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned:
If the action were brought in an Indiana court, that court would presumably
address the question whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would require a hearing, but that would be adjudication of
the same claim of federal right advanced in this action, and not a resolution
of any real question of state common, statutory or constitutional law ...
"Abstention cannot be ordered simply to give state courts the first opportunity to vindicate the federal claim."
Thus, finding abstention improper, the court proceeded to decide the case on the
merits; it resolved the federal constitutional question in favor of appellant
Musgrave.
The Supreme Court of the United States in a per curiam opinion, Justice
Douglas dissenting, reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that:
the relevant [Indiana]
pretermination hearing
district court was right
issue pending resolution

statutory provisions may fairly be read to extend
rights to respondent [Musgrave]. [Therefore,] the
to abstain from deciding the federal constitutional
0
of the state law question in the state courts.Y

The Abstention Doctrine in Perspective
The doctrine of abstention, under which a federal court may decline to
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrowly drawn
4 IND. CoD § 4-22-1-1 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Administrative Act].
Section 1 of the Administrative Act provides:
It is the intent to establish a uniform method of administrative adjudication by all
agencies of the state of Indiana, to provide for due notice and an opportunity to be
heard and present evidence before such agency and to establish a uniform method

of court review of all such administrative adjudication.

IND. CoDE

5
6
7
8
9

10

§ 4-22-1-1 (1971).

357 F. Supp. at 1375.
Id. at 1375-76.
Indiana State Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Boehning, 511 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 836.
Id.
Boehing v. Indiana State Employees Ass'n, 96 S.Ct. 168, 169-70 (1975).
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exception to the duty of a federal court to adjudicate a controversy properly
brought before it. Abstention is justified only in those special circumstances
where remitting the parties to the state court will serve an important courtervailing interest. This doctrine, generally accorded to have been established in Railroad Commission v. Pullman," and now commonly referred to as "Pullman
abstention," has been consistently used by the Supreme Court as a means to allow
state courts to resolve state law issues in particular types of cases,' 2 since, when
federal courts decide questions of state law, there is no possibility of review of
their determinations within the authoritative state judicial system.
As a result of the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in England v. Louisiana
Board of Medical Examiners.," the abstention doctrine allows a case to be
divided, so that federal tribunals make the final decision on the federal issues and
the facts on which they are based, and state tribunals make the final decision on
state issues. Such a division satisfies two of the major policy considerations upon
which Pullman abstention is based: (1) the avoidance of interfering with a
legitimate state program, thereby causing unnecessary federal-state friction, and
(2) the avoidance of unnecessary decision of federal constitutional issues.'
The advantages of abstention, however, are obtained at a high cost. Parties
who have chosen to litigate in federal court are sent to the state court to obtain a
decision on state law issues, involving them in considerable delay and expense. 5
Furthermore, the heavy burden that abstention places on the litigants raises the
question of whether transferring jurisdiction from federal to state court is consistent with federal jurisdictional statutes. This challenge has been met by the
traditional justification for Pullman abstention that it "does not. . . involve the
abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise."' 6
While the England procedure theoretically provides for the eventual resolution of federal questions by federal tribunals, in practice the result is often
different. The delay and expense that abstention entails, along with its requirement that the parties undergo two trials, could effectively deter litigants from
exercising their right to federal jurisdiction. In some cases the path of least
resistance has been for parties to present all claims, state and federal, to the
state court for resolution, with the federal system used only for appeal to the
Supreme Court. 7 Despite these burdens, federal courts, nevertheless, do deem
it within their power to "restrain their [jurisdictional] authority because of
'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state government' and for
the smooth working of the federal judiciary."'"
Thus, abstention is an accepted compromise of important competing interests.
11 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
12 See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-12 (1972); Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 149 (1967); Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1964); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 n.7 (1964); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176-78 (1959).
13 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
14 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
15 See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179-84 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 177, quoted with approval in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964).
17 The NAACP followed this path in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), after
abstention was ordered in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
18 312 U.S. at 501, citing Di Giovani v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935).
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And since it requires the balancing of an individual's right of access to federal
adjudication with considerations of comity and federalism, federal courts are
presented with the delicate and difficult task of defining the doctrine's scope. 9
The Supreme Court's standards, adopted to define the scope of Pullman
abstention, require that the state law must be unclear and that it must be subject
to an interpretation that will avoid a federal constitutional question. ° There is
little judicial analysis of how "unclear" state law must be or how probable that
the federal constitutional question will be avoided.2" Nevertheless, it is clear that
the likelihood of avoiding the constitutional question in Pullman abstention cases
increases as the state issue becomes more and more ambiguous. The verbal
formulations of the abstention prerequisites utilized by the Supreme Court indicate that a minimal lack of clarity is sufficient to order abstention.2 2
Abstention and Boehning in General
Consistent with its past formulations, the Supreme Court in Boehning
ordered abstention because "the relevant [Indiana] statutory provisions may
fairly be construed to extend pretermination hearing rights to respondent."2
Under such circumstances abstention was proper to avoid deciding the federal
constitutional issue until the state law question was resolved by the state courts.24
Accordingly, Boehning would seem to revolve around how "unclear" state law
must be before Pullman abstention is appropriate. 25 However, the actual reasoning employed by the Court indicates that while in theory Pullman abstention
standards were followed in Boehning, the Court, for all practical purposes,
adopted a rule that the state law issue need not be ambiguous to justify federal
abstention in cases involving unconstrued state enactments. Support for this
assertion can be found in the dissents of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black
in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.6
In Constantineau the police chief, pursuant to a state statute, caused to be
posted a notice to all retail liquor outlets in Hartford, Wisconsin, that sales or
gifts of liquor to appellee, a resident of that city, were forbidden for one year.
The statute provided for such "posting" without notice or hearing. A threejudge federal court held the statute 'unconstitutional as violative of procedural
due process. While the Supreme Court affirmed, Chief Justice Burger argued in
dissent that state court should have the first opportunity to construe a chal19 Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era,
80 Hazv. L. REv. 604, 606 (1967).
20 See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972); Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970); Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965).

21

For excellent analysis of this judicial shortcoming, see Field, Abstention In Constitutional

Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine 122 U.
22 See text accompanying notes 42-59 infra.

23 96 S.Ct. at 169.
24 Id.

PENN.

L. REv. 1071 (1974).

25 See Field, supra note 21, for an analysis of this aspect of Pullman abstention. It is
contended that the Supreme Court is moving away from the indefinite and seemingly undefinable standard of "unclear" state law in ordering abstention in certain types of cases. If
this is so, the need to precisely define the lack of clarity standard will be limited or even un-

necessary.
26

400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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lenged state statute regardless of the degree of ambiguity of the statute." Justice
Black, indicating fealty to Pullman abstention standards, contended that the clear
unconstitutionality of the statute made it "uncertain" and therefore abstention
was proper.2" The majority in Constantineau held that the unconstrued state
statute was not ambiguous and therefore abstention was not proper.29 However,
the Supreme Court in Boehning, on facts analogous to those in Constantineau,
held that abstention was proper. Thus, it appears that Boehning formulates a
rule of abstention based in part on the reasoning of the Constantineau dissenters.
Additionally, however, Boehning may foreshadow a much greater movement
by the Supreme Court in the area of abstention. It is basic to Pullman abstention that the presumption is in favor of federal jurisdiction, and that it takes
"special circumstances" to justify referring state law issues to state courts." The
Supreme Court in Boehning appears to be asserting that a federal court should
abstain even if it finds the state law issue clear, i.e., the challenged state enactment is unambiguous, but that upon deciding it, the court would find the statute
to violate the federal constitution. In such a case, the state courts should be given
an opportunity to construe the statute to give it a constitutional construction.
From this reading of Boehning it is only a short theoretical step to a presumption
in favor of state jurisdiction, which is the basis of another type of abstention
known as Younger abstention.2 In contrast to Pullman abstention, Younger
abstention requires the federal plaintiff to show "special circumstances" to
justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 2
Pullman and Younger abstention doctrines have been applied to fairly
distinct categories of cases in the past. Pullman abstention was (and still is)
applied in civil cases, whereas Younger abstention was applied in pending
criminal cases, whenever appropriate. This distinction, however, has been eroded
by the Supreme Court's more recent applications of Younger abstention. In
Huffman v. Pursue,Ltd.,"3 the Supreme Court, following the lead of many lower
federal courts, applied Younger abstention to pending civil cases. This caused
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, to remark: "This is obviously only the
first step toward extending to state civil proceedings generally the holding of
Younger v. Harris.....,"'
In light of Younger's extension to pending civil cases, it is arguable that the
policies upon which Younger abstention is based, comity and federalism, may
have had an indirect, or possibly a direct, effect on the Court's decision to
abstain in Boehning, although the Court did not mention Younger in its decision."5
27 Id. at 440 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, Blackmun, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 444 (Black, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 439.
30 See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472,
492 (1949).
31 This type of abstention was propounded in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
32 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
33 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
34 Id. at 613, (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35 The propriety of advancing the argument that Younger abstention may have influenced
the Court's decision in Boehning is partially based on the fact that Boehning was decided by
relying on a per curiam reversal. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,
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Furthermore, there appears to be another significant factor which not only
influenced the Court's decision to abstain in Boehning, but which is also contributing to the erosion of the distinction between Pullman and Younger abstention. That factor is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which embodies part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.8 Section 1983 has been a primary means for enforcing constitutional limitations and protecting individual constitutional rights in both civil and
criminal cases. It has made it possible for an individual to seek relief in federal
court without first seeking vindication of his federal constitutional rights in state
courts. However, § 1983 is based upon a premise that an apparent majority of
the Supreme Court now consider invalid: distrust of state courts in handling
federal constitutional issues.3 ' Therefore, it appears that Boehning, an action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, indicates that where the challenged state
enactment has not been construed by state courts, exhaustion of state judicial
remedies is required although the basis of the suit is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, while Boehning appears to have been decided according to Pullman
abstention standards, two other factors, the Younger abstention doctrine and the
Supreme Court's changing attitude toward 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seem to have had
a significant influence on the decision to abstain. Therefore, Boehning will be
more fully analyzed in light of three major factors: (1) the apparent abandonment of the "lack of clarity" requirement for Pullman abstention in cases involving unconstrued state enactments; (2) the extension of Younger abstention
to civil cases; and (3) the increasing curtailment of direct relief in federal courts
for plaintiffs seeking vindication of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Boehning and Pullman Abstention
In Boehning the Supreme Court was faced with an unambiguous state
statute which had never been construed by state courts but was clearly unconstitutional on its face." Rather than deciding the state law issue (whether the
statute provided for a hearing for an employee discharged for cause), which is
proper under Pullman abstention when the state law issue is clear, the Court
looked to the body of other state law and found a state statute that if applied to
the challenged statute might "fairly be read to extend such hearing rights to the
respondent."3 " The Court, "finding" the requisite ambiguity in this unique
fashion, abstained.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used the same approach as
the Supreme Court but reached the opposite result. The Seventh Circuit, finding
the state law issue clear, held that even in applying other state law to the chal413, U.S. 49 (1973), noted that by relying on per curiam reversals or denials of certiorari, the
Court was following "a practice which conceals the rationale of decision and gives at least the
appearance of arbitrary action by this Court." Id. at 93.
36 See text accompanying notes 113-32 infra.
37 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972). See text accompanying notes
120-26 infra.
38 The fact that the Court was forced to look to the body of other state law is clear
evidence that the challenged statute, standing alone, was unconstitutional on its face. See text
accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
39 96 S.Ct. at 169.
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lenged statute, the challenged statute still could not be read to entitle plaintiff
Musgrave to a hearing or a remedy for lack of one. Therefore, the question
presented would be the same in state or federal court; whether plaintiff was
entitled to a hearing under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, abstention would be improper."
Thus, the difference between the position taken by the Supreme Court and
that of the seventh circuit in Boehning relates not to the test to be used, but rather
the deference which is to be paid to state statutes. In a footnote to its decision,
the Supreme Court in Boehning reasoned that:
The possibility that the Indiana state courts would adopt the construction
contrary to that of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is somewhat enhanced by the fact that the construction adopted by the Seventh Circuit
may fairly be said to raise federal constitutional problems under recent
procedural due process decisions of this Court....4"
The Court further reasoned that "[t]he state courts may be reluctant to
attribute to their legislature an intention to pass a statute raising constitutional
problems .
,,."The Court noted that the respondent's federal constitutional
right to a hearing in connection with a discharge for cause might have already
been resolved in her favor.43 The Court's preoccupation with preserving the state
statute rather than providing an individual with an immediate remedy for the
violation of her constitutional right to a hearing is clear.
Before it is possible to understand the impact Boehning may have on the
doctrine of abstention, in terms of the Court's unique reasoning and the inquiry
federal courts are now to make when confronted with actions involving unconstrued state civil enactments, it is necessary to place Boehning in its proper
context by briefly examining prior Supreme Court decisions involving unconstrued, and relatively unambiguous, state enactments.
1. Pullman Abstention and Cases Involving Unconstrued State Enactments
Prior to Boehning
In Harrison v. NAACP4 4 plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that five

Virginia statutes, which had never been construed by the Virginia courts, were
unconstitutional and an injunction restraining their enforcement. The district
court found two of the statutes vague and ambiguous and withheld judgment on

them, retaining jurisdiction, pending construction by the state courts. It declared
the other three unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement. The Supreme
Court ruled that as to the three statutes held unconstitutional, the district court
should have abstained, retaining jurisdiction until the Virginia courts had been
afforded a reasonable opportunity to construe them. The Court ordered
abstention because it was
40 511 F.2d at 836.
41 96 S.Ct. at 169.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 170.
44 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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unable to agree that the terms of these three statutes leave no reasonable

room for a construction by the [state] courts which might avoid in whole or
in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least
materially change the nature of the problem.45
46 that there was no special
The Court made it clear in Harmon v. Forssenius
rule for unconstrued state enactments. Forssenius involved suits attacking the
constitutionality of Virginia statutes conditioning federal voter qualification on
payment of a poll tax or filing of a certificate of residence six months before the
election. The district court refused to abstain to afford the Virginia courts an
opportunity to pass on underlying issues of state law. The Supreme Court held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain, finding
the statutes to be clear and unambiguous. The Court stated that:

[T]he [Pullman] doctrine .. . contemplates that deference to state court
adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain. If the
state statute in question, although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is
not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it47 is the duty of the
federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction.
In Reetz v. Bozanich,8 plaintiffs brought an action challenging the constitutionality of an Alaska statute and regulations limiting commercial salmon
fishing licenses to defined groups of persons. Although the same had never been
interpreted by an Alaska court, the district court refused to abstain. The
Supreme Court, while citing Forssenius, vacated the judgment of the district
court, holding that the federal court should abstain because "a state decision
here ...

could conceivably" avoid the necessity for the federal courts to decide

the federal constitutional question.49
Using language similar to that in Reetz, the Supreme Court in Fornaris v.
Ridge Tool Co.5" ordered abstention because it was "conceivable" that the unconstrued Puerto Rican statute "might be judicially confined to a more narrow
ambit which would avoid all constitutional questions."51
52
In 1971 the Court was confronted with Wisconsin v. Constantineau.
The majority of the Court found that there was no ambiguity in the state statute
and that "[t]here [were] no provisions which could fairly be taken to mean that
notice and hearing might be given under some circumstance or under some construction but not under others.""5 Although the Court was faced with a state
statute unconstrued by state courts, it found "the naked question, uncomplicated
by an unresolved state law [to be] whether that Act on its face is unconstitutional."" The Court cited with approval Zwickler v. Koota, where it said that:
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
380 U.S. 528 (1965).
Id. at 534-35 (emphasis added).
397 U.S. 82 (1970).
Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added).
400 U.S. 41 (1970).
Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
400 U.S. 433 (1971).
Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
Id.
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Abstention should not be ordered merely to await an attempt to vindicate
the claim in a state court. Where there is no ambiguity in the state statute,
the federal court should not
abstain but should proceed to decide the
55
federal constitutional claim.
The Court distinguished Reetz by stating that it and other abstention cases "dealt
with unresolved questions of state law which only a state tribunal could authoritatively construe." 5
Chief Justice Burger, in a vigorous dissent, found the majority's distinction
of Reetz unpersuasive and indicated that he favored a departure from current
standards for abstention. He pointed out that the Alaska statute in Reetz could
not have been more clear or less susceptible to a limiting construction than the
Wisconsin statute. He viewed the Reetz decision as a furtherance of the Court's
policy of avoiding interference with the states by avoiding unnecessary constitutional decision-making. Noting that Reetz could not fairly be distinguished,
Burger argued that ambiguity in state law should not be required to order
abstention and that state courts be allowed to pass first on federal issues. He
found the fact that the Wisconsin statute was not ambiguous did not support a
decision not to abstain." Burger, while agreeing that the Wisconsin statute appeared, on its face and in its application, to be in conflict with accepted concepts
of due process, contended that the Court should not strike down a state statute
without affording the Wisconsin state courts an opportunity to dispose of the
problem. He reasoned that "[s]ince no one could reasonably think that the
judges of Wisconsin have less fidelity to due process requirements of the Federal
Constitution than [the Supreme Court, the Court should abstain] until resort to
state court has been exhausted." 9
Justice Black's dissent in Constantineau offered a new and unusual approach to abstention. While the ambiguity was not evident on the face of the
challenged statute, Justice Black found it in other state law. He reasoned that
since "no state court appears to have passed on this Act at all, a state decision
might well apply the body of other State law to require notice, hearing and other
necessary provisions to render the challenged Act constitutional." 6 The fact
that the Act was clearly unconstitutional on its face made it "wholly uncertain
that the state law has the meaning it purports to have."'" In other words, Black
felt that since the challenged statute was blatantly unconstitutional that the
Wisconsin courts should be given the opportunity to construe the statute so as to
avoid both state and federal defects. The ends to which Black was willing to
go to find "uncertainty" in the state law would seem to place him practically
close to Burger, who would not require any ambiguity in state law to order
55

Id., citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1967).

59

Id.

56 Id. at 438.
57 Id. at 442.
58 Id. at 440.

This statement represents a fundamental change in the Court's attitude toward

state courts' ability to deal with federal constitutional issues and is a major reason for the
curtailment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See text accompanying notes 112-32 infra.

60 Id. at 444.
61 Id.
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abstention in cases involving unconstrued state enactments.
Before analyzing Boehning in light of these decisions, it is necessary to
mention a case which points up the Supreme Court's indecision on how ambiguous state law must be to order abstention. In Lake Carriers'Association v.
MacMullan,62 owners of Great Lakes bulk cargo vessels brought suit to enjoin
various sections of Michigan's Watercraft Pollution Control Act. The Supreme
Court noted that the Act had not been construed by any Michigan court and
that "its terms are far from clear in particulars that go to the foundation of
[plaintiff's] grievance."83 In ordering abstention, the Court stated it was "satisfied
that authoritative resolution of the ambiguities in the Michigan law is sufficiently
likely to avoid or significantly modify the federal questions appellants raise to
warrant abstention."6 The Court's decision would seem to satisfy Chief Justice
Burger's argument in Constantineau;however he joined in an opinion dissenting
from the Court's decision to abstain on the grounds that the Michigan law,
though unconstrued was not ambiguous, that the plaintiffs have a right to choose
a federal forum, and that they would be hurt by delay.65 The dissenting opinion
appears to be directly inconsistent with the Chief Justice's earlier pronouncement
in Constantineau,where he advocated that the state courts should have the first
opportunity to pass on its statutes.66
In the decisions prior to Boehning, the Court has consistently failed to
provide any judicial analysis of how "unclear" state law must be for a federal
court to order abstention. The verbal formulations of the abstention prerequisites
that the Court has used appear to indicate that the lack of clarity required in
state law is slight. Since it is almost always "possible" that a state court, in a
Pullman-type case, might construe state law to affect or avoid the federal constitutional issue, the language of these prior cases apparently imposes exhaustion
of state remedies on state law issues. However, the Forsseniusand Constantineau
opinions and the Constantineauand Lake Carriers'dissents indicate that exhaustion of state remedies is not an absolute rule. While the statutes in Constantineau
and Reetz both appeared to be unambiguous and unconstitutional on their face,
the Court reached opposite decisions regarding abstention. Chief Justice Burger's
joining in the dissent in Lake Carriers' appears directly inconsistent with his
dissenting opinion in Constantineau. The most plausible explanation for these
inconsistencies would seem to be the individual Justices' views on the merits of
the particular case.6" Proceeding on this assumption, the Constantineaudissents
62
63
64
65
66
67

406 U.S. 498 (1972).
Id. at 511.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 515-17.
See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
While this is difficult to prove, a case which lends support to this assertion is Procunier

v. Marinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). In Procunier appellees, prison inmates, brought a class

action challenging prisoner mail censorship regulations issued by the appellant, Director of the
California Department of Corrections, and the ban against the use of law students and legal
paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. The district court held
the regulations unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement of the ban on the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellants argued that
the district court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations on the basis of comity. The Court affirmed the distict court's decision not to
abstain noting the district court's reasoning that "the mere possibility that a state court might
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clearly signaled a desire on the part of some Justices to depart from the longstanding Supreme Court standards, that state law be "unclear" before Pullman
abstention can be ordered. The Constantineau dissenters appear to be advocating
abstention when the state law issue is clear due to the clear unconstitutionality of
the unconstrued statute, on the theory that state courts should have the first opportunity to construe their statutes to cure any constitutional defects.
It is within this context of uncertainty and activism in dealing with abstention that Boehning was decided. Boehning represents the first time the Black
rationale, from his dissent in Constantineau, has been endorsed by a majority
of the Supreme Court. It is not fair to say, however, that the Seventh Circuit
erred in refusing to abstain, even after following Black's approach of looking to
the body of other state law, because such an approach does not mandate abstention in every case. Furthermore, the Constantineau majority opinion is strong
authority for the Seventh Circuit's refusal to abstain. Thus, the Seventh Circuit
cannot be faulted for the exercise of its well-reasoned discretion in Boehning. It
seems apparent that the Supreme Court recognized this fact and therefore offered
an additional rationale for its reversal of the Seventh Circuit.
2. Boehning and the Adoption of a Constitutional Rule of Construction
as a Grounds for Abstention
Initially Boehning would appear to be another abstention case decided consistent with the vague verbal formulation reminiscent of prior cases. The Supreme
Court cited Reetz, Forssenius,Fornaris,and Pullman for its authority. However,
the fact that the Court looked to other state law in determining whether the
"uncertainty" requirement for Pullman abstention was present indicates that it
adopted Justice Black's suggestion as stated in his dissent in Constantineau.5
It appears, though, that the Court recognized the tenuousness of resting its
decision to abstain upon the finding of ambiguity in a clear state law on the
basis of other state law. Consequently, the Court looked for a more solid
rationale on which to rest its decision. It noted that there was a serious constitutional problem if the clear meaning of the challenged Indiana statute were
adopted and no constitutional problem if other state law was found to apply to
the statute. Relying on their belief that state courts would, if given the opdeclare the prison regulations unconstitutional is no grounds for abstention." Id. at 400-01,
citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971).
The appellants also asserted as a ground for abstention that CAL. P.ENAL CODE § 2600 (4)
(West Supp. 1975) assured prisoners the right to receive books, magazines, and periodicals,
therefore an interpretation of the statute by the state courts and its application to the regulations might avoid or modify the constitutional question. The Supreme Court viewed this as an
attempt to "establish the essential prerequisite for abstention--'an uncertain issue of state
law .... '" 416 U.S. at 402-03, citing Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965). The
Court was not persuaded and held that "A state court interpretation of § 2600(4) would not
avoid or substantially modify the constitutional question. .. ." 416 U.S. at 403.
Thus, while the similarity of Procunierto Boehning is evident, the Court using reasoning
emphasizing the second requirement of Pullman abstention, namely avoiding the constitutional
question, rather than the lack of clarity requirement as emphasized in Boehning, held that
would be improper. It cannot be doubted that the regulations were clearly unconstitutional and
the state court would have held as such. Therefore, it would seem that the real reason for not
ordering abstention in Procunierwas the Justices' views of the merits of the case.
68 See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
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portunity, afford the statute a constitutional construction, the Court reasoned
that the Indiana state courts would likely adopt a construction of the statute to
provide for a hearing, for if they did not adopt such a construction the statute
would clearly raise federal constitutional problems. The possibility that the
Indiana state courts would adopt a constitutional construction of the statute was
enhanced by the fact that Indiana had a statute which if applied to the challenged statute would cure all procedural due process problems. 6 Thus, the
Court's decision to abstain was based on two major factors: (1) the patent
unconstitutionality of the challenged Act, and (2) the availability of other state
law which, if applied, would obviate decision of the federal constitutional
question.
Thus, even though clear federal unconstitutionality is not a proper ground
for ordering abstention under traditional Pullman standards, the Boehning
opinion indicates that the Supreme Court has adopted such a ground in cases
involving unconstrued state enactments. If a federal court correctly predicts that
the clear unconstitutionality of one construction of the state enactment will lead
the state court to adopt the other construction, abstention would appear to serve
the interests of saving a statute that would otherwise be ruled in violation of the
Federal Constitution. It is this reasoning that the Supreme Court appears to have
adopted in Boehning.
While the reasoning behind the Court's conclusion is sound and in line with
current abstention policies, it represents a new approach to abstention in action
involving unconstrued state enactments. The Court's decision to abstain is based
in part on a long standing rule of constitutional construction frequently articulated
when the validity of a statute is drawn into question. The rule provides that
where a statute is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations, one constitutional
and the other unconstitutional, it is the duty of a court to adopt that construction
which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity." The application of this
rule to situations where a federal court is determining the constitutionality of a
state enactment appears to be consistent with the policy considerations which
underlie Pullman abstention, namely avoiding both interference with a legitimate
state program and unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions. 7
However, this rule had never previously been used to support a decision to
abstain. The rule was applied in one case where it was necessary for the Supreme
Court to interpret a state enactment, but it was not applied for purposes of
determining whether the Court should abstain. In Presser v. Illinois,"2 the
petitioner had been indicted for a violation of the state Military Code. He
contended that the Code violated the second and fourteenth amendments of the
Federal Constitution. The Court in sustaining the constitutionality of the Code
stated:
69 96 S.Ct. at 169.
70 While not articulating this rule, the Court clearly adopted it. The Court, in reasoning
that state courts would give the challenged statute a constitutional construction, cited for its
authority Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), and Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974),
both of which applied this rule of constitutional construction.
71 See Field, supra note 21, at 1093-98, 1113-1116.

72 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
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We cannot attribute to the legislature, unless compelled to do so by its plain
words, a purpose to pass an act in conflict with an act of Congress on a
subject over which Congress is given authority by the Constitution of the
United States. We are therefore of [the] opinion that fairly construed the
sections of the Military Code referred7 3to do not conflict with the laws of
Congress on the subject of the militia.
Thus, faced with a state statute susceptible to two interpretations, one constitutional and one not, the Court construed the statute to be constitutional. It is important to note that the Court, when applying the rule, did not even consider
which meaning a state court might adopt. The rule is based on the presumption
that a state legislature will not intentionally enact an unconstitutional law.
Therefore, the question of whether or not to abstain for state court decisions is
not even relevant. The rule is one of construction, not one of abstention.
Yet strict application of this constructional rule to considerations presented
in Pullman abstention cases would seem to require the following results: (1) if
the statute is dearly unconstitutional, the rule does not apply and the federal
court would hold the state enactment unconstitutional; (2) if the statute is
susceptible to two meanings, one constitutional and one unconstitutional, the
rule applies and the federal court adopts the constitutional meaning and proceeds
to the merits of the case; and (3) if the state statute is susceptible to more than
two meanings, the rule does not apply and the federal court is presented with the
question of whether or not to abstain based on Pullman standards. It is clear that
the construction rule is not meant to be applicable in the abstention context.
Nevertheless, in Boehning the Court used the rule to support its decision to
abstain. The Court took a clearly unconstitutional statute, found it to be
susceptible of two meanings, using Justice Black's approach from Constantineau,
and abstained.
It should be noted that the Court could not apply the rule in its strict sense
and obtain the desired result, that of saving the statute. Strict application of the
rule would require the Court to adopt a constitutional meaning for the statute.
However, it could not do so in Boehning because the statute was susceptible to
only one meaning and therefore the rule would not apply. However, by modifying the rule and applying it in the abstention context, the Court was able to
adopt Black's approach of looking to other state law that could be applied to the
challenged statute to give it the necessary constitutional dimension. Accordingly,
the Court not only avoided decision of the federal constitutional issue, but it
also allowed the state courts the opportunity to save a statute that would otherwise have been ruled unconstitutional.
Thus, Boehning represents a new approach to abstention by allowing a
federal court to order abstention when a state statute is clearly unconstitutional.
The constitutional rule of construction is usually applied when a statute is susceptible of two meanings, one constitutional and one unconstitutional. In its
attempt to mold the rule into a basis upon which to order abstention, the Court
was forced to modify the rule to cover those instances where there is dearly only
73 Id. at 268-69.
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one possible construction for a challenged statute which construction renders
the statute unconstitutional. In such cases, the Court, to meet the constructional
rule's requirements, found the requisite second construction, which would make
the statute constitutional, by either looking to other state law which if applied
would give the statute a constitutional construction or believing that the clear unconstitutionality of the statute would cause state courts to adopt a constitutional
construction of the statute. But, instead of adopting the constitutional construction of the statute, the Court then abstains and allows the state court to do so.
Boehning, then, stands for the proposition that in either case a federal court
should abstain and give state courts the opportunity to cure any constitutional
infirmities in the statute. It is obvious that there will be "special circumstances"
when abstention should not be ordered. This is a necessary exception even in
cases involving unconstrued state statutes. It will provide federal judges the
flexibility to refuse to abstain in cases where they believe the merits of the case
warrant immediate attention. However, it remains to be seen which violations of
constitutional rights the Supreme Court will deem important enough to warrant
immediate attention of the federal courts. In other words, what "special circumstances" will warrant federal jurisdiction where the state statute has not been
construed by state courts.
The Influence of Younger and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on Boehning
While Boehning clearly sanctions a new ground on which to order Pullman
abstention, two other factors appear to have influenced the Court's decision to
abstain. They are the Younger abstention doctrine and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
analysis of these two factors in relation to Boehning is undertaken not only for the
purpose of understanding Boehning, but- also to analyze what appears to be a
trend of the Supreme Court in ordering abstention. It is hoped that this analysis
will serve not only as a guidepost for federal court judges that are confronted
with actions involving unconstrued state enactments, but also for practitioners
who are contemplating bringing such actions into federal court.
1. Younger Abstention
It will be remembered that Pullman abstention is based on a presumption
in favor of federal jurisdiction, and that it takes "special circumstances" to justify
referring state law issues to the state courts.74 There is, however, a category of
cases falling within federal jurisdictional grants in which the presumption is in
favor of state jurisdiction, and the federal plaintiff must show "special circumstances" to justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction." The type of abstention
applicable to this category of cases is called Younger abstention. It further
differs from Pullman abstention in that a federal court decision to stay its hand
74 See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472,
492 (1949).
75 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See also Douglas v. City of Jeanette,
319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
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results in a state proceeding wherein federal issues are adjudicated along with
state ones."6
Younger abstention was established in Younger v. Harris and its
companion cases, which were replete with references to federalism and the need
for comity between federal and state courts." Younger was, in part, a reaction
against lower federal court response to the Supreme Court's decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister." On the authority of Dombrowski, federal courts enjoined numerous state criminal proceedings on the basis of first amendment claims."
In Dombrowski, the plaintiffs brought a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking
relief and an injunction restraining enforcement of a statute allegedly in violation of the first amendment because of its overbreadth. They also alleged that
the threatened prosecutions were not bona fide with the intent to secure valid
convictions, but were part of a harassment campaign. The district court held
that even if the plaintiff's constitutional allegations had merit, an injunction
against state prosecution was not warranted. The Supreme Court reversed,
finding special circumstances justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction:
defense of the state criminal prosecution was not adequate to protect the
plaintiff's constitutional rights."0
In Younger the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant Los Angeles district
attorney from prosecuting him under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act.
He claimed that "the prosecution and even the presence of the Act inhibited him
in the exercise of his rights of free speech and press."'" At the time the plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief was filed in federal court a criminal proceeding was
then pending against him in state court. The district court held in plaintiff's
favor, finding the Act void for vagueness and overbreadth. The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that the plaintiff had not shown bad faith on the part of the
state prosecutors or that the challenged statute was flagrantly and patently unconstitutional and that the state criminal prosecution was an adequate forum for
raising the constitutional issue.82
76 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-54 (1971). See also Field, note 21 supra, 1164.
77 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). For example, in Younger the
Court stated:
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal
prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of
"comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. This . . . is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one
familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into
existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of
"Our Federalism."
Id. at 44.
78 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
79
Those who objected to what they termed the "faddish trend of irritating interventions
in State action that for a while threatened to become an avalanche of constitutional
fetishism"' have received Younger and its companion cases with enthusiasm.
C. WRIGHT, LAW oF FEDERAL COURTS f 52 (2d ed. 1972 Supp.), citing Veen v. Davis, 326 F.
Supp. 116, 119, n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
80 380 U.S. at 486.
81 401 U.S. at 39.
82 Id. at 49-54.
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While federal jurisdiction was exercised in Dombrowski and declined in
Younger, both cases started from the premise that the federal courts should defer
in favor of state jurisdiction if the contemplated state proceeding was adequate
to protect the plaintiff's rights. However, dicta in these two decisions strike a
fundamental difference. Dombrowski emphasized the importance of protecting
individual rights, reacting to the "chilling effect" which bad faith prosecutions
and overbroad statutes have upon individuals.8" In contrast, Younger emphasized the importance of avoiding needless friction between federal and state
courts. This need for comity, the Younger Court said, is required by the very
nature of federalism.8"
One of the questions left open by Younger was whether abstention should
apply to noncriminal cases. The Supreme Court recently answered this question
in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 5 where it considered the "seriousness of federal
judicial interference with state civil functions." 8 Defendant state officials
instituted civil proceedings under the state public nuisance statute against the
plaintiff's predecessor as operator of a theater displaying pornographic films. The
state trial court rendered a judgment in the defendant's favor and ordered the
theater closed for a year and the seizure and sale of the personal property used in
its operation. Rather than appealing within the state system, the plaintiff, which
had taken over operation of the theater prior to the judgment, filed suit in federal
district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court declared the nuisance statute
.unconstitutional and enjoined the execution of the state court's judgment. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, applying the principles of Younger,
even though the state proceeding was civil in nature. The Court stated that the
district court should have applied the tests laid down in Younger in determining
whether to proceed to the merits and should not have entertained the action
unless appellee established that early intervention was justified under the exceptions recognized in Younger."
Prior to Huffman the holding and rationale of Younger had been thought
to apply only to criminal prosecutions.8 The concurring opinion of Justices
Stewart and Harlan in Younger indicated that the distinction between civil and
criminal actions had been based upon the notions that equity courts are less
reluctant to intervene in civil proceedings and that interference with a civil suit
is less offensive to state interests because the state is not a party. 9
The Huffman Court was reluctant to directly repudiate this civil-criminal
distinction. The state nuisance proceeding was described as "more akin to a
criminal prosecution than are most civil cases."' The Court noted that the civil
action in question was closely related to the state's criminal statutes prohibiting
dissemination of obscene 'materials. Federal intervention, therefore, would
83
84
85
'86
87
88
89
90

380 U.S. at 487.
401 U.S. at 44.
420 U.S. 592 (1975).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 603-11.
See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974).
401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart & Harlan, J.J., concurring).
420 U.S. at 604.
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disrupt
the state's efforts to protect the very interests underlying its criminal
91
laws.
Despite the Court's disclaimer that "[flor the purposes of [Huffman] we
need make no general pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all
civil litigation," 92 the opinion suggests that federal restraint may be appropriate
in any state proceeding, civil or criminal, depending upon the circumstances of
the case. The Court emphasized the capability of state appellate courts to rule
adequately and fairly on federal constitutional issues.9"
Significantly, the Court favorably cited a few of the many Federal Court
of Appeals' decisions which have applied Younger when the pending state proceedings were civil in nature. The various reasons those cases offered for extending Younger may be summarized as follows: First, a state civil statute which is
used for the enforcement of the state's criminal laws can be as effective a tool for
regulation or prohibition as the sanctions imposed by criminal statutes;94 second,
since the state is usually a party, the proceeding is of paramount interest to the
state's judicial process and abstention is thus required to avoid needless federalstate friction ;95 third, federal intervention in any pending state proceeding implies
that the state courts are incapable of vindicating federal rights;9" fourth, evaluating the merits of a plaintiff's federal constitutional claims often results in duplication of effort and cost;9" and fifth, civil proceedings are less serious to the individual and therefore less reason for federal intervention." An important factor
to note is that all cases extending Younger to pending, noncriminal proceedings,
were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
For purposes of understanding the connection between Boehning and
Younger abstention it is necessary to consider the application of Younger abstention to purely civil proceedings. The most well-known case where Younger
abstention was applied in a purely civil proceeding is Lynch v. Snepp. 9 In Lynch
a state court had enjoined nonschool members from entering the grounds of a
high school which had experienced violence due to racial tension. Plaintiffs filed
suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to enjoin the state court
order. The federal district court granted plaintiff's request for an injunction.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, stating that abstention was
not warranted because the element of bad faith, required by Younger, was not
present, and because plaintiffs had not shown any irreparable harm would occur
if they presented their constitutional claims in a state court. As an explanation
91

Id. at 604-05.

92 Id. at 607.
93 Id. at 609. The Court found this to be "especially true when . ..
the constitutional
issue involves a statute which is capable of judicial narrowing." Id. The Supreme Court's
growing confidence in the ability of state court judges to fairly handle constitutional questions
is the major factor contributing to 42 U.S.C. § 1983's decline. See notes 112-32 inlra.
94 Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769
(4th Cir. 1973); Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972).
95 Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973).
96 Id.; Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973); Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826
(Ist Cir. 1972); Speight v. Slaton, 356 F.Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
97 Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973); Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st
Cir. 1972); Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski,
Younger, and Beyond, 50 TEx. L. R.v. 1324 (1972).
98 Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973).
99 Id.
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for its extension of the Younger test to this noncriminal case, the Fourth Circuit
stated:
While the offense to a state interest may be less in a civil proceeding than
in a criminal proceeding,... also the burden on the individual if left to his
state court remedies is less severe in the civil context. In requiring a federal
plaintiff to defend a state civil action there is no exposure to criminal penalties which could culminate during the pendency of the action.... Moreover, when coordinate courts are on collision course the disruptive effect on
federalism is not likely to be dissipated by assurance that only civil jurisdiction is involved. 100
The court cited Cousins v. Wigoda'0 to support its rationale.
In Cousins, a state court had enjoined plaintiffs from attempting to oust
state court-determined delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention.
Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought

an injunction against the state court order. The district court granted the injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed stating that the
district court should have abstained, having found neither bad faith nor "special
circumstances," and held that plaintiffs should appeal the state court order
against them in the state appellate courts. On the issue of applying Younger in
this civil proceeding, the court stated that "special respect for the state judicial
process [is required] if federal jurisdiction is not invoked until after state litigation
is commenced."'0 2 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist denied
a stay, relying on the principles of comity between federal and state courts as
enunciated in Younger.'
In addition to the reasons enunciated by the lower federal courts in their

decisions extending Younger to noncriminal cases, support for the extension of
Younger to such cases can be found in dicta of Supreme Court opinions. For
example, Chief Justice Burger (joined by Justices White and Blackmun) concurring in Mitchum v. Foster" stated:

We have not yet reached or decided exactly how great a restraint imposed by
these principles on a federal court asked to enjoin state civil proceedings.
Therefore, on remand in this case, it seems to me the District Court, before
reaching a decision on the merits of appellant's claim, should properly
consider whether general notions of equity or principles of federalism,
similar to those invoked in Younger, prevent the issuance of an injunction
against the state "nuisance abatement" proceedings in the circumstances of
this case.' 05

Justice White made a more assertive statement on the issue in his dissent
(joined by Blackmun and Burger) in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.:1o
100 Id. at 777n. 5.

101

463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972).

102 Id. at 606.
103 409 U.S. 1201, 1205 (1972).
104 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
105 Id. at 244.
106 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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Appellee... invokes Younger and companion cases as a ground for affirming the judgment of the District Court. Of course, those cases involved
federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings, but the relevant
considerations, in my view, are equally applicable where state civil litigation
is in progress.107
It would appear that from the above analysis of Younger and its extension
into the civil law area, as evidenced by Huffman and the Court's approval of
lower court decisions so extending Younger, that Younger's underlying policy
considerations of comity and federalism are becoming the dominant force behind
abstention.
Indeed, the extremes to which the Supreme Court is willing to go to find
"uncertainty" in state law and its new use of a constitutional rule of construction to support its decision to abstain in Boehning, are clear evidence of the
Court's desire to defer to state courts. A presumption in favor of state law is
fast becoming an unarticulated rule of the Supreme Court for cases previously
thought to be subject to Pullman abstention. The correctness of this prediction
is supported by another recent Seventh Circuit decision.
In Horvath v. City of Chicago..8 plaintiffs, operators of massage parlors,
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant's threatened civil
proceedings in state court to enjoin plaintiffs' business practices as a nuisance
prohibited by a city ordinance. Plaintiffs contended that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Even though no state litigation was pending against most of the plaintiffs when their federal action was commenced, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was "satisfied that [the district court]
correctly refused to grant plaintiffs any federal relief."' 9 The Seventh Circuit
held that plaintiffs' claim, which rested on the due process requirement that a
citizen must be given fair notice that his conduct is proscribed before it may
provide a basis for punishment, did not provide a proper basis for federal interference with state civil litigation which, if allowed to run its course, would
presumably eliminate whatever ambiguity existed with respect to the application
of the ordinance to plaintiffs' commercial activities."'
Judge Swygert, disagreeing with the reasoning of Judge, now Justice,
Stevens, asserted in a concurring opinion that:
If one in attempting to protect a property interest from state interference
can arguably assert that his conduct is not included within the prohibitory
terms of a vague statute, he ought not have to await the finality of a state
proceeding against him before asserting his constitutional right to procedural
due process.
To require him to do so is an impermissible form of absten11
tion.'
While Horvath was not decided on abstention grounds, Judge Swygert's
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 561.
510 F.2d 594 (1975).
Id. at 595.
Id. at 595-96.
Id.at597.
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statement clearly points up the abstention aspects of the court's decision. The

court's decision required plaintiffs to litigate their federal constitutional claim
along with state law issues in state courts. Thus, the court's decision had the same
effect that a decision to abstain under Younger would have had. Since no state
litigation was pending against several of the plaintiffs, Horvath clearly has overtones favorable to an extension of Younger abstention to civil cases where no
action is pending. This extension is not surprising since it is the next logical
step beyond Huffman which extended Younger to pending civil cases.
Horvath is similar to Boehning in three important respects: (1) both are
civil cases: (2) no state civil proceeding was pending in either case; and (3)
plaintiffs in both cases asserted federal constitutional due process rights. The
fact that Horvath is akin to Younger abstention and Boehning was decided using
Pullman abstention, taken together with their similarity in such important respects, points to the eroding distinction between Pullman and Younger abstention.
The seeming inconsistency in the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Horvath and

Boehning can initially be explained on a ground pointed out by Judge Swygert:
Judge, now Justice, Stevens' failure to understand the abstention implications of
his reasoning. However, the decisions can be further reconciled by the merits of
each case. Obscenity is an intensely local issue and the avoidance of federalstate friction may weigh heavily in favor of allowing states to control such matters, especially since such matters reach well beyond the individual involved.
Whereas the providing of a hearing prior to discharge from one's employment
is clearly an issue of immediate individual concern rather than a community
concern. Thus, the Seventh Circuit was acting within its discretion by not ordering abstention in Boehning and refusing declaratory or injunctive relief in
Horvath.
42 US.C. § 1983
There is another factor which is contributing to the erosion of the distinction between Pullman and Younger abstention, and which was present in
Boehning. That factor is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Many actions in which Younger or
Pullman abstention is ordered are brought under § 1983. Section 1983 embodies
part of the Civil Rights Act of 187111" and emphasizes individual rights, a concem reiterated by the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfster. However, the
Court in Younger was quick to point out that the considerations of comity and
federalism are paramount in pending criminal cases, except in "special circumstances." Since Huffman recently extended the reasoning of Younger to
pending civil cases the vindication of an individual's federal constitutional rights
112 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, is
entitled "Civil action for deprivation of rights." The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for
redress.
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is arguably being forced to take a backseat to the considerations of comity and
federalism in an increasing number of cases. As Justice Douglas stated in his dissenting opinion in Boehning: "The position of the Court continues the strangulation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that has recently been evident [in] Huffman v.
Pursue, [Ltd.]. . .. ""'
The reason § 1983 is being curtailed, and thus contributing to the merging
of the Younger and Pullman abstention doctrines, is due to Supreme Court's increasing confidence in state courts' ability to fairly handle constitutional claims.
Although its importance went unrecognized for many years, § 1983 has been
used with increasing frequency in the past several years
as a basic tool for enforcing constitutional limitations and protecting constitutional rights."' While
the Supreme Court frequently commented that state courts share with the federal
courts the responsibility of interpreting and applying the Constitution,"' § 1983
reflects the countervailing sentiment that in certain cases federal courts may be
more suitable for adjudication of federal constitutional issues. The most
frequently cited reason for committing § 1983 cases to the federal courts is that
federal judges have an expertise that state courts cannot match, in that they
deal primarily with federal constitutional law and thus are more likely to insure
that legitimate federal interests are vindicated."' Thus, in recognition of the
importance of adjudicating certain constitutional claims in federal courts,
Congress deliberately fashioned § 1983 as a supplementary remedy to assure that
civil rights would not be nullified by state courts."' As Justice Brennan has
stated, "Federal court abstention is particularly inappropriate in cases brought
under [§ 1983, which is] designed specifically to authorize federal protection of
civil rights.""' 9 Further, in Mitchum v. Foster,the Supreme Court held § 1983 to
be an exception to the anti-injunction statute, while also paying lip service to
Younger.'
113 96 S.Ct. at 170 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114 See McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, (1974).
115 See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1971); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249 (1971); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241
(1967).
116 See, e.g., Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884).
117 See Aldisert, judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal judge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORDER 557, 572 (1.973);
Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HAav. L. REv. 1352, 1357 (1970);
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. REv. 250, 263-64 (1974).
[B]y enactment of (§ 1983) . . . Congress recognized important interests in permitting a plaintiff to choose a federal forum in cases arising under federal law ...
This
grant of jurisdiction was designed to preserve and enhance the expertise of federal
courts in applying federal law; to achieve greater uniformity of results; and, since
federal courts are "more likely to apply federal law sympathetically and understandingly than are state courts" . . . to minimize misapplications of federal law.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 513-14 (1973).
118 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw &
CONzaEMP. PROB. 216, 230 (1948).
119 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.13 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
120 The Supreme Court stated that it would not "question or qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to
enjoin a state court proceeding." 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
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The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
states and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, "whether
that action be executive, legislative or judicial."''
Implicit in the Mitchum holding is a determination that state courts are not as
competent as the federal courts to determine federally created rights.
A factor present in each expansion of § 1983, as represented by cases such as
24
Monroe v. Pape,"22
' Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,2 3 Mitchum v. Foster,"
"25
and District of Columbia v. Carter, is that each of the opinion writers has
referred to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. "The Court's
constant recourse to the Act's legislative history is significant for it suggests the
Court has used legislative history to justify a result based on an invalid premise:
126
distrust of the state courts.'
Section 1983 was passed in the post-Civil War era when a new structure of
law was emerging. This structure established the role of the federal government
as a "guarantor of basic federal rights against state power."' 2' The legislators
believed that state courts, particularly in the South, were not enforcing these
rights, and were even being used to harass and injure individuals. 28 While the
legislators had the Ku Klux Klan particularly in mind,121 the legislative debates
surrounding passage of § 1983 indicate a concern for the general needs of all
citizens to have their federal rights enforced in a neutral and detached forum.'
This rationalization, based on events occurring over 100 years ago, cannot be
sustained if one considers it in the context of state criminal courts.
In reality, state judges have had to become federal constitutional experts
since the criminal law revolution began with Mapp, Miranda,and Gideon;
yet, if state judges are competent to handle federal constitutional issues in
criminal cases, they are also worthy of being entrusted with other constitutional claims ....131
Judge Aldisert, writing in 1973, recommended that some statutory limitations be placed on § 1983. He suggested that a statutory format should recognize
distinctions:
(a) Between constitutional issues where state interests predominate and
where they are minimal; (b) between newly enacted and previously interpreted state legislation and regulations; (c) between settled principles of
state law and principles that are yet unsettled. ... Alternatively, such statute
121 Id. at 242, quoting in part from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
122 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
123 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
124 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
125 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
126 Aldisert, supra note 117, at 572.
127 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). For a comprehensive discussion of the
background of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
128 407 U.S. at 240. See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871) (remarks of
Senator Osborn).
129 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1961).
130 Id. at 180-81.
131 Aldisert, supra note 117, at 572.
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could provide for abstention: (a) When no state law is challenged or when
the law challenged can be given a saving construction in state courts; or (b)
when state remedies are in fact adequate; . .. or (d) when no irreparable
harm will follow from declining federal jurisdiction... : Additionally, some
statutory limitation should prohibit federal interference in certain on-going
state civil proceedings. In civil cases where state interest is paramount, a
statute embodying the Younger v. Harrisdoctrine should be applied.132
While Congress has failed to take note of any of Judge Aldisert's recommendations, the Supreme Court has not. The many recent abstention decisions
by the Supreme Court indicate that a majority of the Justices are well aware of
the invalidity of the premise upon which § 1983 is based and, consequently, the
Court has taken it upon itself, rightly or wrongly, to decide cases using reasoning
and language evincing many of Judge Aldisert's recommendations. As a consequence, Younger abstention, which requires an aggrieved party to show
"special circumstances" for a federal court to exercise federal jurisdiction, is
quickly coming to the fore, while Pullman abstention is declining because of §
1983's decline. Indeed, it is probably the fact that Supreme Court Justices supporting § 1983 have failed to justify it on a basis other than a distrust of state
courts in handling constitutional cases that has led to its recent decline.
Boehning, with its adoption of a constitutional rule of construction as a grounds
for abstention and its disregard that the action was brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, clearly represents a major step in this direction.

It would not be fair to conclude that either the Seventh Circuit or the
Supreme Court decided Boehning incorrectly. Rather, Boehning is the result of
a coalescing of two major abstention doctrines that have conflicting considerations. This coalescence seems to be largely due to the Supreme Court's renewed
confidence in the ability of state courts to deal with federal constitutional rights.
It seems likely that this confidence will not be limited to cases involving unconstrued state enactments, as in Boehning, and is a trend of which the lower
federal courts must be cognizant.
Richard James Annen

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-PoLrrIcAL
INDIVIDUALS

AND

RELIEF AGAINST

ORGANIZATIONS

QUESTION AND

MAY, OBTAIN

MANDATORY

A MUNICIPALITY AND ITS OFFICALS UNDER

STANDINGINJUNCTIVE

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Calvin v. Conlisk
In 1973 seven individual plaintiffs and three organizations-the AfroAmerican Patrolmen's League, Concerned Citizens for Police Reform, and the
132

Id. at 577-78.
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Chicago Urban League-brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 19831
seeking an injunction to remedy the alleged failure of the Chicago Police Department to enforce constitutional standards of conduct among its police officers. The
seven individual plaintiffs alleged several incidents of police brutality, and the
three organizations stated that they received complaints of misconduct from
hundreds of persons. The organizations charged the city, the Superintendent of
Police, and Police Board members with failure to maintain an effective police
disciplinary system and that such failure served to condone unconstitutional actions by police officers. The plaintiffs charged the police with violations of their
first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights.2
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois'
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
The court stated that it would not consider a case in which the relief sought would
involve the court in the administration of a city police department. The lower
court, relying on Gilligan v. Morgan,4 determined that this type of injunctive
relief contemplated "inappropriate action"5 under the Gilligan rationale. In
Gilligan, the Supreme Court had held that no justiciable controversy existed
where the plaintiffs sought to restrain the Governor of Ohio from prematurely
ordering National Guard troops to duty and to restrain Guard leaders from committing future violations of students' constitutional rights. The injunction sought
there would have required judicial supervision over training procedures and the
ordering of the National Guard. The Supreme Court concluded that this supervision would thrust the judicial branch into the area of military authority and
responsibility which is constitutionally placed in the hands of the legislative and
executive branches.6
Thus, on appeal the Seventh Circuit encountered several important yet
problematic constitutional and public policy issues. Accordingly, before analyzing
the court's decision in Calvin it is important that these issues be examined. First,
the principle of justiciability was involved. It posits that even though a court has
the power to consider a case, it still may be deemed inappropriatefor judicial
consideration. A further aspect of justiciability is the political question doctrine,
which is designed to restrain the federal courts from entering into areas that are
control of the legislative and executive
assigned by the Constitution to the
7
branches of the federal government.
Second, notions of federalism were involved in Calvin; federal courts are
reluctant to interfere with matters within the authority of state governments,
such as the administration of a city police department.'
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides in part:
S.. [E]very person who, under color of [law] subjects or causes to be subjected any
person [within the jurisdiction of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law (or) suit in equity ....
2 Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975).
1973).
3 Calvin v. Conlisk, 367 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill.
4 413 U. S.1 (1973).
5 Id.at3.
6 Id.
7 Id.at 4.
8 Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 '(1975); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). '
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Third was whether an actual "case or controversy" existed ;9 an issue which
devolved into a question of standing. In Calvin, since plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief for possible future misconduct, the standing question arose because of the
possibility that none of the plaintiffs had suffered harm sufficient to constitute a
case or controversy.
Although the foregoing are significant impediments to the granting of injunctive relief in cases of unconstitutional police conduct, the Seventh Circuit
looked beyond strict legal doctrines to the realities underlying the civil rights
action in Calvin. The court was cognizant of the lack of alternative avenues of
redress available to the victims of police misconduct. These alternatives--civil
damage suits or criminal prosecution against individual police officers-were
found to be expensive, time-consuming, and thus inadequate. The court reasoned
that general considerations of public policy militated toward the establishment
of an effective civilian complaint mechanism.1"
Thus, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's holding in Calvin on
two grounds.1 The court first held that plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief was
justiciable and did not involve a political question as in Gilligan. The court distinguished Gilligan on its facts, finding that although the Constitution expressly
vested authority in military matters with the legislative and executive branches,
no constitutional provision exempted municipal agencies from judicial review.
Second, the court stated that the plaintiffs in Calvin met the traditional criteria
for issuance of mandatory injunctive relief: proof that the remedy at law is inadequate and that irreparable injury would occur if the injunction was not issued.
Yet to fully understand the questions presented in Calvin it is necessary to
examine the Seventh Circuit's holding in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Rizzo v. Goode.12 Rizzo, a case involving facts substantially similar to
Calvin, casts considerable doubt on the validity of the Seventh Circuit's analysis,
since the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Calvin decision in light of
Rizzo."
Rizzo arose out of two class action suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging a pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment of
minority citizens in Philadelphia. The United States District Court for the
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

9
10

U.S.

13

44 U.S.L.W. 3463, 3470 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).

CONST.,

"Without interfering with police discretion in their normal routines, the district court
could, if appropriate, formulate relief that would establish procedures to assure proper processing of citizen complaints concerning police misconduct." 520 F.2d at 7. See also Rizzo v.
Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598, 603 (1976).
11 The Seventh Circuit addressed two additional issues in its holding. First, it fouud that
federal jurisdiction was established under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), as to the city of Chicago.
The court relied on Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1971), in holding that
plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief put the amount in controversy over the $10,000 jurisdictional amount. Faced with the difficulty of placing a monetary value on the constitutional
rights involved, the Seventh Circuit found that allegations in plaintiffs' complaint of false
imprisonment, fourth amendment violations, lost wages, or legal fees incurred as a result of
police misconduct satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement.
Second, the Seventh Circuit faced the question of standing raised by the defendants. The
district court dismissed the claims of the three organizational plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the Afro-American Patrolmen's League complaint because it found a
conflict of interest. However, the court granted standing to the remaining plaintiff organizations.
12 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania 4 made findings of fact that the conduct of two
individual police officers violated citizens' constitutional rights in three out of 40
alleged incidents. The facts indicated that citizens' complaints to the Police
Board of Inquiry resulted in a five-day suspension in one case and no disciplinary
action in another. The district court concluded that neither the city nor the police
officials had endorsed a policy of violation of minority citizens' constitutional
rights. But the court did find convincing evidence of departmental discouragement of civilian complaints.
The city and police officials named as defendants in Rizzo were instructed
to draft and submit for the court's approval "a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints, containing detailed suggestions for revising police manuals and procedural rules for dealing with citizens and for
changing procedures for handling complaints."' 5 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed this order.' 6
The Supreme Court reversed on two grounds. First, the Court stated that
there was no case or controversy between the respondent citizens and the city
and police officials. The Court explained that the respondents' claim of real and
immediate injury rests "not upon what the named petitioners might do to them
in the future but upon what one small, unnamed minority of policemen might do
to them."'" Therefore, the citizens lacked a personal stake in the modification of
the police disciplinary system and thus the outcome of the case.
Secondly, the Supreme Court held that the injunctive relief granted by the
district court constituted an unwarranted intrusion by the federal courts into the
authority of the city and police officials' functions. The Court stated that the
lower court exceeded the bounds of its authority under § 1983 because it granted
the injunction without a showing that the petitioners were directly linked to the
actions of a small number of policemen. The Supreme Court was thus unpersuaded by the lower court's finding that the city's failure to act was equally
enjoinable under § 1983 as was active participation by city or police officials in
alleged deprivations of constitutional rights. The Court bolstered its reversal by
emphasizing that the concept of federalism does not contemplate that federal
equity procedures be used to regulate the conduct of state employees.
Finally then, against this background of conflicting interpretation of case
law and policy considerations, it is necessary to examine the questions raised by
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Calvin from three perspectives. First, would an
injunctive decree such as the one sought in Calvin violate the well-settled principles of justiciability and federalism? Secondly, was there a sufficient showing
of a case or controversy to allow the court to decide the case? Third, what role
do public policy considerations play in resolving this case?

14 Goode v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974),
rez'd, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
15 96 S. Ct. at 603-04.
16 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974).
17 96 S. Ct. at 605.
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Political Question and Federalism
The Seventh Circuit dealt directly with the political question issue. As previously indicated, the district court based its dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint
on the Supreme Court decision in Gilligan v. Morgan. 8 The Seventh Circuit,
however, correctly distinguished Gilligan on its facts. In Gilligan, Kent State
students brought an action to restrain the Governor of Ohio from prematurely
ordering the National Guard to duty in civil disturbances and to restrain Guard
commanders from violating students' constitutional rights of free speech and
assembly. The Supreme Court held that the issues presented in the case were
nonjusticiable. The Court explained that the relief sought by plaintiffs required
"continuing surveillance over the training and weaponry and ordering of the
National Guard,"' 9 and thus went beyond the scope of the court's power. Further,
the court held that the Constitution vests this responsibility in the legislative and
executives branches of the federal government."0 The Gilligan Court stated:
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political
branches directly responsible .

.

. to the electoral process. Moreover, it is

difficult to conceive of2 an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence.

1

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit narrowly interpreted Gilligan to apply only in
situations where the federal courts were asked to interfere with military matters,
clearly designated by the Constitution to come within the authority of the legislative and executive branches of the government.
Although Gilligan is factually distinguishable, that court further emphasized
two significant points. First, the court correctly noted that federal courts are inappropriate government agencies to take over such activities as the training of
the National Guard. Likewise, it may be difficult to imagine the effectiveness of
a federal court overseeing the day-to-day operations of a police department. The
Calvin court recognized this problem and stated in dicta that federal courts should2
only issue injunctions sparingly and by drawing them as narrowly as possible.1
Even a narrowly drawn injunction, however, brings the federal courts into a
supervisory role over city police departments. The dissenting justices in Rizzo,
however, pointed out that the injunctive remedy formed by the district court
"was one evolved with the defendant official's assent, reluctant though that assent
may have been, and it was one that the Police Department concededly could live
with.,,*,

Another significant aspect of the Gilligan holding is its deference to the electoral process. Under the Constitution, both the judiciary and the electorate exercise a check on the power of the executive and legislative branches of government.
18 413 U.S. 1 "(1971).

19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
520 F.2d at 7.
96 S. Ct. at 609 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
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The denial of judicial relief in a case such as Calvin does not preclude the removal
from office of officials who condone illegal conduct, nor does it preclude public
pressure for revised police disciplinary procedures. This argument fails, however,
to take into consideration the fact that the persons who are most often the victims
of unconstitutional police conduct have the least political clout and ability to
effectively use the electoral process.
Although the Seventh Circuit did not face the issue of the propriety of
federal court interference in state government, the Supreme Court in Rizzo emphasized the recent relevance of this issue.
Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal
courts must be constantly mindful of the special delicacy of the adjustment
to be preserved between federal equity power and state administration of its
own law.24
Moreover, the Supreme Court and the Congress have previously considered
3 struck
this issue. The Supreme Court in the seminal case of Younger v. Harris"
down federal court interference in state criminal proceedings." In addition,
Congress passed legislation, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2283, denying district
courts the authority to issue injunctions in special circumstances." Although
actions under § 1983 are exempted from the operation of § 2 2 8 3 ,' s the Rizzo
Court declared that princiles of federalism should apply not only where injunctive relief is sought against the judicial branch of state government but also
against officials in charge of an executive branch of state or local government.
Applying the doctrine of federalism to cases such as Calvin and Rizzo, however, may leave important federal law and constitutional considerations unprotected. Surely, the guarantees of § 1983 would become meaningless if federal
courts were to adhere to a broad extension of federalist principles. Often state
governments may find it politically unwise to investigate or take corrective measures to reform police procedures. Indeed, Justice Blackmun" in his dissenting
opinion in Rizzo stated: "Where must be federal relief available against persistent deprival of federal constitutional rights even by [or,... particularly by]
constituted authority on the state side."3' 0 Certainly the nation's experience with
school desegregation cases has indicated the occasional necessity for federal court
intervention in areas of state and local government concern. This conclusion is
equally applicable in other cases where there are allegations of a widespread
policy of endorsing unconstitutional conduct, as was arguably the case in Calvin.
24 96 S. Ct. at 607.
25 401 U.S. 37 (1971).,
26 Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975), extended the Younger doctrine to federal
interference in state civil actions.
27 28 U.S.C. §,2283 (1970) provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to-stay proceedings in a
state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
28 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
29 Rizo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976) (5-3 decision). Justice Blackmun authored a dissenting opinion in which justices Marshall and Brennan joined.
30 Id. at 609.
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Action v. Inaction and the Case or Controversy Requirement
The Supreme Court in Rizzo held that § 1983 did not provide for relief
against the city and police department because no connection was established
between isolated incidents of police misconduct and a city or police department
policy assenting to the misconduct. The Supreme Court thus rejected the lower
court's rationale that unless there were changes made in police department disciplinary procedures, incidents of unconstitutional conduct were likely to continue,
not necessarily with regard to the complainants as individuals, but with regard
to minority citizens in the city. The Court explained that the lawsuit:
[E]volved into an attempt by the federal judiciary to resolve a controversy
between the entire citizenry of Philadelphia and elected and appointed officials over what steps might, in the [Court's judgment] appear to have the
potential for prevention of future police misconduct."'
In addition to the requirement that the plaintiffs establish an affirmative
link between police misconduct and its approval by the city or police department
officials, the Supreme Court stated that these actions will fail unless the plaintiff
can show an imminent threat of injury. Past incidents of misconduct are insufficient. The Court's decision in O'Shea v. Littleton" demonstrated the application
of this rationale. In O'Shea, plaintiffs brought a civil rights action against a
county magistrate and circuit court judge alleging that the defendants, under
color of state law, engaged in a practice of illegal bond setting, sentencing and
jury fee practices. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that past incidents
of illegal conduct that are not accompanied by a showing of the likelihood of
present or future misconduct do not form an adequate basis for injunctive relief.
Citing O'Shea, the Rizzo Court stated that the plaintiffs' claim
to real and immediate injury rests not upon what [the city and police
department] might do to them in the future but upon what one of a small,
unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future ....33
...

In both Rizzo and Calvin, the Supreme Court thus found that the threat of
future harm was too speculative and therefore that the facts did not present a
cae or controversy between the plaintiffs and the city and police department
officials. However, the Court did not rule out the availability of injunctive relief
under § 1983 against individual police officers if the plaintiff could show a threat
of imminent harm.
Similarly, the Supreme Court did not find a sufficient link between alleged
incidents of police misconduct and active knowledge and approval of the misconduct by city and police department officials. The Seventh Circuit in Calvin
recognized that injunctive relief has traditionally been applied "where warranted
by a pattern of police misconduct."34 Injunctive relief based on an illegal pattern
31

Id. at 604.

34

520 F.2d at 6.

32 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
33 96 S. Ct. at 605.
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5 In Hague an inor practice of conduct was first recognized in Hague v. CIO.1
junction was issued after the court found that the police adopted a deliberate
policy of forbidding plaintiffs' labor organizers from communicating their views
on the National Labor Relations Act. Here, the police used force and violence
to exclude labor organizers; conduct which the plaintiffs were able to convince
the court that the police planned to continue.
Two recent cases have bolstered Hague. In Allee v. Medranoss and Lankford v. Gelston T the plaintiffs were able to show a pervasive pattern of police
intimidation and violation of constitutional rights; equitable relief was therefore
obtained. From these cases, it is clear that injunctive relief under § 1983 is
contingent on two factors. First, there must be a showing of a repeated pattern
or practice of misconduct which can be traced to the upper echelons of the police
department. Second, the plaintiff must prove that there was active participation
by such officials.
However, the Supreme Court in Rizzo did not find an instance in which city
or police officials actively deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.
The Court was thus able to distinguish school desegregation cases" in which injunctive relief was granted on a showing of active participation by school authorities in implementing policies of racial segregation.
Although the Seventh Circuit in Calvin did not directly address the case or
controversy question, the court recognized the Allee and Gelston holdings as the
basis for its decision to allow injunctive relief. It is questionable, however, whether
these cases supply an adequate basis for the court's holding. In each of these
cases, as in Hague, the plaintiffs showed a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional
conduct present throughout the police departments. Although the Seventh Circuit made no findings of fact in Calvin, the allegations quoted in the opinion do
not specifically indicate any wrongdoing on the part of the city or police officials.

35 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, labor organizers brought suit for injunctive relief
against the Mayor, the Director of Public Safety, and the Chief of Police of Jersey City alleging that these officials denied plaintiffs the right to hold public meetings in the city for the
purpose of organizing labor. The plaintiffs also alleged they were arrested and subjected to
unlawful searches and seizures pursuant to a deliberate plan adopted by the city and police
officials. The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief on the basis
of their showing deprivation of constitutional rights and threat of continuing violations.
36 416 U.S. 802 (1974). In Medrano, union organizers brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983 and 1985, alleging that law enforcement officials had conspired to deprive plaintiffs of
their first and fourteenth amendment rights. They also challenged the constitutionality of
Texas statutes under which a state court had issued an injunction against the plaintiffs forbidding their picketing on or near the farms which they were attempting to organize. The
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that injunctive relief was properly granted against the law
enforcement officers where plaintiffs had shown a persistent pattern of police misconduct,
inadequacy of remedies at law, and a threat of irreparable injury.
37 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). In Lankford, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against
the Police Commissioner of the city of Baltimore to prevent further invasions of their fourth and
fourteenth amendment rights. Plaintiffs alleged that during a 19-day search for two murder
suspects, Baltimore police searched more than 300 private homes. The searches were based on
anonymous tips and occurred at all hours of the day and night. The district court hearing the
case denied relief on the basis that the federal judiciary could not use its injunctive power to
oversee police practices. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the
unconstitutional conduct was part of an overall plan drawn up by police officials and that
actions at law for money damages were inadequate to repair the injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs.
38 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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The complaint merely alleges facts similar to those in Rizzo which, of course,
the Supreme Court found insufficient.

However,- the dissent in Rizzo -strenuously emphasized the lower court's
factual finding in its conclusion that the active-inactive distinction is without
merit. Four findings were cited as relevant: (1) actual violations of citizens'
constitutional rights; (2) a pattern of such incidents; (3) their likely reoccurrence; and (4) official indifference to taking any action to stop the misconduct."
The dissent found that "the case, accordingly plainly fits into the mold of Allee
...and Hague ....,' The dissent made a convincing observation that passive

tolerance of police misconduct should be afforded the same protection as active
participation in the deprivation of constitutional rights. The dissent also stated
that § 1983 must be read to reach not only the acts of an official, but also acts of
persons under the official.
It is clear that an official may be enjoined from consciously permitting his
subordinates, in the course of their duties, to violate the constitutional rights
of persons with whom they deal. In rejecting the concept that the official
may be responsible under . 1983, the Court today casts aside reasoned conclusions to the contrary reached by the courts of appeals of 10 circuits.41
A survey of the circuit court cases cited by the dissent shows that most
lower courts have given § 1983 a liberal interpretation with respect to2 holding
superiors liable for the unconstitutional conducts of their subordinates.
Public Policy and Political Reality
The principal foundation for the Seventh Circuit's holding in Calvin rests
on considerations of public policy and what may be termed political reality. After
discussing applicable case law, the court announced that:
39 96 S. Ct. at 609.
40 Id.
41 96 S. Ct. at 611.
42 See, e.g., Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1974) (court reversed dismissal of complaint where police failed to provide proper medication in light of arrestee's
diabetic condition); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196, 1199 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) (court refused to distinguish between an official's misfeasance and nonfeasance); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973) '(Although
the court upheld the dismissal of a complaint in a civil rights action against police officers because of insufficient allegations, the court stated: "Where . . .one has an affirmative duty to
act and fails to act accordingly he may be held liable for his nonfeasance if his omission is
unreasonable under the circumstances."); Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1973)
(Dicta); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 10-11 (7th Cir. 1972) (overturned a motion to dismiss
granted in an action against police officers who allegedly stood by and did nothing while the
plaintiff was beaten); Jennings v. Patterson, 460 F.2d 1021, 1022 (5th Cir. 1972) (city
councilmen who had full knowledge of and acquiesced in the erection of a fence across a street
thereby denying black residents access from their homes were proper defendants in a civil rights
class action); Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1351 (3d Cir. 1971) (held that if plaintiffs
could show a deliberate pattern and practice of constitutional violations by state police, they
were entitled to an injunction under the Civil Rights Act); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126,
134-135 '(2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972) (upheld an injunction prohibiting
prison officials from confining inmates to psychiatric cells without justification; state prison
warden, having the ultimate responsibility for operation of segregated cells, was deemed to have
had knowledge of the conditions complained of); Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084
(7th Cir. 1969) (class action by newspaper photographers seeking injunction against police
interference with coverage of the 1968 National Democratic Convention allowed); Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding discussed in note 37 smpra).
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To hold that suits seeking injunctions against the police are non-justiciable
would erect a permanent bar to relief, no matter how egregious and persistent
the violations of the constitutional rights of citizens. Such a bar would not
be wise public policy, especially where less absolute restrictions will serve to
protect the police from undue court interference."
It is evident that the Seventh Circuit was cognizant of the impediments facing an individual who seeks redress for a policeman's violation of his constitutional
rights. The problems associated with injunctive relief have been discussed; yet
two alternatives remain-the exclusibnary rule and a civil damage action.
The exclusionary rule was adopted by federal and state courts as a means
to deter unconstitutional public searches and seizures under the fourth amendment." A defendant in a criminal proceeding may have the fruits of an unlawful search or seizure excluded from evidence in court proceedings. This alternative, of course, is of little use to the innocent citizen who does not conie to trial
but who was the victim of unconstitutional police conduct.
The civil damage action brought against an individual police officer is also
fraught with impediments. It is unlikely that citizen juries will return a verdict
against individual police officers, 5 especially where the plaintiff belongs to a racial
or ethnic minority group. Moreover, if the plaintiff should win, he may have
difficulty satisfying his judgment because of the policeman's limited financial resources and the lack of compensation from public funds.4 1 In addition, it is a
defense in a civil action that the officer "believed in good faith, that his conduct
was lawful [and] his belief was reasonable?' 4a
Furthermore, even though the Seventh Circuit permitted injunctive relief,
in so doing it may have rendered it practically impossible for plaintiffs to obtain
relief. The court emphasized that plaintiffs must satisfy the traditional criteria
for the issuance of mandatory relief and that the district court must design a
decree "to stop deprivations of constitutional rights without unnecessary encroachment upon local government functions.!'" Although plaintiffs in Calvin may be
able to show the inadequacy of various actions at law available to protect constitutional rights, they may not be able to show that irreparable harm will occur
if the injunction is not issued. The Supreme Court in Rizzo stated that the statistical prevalence of past police misconduct in Philadelphia was not a sufficient
showing of future harm to bring the case within the actual case or controversy
requirement for federal court jurisdiction.4 9 Thus, the Seventh Circuit in its holding may be cutting off the very relief it acknowledged to be necessary as a matter
of public policy.

43 520 F.2d at 6.
44 Comment, The Federal Injunction as Remedy, for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78
YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
45 Note, Injunctive Relief for Violations of Constitutional Rights by the Police, 45 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 90, 102 (1973).

46 Id. at 100.
47 Id.
48 520 F.2d at 7.
49 96 S. Ct. at 606.
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The analysis of recent case law and policy considerations inherent in determining whether and how federal injunctive relief should be granted in cases such
as Calvin indicates that the law in this matter is in a developing stage. Consideration of the scope of § 1983 and the case or controversy requirement further indicates that plaintiffs carry a heavy burden in civil rights actions against a city and
its police department. Not only must the plaintiff show an affirmative link between police misconduct and its approval by the city and the police officials, but
he must show active approval rather than mere passivity with regard to the misconduct. The examination of the justiciability doctrine and principle of federalism demonstrated that federal courts are reluctant and perhaps incompetent to
interfere in areas of governmental authority allotted to the state executive and
legislative branches of government. Finally, the public policy concerns announced
in Calvin compel a closer scrutiny of the role federal courts should play in protecting citizens' constitutional rights from abuse by city police departments.
PatriciaS. Higgins

III. Federal Statutes and Government Regulation
ANTITRUST-RELEVANT

PRODUCT MARKET IS TO

BE

NARROWLY DEFINED

TO BETTER REFLECT MONOPOLY POWER IN COMPLEX ECONOMIC MARKETS

Avnet, Inc. v. FTC
Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v. National Educational
Advertising Service, Inc.
The determination of the relevant product market of an alleged violator of
the antitrust laws has long been a necessary first step in the process by which
courts decide the existence of anticompetitive activity.' Violations of the antitrust laws can occur when one or more companies obtain monopoly power in
such a way as to inhibit competition. 2 Monopoly power has been defined as the
power to control prices or to exclude competition from a relevant market.' This
market concept is divided into two considerations: the product market and the
geographic market. Therefore, in order to determine whether a company wields
the prohibited monopoly power, a court must first determine the market over
which the alleged violator has control.'
The definition of relevant product market is basically a factual question,
heavily dependent on the special characteristics of the industry involved.' However, guidelines by which the courts can make such a determination have been
enunciated by the Supreme Court. These guidelines were examined by the
Seventh Circuit and used to narrowly define product markets in two recent cases,
1
2
3
4
5

See, e.g., Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969).
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §q 12-27 (1970).
United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
Id. at 380.
Sulmeyer v. Coca-Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975).

[Vol. 51:981]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Avnet, Inc. v. FederalTrade Commission' and Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v.
National EducationalAdvertising Service, Inc.7

The case that sets the standards for the determination of relevant product
market in antitrust cases is United States v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,8
commonly known as the Cellophane case. A Government suit was brought under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act9 against Du Pont for monopolistic activity in the area of
cellophane production; Du Pont produced 75 percent of the cellophane sold in
the United States. However, cellophane itself constituted less than 20 percent of
all the flexible packaging materials used in the United States. Thus, the question
devolved into a determination of which relevant product market should be considered in measuring monopoly power.
The Supreme Court held that the larger flexible packaging materials market,
and not the cellophane market as urged by the Government, was the relevant
product market."0 The Court found that illegal monopoly power must be established in terms of the competitive market for the product,1 which is determined
by the similarity of products in their character and use and by the cross-elasticity
of demand between one product and others which are alleged to be in the same
market."
Cross-elasticity of demand is the extent to which one product can be substituted for another for the same use, taking into consideration price, characteristics, and adaptability of the competing products.' 3 A high cross-elasticity
indicates a high degree of interchangeability between the products, while a low
cross-elasticity suggests the reverse. Thus, commodities reasonably interchangeable by the consumer for the same purpose constitute the relevant product market
by which monopoly power is determined.' 4 In the Cellophane case, the Court
found that cellophane, while possessing unique characteristics, was not so discrete
from other flexible packaging materials to constitute a separate market. Other
materials could be used in place of cellophane with no appreciable disadvantage."
Although the Cellophane case dealt with Sherman Act violations, the importance of the relevant product market in actions brought under the Clayton Act'
was soon established. In United States v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 7 a
case involving an attempt by General Motors to purchase a large amount of Du
Pont stock, the Supreme Court concluded that the determination of the relevant
market is also a necessary predicate to finding a Clayton Act violation. 8 The
Court argued that since the Clayton Act prohibited mergers or acquisitions that
would substantially lessen competition within an area of effective competition,
substantiality could be determined only in terms of the affected market. There6 511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1975).
7 516 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1975).
8 See note 3 supra.
9 See note 2 supra.
10 United States v. E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
11 Id. at 393.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 380.
14 Id. at 395.
15 Id.
16 See note 2 supra.

17 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
18

Id. at 593.
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fore, the market must again be defined in order for the courts to determine the
impact of the alleged anticompetitive activity. 19
Yet, having decided that the relevant product market's determination is a
necessary prerequisite in examining antitrust behavior, the Supreme Court soon
recognized that within any broad product market, well-defined submarkets which
in themselves constitute relevant product markets for antitrust purposes may exist.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,2" the Court divided the shoe market into
separate and distinct submarkets of men's, women's, and children's shoes.2 In
so doing, the Court held that the boundaries of a product market must be drawn
with sufficient breadth to include competing products, but that the limits set
should also be
narrow enough to reflect the realistic market where competition
in fact exists. 22
The criteria used by the Court in determining submarkets focused on the
industry's or the public's recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and/or use, unique production facilities, and specialized vendors.2 ' A distinctive price was also considered an indication of a submarket's independent existence, with products which compete with
one another being placed in separate submarkets because of a large discrepancy
in their prices. 2
Once the court has established the submarket, anticompetitive action therein
could be sufficient to constitute an antitrust violation, even though the activity
involved only a small portion of the broader market.2 s Accordingly, alleged antitrust violations are examined in a narrower, more sensitive context. The promotion of championship boxing contests as opposed to all professional boxing
contests, 2 aluminum conductors in contrast to all metal conductors,' or commercial banks as distinguished from all savings banks' have been held to be
separate submarkets for antitrust purposes.
The most recent development in the relevant product market's determination
was United States v. Grinnell Corp.,29 where the Supreme Court held that a
central station alarm system, whether for fire or burglar protection, was itself a
single submarket, distinct from the general market of property protection devices." The Court determined that a number of different products could be combined in a single market where such combination reflected commercial reality.2
While the product provided by Grinnell differed from customer to customer
depending on specific needs, the same basic service, a central station alarm, was
provided to all. The central station alarm system, no matter what type of protection it provided, was held to be the relevant product market there. Other types
19 Id.

20 370 U.S. 294 '(1962).
21 Id. at 298-99.
22
23

Id. at 326.
Id. at 325.

24 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 276-77 (1964).
25 Brown Shoe Go. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
26
27

International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 276-77 (1964).

28 United States v. Connecticut Nat'1 Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
29 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
30 Id. at 572.
31 Id.
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of property protection services were excluded from the submarket by the Court
because the quality and operation of the other devices were sufficiently different
from the central station alarm system to preclude their use as reasonable substitutes." The Court used the principles of the Cellophane case and Brown Shoe
to define a limited relevant product market.
Recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit have also narrowly defined relevant
product market. A narrow relevant product market can be either an aid or a
hindrance to an alleged antitrust violator in defending against actions brought
under the antitrust laws. In some cases the market is drawn so narrowly so as
to preclude a finding of monopoly power. For example, in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America,3 3 the Supreme Court held that the relevant product
market was limited to aluminum conductors as opposed to all-metal conductors.
This allowed Alcoa, a major producer of aluminum conductors, to acquire a company which produced copper conductors without acquiring with it an imperniissible market share under the Clayton Act. 4 Had the Government's argument
for the broader market been accepted by the Court, Alcoa would have violated
the antitrust laws through its acquisition. 5
A narrow relevant product market, however, more often results in the courts
finding that an alleged antitrust violator does in fact wield monopoly power
within the designated market. This was the result reached in both recent Seventh
Circuit cases. Avnet, Inc. v. FederalTrade Commission" dealt with the acquisition by Avnet of two companies which provided parts to rebuilders of automotive
electrical units. The rebuilding industry consists of two types of rebuilders of
these units. One group operates on a mass production scale, rebuilding the units
which are then sold in large quantities to jobbers for distribution to the retail
trade. They are known in the industry as "production-line rebuilders." The other
type of rebuilders, "custom rebuilders," operate out of repair shops where one
unit at a time is rebuilt for an individual customer.37 The two companies acquired
by Avnet controlled approximately two-'thirds of the sales to production-line rebuilders." The Federal Trade Commission's contention that the relevant product
market should be limited only to these rebuilders was upheld by the Seventh
Circuit. 9
Avnet, arguing that the custom rebuilders also should have been included
in the relevant market, claimed that its acquired companies, as well as their competitors, made significant sales to custom rebuilders as well as to production-line
rebuilders. Therefore, it claimed that there was no industry recognition of the
two classes of rebuilders as separate economic submarkets. 0
The court disagreed, holding that Avnet had not demonstrated that sales
were being made by the parts manufacturers to custom rebuilders. The FTC,
32

Id. at 573.

33

377 U.S. 271 (1964).

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 276.
Id. at 279.
511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 78.
Id.
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on the other hand, had introduced sufficient evidence to limit the market to production-line rebuilders. The court concluded that the custom rebuilders and the
production-line rebuilders performed significantly different functions and operated at significantly different levels of distribution within the overall market.
The custom rebuilders operated on the retail level and sold what is primarily a
service to an individual customer. The production-line rebuilder, however, sold
the finished product on a wholesale level and the product was then distributed
by others. There was also a significant price difference between what the custom
rebuilder charged its customers and what the production-line rebuilder charged
his. These differences in customers, distribution levels, and price were sufficient
for the court to place the two groups of rebuilders into separate submarkets for
antitrust purposes.41
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the definition of relevant product in greater

depth in Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v. National Educational Advertising
Service, Inc. 2 In that case, Cass instituted a private antitrust action against
NEAS under the Sherman Act. Cass alleged that NEAS had obtained illegal
monopoly power in representing college newspapers to national advertisers."
The student newspapers would contract with NEAS to represent them in soliciting
advertisers on the national level. NEAS held contracts with college newspapers
44
which reached 87 percent of the college students in the United States.
The district court had defined the relevant product market in this case to
include all modes of competition used to present national advertising to college
students."5 This included other publications and media which would also reach
college students, such as national magazines with a large college readership. Within this market, concluded, the district court, NEAS possessed no illegal monopoly
power. 6
The Seventh Circuit held on appeal that the district court had misapplied
the appropriate legal standards in determining the relevant product market."
The court analyzed the lower court's decision in light of the Cellophane case and
Brown Shoe, and determined that the relevant market was the service of representing college newspapers throughout the United States in the placement of
national advertising." The Seventh Circuit found that the district court had
defined the relevant market by considering the service afforded by NEAS as
being offered only to national advertisers. The court reasoned that NEAS operated rather in two separate markets, offering two separate services. It did in fact
provide a service to the national advertisers by providing them with college newspapers in which they could place their advertisement, but NEAS also provided
a service to the college newspapers by soliciting national advertisement for them.
Since these markets were separate and distinct, each one was by itself a relevant
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 78 n.21.
516 F.2d 1092 (1975).
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1096.
Cass Student Adv., Inc. v. National Ed. Adv. Serv., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 796, 803 '(N.D.

I1. 1974).
46
47
48

Id.
516 F.2d at 1093.
Id. at 1095.

[Vol. 51:981]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

product market. If NEAS dominated either market, it would then have violated
the antitrust laws.49
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that NEAS did not have
illegal control over the market in which the national advertisers were the consumers.5 0 There were far too many ways these advertisers could reach college
students other than through college newspapers for there to be monopoly power
here." However, the court determined that the other market containing the
newspapers had not been adequately examined by the lower court.2
In examining this submarket, the Seventh Circuit noted that college newspapers used specialized vendors who differed from those used by other publications.5" The newspapers serviced by NEAS were also distinct customers, in
that they could be considered a specific communications medium in themselves. 4
Moreover, the advertising industry recognized the representation of college newspapers as a specialized business." Finally, the newspapers were affected by any
price change by NEAS, since they could not efficiently solicit on their own advertising on the national level. They were dependent on NEAS or someone like
NEAS to perform this service for them. 5
All of the above considerations conformed with the tests enunciated in Brown
Shoe to determine relevant product market. The Seventh Circuit concluded,
then, that the submarket of representing college newspapers in the solicitation of
national advertising was in itself a relevant product market for antitrust purposes.
Since NEAS
controlled a significant part of this market, it had violated the anti57
laws.
trust
The Seventh Circuit's narrow definition of relevant product market in these
cases does not necessarily indicate a court policy to draw limited boundary lines
in determining what constitutes a relevant market. A relevant product market
is by its nature defined in terms of the particular industry before the court and is
limited only by the standards set out in the Cellophane case and Brown Shoe. If
the Seventh Circuit had been faced with different facts, it may have used the
same standards applied in Avnet and Cass Student Advertising to find a broader
market. The standards remain the same; only the facts, and therefore the result
reached by application of the standards, will differ.
Yet the Seventh Circuit seems to favor a narrow definition of relevant product market. In the earlier case of L.G. Balfour Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,"8 the Seventh Circuit had also drawn a narrow relevant product market.
That case involved a manufacturer of goods which bore college and fraternity
insignias. The Federal Trade Commission contended that Balfour held illegal
49

Id. at 1097-99.

50

Id. at 1098.

54

Id.

55
56
57
58

Id.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).

51 These include television, radio, commercial newspapers, magazines, billboards, direct
mail advertisements, posters, student directory advertisements, and advertising samples. Id. at
1097.
52 Id. at 1099.
53 Id.
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monopoly power in the production of goods bearing fraternity insignias. Balfour
argued that the relevant market should be more broadly defined to include all
insignia-bearing goods. The Seventh Circuit upheld the FTC as to relevant
market.5 9 Again applying the Brown Shoe standards, the court found that the
relevant product market should be delineated to conform with areas of effective
competition, that is, where competition does in fact exist." A submarket which
is a separate economic entity does not interact with the broader market as a true
competitor. Rather, only those products within the submarket compete with each
other."'
Where a relevant product market is narrowly defined, the likelihood of finding monopoly power increases. A submarket can be so limited as to include a
product offered by only one manufacturer. 2 It is conceivable that a manufacturer
could violate the antitrust laws by being the only supplier of a needed product.
On the other hand, a broadly defined market could include products which
really do not compete effectively with one another, but whose inclusion dilutes
the monopoly power to those within the market. A tendency to limit the relevant
market, as seen in recent Seventh Circuit cases, indicates a strong concern about
containing anticompetitive behavior. The Seventh Circuit seems to demand a
strict determination of relevant product market in conformity with the economic
realities of today's industries.
Jane M. Grote

ANTITRUST-SHERMAN ACT JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS-PURCHASE OF
SUPPLIES IN

INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT OBTAINED BY MEANS OF RIGGED BIDS AND PAYMENT WITH FUNDs PROVIDED BY
HUD HELD TO SATISFY SHERMAN ACT JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS -

POTENTIAL RESTRAINT UPON INTERSTATE COMMERCE FOUND.
United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc.
Finis P. Ernest, Inc. and Modem Asphalt Paving and Construction Co. were
indicted under § 1 of the Sherman Act for conspiring to submit rigged bids to
the city of East St. Louis, Illinois, in order to obtain a city sanitary sewer contract.
The city awarded the contract to Finis P. Ernest, which in performance of the
contract purchased materials worth $9,307 from out-of-state suppliers. The city
paid for the work with funds provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), part of which were secured after the
contract had been awarded in order to meet Ernest's price which was in excess
of the engineer's original estimate.
The case was tried before a jury in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Illinois; the defendants were found guilty of the Sherman
59 Id. at 9-10.
60 Id. at 10-11.
61
62

Id. at 11.
See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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Act offense. Upon appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Finis P.
Ernest contended, inter alia,' that the Government's evidence was insufficient to
prove a restraint upon interstate commerce-the jurisdictional requirement of
the Sherman Act. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding' that the $9,307 spent
in interstate commerce to further a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and the
use of HIUD funds to pay for the artificially increased contract price, were enough
to warrant application of the Sherman Act. The court stated that a potential
restraint on interstate commerce, if that was used as a test of Sherman Act jurisdictional reach, could be inferred from the bid-rigging.
The Finis P. Ernest court's holding was reached through application of two
"differing approaches" 3 to the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act.
The contours of these approaches were set out when the court initially stated that
[olur problem of interpretation is whether the elements of restraint and interstate commerce may be satisfied separately or whether jurisdiction requires
the restraint be upon interstate commerce. 4

From this, the court defined the two approaches to Sherman Act jurisdictional
analysis: (1) jurisdiction can be had over a restraint--especially if it is of a per

se nature-as long as it is sufficiently related to interstate commerce to permit
federal regulation; and (2) jurisdiction can be had only if a restraint is upon
interstate commerce itself. These two theories of Sherman Act jurisdictional
requirements-what may be termed the "sufficient relationship" approach and
the '"nexus" approach-were seen by the Finis P. Ernest court to be used by
courts when confronted with the issue of Sherman Act jurisdictional reach. The

court expressed no preference for one approach or the other, and since the bidrigging here met the jurisdictional requirements of either approach, the court
was not compelled to choose between them. Yet the court implied that either
would have been sufficient to allow the Sherman Act to be applied.5
If the Finis P. Ernest holding establishes two independent and equally tenable approaches to the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act, analysis
of both is necessaiy to determine if, in light of the judicial development of the
Sherman Act, separate grounds for each approach exist.

1 The defendants also contended that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy to rig their bids to the city, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that
Modern did not have enough money in its checking account to cover the price it bid to the
city. The Seventh Circuit dismissed both contentions. United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc.,

509 F.2d 1256. 1261-63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 191 (1975).
2 United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
191 (1975).

3 Id. at 1258.
4 Id.
5

Thus, -there is substantial support for both responses
Sherman Act jurisdiction requires proof of a restraint
need not resolve that issue here however, because we
sufficient evidence in this case to support a finding
approach.
Id. at 1260-61.

to the question of whether
on interstate commerce. We
are convinced that there is
of jurisdiction under either
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Development of the JurisdictionalRequirements
of the Sherman Act
Grounded on the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,' the
Sherman Act prohibits restraints and monopolies of "trade or commerce among
the several States.... ." Since the Sherman Act's purpose is directly related to
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the reach of the Sherman
Act is said to be coextensive with that of the commerce power.'
The past 40 years have witnessed the steady expansion of the reach of federal
power under the commerce clause.' Returning to the spirit of the early case of
0 courts have consistently upheld the use of the commerce
Gibbons v. Ogden,"

6

The Congress shall have Power . . . [tlo regulate Commerce . . . among the several

States....
U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8.

7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
8 This correlation between the Sherman Act and the commerce power was expressly stated
in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). While generally
accepted by courts, this statement by the South-Eastern Court raises two interrelated problems:
(1) the commerce power, as it was understood at the time the South-Eastern case was decided
in 1944, was only beginning to expand into its present form, raising a doubt whether the Sherman Act today goes as far as noncommercial statutes based on the commerce power; (2) the
commerce power is not uniformly applied by Congress in regulating interstate activities. Some
statutes reach farther than others. This raises a doubt whether the Sherman Act should be
considered coextensive with the farthest-reaching statutes, or if the peculiar nature of the Act
should require courts to -determine its reach without undue reliance upon other statutes. See
notes 14-18 and accompanying text infra.
9 Before the advent of the New Deal, courts seemed reluctant to allow federal power to
extend far beyond direct commerce between the states. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1 (1895) (manufacture of goods later shipped in interstate commerce held an indirect
effect on that commerce and thus not within the reach of the Sherman Act). This line of
cases continued into the 1930's. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936);
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918).
Starting in 1937, however, with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), the commerce power began to be interpreted expansively to allow Congress not only
to regulate interstate commerce, but also to regulate those activities that could obstruct or burden it. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), continued the trend, and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), which allowed federal regulation of local activities that
exerted a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce, brought the commerce power
to full maturation.
Recent cases supporting federal regulation under the commerce power include: Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). All of these cases represented a congressional
intention to go the fullest extent of the commerce power.
When such is not the case, the result is not always the same. See United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336 (1971) (neither customers of nor operator of gambling operation frequented by
out-of-state bettors are covered by the Travel Act); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808
(1971) (possession of firearms in violation of § 1202(a) (1) of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 must be related to interstate commerce to be regulated by Act).
10 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Remarkably, Marshall, C.J., delivered an opinion on
the federal power over commerce which only recently has been given full approval. See Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ("cases callfing] forth [broad] interpretations of the Commerce
Clause [brought] about a return to the principles first enunciated . . . in Gibbons v.
Ogden . . . ."; id. at 122).

In Gibbons, Marshall laid down the principle that federal regu-

lation was properly had over states' internal concerns which affect the states generally and
which it was necessary to interfere with in order to execute the general powers of government.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. Courts now use Gibbons as the source for their understanding of
the commerce power's reach.
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power in a variety of contexts not directly related to commercial activity, 1 and
with only a potential impact upon interstate commerce. 2 Certain classes of activities, even if entirely intrastate in character, have likewise come under congressional regulation.' 3
This expansive reach of the commerce power is due to the courts' acquiescence to congressional determinations that specific activities are in or affect interstate commerce. Courts now generally allow Congress to fix the scope of the
commerce power.' 4 However, since the Sherman Act is phrased in broad, general terms, and since its scope has not been delimited by Congress, it has been
concluded that Congress meant for the courts themselves to arrive at the proper
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act.'
The courts in determining those activities that can be reached by the Sherman Act treat the jurisdictional requirements of that Act differently than they
do other statutes similarly based on the commerce power. This treatment, as the
11 The need for federal regulation over a wide range of activities has led to reliance upon
the commerce power as the constitutional justification for such regulation, even though "commerce" was not involved. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate
credit transactions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (racial discrimination in
food-service); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (racial discrimination in accommodations); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (wage ancf hours
of employees).
12 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), established that a wholly intrastate activity
can still be federally regulated if it exerts a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. . . ." Id. at 125. Defendant, an Ohio farmer, grew 239 bushels of wheat in excess of
what he was allowed to grow under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The Act was
intended to regulate the amount of wheat in the market and to restrict the amount of wheat a
farmer could keep out of the market. The farmer there grew his excess wheat for home-consumption. Nevertheless, the Court held that this wheat affected interstate commerce.
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is
not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.
Id. at 127-28. The impact upon interstate commerce in Wickard was obviously de minimis,
but even a potential impact was thought to be reached by the 1938 Act. This reasoning was
also evident in other cases finding a valid congressional regulation. See, e.g., United States v.
Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (branding of drugs already shipped in interstate commerce);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (wage and hours conditions of employees who
produce goods shipped in interstate commerce); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) (convict-made goods shipped into a state whose law forbids
receipt, sale, or possession of such goods).
13 In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), defendant was a "loan shark" in the
habit of threatening violence as a way to collect on his loans. This made him a "member of
the class which engages in 'extortionate credit transactions' as defined by Congress. . . ." Id.
at 153 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction
for this practice without requiring proof that his crime in any way affected interstate commerce. The Court was content to let Congress decide that it did. "Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce." Id. at 154. See also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
14 By this date, the question concerning congressional use of the commerce power amounts
to one of congressional discretion, not constitutional limitation. The courts' function thus
becomes one of finding a rational basis for a regulation's protection of interstate commerce.
[Wihere we find that the legislators . . . have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at
an end.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964). However, if a court finds that Congress has not used the commerce power to its fullest extent, a more careful-and criticalreview of a regulation will be made. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
15 "Congress has . . . left it to the courts to determine whether the intrastate activities
have the prohibited effect on the commerce... in the Sherman Act." United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 120 (1941).
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Supreme Court recently noted,
turning as it does on the circumstances presented in each case and requiring
a particularized judicial determination, differs significantly from that required when Congress itself has defined the specific persons and activities
that affect commerce and therefore require federal regulation.16
This "particularized judicial determination" is concerned not with "abstract or
mechanistic formulae,"' but rather with "a practical, case-by-case economic
judgment '" as to the impact an activity has upon interstate commerce.
From this method of judicial determination of Sherman Act jurisdictional
requirements, the rule has been established that for the Act to apply there must
be a showing that an alleged restraint occurred in interstate commerce or, if intrastate, that it substantially affected interstate commerce." Like the commerce
power itself, however, this rule has recently undergone expansion; specifically
there has been an enlargement of the concept of "affecting" commerce. Wholly
intrastate conduct can now affect interstate commerce even if the affect is not
readily susceptible of proof.2 0 If the impact upon interstate commerce is not de
minimis, a "substantial affect" can be inferred.2
The rule requiring a restraint to be in or substantially affecting interstate
commerce has not been without its difficulties. While necessarily flexible in order
to allow courts to undertake a particular economic judgment of an alleged restraint, the rule's flexibility has sometimes produced unpredictable results. 22 To
16 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n.12 (1974).
17 Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 527 n.20 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). The Wickard Court stated: "[The relevance of the economic
effects in the application of the Commerce Clause ... has made the mechanical application of
legal formulas no longer feasible." 317 U.S. at 123-24.
18 472 F.2d at 527 n.20. This principle was recognized as early as Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). Holmes, J., there said: "[Clommerce among the States is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business." Id. at 398.
19 This rule stems directly from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), and
has been followed in innumerable Sherman Act cases. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320
(1967); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). This rule received its most recent affirmation in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), where the Court, viewing local title examination to
be inseparable from the interstate aspects of real estate transactions, held that it affected
interstate commerce.
Where, as a matter of law or practical necessity, legal services are an integral
part of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those services may substantially affect
commerce for Sherman Act purposes.
Id. at 785.
That the Goldfarb Court saw such an effect to be necessary for the Sherman Act to apply
is clear from its statement that "there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate
commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act." Id.
20 See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967), discussed in text accompanying note 58 infra.
21 A de minimis impact upon interstate commerce-where the effect, if any, is determined
to be so insubstantial that federal regulation is considered unwarranted-is usually not reached
by the Sherman Act. See Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1969); Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1961).
22 Flexibility leading to unpredictability occurs when courts determine that certain activities are inherently "local" or not the kind of activity that Congress meant to regulate with
the Sherman Act. Perhaps the most famous example of this is professional baseball's exemption
from the Sherman Act. Federal Baseball Clubs v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)
(Holmes, J.), laid the foundation for this by stating that "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce." Id. at 209. This was followed in Toolson v. New
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alleviate this situation it has been suggested that Sherman Act jurisdictional
analysis should be simplified into easily applicable standards similar to those
found with other statutes based on the commerce power.23 However, this suggestion may be unrealistic, since "the real-world business nature of the Sherman
Act's purpose and subject matter permits no easy solutions."'2 4
The Two Approaches of the Seventh Circuit
From the development of Sherman Act jurisdictional requirements the
Seventh Circuit in Finis P. Ernest extracted two approaches to the jurisdictional
reach of the Sherman Act. The court found the "sufficient relationship" approach
in recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 25 and in Supreme Court

York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (players' reserve clauses outside reach of Sherman
Act), and as recently as 1972 a 5-3 majority of the Court-admitting the exemption to be
both an anomaly and an aberration-affirmed Toolson and Federal Baseball in Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258 (1972) (Douglas, Marshall & Brennan, J.J., dissenting). Justice Douglas' dissent
rightly called Federal Baseball "a derelict in the stream of the law," id. at 286, which the
Court should correct.
The exemption of professional baseball from the Sherman Act is in stark-and conceptually insupportable--contrast to other professional sports, which have not received similar
treatment. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v.
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
However, there is indication that such broad exemptions from Sherman Act coverage are
no longer acceptable. The Supreme Court recently held that minimum fee schedules for title
examinations performed by lawyers violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (Burger, C.J.). The defendant argued there that title examination was (1) a local activity performed by persons engaged in (2) a "learned profession";
both elements were urged as valid exceptions to the Sherman Act. The Court thought otherwise, stating first that "a title examination is an integral part of an interstate transaction" in
real estate. Id. at 784. The Court viewed a title examination as inseparable from the interstate aspects of a real estate transaction. Secondly, the Court refused to give a complete
exemption to learned professions from the Sherman Act. "The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act ... " Id. at 787 (citation omitted).
The professional activity in Goldfarb was held to be within the scope of the Sherman Act's
substantive reach.
Whatever else it may be, the examination of a land title is a service; the exchange of
such a service for money is "commerce" in the most common usage of that word....
In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers
may exert a restraint on commerce.
Id. at 787-88. However, the Court was careful to limit the extension of its holding in Goldfarb.
It recognized that for the purpose of the Sherman Act it was relevant to distinguish a "profession" from a "business." Id. at 788 n.17. The Court noted:
The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman
Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other
situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id.
23 See Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 323 (1974). The writer, disagreeing with what was called a "narrow, ad hoc approach"
to the reach of the Sherman Act, advocates the abandonment of the notion that the Sherman
Act is different from any other commerce power-based statute.
24 Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 527 n.20 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
25 Cough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Liquid Asphalt Cases,
487 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part sub nom. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186 (1974). The court also cited Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
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dicta. 6 From the majority of courts of appeals27 and other Supreme Court cases'
the Seventh Circuit found the "nexus" approach.
The "sufficient relationship" approach appears to significantly widen the
scope of Sherman Act application by not requiring-as does the "nexus" approach-that a restraint be upon interstate commerce. But further analysis
reveals that the "nexus" approach can reach all restraints that the "sufficient
relationship" approach can permissably reach; taken by itself, however, the
"sufficient relationship" approach is ultimately inconsistent with case precedent
and congressional intention.
1. The "Sufficient Relationship" Approach
From several recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit that contained the term
"sufficient relationship" in their phrasing of the jurisdictional test of the Sherman
Act, the Finis P. Ernest court constructed an approach to Sherman Act jurisdictional analysis that did not require a restraint to be upon interstate commerce.
In the court's judgment, the Ninth Circuit
viewed the question of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act as entirely one
of constitutional power: whether defendants' conduct had a sufficient relationship to interstate commerce to be subject to regulation by Congress. 2
Applying the facts presented in FinisP. Ernest to this definition of Sherman Act
jurisdictional reach, the court found a sufficient relationship between the defendants' conduct and interstate commerce.
This "sufficient relationship" approach, as applied in Finis P. Ernest, demanded only that interstate commerce be somehow involved in the restraint for
the Sherman Act to apply. It was sufficient for interstate commerce to be present;
26 The court stated: "[Decisions of the Supreme Court . . . emphasize that Congress in
the Sherman Act intended to exercise the full extent of its constitutional authority under the
Commerce Clause." 509 F.2d at 1259. For authority it cited Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974) ; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945) ;
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). The proposition that Congress intended in the Sherman Act
to go to the fullest extent of the commerce power is referred to as "dicta" because the analysis
in each Supreme Court case cited was concerned primarily with whether an alleged restraint
was in or affected commerce. For further discussion of problems raised by the proposition, see
note 8 supra.
27 The court cited Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469
F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.
1964); Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959). However, there is an abundance of other appellate cases that are in agreement
with the three cited. Two from the Seventh Circuit itself are United States v. Evanston Cab
Co., 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); United States v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953).
28 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974); United States v. Employing
Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) ; United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336
U.S. 460 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948). The fact that the court mentioned Gulf Oil in support of both the "sufficient
relationship" and "nexus" approaches indicates that, properly understood, the jurisdictional
requirements of the Sherman Act call for only one approach: A "sufficient relationship" between a restraint and interstate commerce exists if the restraint is in or affects commerce.
See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ("mhe validity of the prohibition turns on
the question whether ... [the activity] is so related to the commerce and so affects it as to be
within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it." Id. at 117).
29 509 F.2d at 1258.
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it did not have to be restrained. This conclusion is evident from the Finis P.
Ernest court's treatment of the facts in the case. The court, using the "sufficient
relationship" approach, held that the $9,307 spent in interstate commerce in
performance of a contract obtained in violation of the Sherman Act was enough
to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act. The court stated
that "[t]his relationship is sufficient to assure that application of the30 Sherman
'
Act to this case is not beyond the constitutional authority of Congress.
The per se nature of the restraint entered into the court's use of the "sufficient relationship" approach, but to an extent that is unclear. The court determined that a per se Sherman Act offense did not require "proof of an adverse
impact on interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements." " - From
this, it held that "[w]here a per se restraint is involved, the quantity of interstate
commerce is unimportant."3 2 It is apparent that the court viewed per se Sherman Act offenses to be a class of activity which can be reached by federal power
without an initial determination that interstate commerce was adversely affected.33
What is not clear, however, is the significance a per se offense has in the "sufficient relationship" approach. The court in one place called the per se offense
in Finis P. Ernest an "additional reason"'" for not requiring the restraint to be
upon interstate commerce, implying that it was not a necessary element in the
"sufficient relationship" approach. Yet the court's holding relied on the per se
nature of the bid-rigging to dismiss any argument that the small fraction of
interstate commerce involved in the local construction project made the restraint's
relationship with interstate commerce insufficient to warrant application of the
Sherman Act. 5 It is uncertain, then, whether the "sufficient relationship" approach would find any interstate involvement-no matter how minimal-to be
enough to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act, or whether
this finding depends on the presence of a per se Sherman Act violation. Since
the court did not make mention of this distinction, it can be said that the "suf30 Id. at 1261.
31 Id. at 1259. Per se violations of the Sherman Act have been established to alleviate
courts from complex analyses of economic statistics meant to determine if a restraint was
"unreasonable." A per se violation is "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (tying arrangement held per se offense). See also, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333 (1969) (price-fixing); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)
(vertical restraints); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying
arrangement); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group
boycott); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing).
32 509 F.2d at 1261. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
33 Cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate credit transactions held
within interstate commerce without proof that a particular case involved that commerce because Congress had labelled it a class of activity that it meant to regulate).
34 509 F.2d at 1259.
35 In support of this contention the court cited United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1970).
These cases held that when a per se Sherman Act offense is present, the amount of interstate
commerce affected is unimportant; however, interstate commerce was still required to have
been affected for the Sherman Act to apply. In Bensinger, for instance, the alleged restraint
concerned only one dishwasher. The Eighth Circuit held that, since the dishwasher had been
shipped in interstate commerce, the Sherman Act reached the restraint because it had affected
interstate commerce. Neither case, therefore, supports the "sufficient relationship" approach,
which would not require a restraint to affect interstate commerce.
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ficient relationship" approach is not dependent upon a per se Sherman Act
violation.
The Finis P. Ernest court's inclusion of per se offenses into Sherman Act
jurisdictional analysis also raises the objection that it has mixed together two
separate issues: the jurisdictional reach of the Act, and its substantive prohibitions. Though some courts have treated both issues as one, the better view is
that each must be dealt with separately. 6 If this is so, there does not seem to be
a place in the jurisdictional analysis of the Sherman Act for any mention of per
se offenses, which bear solely on the Act's substantive provisions. The Finis P.
Ernest court, however, was apparently struck by the seeming inconsistency involved in demanding that a showing of a restraint upon interstate commerce be
made to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act in a per se
case, when such a showing was not needed to establish the substantive violation
of the Act. The court stated: "It may be anomalous to require proof of effects
to satisfy jurisdiction in those cases where proof of effects is not necessary to
establish the substantive offense." 3 The view that jurisdiction and the substantive offense are different issues requiring different criteria for their determination
was not accepted by the court. The court's attitude indicates that it was dissatisfied with an approach that would treat a per se Sherman Act offense differently than it would a serious violation of another commerce power-based statute.
The Finis P. Ernest court's "sufficient relationship" approach relied upon
recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit for its authority. Those cases indeed used
the term "sufficient relationship" in defining the test of the jurisdictional reach
of the Sherman Act; however, the Ninth Circuit never expressly stated that a
restraint need not be upon interstate commerce for the Sherman Act to apply.
Analysis of those cases leads, in fact, to the opposite conclusion.
In Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.,5 5 one Ninth Circuit decision relied upon by
the Finis P. Ernest court, plaintiff, engaged in the retail sale of carpeting, alleged
that the defendant residential developer had restrained his business by refusing
to allow his advertisements in the "house" newspaper of one of its developments.
36 Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954), treated the substantive and jurisdictional aspects of the Sherman
Act as indistinguishable. This nosition has not been followed. The Ninth Circuit, in Uniform
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 400 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1968), stressed that the two parts
of the Sherman Act are different concerns to be treated separately. A restraint-whether conclusively unreasonable or not-must have substantial interstate impact to satisfy the Sherman
Act's jurisdictional requirements. See also Cough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.
1973); Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 950 (1973); Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Since jurisdiction is essentially a question of power to adjudicate a legal claim, its difference from the
legal claim itself-in the Sherman Act context whether an alleged restraint violates the Actis apparent.
37 509 F.2d at 1259. The court relied on P. ARPEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 183 (2d ed.
1974). The author there asks: "If certain conduct be held within the antitrust ban because
of its potential for harm, regardless of demonstrated harm in any particular case, is it inconsistent simultaneously to require proof of effects to satisfy the statute's jurisdictional test?"
Id. at 122 (footnote omitted). The simple answer is that it is not. "Interstate effects" is a
confusing term if it is not clear which aspect of the Sherman Act-jurisdictional reach or
substantive violation-is under discussion. Inconsistency would arise if both were subject to
the same analysis and different results were reached. However, since the reach of the Sherman
Act is analyzed differently than its substantive prohibitions, proof of interstate effect for jurisdictional purposes, but not for substantive purposes, is clearly not inconsistent. See note 36
supra.
38 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973).
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The Ninth Circuit put the jurisdictional question there in terms of "whether
defendant's conduct had a sufficient relationship to interstate commerce to be
subject to regulation by Congress.... ."" The court quickly added, however, that
[t]his in turn depends upon whether the defendant's conduct has a "substantial economic effect" upon interstate commerce or, "'concerns more
states than one' and has a real and substantial relation to the national

interest."" o

The focus of the Gough court was clearly upon the interstate impact of the
alleged restraint: "IT]he issue is... whether the defendant's conduct... has a

sufficient impact on interstate commerce to justify regulation under the Commerce Clause." 1 The court held that because all the carpeting used in plaintiff's business was obtained in interstate commerce, a "substantial economic
effect" upon interstate commerce resulted in the elimination of plaintiff's competition.4 The court added: "The relationship between the restraint and the
national interest in the distribution of carpeting in a free competitive economy
is not so tenuous as to bar federal interference." 4
The Gough decision is significant for the broad interpretation it gave the
relationship between a restraint and interstate commerce. However, the court
found the Sherman Act applicable not because of the mere presence of goods
shipped in interstate commerce but because the restraint was precisely upon
those interstate goods. The elimination of competition in interstate carpeting
had an "inevitable affect" 4 4 upon interstate commerce.
Another Ninth Circuit decision relied upon by the Finis P. Ernest court was
In re Liquid Asphalt Cases." The defendants there, producers of asphaltic oil,
were accused of restraining competition by plaintiff producers of asphaltic concrete. The restraint occurred in connection with roadway construction that was
part of an interstate highway system. However, the great majority of the products
involved were produced, sold, and delivered intrastate. The Liquid Asphalt
court held that "the production of asphalt for use in interstate highway rendered
the producers 'instrumentalities' of interstate commerce and placed them 'in'
commerce as a matter of law."" This conclusion was reached by analogizing

39 Id. at 376.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. This term "substantial economic effect" comes from Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942): "[elven if ... activity local and ... not regarded as commerce, it may still . . .
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce..
Id. at 125.
43 487 F.2d at 378.
44 The phrase is the Supreme Court's, used to describe the effect upon interstate commerce in Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 322 (1967).
45 487 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part sub nom. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
46 Id. at 204.
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from the Fair Labor Standards Act, a statute based on the commerce power. 7
The Finis P. Ernest court read this holding to mean that interstate commerce and a restraint could exist separately and still meet the jurisdictional
requirements of the Sherman Act. "The [Liquid Asphalt] court's bifurcated
analysis made it unnecessary in deciding the question of jurisdiction to consider
whether any interstate commerce was allegedly restrained." 4 The Liquid Asphalt court was careful to point out, however, that there was a connection between the restraint and interstate commerce. The restraint, said the court, was
the "illegal manipulation of the very costs and products which put the defendants'
49
business 'in' interstate commerce ....
The Supreme Court's disposition of Liquid Asphalt upon appeal"0 sheds
further light on the precedental value of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. While the
Supreme Court's review did not extend to the Sherman Act jurisdictional issue,"1
the Court's unfavorable treatment of the Ninth Circuit's holding, which had
placed the defendant in interstate commerce as a matter of law, 2 calls into question the appellate court's Sherman Act analysis as well.
In any case, the re47 The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970), is meant to reach wage
earners who work under substandard labor conditions. For constitutional reasons, the Act is
applicable to those employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods
for interstate commerce. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), established the extensive
reach of the Act's provisions. In a telling commentary on the reach of the commerce power
in Wirtz, Harlan, J., stated:
Neither here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively
trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or
private activities. The Court has said only that where a general regulatory statute
bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.
Id. at 197 n.27. Though this statement was specifically addressed to the issue of state autonomy
raised in Douglas, J.,'s dissent, id. at 201, 204, it has relevance in a broader area. It first
establishes the need for something more than a "trivial impact on commerce" to justify congressional regulation. Secondly, it implies that Congress has intended different jurisdictional
requirements for statutes based on the commerce power. While the Fair Labor Standards Act
might be unconcerned with the de minimis character of individual cases, this is clearly not the
case with the Sherman Act. See Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d
Cir. 1964); Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1961). Thirdly, the use of the phrase
"substantial relation" here indicates that it is equivalent to an effect upon interstate commerce.
Especially when a "trivial impact" is rejected as a basis for federal regulation, it seems clear
that "relation" and "effect" are interchangeable words. At a minimum, nothing in the language
of the Wirtz Court indicates that there can be more than one permissible approach to commerce power analysis.
48 509 F.2d at 1259.
49 487 F.2d at 204.
50 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
51 The Court limited its grant of certiorari to issues raised under § 2(a) of the RobinsonPatman Act and 2 §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court held that the "in commerce"
requirement of § (a) demanded that allegedly prohibited activity must be directly in interstate
commerce. The Clayton Act requires that such activity must at least "affect commerce," but
respondents presented no evidence on this point; the Court thus held that their Clayton Act
contention failed for want of proof.
52 The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's analogizing from the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970), to the Robinson-Patman and Clayton Acts. To the
argument that the concept of "in commerce" should be expanded to include categories of
activities that are perceptibly connected to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce-here
interstate highways--the Court said: "The chain of connection has no logical endpoint. The
universe of arguably included activities would be broad and its limits nebulous in the extreme."
419 U.S. at 198.
53 Considering how little the Court thought of the argument that "in commerce" should
be expanded to reach activities only tangentially connected with interstate commerce, the language of the Sherman Act-requiring a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce-would
seemed to have barely met the Court's approval. In his dissent, Douglas, J., said as much.
The decision of the Court of Appeals on the Sherman Act issue . . . held that
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straint in Liquid Asphalt, if it was not "in" interstate commerce, can at least be
said to have affected that commerce. The Supreme Court admitted as much
when it stated that "[t]he jurisdictional reach of § 1 [of the Sherman Act] thus
is keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and the interstate flow of goods."5
Gough, Liquid Asphalt, and other Ninth Circuit decisions s5 provide no support, therefore, for the Finis P. Ernest court's conclusion that these cases used an
approach to Sherman Act jurisdictional requirements that did not demand that
there be a restraint upon interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit has widened
the reach of the Sherman Act,' but not to the extent that any involvement of
interstate commerce can justify application of the Sherman Act. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit has expressly recognized that there is a definite limit to the reach
of the Sherman Act even where interstate commerce is present. Though it is
a question of degree, that limit is reached when the effect upon interstate commerce is 7so incidental to an otherwise local restraint that it is rendered de
inim s

petitioners and their alleged activities were sufficiently "in commerce" to support
Sherman Act jurisdiction. . . . The majority now holds, however, that petitioners
and their alleged activities were not sufficiently "in commerce" to support Clayton
and Robinson-Patman coverage. In light of the latter holding, it is difficult to imagine
the reception that Copp's Sherman Act claims will receive on remand.
Id. at 208 n.6 (emphasis supplied). A key to future interpretations of the Sherman Act appears
in the Court's statement that, in determining whether a local activity is harmful to the national
marketplace, courts are required "to look to practical consequences, not to apparent and
perhaps nominal connections between commerce and activities that may have no significant
economic effect on interstate markets." Id. at 199.
54 Id. at 194.
55 Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
56 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it will accept a potential affect upon
interstate commerce as sufficient without the need for proof that such effect has occurred. See
Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973); Rasmussen v. American Dairy
Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
57 In Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1961), defendant newspapers banded together
into a bureau to better serve the legal advertising market in Los Angeles County, California.
Plaintiff newspaper was not among those included in the bureau, and as a result was soon
forced to terminate publication. Surviving newspapers picked up most of the plaintiff's former
subscribers, but 13 were not. Plaintiff had purchased newsprint, ink, and other supplies in
interstate commerce.
On these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirements of the Sherman Act had not
been met, notwithstanding the lessening of interstate commerce. Id. at 333-34. The Page
court reasoned that the decrease in interstate commerce was too insubstantial to bring the
Sherman Act to bear on what was essentially a local restraint. The market for legal advertising
was in the court's judgment local, and the defendants' conduct was in only that market, and
did not sufficiently affect interstate commerce to justify federal prohibition.
The Page decision stands for the principle that a de minimis effect upon interstate commerce is insufficient to require application of the Sherman Act. See Rasmussen v. American
Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). See
also Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969) (interstate effect called "incidental" to local restraint; Sherman Act held not applicable).
To the Finis P. Ernest court, Page seemed "inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's most
recent decisions, yet Page continues to be cited with approval in those cases." 509 F.2d at
1259. Page is inconsistent with Gough, Liquid Asphalt, and Rasmussen only if the latter cases
are taken to hold that even a trivial connection with interstate commerce is enough to meet
the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act. That these cases do not so hold is apparent
from the fact-which the Finis P. Ernest court admitted-that they expressly limit Sherman
Act jurisdictional reach to those restraints upon interstate commerce that are not de minimis.
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2. The "Nexus" Approach
Along with the "sufficient relationship" approach, the Seventh Circuit
analyzed the jurisdictional issue in FinisP. Ernest by use of the "nexus" approach.
This approach requires that a restraint be upon interstate commerce for the
Sherman Act to apply. A restraint that is in interstate commerce or substantially
affects that commerce has the requisite connection to meet the jurisdictional
requirements of the "nexus" approach.
The "nexus" approach is the traditional method courts have used to determine Sherman Act coverage, and is thus well-established in case law. Its most
recent judicial affirmation was in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,5" where the
Supreme Court held that title examination was such an integral part of the interstate aspects of real estate transactions that it substantially affectedt interstate
commerce. The Court clearly relied on a "nexus" approach to reach its conclusion.
Where, as a matter of law or practical necessity, legal services are an
integral part of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those services may
substantially affect commerce for Sherman Act purposes. Of course, there
may be legal services that involve interstate commerce in other fashions,
just as there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.56
As is apparent from Goldfarb, the "nexus" approach is capable of an expansive interpretation of what is in or affects interstate commerce. For example, in
Burke v. Ford" the Court held that a horizontal territorial division of the Oklahoma wholesale liquor market was a restraint upon interstate commerce, even
'
though the liquor "came to rest"61
in the wholesalers' warehouses before distribution and even though all sales were made intrastate. The Burke Court indicated that the liquor retained its interstate character throughout the chain of
distribution; more than this, the Court saw in the wholesalers' division of the
'
Oklahoma liquor market an "inevitable effect" 62
upon interstate commerce,
although there was no proof of such effect. The Court stated:
The wholesalers' territorial division here almost surely resulted in fewer sales
58 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (Burger, C.J.).
59 Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
60 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
61 The "come to rest" doctrine is a conceptual explanation of the point at which interstate
commerce ends. While the doctrine has some bearing on the issue of when a restraint is "in"
interstate commerce for Sherman Act purposes, it has no relevance to the issue of a restraint's
effect upon interstate commerce. As the Burke Court said in response to the argument that
the Sherman Act could not apply where the restraint occurred after the liquor had "come to
rest" in defendants' warehouses: "[Wlhatever the validity of that conclusion, it does not end
the matter. For it is well established that an activity which does not itself occur in interstate
commerce comes within the scope of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate
commerce." 389 U.S. at 321 (emphasis supplied).
The "come to rest" doctrine might be generally irrelevant to the Sherman Act context.
Such is the import of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), where the Court stated
that the doctrine was not applicable to analysis of the scope of the commerce power. Cases
upholding the doctrine, it was said, have "been applied with reference to state taxation or
regulation but not in the field of federal regulation." Id. at 302.
62 389 U.S. at 322.
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to retailers-hence fewer purchases from out-of-state distillers-than would
have occurred had free competition prevailed among the wholesalers. 63
The Burke holding stemmed from the Court's determination that the economic realities of the territorial division inevitably had an effect upon interstate
commerce. Thus a potential effect was sufficient to justify application of the
Sherman Act; there was a nexus here between the restraint and interstate commerce."
A Ninth Circuit decision which followed the rationale of Burke is Rasmussen
v. American Dairy Ass'n.0 In that case the defendant associations were accused
of engaging in anticompetitive practices to drive the plaintiff out of the Phoenix,
Arizona, milk market. Plaintiff sold a "filled milk" product, "Go," in competition
with the fluid milk offered by the associations. The product was composed of
ingredients obtained, all except for water, in interstate commerce. The Rasmussen court held that "a sufficient relationship appears.., between the restraint
allegedly imposed by defendants and interstate commerce in 'Go' and its ingredients to establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Act."' 6, It is significant that
the court used the term "sufficient relationship" but tied it directly to a restraint
upon interstate commerce; this would indicate the Rasmussen court was also
using a "nexus" approach.
The fact that the restraint took place only in the local Phoenix market did
not convince the Rasmussen court that there was no effect upon interstate commerce. Admitting that "[t]here is no bright line dividing cases in which the
effect upon interstate commerce is sufficient to permit Congress [to regulate] ...
from cases in which it is not sufficient,"6 the court indicated that determining
the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act "becomes a matter of degree."?6 s
The court found the Sherman Act reached the restraint there because the "ingredients that move in interstate commerce represent the greater part of the valut
of 'Go.' ,'69 The court explained that
[tihe fact that the conduct to be prohibited is directed against the distribution
of "Go" itself, and that all of "Go" 's economically significant ingredients
derive from a line of interstate commerce, makes the prohibition of that
conduct more clearly reasonable as a7means
of protecting the particular line
0
of commerce of interstate commerce.
The Rasmussen court was thus engaged in line-drawing between restraints which
affect "economically significant" lines of interstate commerce and those which
are only incidental to interstate commerce. It determined that the degree of
63

Id.

64

The effect upon interstate commerce was "potential" to the extent that it could not be

readily demonstrated. A substantial-if conjectural-impact upon interstate commerce can
thus be judged within the reach of the Sherman Act. See also Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487
F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973).
65 4-72 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
66 Id. at 528.
67 Id. at 526.
68 id. at 527.
69 Id.

70 Id.
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interstate commerce affected by the associations was sufficient to find the Sherman Act applicable
The Seventh Circuit's use of the "nexus" approach in Finis P. Ernest implicitly relied upon cases like Goldfarb, Burke, and Rasmussen to find a restraint
upon interstate commerce. Unlike those cases, however, there was no line of
commerce in Finis P. Ernest that was the object of the restraint. Interstate commerce was related only indirectly to the bid-rigging. The court found, nevertheless, that a potential restraint upon interstate commerce resulted from the purchase of interstate supplies and from the use of HUD funds to pay for the
contract.
Concerning the $9,307 spent in interstate commerce, the Finis P. Ernest
court held that an inference could be drawn that the defendants' conduct restrained interstate commerce by "potentially reduc[ing] competition in materials
in interstate commerce." 7' The court stated that "[i]f there had been genuine
competitive bidding, each contractor, in an effort to make the lowest bid, would
have obtained competitive prices from materials suppliers."' 2 The court further
held that the bid-rigging had artificially increased the city's cost for the project
"in at least two ways."' s First, HUD funds, transferred in interstate commerce,
had to be increased after the bid in order to pay for the higher contract price.
This increase "would inevitably mean that there would be less money available
for HUD projects elsewhere in the United States. 7 4 Second, "where the city
must use more of its available funds to complete the sewer project it will have
less money to expend for other projects requiring use of goods shipped in interstate commerce. 7 5
The Seventh Circuit's finding of a restraint upon interstate commerce here
was conjectural, but persuasive nonetheless. A "significant, if unpredictable, impact upon interstate commerce' is enough to warrant application of the Sherman Act. As the Rasmussen court noted: "The specific consequences may be
speculative, but the reality of the economic impact is not. 77 Prohibition of conduct which reduces competition in interstate sales of materials and which increases the Government's expenditure of funds for urban redevelopment can
legitimately be said to be substantially related to the national interest, and thus
within the reach of the Sherman Act.7 ' The effect upon interstate commerce
here was as inevitable as it was in Burke or Rasmussen.
71

72
73
74
75

509 F.2d at 1261.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

76 Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 950 (1973).
77 Id.
78 The argument could be made that HUD funds are not "commerce" and that there was
no real competition restrained in the division of those funds between the states. However, it is
clear that federal money provided for state and local redevelopment projects stimulates commerce, and no doubt interstate commerce, in goods and labor. That this federal money should
not be artificially channeled into one project more than another, especially when caused by
an anticompetitive practice such as bid-rigging, is beyond dispute. The commerce power can
reach activities which have substantial relation to the national interest. See Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
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3. The Two Approaches Compared
Both approaches used by the Seventh Circuit in Finis P. Ernest to determine
the Sherman Act jurisdictional issue led to the conclusion that the defendants'
conduct came within the reach of the Act. It is clear, however, that in a different
factual setting the two approaches would produce different results.
The "sufficient relationship" approach found the Sherman Act applicable
because the bid-rigging led to interstate involvement with the purchase of out-ofstate supplies. Because bid-rigging is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, it
did not matter how small the proportion of interstate commerce was to the total
contract expenditures. 0 It is not clear if the Finis P. Ernest court would have
found the Sherman Act applicable under this approach if there had not been a
per se violation and the interstate
commerce involved was minimal; the court's
0
indication is that it would have.
If the defendants had not purchased supplies in interstate commerce, the
"sufficient relationship" approach would apparently deny the applicability of
the Sherman Act. Under that approach, the restraint need only be sufficiently
related to interstate commerce to give Congress power to act,"1 but the Finis P.
Ernest court defined that relationship solely in terms of actual involvement of
interstate commerce through an out-of-state purchase. Thus the "sufficient relationship" approach could not reach restraints that occurred wholly intrastate.
The "nexus" approach, by comparison, is not dependent upon the involvement of interstate commerce for a finding that the Sherman Act reaches an
otherwise intrastate restraint. This approach is concerned with a restraint's effect
upon interstate commerce, no matter how local the restraint's geographical scope
might be. The "nexus-' approach would have allowed the Sherman Act to reach
the defendants' conduct in FinisP. Ernest even if there had not been the purchase
of supplies in interstate commerce.
Thus, while the "sufficient relationship" approach extends the reach of the
Sherman Act to restraints that only indirectly involve interstate commerce, the
"nexus" approach is more pervasive, since it can find Sherman Act application
in the most local of restraints, so long as it affects interstate commerce.82 The
"nexus" approach can reach all restraints that the "sufficient relationship"
approach can permissibly reach, as it did in Finis P. Ernest. But if the "nexus"
approach were held not to reach a restraint-because of a de minimis effect upon
intrastate commerce-it is doubtful that the "sufficient relationship" approach
could legitimately reach it. The mere involvement of interstate commerce in an
anticompetitive practice cannot by itself justify application of the Sherman Act.
79 See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
80 The court implicitly held that a per se violation was not a necessary element of the
"sufficient relationship" approach. First, the court's analysis of that approach stemmed from
other courts that had used the term, albeit in a different sense. Secondly. the court called the
er se violation of the Sherman Act in Finis P. Ernest an "additional reason" for not requiring
e restraint to be upon interstate commerce, 509 F.2d at 1259, indicating that a per se restraint was a supplement to-rather than an ingredient of-the "sufficient relationship"
approach.

81

82

509 F.2d at 1261.

See Gough v. Rossmoor, Corp., 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973); Rasmussen v. American

Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
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More is required, and that means that the practice must restrain interstate
commerce.
As defined by the Finis P. Ernest court and applied to the defendants' conduct there, it is clear that the "sufficient relationship" approach has no support
in prior cases, 3 and contradicts the congressional intention that courts make
their own determination of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act from a
judgment of the economic realities of each alleged restraint.8 This congressional
intention would presumably apply to all restraints, including those that are per
se violations of the Sherman Act.8
Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's dual approaches to the reach of the Sherman Act in
Finis P. Ernest indicates the court's doubts about the requirement that a restraint
must be upon interstate commerce for the Sherman Act to apply. The court
expressed no preference for one approach or the other; at the least, however, it
viewed each approach to be as equally satisfactory as the other.
The court's "sufficient relationship" approach treated an alleged restraint
and interstate commerce as separate issues; as long as interstate commerce was
to some extent involved, the Sherman Act could reach a restraint that had no
effect upon interstate commerce. The court's "nexus" approach, on the other
hand, required the restraint to be upon interstate commerce, whether by being in
interstate commerce or substantially affecting that commerce.
The "nexus" approach comports with the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act as defined by case precedent and congressional intention. However, the
"sufficient relationship" approach does not have this support. It rests on an expansive reading of several recent Ninth Circuit decisions and the application of
analogous statutes to the Sherman Act. But the Ninth Circuit, like other courts,
continues to demand that interstate commerce be affected for the Sherman Act
to apply. And while other statutes based on the commerce clause contain specific
congressional indication that certain activities affect interstate commerce, it is
Congress' intention that in a Sherman Act context it should be the courts who
make such a determination. This determination, in turn, requires a court to make
in each case a practical, economic judgment of an actual or potential effect upon
interstate commerce.
The Finis P. Ernest court's "sufficient relationship" approach does not reflect
this understanding of Sherman Act jurisdictional analysis. The Seventh Circuit,
therefore, should forego this approach, and determine future questions of the
Sherman Act's reach solely in terms of the "nexus" approach.
Martin I. Hagan
83 Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202'(9th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part sub nom., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974). See also Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); Rasmussen v. American Dairy
Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
84 See notes 17-18 & accompanying text supra.
85 See note 36 supra.
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City of HighlandPark v. Train
Tht Cook County, Illinois, Highway Department developed plans in 1967
to expand the Lake-Cook Road in order to enable it to accommodate projected
traffic levels for the following 20 or more years. In January 1973, developers submitted plans for the construction of a large shopping center which would be located in an area that would make Lake-Cook Road the only main thoroughfare
providing access to the shopping center from the major arteries serving Chicago.
The 1967 estimates for the road expansion had not taken into account the volume
of traffic a shopping center of this size would produce. It was predicted that 90
percent of an estimated 28,400 vehicle trips per day generated by the proposed
shopping center would have to use Lake-Cook Road.
Apart from the construction projects in the Chicago area, the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was reviewing implementation
plans for national ambient air quality standards that had been prepared and
submitted by the State of Illinois for EPA approval. The purpose of the implementation plans was to establish control procedures for various sources of air
pollution in Illinois. Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,1 the EPA Administrator was required to review the Illinois plan to determine if it satisfied
statutory requirements, and to approve or disapprove the plan in part or in whole.
Having found the Illinois plan deficient 2 in regard to regulations for indirect
sources,' the EPA Administrator incorporated a federal regulation that was considered to correct this deficiency. Under the established classification system, the
shopping center and road expansion were regarded as indirect sources of air
pollution. However, the federal regulation4 thus incorporated exempted construction projects that were begun before January 1, 1975. Since construction on both
the shopping center and road expansion was begun before that date, and were
therefore exempted from the requirements of the indirect source regulation, the
local citizens, residents of Highland Park, would be subjected to increased pollu-

tion levels.
The city of Highland Park, without previously notifying the EPA Administrator of its intended action as the EPA alleged was required by the Clean Air
1 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2 39 Fed. Reg. 7281 (1974).
3 The term "indirect source" means a facility, building, structure, or installation which
attracts or may attract mobile source activity that results in emissions of a pollutant for which
there is a national standard. Included in this definition are roads and parking facilities. 40
C.F.R. § 52.22(b) (1)(i) .(1975).
4 40 C.F.R. § 52.22(b) (1974).
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Act, commenced suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois,5 alleging failure on the part of the EPA Administrator to perform
certain nondiscretionary duties. The plaintiffs based their claim on the citizen
enforcement provisions contained in § 304 of the Clean Air Act' that allow
parties to obtain judicial remedies when the EPA Administrator fails to perform
a duty required by the Act. The plaintiffs defined the nondiscretionary duties
here to be a failure to promulgate indirect source regulations for those sources
exempted by the EPA's regulation incorporated in the Illinois implementation
plan, and a failure to promulgate significant deterioration7 regulations in view
of the Clean Air Act's nondegradation requirements. It was alleged that the
expected traffic growth generated by the shopping center would increase traffic
congestion to the extent that the concentration of carbon monoxide in the ambient air would increase by more than 66 percent over existing levels and would
probably exceed the standards that the EPA Administrator would be directed
to promulgate.3
The district court found that § 304 of the Clean Air Act was applicable,
but that the plaintiffs' failure to give the EPA 60 days' notice as required by §
304 was fatal to any claim based on the Clean Air Act.9 The court said that not
only was strict adherence mandated by the statute, but it was supported by compelling practical and policy considerations. In considering other alternative
sources of jurisdiction for the plaintiff's suit, it was determined that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' 0 did not constitute an independent jurisdictional
basis, but that based on the allegations, general federal question jurisdiction"1
did exist. After examining the Clean Air Act and a previous court order in another jurisdiction 2 establishing a timetable for the EPA Administrator to promulgate indirect source regulations, the district court deemed the indirect source
action premature, dismissed the significant deterioration acion for failure to state
a claim under the Clean Air Act, and found the showing insufficient to warrant
an injunction.
Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuite '
affirmed the result reached by the district court but did not entirely agree with
the district court's reasoning. While the district court dismissed the significant
deterioration claim on the merits, the Seventh Circuit found that a sufficient
jurisdictional base was never established for any of the city's claims. The Seventh
5 City of Highland Park v. Train, 374 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2 (Cum. Supp 1976).
7 "Significant deterioration" refers to situations where the level of pollution in a given
area is lower than the secondary air pollution standard and is allowed to degrade to the level
of the secondary standard.
8 In additional counts of the complaint, the plaintiffs sought (Count III) to enjoin the
road expansion until an environmental impact statement pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. (1970), had been filed, and
alleged (Count IV) that the Village of Northbrook had denied them equal protection of the
laws by the adoption of a zoning ordinance which permitted the construction of the shopping
center.
9 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
10 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
12 National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13 City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).
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Circuit held in part that where air pollution regulations which had been issued
by the EPA Administrator exempted from compliance indirect sources on which
construction was commenced before January 1, 1975, the exemption provision
was an integral part of the implementation plan which could be reviewed only by
a petition for review under § 307,"4 and not under § 304, of the Clean Air Act.
The court refused to characterize the Administrator's action of inserting EPA
regulations with an exemption provision in the Illinois implementation plan as
a failure to promulgate indirect source regulations for the shopping center and
road expansion. Since a § 307 action could be commenced only in a court of
appeals, the plaintiffs were not permitted to litigate the indirect source question
in the district court. In regard to the Administrator's failure to promulgate significant deterioration regulations, the court determined that the suit could not be
maintained under the Clean Air Act because the 60-day notice provision under
§ 304 had not been given. The Seventh Circuit finally concluded that § 304 was
an exclusive source of district court jurisdiction in this instance, and that no other
jurisdictional statutes were applicable.
Thus the city's allegation that the EPA Administrator had failed to perform
a nondiscretionary duty by not promulgating indirect source regulations was held
properly dismissed by the district court because it is an action under § 307; the
allegation that the EPA Administrator had failed to perform a nondiscretionary
duty by not promulgating significant deterioration regulations was dismissed because it was barred by the 60-day notice requirement, and the contention that
alternate sources of jurisdiction were available was unfounded because § 304 in
this instance was the exclusive source of jurisdiction. 5
Background of Federal Efforts in Pollution Control
The holding of the Seventh Circuit in HighlandPark can best be understood
by first investigating the evolution of federal pollution control policy. The history
of federal efforts at air pollution control has been one of increasing involvement
in terms of federal, state and citizen participation.
The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955" was the first federal effort dealing
with air pollution control. Under this legislation, enforcement was left entirely
to the states, with the federal government limiting its role to research, information,
technical assistance, grants, and encouragement of interstate compacts. The Air
Quality Act of 19677 attempted to provide more of a balance between federal
and state responsibility. This effort failed, however, when the federal government
neglected to designate air quality regions and the states did not establish their own
air quality standards within a reasonable period of time.' Several other air
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
15 The additional counts were dismissed because the court found (Count III) that there
was no federal action to require NEPA, and '(Count IV) that zoning legislation may be held
unconstitutional only if no relation between the state's interest in protecting the health, safety,
or general welfare of the public could be found.
16 Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322.
17 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485.
18 Greco, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotiue Ideas from Congress,
12 B.C. IND. & CoMm. L. Rnv. 571, 577 (1971).
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quality laws were enacted and later amended to give the federal government
more responsibility and power for the prevention and control of air pollution.1 9
For the most part, however, these early efforts met with either limited success or
were totally unsuccessful.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 represent a complete revision of
federal air pollution policy.2" The Glean Air Act Amendments were passed with
the purpose that, rather than limit regulation to the current state of technical
feasibility, the EPA would determine what air standards were necessary to protect public health and welfare and then require the technology to meet those
standards. In establishing the procedural framework for the Clean Air Act
Amendments, Congress utilized a collaborative federal-state approach that complicated what was already an elaborate administrative procedure. Under this
collaborative approach, the states retain primary responsibility for the prevention
and control of air pollution, while the federal government is left to develop national ambient air quality standards. Interested citizens are also given a significant role in the enforcement of the new standards. 2' Under the new procedure,
if a polluter violates air pollution standards and the state fails to act, both the
federal government and interested citizens can seek a judicial remedy to enforce
compliance.
To ensure meaningful citizen participation, the Glean Air Act Amendments
establish, under §§ 304 and 307, two major provisions for access to the federal
judicial system. Section 304 is specifically concerned with citizen suits, while §
307 is a general provision dealing with methods of obtaining judicial review. The
dividing line between these two sections, however, has been determined to be
narrow.
Section 304 provides for enforcement of the Clean Air Act by allowing "any
person" to commence a civil action against the federal or local government or
private polluter who is allegedly in violation of a federally approved or promulgated plan. The broad language used in § 304 referring to "any person" liberalizes even contemporary standards for standing to bring suit. Further, a civil
action may be commenced against the EPA Administrator for failure to perform
a nondiscretionary duty. However, the party bringing suit is required by statute
to give the defendant party 60 days' notice before the action is filed. Jurisdiction
is conferred on the district court without regard to the amount in controversy or
citizenship of the parties, as is normally required for jurisdiction in the district
courts under the federal question statute. What has been called the savings clause,
§ 304(e), provides that nothing in § 304 shall restrict any right which a person
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of a standard
or any other relief.
19 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392; Motor Vehicle Air Pollution
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954.
20 See generally Bolbach, The Courts and the Clean Air Act, 5 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL
REP. MONOGRAPH 19 (1974).
21 See generally Luneburg & Roselle, judicial Review under the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, 15 B.C. IND. & CoMm. L. REv. 667 (1974); Steinberg, Is the Citizen Suit a Substitute
for the Class Actiolt in Environmental Litigation? An Examination of the Clean Air Act of
1970 Citizens Suit Provision, 12 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 107 (1974).
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Section 307 is fundamentally different from § 304. Under § 304 a party
must allege that the EPA Administrator has failed to do what he is required to
do and request the court to issue appropriate orders to force action. Section 307
applies when the Administrator has already acted and a party is trying to seek
judicial review in order to contest the action. However, § 307 provides for judicial review of only certain actions specified in § 307 and not all actions that are
performed by the EPA Administrator. The purpose of § 307 is to channel
judicial review into the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia2 2 or an appropriate circuit court of appeals. Petitions to review promulgation or approval of an implementation plan (such as the Illinois plan in Highland Park) may be filed only in the circuit court covering the state in which the
plan is being challenged. All petitions under this section must be filed within 30
days from the date of such promulgation or approval unless the petition is based
solely on grounds arising after the 30-day period.
Since both §§ 304 and 307 refer to different jurisdictional forums, the time
limits set for bringing a suit under either section are especially important, for if a
suit is filed under the wrong provision, a dismissal might result. A party mistakenly filing suit -under § 304 and waiting the required 60 days may later be precluded from refiling the action under § 307 because the action was started after
the 30-day limit.
There have been relatively few circuit court decisions23 construing these
sections, but the importance of these sections has been increasing due in part to
restrictions on environmental class action suits. 24 The distinctions between §§
304 and 307 have been clarified neither by the language of the Clean Air Act nor
the courts. There is a great disparity of opinion among the district court jurisdictions that have interpreted these provisions.
The Approach of the Seventh Circuit
In City of Highland Park v. Train, the Seventh Circuit was called upon to
clarify some of the ambiguities concerning the scope and applicability of §§ 304
and 307. The Highland Park court focused on three separate aspects of the
jurisdictional provisions under the Clean Air Act: (1) the relationship between
§§ 304 and 307; (2) the 60-day notice requirement'under § 304, specifically
its purpose and the extent to which it should be strictly applied; and (3) the
sources of federal district court jurisdiction outside of the Clean Air Act and to
what degree § 304 would affect their availability. This last aspect of the case
also focused on the exclusivity of § 304 in light of the savings clause.
22 Actions of the EPA Administrator reviewable in the District of Columbia Circuit Court
include the promulgation of any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard,
any emission standard for hazardous substances, any performance standard in the new source
performance section, and any standard or control measure relating to mobile sources of air
pollution.
23 Until the Highland Park and NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 '(D.C. Cir. 1975), decisions were rendered, all cases were decided at the district court level.
24 The class action has been an ideal method of seeking redress in environmental litigation,
but since Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), and Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), have restricted use of this device, -more dependence will be
placed on §§ 304 and 307.
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1. Scope and Applicability of §§ 304 and 307
The relationship between §§ 304 and 307 was of significance to the parties
in Highland Park. Suit was commenced in federal district court, the appropriate
forum to litigate an action under § 304. A § 307 action, however, can be started
only in a circuit court of appeals. Thus, a finding that the review procedure for
the indirect source regulation on question fell only under § 307 would have permitted the Seventh Circuit to find that the district court properly dismissed the
city's claim.
The complaint in Highland Park alleged that the EPA Administrator had
failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty by not promulating indirect source
regulations for indirect air pollution sources with beginning construction dates
prior to January 1, 1975. If this was the case, the plaintiffs would have been
permitted to bring a citizen suit under § 304 and in district court. By contending
that the EPA Administrator failed to perform this nondiscretionary duty, the
plaintiffs in effect were challenging the exemption provision contained in the
federally approved Illinois implementation plan for the Clean Air Act. Yet
under § 110 (c) of that Act,25 the EPA Administrator's incorporation of standards
becomes a part of the implementation plan and is reviewed exclusively under §
307. Thus, the exemption of indirect sources with construction dates before
January 1, 1975, could be classified as an integral part of the Illinois implementation plan. This finding required dismissal of a § 304 action in district court.
Moreover, in its conclusion that the exemption provision was an integral part of
the Illinois implementation plan, 6 the Seventh Circuit determined that §§ 304
and 307 were mutually exclusive provisions, and that an action by the EPA
Administrator could not fall under both provisions at the same time.
Several jurisdictions have been called upon to decide similar but not identical
questions relating to §§ 304 and 307. These courts have weighed the factors
differently in determining which section an action should fall under, but all
courts have characterized the action as either one under § 304 or § 307 and not
under both at the same time. The Highland Park court strongly relied on Getty
Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus" to support its conclusion in what it considered were analogous circumstances. The plaintiff in Getty attacked an EPA-approved state
implementation plan setting up sulfur dioxide standards for ambient air. The
plaintiff in Getty challenged the merits of a sulfur dioxide standard but did not
contend that the EPA Administrator had failed to promulgate an ambient standard for sulfur dioxide. The Third Circuit found that under such circumstances
§ 307 provided the exclusive method or review. Unlike Getty, however, the plaintiffs in HighlandPark argued that the exemption provision could be considered a
failure to promulgate regulations on the part of the EPA Administrator. The
Highland Park court also cited other lower court decisions,2 but most of those

25 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
26 519 F.2d at 689.
27 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
28 West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 378 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Delaware Citizens
for Clean Air v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Del. 1974).
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also concerned an attack on the merits of standards, methods, or time schedules
in implementation plans and not an exemption provision which could also be
classified as a failure to include a provision.
A case factually similar to Highland Park was Pickney v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency.' The action by local residents there sought to compel
the promulgation of indirect source regulations in an attempt to block construction of a shopping center. The citizens contended that the EPA Administrator abused his discretion in delaying for 180 days the effective date of federal
regulations with respect to indirect sources of air pollution. The Pickney court
held, however, that the Clean Air Act provided adequate provisions for judicial
review of implementation plans. The court further held that the delay was an act
under the implementation plan and therefore that § 307 was the exclusive method
of review. Although similar to HighlandPark in result, the Pickney decision was
not squarely on point as stated by the Seventh Circuit because the plaintiffs in
Highland Park contended that the EPA Administrator's duty was nondiscretionary. As previously mentioned, a failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty
would permit plaintiffs to file an action under § 304.
By classifying the EPA Administrator's action as an act exclusively under
§ 307, the Seventh Circuit has to distinguish the purposes and effects of each
section. Section 304 grants judicial relief that otherwise might not be available
for a failure on the part of the EPA Administrator, while § 307 sets out requirements to obtain judicial review that already is guaranteed by the APA for an
action by the EPA Administrator. The action of the EPA Administrator in
Highland Park had been codified and was final agency action that could have
been reviewed without express authorization in the Clean Air Act."
Yet while the Seventh Circuit decision did not further the concept of citizen
suits that is an integral part of the Clean Air Act, it did further other factors that
were important. Specifically, the ability of § 307 to channel review of the EPA
Administrator's action would expedite environmental litigation to an appellate
level and provide more uniformity for actions that require a consistent national
application."1 Pollution sources are capable of causing damage far beyond their
state or regional boundaries, and the need for consistent national application is
apparent. Further, if §§ 304 and 307 were not found to be mutually exclusive,
concurrent de novo jurisdiction would exist at the district court and appellate
court levels which could result in an inefficient and cumbersome method of
review.
2. The Notice Provision of § 304
Having determined that the district court properly dismissed the portion of
the city's complaint relating to review of an action in the Illinois implementation
plan, the Seventh Circuit next considered the alleged failure of the EPA Administrator to issue significant deterioration regulations for automobile related pollu29 375 F. Supp. 305 '(N.D. Ohio 1974).
30 The Supreme Court established a presumption of judicial review under the APA in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
31 S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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tants 2 This portion of the complaint related only to a failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty, thus making § 304 the applicable jurisdictional provision."
The Seventh Circuit, however, found that the notice requirement of § 304 had
not been fulfilled and that this failure was decisive.
The Highland Park decision was the first decision where an appellate court,
considering the 60-day notice issue, read the legislative history to require strict
construction. The Seventh Circuit justified this strict construction as necessary
to prevent frustration of the clear intent of Congress to provide adequate notice.
According to the Seventh Circuit, Congress intended to provide for citizen suits
in a manner least likely to additionally burden federal courts and most likely to
trigger governmental action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief. 4
The court cited three district court decisions as apposite to its own ruling.
The first, Pickney, found that only a strict interpretation would render the notice
requirement meaningful, otherwise alleged violations of the Clean Air Act would
be filed regularly without prior notice."5 Yet the court did not examine the legislative purpose behind the notice requirement but instead focused only on its
literal meaning. In West Penn Power Co. v. Train8 another district court commented in dictum on the 60-day notice requirement. Since the EPA Administrator's duty in West Penn was determined to be discretionary, a finding under
the notice provision of § 304 was not required. Yet the court reasoned that if
Congress can specify the terms upon which the Government consents to be sued,
then such terms must be strictly followed."
The Highland Park court also concluded that Metropolitan Washington
Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia3 8 was consistent with the strict
construction standards accorded the 60-day notice requirement as set out in
Pickney and West Penn. Although a formal 60-day notice was not given to the
defendant there, the court did not dismiss the suit because it held that a prior
complaint had in substance afforded the defendant the required notice. In
MVdetropolitan it was emphasized that the notice requirement of § 304 was not
intended to be a bar to suits, but at most a 60-day delay in order to allow ap-

32 It was previously held in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C), af'd
per curiam, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 541
(1973), that the EPA Administrators had failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty by not
promulgating significant deterioration regulations for automobile related pollutants. Prior to
the Seventh Circuit decision, the EPA Administrator issued significant deterioration regulations
for only two of the six air pollutants for which national ambient air standards had been established. The remaining pollutantscarbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidants,
and nitrogen dioxide - are especially important for mobile sources, including automobiles. 40
C.F.R. § 52.20 (1976).
33 Prior to the Seventh Circuit decision, the plaintiffs had filed a petition for review under
§ 307 in an effort to safeguard their jurisdictional grounds for the significant deterioration
issue. The petition sought to review the EPA Administrator's action in regard to his failure to
promulgate significant deterioration regulations. Finding that the petition only sought to review
the EPA Administrator's failure to act and not the merits of the significant deterioration regulations, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the § 307 petition, holding that § 304 was the only jursdictional authority available for this claim.
34 519 F.2d at 691.
35 375 F. Supp. at 308.
36 378 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
37 Id. at 944.
38 373 F. Supp. 1089 '(D.D.C. 1974).
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propriate officials time to act.3 While the plaintiffs in Highland Park could not
refer to a prior complaint that could have given constructive notice to the EPA
Administrator, it is doubtful that the Metropolitan court would have taken the
drastic action of dismissing the complaint altogether given the same circumstances.
Clearly contrary to the holding in HighlandPark was Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, ° where the court ruled that a failure to give the 60-day notice would not
absolutely bar suit. In this instance actual notice was held to have been given
the EPA Administrator in the complaint, and because 60 days had elapsed between the date of filing of the complaint and the date of the hearing, the EPA
Administrator was accorded the beneficial effect that the provision meant to
accomplish. Both the Metropolitan and Riverside courts made a distinction between notice requirements where failure to comply bars suit forever, and those
where the only consequence is at most a delay of 60 days in filing suit. Using its
strict construction interpretation, however, the Seventh Circuit in Highland Park
found no such distinction; it ruled that a violation of the notice requirement resulted in dismissal.
Although the Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to consider the
60-day notice requirement in the Clean Air Act, a subsequent appellate decision
declined to follow Highland Park. The Second Circuit, in National Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,41 was called upon to interpret the 60-day
notice provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), which
is similar to that in the Clean Air Act. The court found that the purpose of the
60-day notice provision-to give the agencies time to investigate and act on an
alleged violation-had been served because the plaintiffs had been informed before suit was commenced that no action would be taken. The Second Circuit
reiterated its stand that the 60-day notice provision is not an absolute bar to suits
by private citizens.' The 60-day delay in Callaway would have been useless in
encouraging prompt agency action because the agency had already made a final
decision. There were indications that the 60-day delay in Highland Park also
would have been of little beiefit, but the Seventh Circuit refused to consider this
and found that the complaint was void on its face for not complying with the
60-day notice requirement.
It is not altogether clear whether the purposes of the statutory notice provision will be fulfilledby its strict construction. The legislative history indicates
that the notice clause was meant to encourage prompt agency action, act as an
opportunity for settlement, given the agency sufficient time to prepare for a complex suit, and to provide for minimal interference with the normal process of
regulation. 3 In light of the argument that § 304 is a provision designed to grant
judicial relief that *otherwise 'would be unavailable, the practicalities of an environmental suit would indicate that the delay and not the dismissal approach
should be followed. In the end the harsh approach taken by the Seventh Circuit
may only protect the violator and reduce the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act.
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 1092.
4 E.R.C. 1728 (C.D. Gal. 1972).
8 E.R.C. 1273 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1276.
374 F. Supp. at 766.
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3. Sources of Jurisdiction Outside of the Clean Air Act
After determining that § 304 of the Clean Air Act could not give the district
court jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit considered petitioners' contention that
jurisdictional statutes outside the Clean Air Act were sufficient to give the court
authority to consider the merits of the case. Alternatively, the petitioners argued
that the statutory mandamus statute," the general federal question statute, 5 and
the APA46 were applicable.
The relationship between § 304 and other jurisdictional statutes outside the
Clean Air Act has produced a difference of opinion among district and appellate
courts. Section 304 provides an extensive jurisdictional basis for parties seeking
access to the federal courts, but with limitations as to time and scope. But the
APA and generalfederal question statute have been equally appealing to litigants
in recent environmental actions. However, the availability of the latter two
sources as concurrent bases of jurisdiction is open to question when § 304 is found
to provide an adequate remedy.
In Highland Park the Seventh Circuit found that § 304 provided an adequate remedy for the city's claims and held that it was an exclusive remedy. This
was so even though the suit was dismissed for failure to comply with § 304's
notice requirement. The court in construing the APA found that its basic presumption of judicial review does not provide independent jurisdiction where there
is an adequate statutory remedy already available to a party. Review under the
APA would be permitted only when there is "no other adequate remedy in
court."
This conclusion would have had significant weight if the plaintiffs
realistically had access to the judicial system under the Clean Air Act, but since
the plaintiffs were denied jurisdiction under the Act, such a conclusion appears unduly strict.
The Seventh Circuit carried this principle of § 304's exclusivity to the jurisdictional claims under § 1331, and denied relief based upon that statute. The
petitioners were thus put in the perplexing situation where jurisdiction under
§ 1331, § 1361, or the APA was denied because an adequate remedy was available under § 304, but § 304 could not be used because of failure to comply with
its notice provision.
Although both the district and appellate courts dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, they did so for different reasons. The courts agreed to the extent that the
APA could not be used to establish jurisdiction. Like the appellate court, the
district court found that where a statute such as the Clean Air Act "has established a review proceeding adequate to the subject matter, that proceeding is to
control." ' The difference in reasoning occurred in considering the general feaeral question statute. The district court held that § 1331 gave it jurisdiction to
hear the plaintiff's suit. The district court said that the allegations that the

44
45
46
47

28 U.S.C. q 1361 (1970).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
519 F.2d at 692.

48

374 F. Supp. at 767.
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Administrator has breached a statutory duty owed to [the city] under the
Clean Air Act Amendments dearly brings the complaint within the purview
of the general federal question statute and requires an examination of the
Clean Air Act to determine whether claims are well founded. 49
In conferring jurisdiction under § 1331, the district court characterized § 304(e),
which states that other rights were not restricted by § 304, as an "apparent savings clause."
The only other appellate court that considered the exclusiveness question of
§ 304 before Highland Park also found that concurrent jurisdiction could exist
not only with § 1331, but also with the APA. In National Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train,"'which cited the Highland Park district court decision,
the savings clause was liberally construed in order to fit in with the overall purpose of § 304, which was held to widen citizen access to the courts and to specifically preserve existing rights. This indicated to the court the existence of concurrent jurisdiction. When this decision was made the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was dealing with a case of first impression at the circuit
court level. Lower court opinions did exist, but these district court decisions were
found to be in disarray. The court referred to an analogous situation involving
impoundment cases, and found that if the exclusivity doctrine were accepted it
would cover "far more than Congress really had in mind." ' While recognizing
that its position was inconsistent with that of the District of Columbia Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit nevertheless did not alter its interpretation of the legislative
history as providing exclusive jurisdiction under § 304.
The interpretation of the savings clause has controlled any determination of
whether or not the exclusivity doctrine should apply to § 304. The District of
Columbia Circuit and Seventh Circuit have placed themselves at opposite ends
of the spectrum in interpreting the savings clause; their positions are not readily
reconcilable. A more recent Second Circuit decision, which considered the savings
clause, chose to follow the District of Columbia Circuit. Citing NRDC v. Train
with approval, Callaway found a concurrent jurisdictional basis that included the
general federal question statute and the APA.
Conclusion
The questions presented in Highland Park involved procedural issues that
are applicable to the major federal environmental laws concerning pollution control. Before courts will be able to concern themselves with the more substantive
aspects of pollution laws they first will be required, out of necessity, to answer
these initial procedural questions. An increased reliance by environmental groups

on jurisdictional provisions within the pollution statutes will provide a
source of pressure to resolve these ambiguities. It is clear that recent
mental laws are giving citizens and environmental groups a substantial
portant role in the execution and enforcement of these statutes. Courts
49
50
51

374 F. Supp. at 769.
510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 703.
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required to interpret this mandate to permit increased citizen participation without severly hampering the administrative functions of the agency involved.
The actions being taken by the federal agencies are national in scope and
require consistent national application. To a certain extent citizen participation
may well depend on how effective the EPA and other agencies are in carrying
out their statutory duties. The Seventh Circuit restricted the citizen suit provision
which was originally included to provide a check on governmental enforcement
proceedings. The strict constructional interpretation taken by the court in Highland Park may be well suited for a functionally efficient and trustworthy system,
but may be inappropriate for one that lacks those characteristics. It can only be
hoped that this elaborate and complicated administrative process can become an
efficient mechanism.
Roger P. Balog

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT-THE
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION MAY NOT DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PREPARING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR PROPOSED HIGHWAY TO
STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION

Swain v. Brinegar
In 1969, on the basis of a report forecasting highway needs for the state of
Illinois,' plans were developed for the construction of a freeway between the
cities of Lincoln and Peoria. Following several years of extensive planning, a
draft environmental impact statement (EIS) was prepared by the Illinois Department of Transportation and submitted to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for approval. 2 This draft was modeled after the § 102(2) (c)3
1 ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND BUILDINGS, ILLINOIS HIGHWAY NEEDS
AND FIsaLAT. STUDY.
2 Although the highway project was in progress prior to the date NEPA went into effect,
the court held that pursuant to the language of the Act directing NEPA's provisions be complied with "to the fullest extent possible," the Act's requirements apply to some "ongoing"
projects. The Seventh Circuit cited previous decisions holding that:
an ongoing project is subject to the requirements of Section 4332 until it has reached
that stage of completion where the cost of abandoning or altering the proposed project
clearly outweighs the benefits which could flow from compliance with Section 4332.
Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th Cir. 1972). See also
Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1972); Barta v. Brinegar, 358 F. Supp.
1025 '(W.D. Wis. 1973).
3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970). This section provides:
(2) all agencies of the federal government shall-...
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsile official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
'(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 'resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

[Vol. 51:981]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),' but was later
criticized by plaintiff Swain as lacking sufficient detail to satisfy the NEPA requisites. Specifically, questions of alternative means of transportation, automotive
pollution, and the effect on world food supplies resulting from the removal of
farmland from production were either ignored or given superficial treatment.5
This draft EIS was circulated among federal, state and local agencies for
comment,' and after receiving their views, the Illinois Department of Transportation prepared the final EIS. The final statement substantially mirrored the
original, and was subject to the same criticisms as the draft.
Notwithstanding the criticisms of the EIS, in October of 1973 the FHWA
gave final approval to the project. The only function performed by the FHWA
in the development of the EIS was to suggest minor revisions in the "alternatives"
discussion, and to give final approval to the statement. Such conduct markedly
contrasts with the usual role played by other federal agencies who are responsible,
under NEPA, for the preparation of an EIS. In most instances, the federal agency
itself prepares the final EIS; the concerned state agency merely provides information of the project or at most prepares the EIS draft. Due to the enormous
volume of federally aided highway construction in recent years,' however, it has
become the practice of the FHWA to delegate the task of preparing the EIS to
the state highway commission 8
As owner of a farm in the path of the freeway, plaintiff Swain brought an
action challenging both the procedures followed by the FHWA in delegating the
responsibility for preparation of the EIS to the state officials, and the lack of
sufficient detail in the EIS itself. The District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois found that the EIS was "sufficiently detailed to satisfy the requirements of
NEPA," 9 and further concluded, relying on Policy and Procedure Memorandum
90-1 (PPM 90-1)1o issued by the federal Department of Transportation, that
state agency preparation of the EIS was not in violation of the NEPA provision
requiring the "responsible official" to provide an EIS. Although NEPA contains
no specific authorization for the delegation process, the district court maintained
it could find no violation of the Act if it was shown "that the federal agency com4 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).

5 The Seventh Circuit, in attacking the "conclusory" nature of the EIS noted that in its
initial review letter, the U.S. Department of Interior had raised similar objections to the EIS.
"The statement itself contains many generalities, is lacking in specific information, and inadequately treats the natural environmental resources associated with the project." 517 F.2d 766,
774 n.11 (7th Cir. 1975).
6 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970) requires:
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any federal agency which has jurisdiction by
law or by special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies
of iuch statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State and
local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards,
shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to
the public .. and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review
processes.
7 In 1973, the Federal Highway Administration expended $4,272,043,146 in federal-aid
highway funds. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT or TRANSPORTATION. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, I G wAy STATIsTicS (1973).
8 Environmental Impact and Related Statements, 37 Fed. Reg. 21809 (1972).
9 378 F. Supp. 753, 759 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
10 See note 7, supra.
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prehensively considers and reviews both the draft and the final EIS."'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. 2
Holding that the language of NEPA was clear in directing the appropriate federal
agency to prepare the EIS, the court concluded that it was improper for the
FHWA to delegate that responsibility to the Illinois State Department of Transportation.1 3 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit indicated that although the procedures followed by the FHWA included federal review and final approval of the
EIS, any mere federal review process would be insufficient to satisfy the "detailed
consideration of alternatives" required under § 102(2) (c). Indeed, the court
stated that the failure of the FHWA to prepare the EIS inevitably led to the
problems of inadequate detail and insufficient consideration of alternatives complained of by the plaintiffs.
Federal Responsibility for Environmental Impact Statements
The National Environmental Policy Act became law on January 1, 1970.
The Act was designed to force federal agencies to incorporate into their decisionmaking processes the environment consequences of proposed actions. The heart
of NEPA is § 102(2) (c) which requires that in reports on proposals for legislation and "... other major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official. . ." be
included. This statement must include five specific elements:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the enhancement of long-term productivity;
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.' 4
Section 102(2) (c) never explicitly states whether the "responsible official" can
be other than a federal official, although the section clearly discusses federal duties
and obligations.'"
NEPA also created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)" 6 which,
in addition to other functions, was to issue guidelines to federal agencies for the
preparation of environmental impact statements.' From these guidelines, it appears that the federal agency has final responsibility for the EIS but, like the act
itself, no guidance is provided as to whether the duty of preparing the EIS may
be delegated to a state agency.'
11 378 F. Supp. at 761.
12 517 F.2d at 776-77.
13 Id. at 778-79.
14 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c)(1970).
15 See Iowa Citizens For Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 855-56 (8th
Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970).
17 Council on Environmental Quality, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting
the Environment, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
18 Id. at 7724(3).
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NEPA and the CEQ guidelines are implemented in the FHWA through
Policy and Procedures Memorandum 90-1 (PPM 90-1),"' issued by the Department of Transportation. This regulation, in cases involving the planning and
construction of federally aided highways, authorizes the delegation of the responsibility for preparation of an EIS to the state highway commission. Accordingly,
the FHWA has attempted to take advantage of the imprecise language of the
statute and the CEQ guidelines by delegating the EIS responsibility to the state
20
agency
Most of the court decisions discussing the legitimacy of state highway commission EIS preparation have dealt with the validity of PPM 90_1.21 The basic
criticism of the delegation process, however, came in a situation where an applicant for a license from the Federal Power Commission (FPC) was delegated the
duty to prepare the EIS. Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power
Commission22 involved a request by the New York Power Authority to construct
a 35-mile-long high-voltage transmission line. Consistent with FPC regulations,
the applicant prepared and submitted the EIS to the FPC, which ratified the
statement, maintaining that it fulfilled the requirements of NEPA. The Second
Circuit held that the FPC "abdicated a significant part of its responsibility"2 by
substituting the applicant's EIS for its own. Basing its decision on fears that the
EIS would reflect the applicant's "self-serving assumptions," 2 the court found
that "the primary and non-delegable responsibility" for consideration of environmental values at every stage of a project lies with the federal agency.25
6
Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation"
extended Greene County's reasoning to state highway department EIS preparation. This case involved an EIS prepared by the Vermont Highway Department for a proposed freeway. Although the highway department was clearly not
an applicant for the proposed project, the district court still found a strong pos-

19 Environmental Impact and Related Statements, 37 Fed. Reg. 21809 (1972).
20 Id. at 21810 § 3(e). This provision states that the agency with the duty of preparing

the EIS is:

The agency with the primary responsibility for initiating and carrying forward
the planning, design and construction of the highway. For highway sections financed
with Federal-aid highway funds, the HA (highway agency) will normally be the
appropriate State highway department. For highway sections financed with other
funds, such as Forest highways, Park roads, etc., the HA will be the appropriate
Federal State highway agency.
21 Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973); Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation, 362 F. Supp. 627 '(D. Vermont 1973); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Mont. 1972);
National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972).
22 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
23 Id. at 420.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 419. The court quoted from an earlier decision:
In this case . . . the commission has claimed to be the representative of the
public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls
and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive
active and affirmative protection at the hands of the commission.

Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.

denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
26 362 F.Supp. 627 (D.Vermont 1973).
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sibility that a "self-serving" EIS would result, relying on the fact that the highway department had the duty to proceed with legislatively mandated highway
construction.1 The court conceded that state agency EIS preparation might be a
more feasible way of preparing a statement, "but it is not what is required by
NEPA, the purpose of which is to insure that the federal agency making the
decision consider environmental values, potential alternatives and the overall
consequences of the proposed action."'
Notwithstanding the decisions in Greene County and Conservation Society,

the majority of decisions have permitted the delegation of the responsibility for
preparing environmental impact statements to state highway commissions. In
Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe,29 the Eighth Circuit rejected a contention that this procedure amounted to a mere "rubber stamp""
and approved the delegation of the responsibility of preparing the EIS for a
section of the interstate highway system to the Iowa State Highway Commission.
The court distinguished Greene County and Conservation Society by noting that

although the required procedures were the same, the evidence revealed much
more federal participation in the Iowa situation."' Placing their confidence in
federal review procedures as opposed to independent federal appraisal of environmental effects, the court concluded that the procedures followed in this case were
"in harmony with the purposes of the statutory requirements and goals of
32

NEPA."

The dissent in Iowa Citizens raised the same objections to delegation which
3
were made in Greene County and Conservation Society.1
In addition to noting

the apparent intention of NEPA to require EIS preparation by the responsible
federal official, the dissent also expressed concern about the objectivity of an EIS
prepared and written by a state agency. Arguing that the state agency might act
as an advocate of highway construction, because of its bureaucratic nature as
well as a legislative mandate to build highways, the dissent maintained that it
is always the concerned federal agency which must prepare the EIS. 4
The majority of courts have followed the lead of the Iowa Citizens majority
and have not looked at who in fact prepared the final EIS but rather have chosen
In Vermont . . . the Vermont Highway Department has the duty . . . to follow
legislative mandate in regard to proposed highway construction, and the construction
here contemplated was legislatively mandated in 1968. Thus it is impossible for the
VHD not to be an advocate of legislatively mandated construction and still act consistently with its duty as a state agency.
Id. at 631.
28 Id. at 632.
29 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973).
30 In an earlier decision, the District Court for the Western District of Washington held
an EIS prepared by the state to be inadequate, and attributed this at least partially to the
FHWA review procedures. "The state's first draft environmental impact statement was inadequately considered by FHWA. . . . The statute contemplates more deliberation than the time
required to use a rubber stamp." Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 259 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
31 487 F.2d at 854. "Review, modification, and adoption by the FHWA of the statement
as its own occurred in this case."
32 Id. at 854.
33 Id. at 856 (Lays, J., dissenting).
34
If Congress had intended the federal agency to sit as a board of review it could
simply have said so. It did not. It made clear that the federal agency has an affirmative obligation to make a detailed investigation and study.
Id. at 858.
27
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to examine the extent of federal participation in the EIS preparation process.s5
In Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe,"6 the Fourth Circuit confronted a situation in which the FHWA had delegated to the North Carolina
Highway Commission the responsibility of preparing an EIS for a proposed freeway. Noting that federal officials periodically had reviewed the work done by
state officials in preparing the EIS,87 the court concluded that the compliance
test of "good faith objectivity" 8 had not been violated because of state agency
preparation of the EIS.9 Similarly, in Life of the Land v. Brinegar,0 the Ninth
Circuit under similar circumstances concluded that where there had been "significant and active participation"'' by the federal agency in preparation of the
EIS, there was no abdication of responsibility through an improper delegation.4 2
The Second Circuit has also retreated from its strong position in Greene
County that the responsible federal agency must prepare the EIS in order to
avoid the danger of "self-serving" assumptions. In 1-291 Why? Association v.
Burns4 the court adopted the same manner of examining the delegation problem
utilized by the majority of other courts," but concluded that "the amount of
federal contact in the preparation of the 1-291 EIS did not comport with the
standard of primary and non-delegable responsibility placed on the federal
agency. ..

."

Disclaiming the district court's interpretation of its decision in

Greene County, the Second Circuit stated that that decision should not be viewed
as "establishing a per se rule to the effect that state participation in the preparation of an EIS renders it invalid."46
The majority position indicates that in instances of EIS delegation judicial
attention must be directed primarily to the extent of federal involvement in the
preparation of the statement. This of course can only serve to divert judicial
attention away from what should constitute the real issue in these cases, i.e.,
whether the EIS reveals a full consideration of alternatives and environmental
consequences of the proposed project. The type of analysis followed by these
courts may therefore run the risk of validating environmental impact statements
which inadequately examine the environmental consequences of a project, simply
35 1-291 Why? Association v. Bums, 517 F.2d 1077, 1081 (2d Cir. 1975); Fayetteville
Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 515 F.2d 1021 '(4th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn,
502 F.2d 43, 59 (5th Cir. 1974); Iowa Citizens For Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe,
487 F.2d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1973); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 467-68 (9th
Cir. 1973); Finish Allatoonas Interstate Right (FAIR) v. Volpe, 355 F. Supp. 933, 938 (N.D.
Ga. 1973).
36 515 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1975).
37 Id. at 1025.
38 "The test of compliance with § 102 then, is one of good faith objectivity rather than
subjective impartiality." Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the U.S.
Army, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th Cir. 1972).
39 515 F.2d at 1026.
40 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973).
41 Id. at 468.
42 In Life of the Land there was also evidence indicating that a private consulting firm
with a financial interest in the outcome of the project assisted in preparing the EIS. Although
possibly bringing the case within Greene County and the fears of an applicant's "self-serving"
assumptions, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless focused upon the extent of federal involvement in
the preparation process and held this was sufficient to validate the EIS.
43 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975).
44 See note 29 supra.
45 517 F.2d at 1081.
46 Id.
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because the court found a "significant" level of involvement on the part of the
federal agency. The focus of the court should always be on whether the BIS
represents a fair and comprehensive examination of alternatives and consequences. While a state agency may in some cases be capable of providing this, as
Swain v. Brinegar" indicates, in many instances they are not.
The Swain Rationale
In Swain v. Brinegar, the Seventh Circuit rejected the trend of decisions
which permitted the delegation of the duty of EIS preparation to state officials
if it was found that the federal agency played a "significant" role in the process
of review and approval. Maintaining that the "delegation of the research and
drafting of the initial EIS to... [a state agency] . . . precludes that impartial
assessment of environmental consequences which lies at the heart of the National
Environmental Policy Act,"4 the court held that "it is the federal official who is
to make the detailed statement after consultation with other interested federal
agencies.""
The Seventh Circuit based its conclusion on considerations similar to those
relied upon in Greene County and Conservation Society.5" Noting that the
"need" for highway projects always appears greater to those responsible for the
proposal and construction of such highways, the court cautioned that a sense of
"loyalty" to these projects could develop within a state highway commission,
thereby reducing the objectivity of a state-prepared EIS. This sense of loyalty
could further lead to the danger that these state agencies would view the preparation as a mere "procedural hurdle" to be overcome in order to proceed with
a project already decided upon, rather than as part of the decision-making process. 5 This result would be directly in conflict with the purpose of NEPA. Previous decisions have made it clear that the EIS preparation process is to be an
integral part of the initial decision-making procedures. The EIS is not to serve
merely as further justification for a project already decided upon through traditional economic measurements. The Seventh Circuit feared in Swain that a state
agency might be reluctant to view objectively the continuance of a project in
which the state had made financial and administrative commitments.
It would appear that similar fears could be expressed regarding FHWA preparation of environmental impact statements. Similarly enthusiastic viewpoints
on highway construction are as likely held by officials in the federal agency administering highway projects as within state agencies. Thus there is no reason to
believe that FHWA officials would take a stance inconsistent with that advanced
by state personnel. To this extent, however, NEPA affects all federal agencies in
the same manner. NEPA's very purpose is to require federal agencies to examine
the environmental consequences of projects which they propose or must adminis47 517 F.2d 766 '(7th Cir. 1975).
48 Id. at 779.
49 Id. at 777.
50 See notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra. See also Comment, The Preparationof
Environmental Impact Statements By State Highway Commissions, 58 IowA L. REv. 1268
(1973).
51 517 F.2d at 778.
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ter,52 notwithstanding that there always exists the danger that environmental
impact statements will not reflect totally objective viewpoints. It was apparently
hoped by the Seventh Circuit, however, that removal of the responsibility of
EIS preparation from the states and placing that duty on the federal agency
would minimize the "loyalty" problem by placing some distance between those
most intimately connected with the project and those making the final decision
to proceed.
More specific objections to state agency preparation of environmental impact statements were made by the Seventh Circuit with respect to the discussion
of "alternatives" to the proposed action as required by § 102(2) (c) of NEPA. 5
The court maintained that within a state highway commission there inevitably
would be a great reluctance to evaluate objectively alternative transportation
systems. In addition, there might also exist a lack of expertise on the part of a
state agency to thoroughly examine different means of transportation. The
Seventh Circuit contended that this problem could be eased if the federal agency,
with its broader resources, were to prepare the EIS. It has also been suggested
that having an impartial state agency, such as the state environmental protection
agency, prepare the statement would substantially avoid these problems.5 4
A final concern expressed with state EIS preparation was the belief that it
resulted in inadequate consideration of national and worldwide environmental
consequences." State agencies are primarily concerned with the interests of their
own state, and are neither motivated to, nor usually in a position to, evaluate
environmental effects of a wider scope. The Seventh Circuit felt that the cumulative impact of increased automotive pollution, and of taking farmland out of
production were among concerns that state agencies are simply not able to
evaluate, given their limited interests and resources." 6
This view that state BIS preparation inevitably results in deficiencies in the
statement constitutes the basic difference between the Seventh Circuit and approaches taken by other courts to the delegation problem. Previous decisions had
examined the facts surrounding the preparation of the EIS in determining

52

42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible; . . . (2)
all agencies of the federal government shall (A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
Council on Environmental Quality ... which will insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decision-making along with economic and technical considerations; ....
53 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)"(c) (iii) (1970) requires that the EIS include consideration of
"alternatives to the proposed action."
54 See Comment, The Preparationof Environmental Impact Statements by State Highway
Commissions, 58 IowA L. R:v. 1268 "(1973).
55 The Seventh Circuit noted also the widespread duplication of efforts by state agencies
in preparing environmental impact statements which deal with problems of a nationwide
character. "There is little to recommend a procedure whereby various officials and departments
in each of the fifty states independently research and evaluate such problems." 517 F.2d at 778
n.18.

56 517 F.2d at 778.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[July 1976]

whether "significant" federal participation was present.5 7 The Seventh Circuit
noted that substantive review of an EIS is itself a difficult judicial task, and determined that a judicial review of a FHWA review of a state-prepared EIS was
indeed too difficult a task for judicial resolution.5 Stating that "it is difficult for
a court to determine when federal review amounts to a 'rubber stamp' within
the context of an apparently 'detailed' and often sophisticated impact statement,"5 the Seventh Circuit held that it preferred an approach which always
requires federal EIS preparation. 0
Maintaining that this would substantially avoid the problems of inadequate
consideration of alternatives and insufficient detailing of environmental consequences, the court concluded that "the clear requirement that the 'responsible
federal official' prepare the EIS for all major federal projects must be strictly
enforced."'"
This conclusion is clearly justified in view of the shortcomings of state EIS
preparation. By removing from court examination the issue of whether FHWA
review procedures are sufficient not only leaves the court free to examine the
substantive issue of the adequacy of the EIS, but should also aid in improving
the thoroughness of the statement. When the principal concern is whether the
environmental consequences of a proposed action were adequately considered, it
serves no purpose to make an additional determination as to the significance of
federal involvement in the preparation of the EIS. Thus, given the problems
which arise from state EIS preparation, the Seventh Circuit's decision to require
"rigorous adherence to the statutory procedures.. ." is well warranted.
Jon R. Robinson

FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

- PERSONAL ATTACK RULE - POLISH AMERICANS
NOT ENTITLED TO REPLY TIME TO RESPOND TO ABC TELECAST OF POLISH
JOKES IN COMEDY SKIT. No DEMONSTRATION THAT SUBJECT MATTER OF
BROADCAST WAS CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

Polish American Congress v. FCC
During the broadcast of ABC's The Dick Cavett Show on August 10, 1972,
comedian Bob Einstein, masquerading as "Gil Drabrowski," president of an
imaginary Polish Anti-Defamation League, told four "Polish jokes," all denigrating the intellectual or motor skills or the personal hygiene standards of Poles.
57 See note 29 supra.
58 See Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973), where
the court concluded that if the EIS was adequate, the fact that it was prepared by state officials
without significant federal involvement is irrelevant.
59 517 F.2d at 779.
60 Id.
61 Id. The court quoted from Iowa Citizens in stating its belief that NEPA requires more
than a simple federal review procedure.
NEPA does not set up the responsible federal agency as a review board of the
contemplated state action, simply making a suggestion here, modifying there, with the
idea of either giving ultimate approval or rejection to the plan.
487 F.2d at 855.
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As a result of a protest by the Polish American Congress and others, on the following evening Steve Allen, the show's host on August 10th, explained that the
"Polish joke" comedy sketch had been intended to amuse "just as the 'All in the
Family' show, which is the number one show in the country, intends to amuse
when it does jokes about the Polish, Italians, and every group in the world."'
Allen then stated that he, Bob Einstein, and ABC apologized to those who were
offended. Although Allen indicated that he had invited a spokesman for a protesting Polish-American organization to "speak his piece" during the August 11th
show, no such spokesman appeared.
On October 4, 1972, Thaddeus Kowalski, on behalf of himself and the
Polish American Congress, wrote a letter to ABC requesting "equal time" to reply

"under Federal Communications Commission Regulations" to the August 10th
telecast. In its response to the letter, ABC concluded that "equal time" under
§ 315 of the Communications Act2 was limited in scope to candidates for public
office and accordingly declined the "equal time" request.
Eight months later the Polish American Congress filed a complaint with
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), requesting it to rule that under
the fairness doctrine, as well as under the personal attack rule of that doctrine,
it was entitled to "equal time" to respond free of charge on the ABC network
"to the personal attacks on the character, intelligence, hygiene or appearance of
members of the Polish American Community."3 On September 26, 1973, the
FCC's Broadcast Bureau denied the complaint. Subsequently, the petitioners
appealed to the full Commission for a review of the Broadcast Bureau's ruling.
The application for review was again denied. 4
Thereafter, the Polish American Congress filed a petition in the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the FCC order denying the complaint.
The Court, in an opinion by Judge Cummings, held in Polish American Congress
v. FCC' that the televised "Polish joke" material did not constitute a presentation
of views on a controversial issue of public importance within the general fairness
doctrine or the personal attack rule pertaining to the right to a reply.
The court initially indicated that the scope of its review was limited to an
inquiry into the reasonableness and good faith of the FCC and ABC in determining whether a controversial issue of public importance was involved, stating
that the court itself could not make a de novo determination. 6 The court found
no evidence indicating that ABC was acting unreasonably or in bad faith when
it determined that the August 10th telecast contained no controversial issue of
public importance.'
That determination-was fatal to the Polish American's request, since in order
to obtain the right to reply under either the fairness doctrine or the personal
attack rule, the Polish Americans had to establish that the views stated in the
1 Polish American Congress v. FCC, 520 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3472 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).

2

47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).

3

520 F.2d at 1250.

7

Id. at 1255.

4 46 F.C.C.2d 124 (1974).
5 520 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3472 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).
6 Id. at 1253.
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telecast related to a controversial issue of public importance." The court stated
that the Polish Americans had failed to meet this threshold burden because they
had failed to allege anything that would have indicated that a true controversy
existed as to the intelligence, cleanliness, or coordination of Poles, and also that
they had failed to demonstrate the public importance of the alleged controversy.'
Thus the FCC order denying the Polish American's request for review was affirmed, since the Commission was held to have properly determined that ABC's
conclusion that the broadcast did not involve a controversial issue of public importance was not unreasonable nor reached in bad faith."
The FairnessDoctrine and Equal Time Provisions
The fairness doctrine, the legal rule the Polish Americans based their claim
upon, requires a broadcaster to devote a reasonable percentage of his broadcasts
to coverage of public issues, and to provide along with that coverage an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view. The roots of this doctrine stem from a 1949 FCC report that:
in the presentation of news and comment the public interest requires that
the licensee must operate on a basis of overall fairness, making his facilities
available for the expression of contrasting views of all responsible elements
in the community on the various issues which arise.' 2
This FCC report is widely recognized as the primary source of the fairness
doctrine as it first emerged over 25 years ago. However, the fairness doctrine was
not statutorily codified until 1959 when, almost as an afterthought, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315 was amended to read in part as follows:
'(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station .... No obligation is imposed upon any licensee
to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.... Nothing in the
foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection
with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and
on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon
them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
public importance.' 3
Although § 315 indicates the licensee's duties with regard to both equal
time and the fairness doctrine, it also makes clear that the two concepts are distinguishable. Section 315's equal time requirement applies only to those situations
where a "legally qualified candidate for any public office [is] allowed to use a
8
9
10
11
12

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
In the

1252-53.
1253.
1252.
Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1250 (1949).

13 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
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broadcasting station."' If such is the case, then the licensee allowing use of his
facilities is compelled to "afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office in the use of the broadcasting station."1 5
The scope of the fairness doctrine is much broader than that of equal time;
it is appropriate in any situation where a licensee has provided the use of his
facilities to a person or group for the purpose of stating a position relative to a
controversial issue of public importance."8 In these situations, the licensee is to
make reasonable judgments in good faith as to whether a controversial issue of
public importance exists, what opposing viewpoints should be presented, the
format and spokesman to present these opposing viewpoints, and all other facets
of such programming. The fairness doctrine thus involves far greater discretion
for the licensee than does equal time. For example, under the fairness doctrine
"identical treatment of both sides of the issue is not necessary" and the "licensees
may exercise their judgment as to what material is presented and by whom."1
The fairness doctrine also includes the two related concepts, labelled the "personal
attack rule" and the "political editorial rule." Essentially these doctrines require
a licensee, under appropriate circumstances, to provide reply time to persons who
have been personally or politically attacked.' 9 The rules underlying these doctrines have been set out in the Code of Federal Regulations."0
This distinction between the fairness doctrine and equal time has received
judicial affirmation. The Supreme Court, in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,2
14
15

16
17
18
19
20

47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
47 C.F.R. § 73.679 (1975).
Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
47 C.F.R. § 73.679 (1975). See note 20 infra.
The pertinent provisions within these Regulations include:
§ 73.679 Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal
qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time
and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or group
attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a
script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the
attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's
facilities.

"(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial,
transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates for the same
office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (i) notification of the date and
the time of the editorial; "(2) a script or tape of the editorial; and (3) an offer of a
reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the candidate to respond
over the licensee's facilities.
47 C.F.R. § 73.679 applies to television licensees. There are identical provisions in 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300 and 73.598 (1975) which apply to standard broadcast stations, FM
broadcasting stations, and noncommercial educational FM broadcasting stations. Subsection
(b) in all of these sections indicates that the personal attack rule is not applicable where a
legally qualified candidate, or his or her associates, attacks other qualified candidates. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.679(b) (1975). Subsection (b) has been inserted into these regulations because the
equal time provisions of § 315, and not the personal attack rule under the fairness doctrine,
apply when candidates are involved. In the matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules to
Provide Procedures in the Event of a Personal Attack or where a Station Editorializes as to
Political Candidates, 8 F.C.C.2d 721, 726 (1967). This is a further reason why it is important
to distinguish between equal time and the fairness doctrine.
21 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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stated that the fairness doctrine was distinct from § 315's requirement that equal
time be allotted to all qualified candidates for public office.' The Court held
that the personal attack and political editorial regulations23 of the fairness doctrine were authorized both by statute and the Constitution.2 4 Yet in the Polish
American Congress case, the Seventh Circuit failed to mention this distinction
between equal time and the fairness doctrine when apparently the distinction
was appropriate." In so doing, the court risks its opinion being read as an equal
time case when the fairness doctrine was clearly at issue. Although this did not
have an impact on the ultimate result, it is important in accurately understanding
what the case represents.
PersonalAttack Rule
Since no qualified candidate for public office was involved in Polish American Congress, neither the equal time provision of § 315 nor the political editorial
rule of the fairness doctrine was applicable. Therefore, the only real issue before
the Seventh Circuit was whether the personal attack rule of the fairness doctrine
would justify giving the Polish Americans access to ABC's broadcasting facilities.
The court noted that the personal attack rule is triggered only when the
attack occurs during the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.26
A concise FCC statement of the personal attack rule's application is found in a
1964 report on the fairness doctrine: "The personal attack principle is applicable
where there are statements in connection with a controversial issue of public importance, attacking an individual's or group's integrity, character or honesty or
like personal qualities." '
It is important to note, however, that the basis of the personal attack rule,
the existence of a controversial issue of public importance, has never been specifically defined by the FCC or the courts. In 1974, the FCC made the following
general comments about "controversial issues of public importance":
It has frequently been suggested that the Commission set forth comprehensive guidelines to aid interested parties in recognizing whether an issue
is "controversial" and of "public importance." However, given the limitless
number of potential controversial issues and the varying circumstances in
which they might arise, we have not been able to develop detailed criteria
which would be appropriate in all cases.28
22 Id. at 369-70.
23 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1975).
24 395 U.S. at 400-01.
25 The Polish group had originally asked for "equal time" from ABC. In denying the
request ABC ignored the possibility that the Polish group may have used the term in its
generic sense and responded only in terms of the narrowly defined meaning of equal time within
§ 315. The court could have stated that the equal time doctrine did not apply because a
qualified candidate was not involved. However, the court did not comment on the inappropriateness of ABC's reply. 520 F.2d at 1250.
26 520 F.2d at 1252-3. See also 47 C.F.R. § 73.679(a) (1975).
27 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine, 40 F.C.C. 598, 612 n.5 (1964). Although this
statement was contained in a footnote, there is a close similarity with the language in 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.679 (1975).
28 Handling Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 48 F.C.C.2d 1,11 (1974).
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Although the FCC has yet to explicitly define a "controversial issue of public
importance," it has set some standards concerning its character. For example, an
issue is not laden with public importance merely because it has received broadcast
or newspaper coverage. 9 Among the factors the FCC deems significant in determining the existence of a controversial issue of public importance are: (1) the
degree of media coverage; (2) the degree of attention the issue has received from
governmental officials and other community leaders; and (3) as the "principle
test," a subjective evaluation of the impact the issue is likely to have on the
community at large."0 Consistent with other courts, the Seventh Circuit declined
to define "controversial issue of public importance" in this case. Indeed, the
court viewed its role of judicial review quite narrowly, following the practice of
approaching fairness doctrine cases by substituting the licensee's discretion for its
own definition of a controversial issue of public importance.3 "
The Seventh Circuit'sAnalysis in Polish American Congress
1. Failure to State a Proper Issue
In holding that the Polish Americans had failed to show that ABC was unreasonable in determining that the television program did not involve a controversial issue of public importance, the Seventh Circuit stated that the burden of
defining the issue is placed on the complainant. 2 This not only comports with
the general rules of evidence, but also affords the complainant the opportunity
to frame the issue in a manner favorable to himself. The licensee is then forced
to use good faith in determining whether the issue so defined is controversial and
of public importance.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Polish Americans had not met their
burden of proof. The court indicated that it could find "no clear statement of a
question that could serve as an issue around which an important public con29 Id. at 11. See Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In this case the court
held that "merely because a story is newsworthy does not mean that it contains a controversial
issue of public importance." Id. at 922. The Los Angeles Times had featured an article
stating that, although Dorothy Healey was a Marxist and a Communist, she was a good American. The following day George Putnam of KTTV criticized the Times article and Mrs.
Healey. The court of appeals sustained an FCC ruling that KTTV had not violated the fairness
doctrine by denying Mrs. Healey's request for reply time, even though both radio and television
had covered the issue. The fact that this issue was mentioned in the press did not make it a
controversial issue of public importance. 460 F.2d at 922.
30 48 F.C.C.2d at 11-12. It is of major significance to keep in mind that the subjective
evaluation the FCC is referring to is that of the licensee.
31 520 F.2d at 1253. The reluctance to look into the facts of each case and attempt to
define a controversial issue of public importance is shared by all of the courts handling "personal attack" cases. The Fourth Circuit, in M. Goldseker Real Estate Co. v. FCC, 456 F.2d
919, 921 (4th Cir. 1972), stated that it would only inquire into the reasonableness of the
FCC's decision. The District of Columbia Circuit Court, in Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC,
460 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1972), indicated that the FCC (and presumably a court) is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the licensee.
32 Id. at 1253. At this point the court cited Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir.
1971). In this case Green requested the court to reverse an FCC ruling denying his request for
free time to rebut recruitment announcements appealing for volunteers to join the various
branches of the military. In its analysis of the facts, the court noted that "it is not only
necessary to define a controversial issue of public importance, but implicitly it is first necessary
to define the issue." 447 F.2d at 329. A similar requirement was mentioned in Healey v. FCC,
4,60 F.2d 917, 921 '(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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troversy could form."' ss The court also stated that "nowhere in the complaint or
application for review before the Commission is there a clear statement of the
issue which is alleged to be both controversial and of public importance.""4 The
language the court was referring to was that employed by the Polish American
Congress in its complaint to the FCC. The complaint read in part:
Under the Fairness Doctrine, the broadcasting of personal attacks, the depiction of Polish persons or culture in a demeaning manner, the broadcasting
of ethnic "humor" that is insulting to the intelligence, character, hygiene, or
appearances of these persons is a controversial issue of public importance because such programming represents a single warped and negative point of
view which has an enormous influence on the viewing audience. The televising of so-called "Polack jokes" is per se a controversial issue of public
importance, harmful and insulting to a considerable segment of the American population- 5
Since the court criticized the Polish Americans for failing to state a legally
cognizable issue, 6 it is regrettable that the court did not more fully explain its
reasons finding a deficiency. By stating only the bald conclusion that the issue
was inadequately defined, the court leaves open the question of which elements
are necessary for a cause of action to be made out. Presently, the deficiency in the
Polish Americans' case is difficult to determine; the court's silence on this point
leaves its decision less than complete.
2. Failure to Establish the Controversialness and Public Importance of the Skit
The Polish American Congress court further indicated that it did not have
to rely on the complainant's failure to clearly state a legally cognizable issue to
find against the Polish American Congress because, assuming that such issues were
contained in the complaint, the FCC would still be upheld in its ruling that
ABC had acted reasonably in determining that a controversial issue of public
importance was not involved.
Nevertheless the Seventh Circuit, after criticizing the Polish American
Congress for failing to state an issue, somewhat inconsistently read the Polish
American's complaint as possibly containing two controversial issues of public
importance: (1) are Polish Americans inferior to other human beings in terms
of intelligence, personal hygiene, etc. ?; and (2) is the promulgation of Polish
jokes by television broadcast desirable? The court proceeded to discuss the issues
that it construed from the complaint with regard to their alleged controversial
nature and public importance.3"
33 520 F.2d at 1254.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. The court criticized the Polish Americans for failing to define the issue at two
points in the opinion. The court first stated "[w]e have found no clear statement of a question
that could serve as an issue around which an important public controversy could form." Id. at
1254. The court later reemphasized the point by stating "[nlowhere in the complaint or application for review before the Commission is there a clear statement of the issue which is alleged
to be both controversial and of public importance." Id.
37 Id. at 1254. The complainant's burden of proof has been clearly set out by the FCC.
It has stated that "where the complaint is made to the Commission, the Commission expects a
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a. Inferiority of Polish Americans
The Polish American Congresscourt stated that the first issue possibly raised
in the Polish American's complaint, the inferiority of Polish Americans, was
required to be both controversial and of public importance in order to warrant
application of the personal attack rule. The court held, however, that the complainant had failed to meet this requirement in the first issue, because it "allege[d]
nothing that would support a contention that there is a controversy over the issue
whether Poles or Polish Americans are less intelligent, less clean, less coordinated,
etc. than other people.""
Here the court was justified in requiring the Polish Americans to demonstrate that the issue contained both controversy and public importance. This
requirement allows the licensee to retain maximum control and discretion in its
choice of programming, while at the same time compelling it to provide access
to its facilities only when more than "hurt feelings" are involved. The court's
reasoning is particularly persuasive in light of the context in which the issue
arose-a comedy skit. Since ABC was ostensibly making an attempt at humor,
however lame that attempt might have been, the Polish Americans should have
been obligated to demonstrate the seriousness of the issue-to explain why it was
an attack on the qualities of Polish people.
b. Desirability of BroadcastingPolish Jokes
The second issue the court considered was whether the desirability of broadcasting Polish jokes was a controversial issue of public importance. The court
indicated that this issue was not present. The court reached this conclusion based
on its reasoning (1) that the newsworthiness of the event did not render it controversial, " and that in any case the news coverage was not timely, since it had
occurred 11 months after the broadcast; 40 (2) that legislative resolutions denouncing Polish jokes to illustrate the controversialness of the issue were deficient because no contrary resolutions or disagreements were evident, 41 and (3) that an
apology by the licensee was not tantamount to an admission that the desirability
42
of broadcasting Polish jokes was controversial.
The court first determined that the Polish Americans failed to demonstrate
that the newsworthiness of the television broadcast created a controversial issue

complainant to submit specific information indicating (1) the particular station involved; (2)
the particular issue of a controversial nature discussed over the air; (3) the date and time when
the program was carried; (4) the basis for the claim that the station has presented only
one side of the question; and (5) whether the station had afforded, or plans to afford, an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine,

40 F.C.C. 598, 600 (1964).
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of public importance over the issue of whether broadcasting Polish jokes was

desirable." The court, citing Healey v. FCC," stated that "all newsworthy events
do not constitute controversial issues of public importance."45 Thus the court
prevented the petitioner from using the fact that many newspapers across the
country had carried a wire service story describing the action the Polish Americans had filed with the FCC. 4' The court was perhaps inaccurate in its citing of
Healey, because in that case only one newspaper and one television station had
provided coverage of Healey's Marxist affiliation, the claimed controversial issue.4
It is not difficult to distinguish a situation where nationwide wire service coverage
is given to an issue from one where only two local media sources provide exposure.
This is not to suggest that nationwide wire service coverage makes an issue per se
controversial and of public importance; rather it illustrates that the court should
have offered further justification for its position on this issue.
Another reason for the court's dismissal of the impact of the news stories was
that they were carried 11 months after the broadcast. As the fairness doctrine
requires a current judgment, the court thought the FCC may have determined
that the news stories lacked relevancy. The court implied that timeliness was
not the critical issue; it indicated that the newsworthy event was not the skit but
the filing of the complaint.4 9 The court's treatment of the timeliness problem was
less than complete, but apparently if the petitioner's could have shown that the
coverage was concerned with the skit as well as with the filing of a complaint,
the court would have allowed them to use these factors in support of their
contention.
The court next considered the allegation that various legislative resolutions
had created a controversial issue of public importance. The court held that the
Polish Americans could not use resolutions denouncing Polish jokes passed by the
city of Hartford, Connecticut, and the United States House of Representatives,
because there was no evidence of contrary resolutions or other disagreements with
the resolutions from which ABC or the FCC could have surmised that a controversy existed over the desirability of broadcasting Polish jokes."0 Apparently
the court felt the Polish Americans had to establish that opposing resolutions had
been passed advocating the broadcasting of Polish jokes in order to establish that
a controversial issue of public importance existed. The court's reasoning in this
regard is suspect. The mere fact that the House of Representatives felt called
upon to pass a resolution denouncing attacks on Polish Americans indicates that
there existed some controversy. Further, it is difficult to imagine that any unit of
government, or some other group, would advocate by resolution the use of Polish
43 Id.
44 460 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
45 520 F.2d at 1255. In the Healey case the D.C. Circuit stated that merely because a
story is newsworthy does not mean it contains a controversial issue of public importance. Healey
v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46 Id. at 1255.
47 Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d at 918 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
48 520 F.2d at 1255. Here the court cited Larus & Brother Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876
*(4th Cir. 1971), where the Fourth Circuit mentioned on two occasions that the fairness doctrine requires a current judgment. Id. at 881, 883.
49 Id. at 1255.
50 Id.
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jokes. The court placed such an unrealistic burden on the Polish Americans that
it must have known that it would be virtually impossible for the Polish Americans
to meet it.
Apparently even the Seventh Circuit was not convinced of the soundness of
its logic, as it later stated:
[E]ven if we assume that the skit constituted a statement favoring the broadcasting of Polish jokes, it was reasonable to conclude that such an endorsement does not create a public issue requiring a response, where nothing suggests that such an issue existed before the broadcast.51
Thus the court's handling of this issue leads to some confusion. 2
The third allegation considered by the Seventh Circuit was that an apology
in this case was an implied admission that the desirability of Polish jokes is a controversial issue of public importance. The court, however, also rejected this contention. The court noted that issuing an apology was "not the same as acknowledging that a controversial public issue was discussed. 513 Making such a distinction between an apology and acknowledgment is surely valid, especially for
reasons of practicality. Equating these terms with the triggering of the right to
reply would create a situation where licensees would be reluctant to apologize for
merely offensive broadcasts where the fairness doctrine would not otherwise apply.
First Amendment Considerationsand the Scope of Review
Underlying thePolishAmerican Congress decision was the Seventh Circuit's
regard for first amendment implications in curtailing the freedom of a broadcaster to use his facilities as he sees fit. This concern led the court to exercise a
rather limited scope of review over the actions of the broadcaster. The Seventh
Circuit's approach in Polish American Congress is consistent with the approach
51 Id. This statement is significant in two respects. First, exactly why the court was forced
to assume that the skit was a statement favoring Polish jokes is unclear. It would be illogical
to conclude that the skit was a statement opposing Polish jokes and it would be almost as
illogical to say that the skit represented a neutral posture. Secondly, the court was apparently
reducing the burden of proof it had earlier placed on the Polish Americans if it was suggesting
that they must merely establish that the skit was equivalent to a statement advocating Polish
jokes. Until the court made this statement, it had apparently required the petitioner to prove
that a group had, in so many words, approved of the policy of telling Polish jokes.
52 The court's analysis can be summarized as follows: the resolutions did not cause the
skit to become a controversial issue because no contrary resolutions or disagreements were cited;
however, even if the skit was such a disagreement no controversy existed because nothing
suggested that such an issue existed before the skit. The confused analysis suggests two
equally unsatisfactory rationales. The court may have felt that the broadcast itself could not
be used to create the controversy. If the Seventh Circuit was seriously interested in enforcing
the fairness doctrine, the policy was unsound, since it gave licensees the ability to launch an
initial personal attack without having the commensurate responsibility of providing time to
reply. Such a situation is precisely what the fairness doctrine, and more particularly the
personal attack rule, were designed to prevent. On the other hand, the court may have been
suggesting that the resolutions did not indicate that a controversy existed concerning the issue
of Polish jokes. It seems ridiculous to suggest that the United States House of Representatives
would pass a resolution denouncing Polish jokes if there were no controversy over their value.
Perhaps the court had another rationale for its conclusion which would be more satisfactory
but it is not readily discernible from the opinion.
53 Id.
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other courts have taken in the past when faced with similar issues. s4
The procedure employed under the fairness doctrine requires a complainant
to request reply time from the licensee before going to the FCC or the courts. s
The licensee in turn is obliged to make a good faith judgment as to the existence
of a controversial issue of public importance.5 " This method ensures the protection of first amendment rights from undue government censorship.5" Likewise, a
court in reviewing a fairness doctrine complaint is limited in its scope of review;
it can only pass on the reasonableness of the licensee's judgement.5 8 The court in
fact is two steps removed from the actual issue, for it reviews the FCC's initial
review of the licensee's use of discretion. 9
54 The court cited the following cases as supporting its view of a narrow scope of review.
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118-19, 124, 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 900-03 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843 (1973); Larus & Brother Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1971); Green v.
FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Neckritz v. FCC, 446 F.2d 501, 502 (9th Cir.
1971). In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
55 Id. at 1253. This aspect of the doctrine is now well-settled. As early as 1949, the
Commission stated, "The licensee will in each instance be called upon to exercise his best judgment and good sense in determining what subjects should be considered, the particular format
of the program to be devoted to each subject, the different shades of opinion to be presented,
and the spokesman for each point of view." In the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcasting
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1249, 1251 (1949). The Supreme Court has given its imprimatur to this
policy by stating: "[I]n the area of discussion of public issues Congress chose to leave broad
journalistic discretion with the licensee." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 105
(1973). The D.C. Circuit's concurrence in this practice was illustrated when it commented
that "the licensee has both initial responsibility and primary responsibility. It has wide discretion and latitude that must be respected even though, under the facts, the agency would
reach a contrary concluson." NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
56 The FCC has clearly stated its position on this matter. "The licensee, in applying
the fairness doctrine, is called upon to make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts
of each situation-as to whether a controversial issue of public importance is involved."
Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964). The FCC further emphasized this point in a case where it stated, "It is the initial responsibility of the licensee to
determine whether a controversial issue of public importance has been presented." In re Port
of New York Authority, 25 F.C.C.2d 417, 419 (1970).
57 The extent of the concern over possible government censorship is reflected in 47 U.S.C.
§ 326 (1970) which reads: "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give
the [Federal Communications] Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication."
58 In a 1974 fairness report the FCC said it was its belief that the public need to be
informed was best served through a system in which the licensees exercised wide discretion.
The FCC indicated that it was convinced that there was no formula which could be established
to deal with the problem and concluded by stating, "It is obvious that under this method of
handling fairness, many questionable decisions by broadcast editors may go uncorrected. But,
in our judgment, this approach represents the most appropriate way to achieve 'robust, wide
open debate' on the one hand, while avoiding 'the dangers of censorship and pervasive supervision' by the government on the other." Handling Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1974). The quoted portions were taken from Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom. Tobacco Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S.
842 (1969). The Supreme Court also has noted that "Congress appears to have concluded,
however, that of the two choices - private or official censorship - Government censorship
would be the most pervasive, the most self-serving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the
one most tobe avoided." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973).
59 The court made two basic points concerning its role in the reviewing process. First, it
stated that it could not make a de novo determination. Secondly, the court indicated that it
reviewed FCC orders only in terms of good faith and reasonableness considerations. Recently
the D.C. Circuit made a revealing comment as to the role of the FCC in reviewing the
licensee's decision. "The Commission's reference to 'patently unreasonable exercise of discretion by the licensee, as the standard that warrants agency intervention, captures the spirit

[Vol. 51:981]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

1171

This is not to minimize the role of the court's review. While the policy is to
allow the licensee wide discretion in fairness doctrine matters so as to ensure first
amendment protection, in practice this could permit the party who is accused
of violating the fairness doctrine to stand in judgment over its own actions. Thus
the licensee will not be allowed unfettered discretion. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has stated: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount."' "
In Polish American Congress the Seventh Circuit indicated that it was following the precedent established by the Supreme Court and other courts of
appeal. Moreover, its approach to the Polish American's complaint, which placed
great weight on the licensee's initial judgment and its own limited scope of review,
is consistent with the approaches it has taken in the past concerning similar issues.
In fact, the Seventh Circuit has had a history of placing perhaps too much emphasis on the licensee's first amendment rights. In 1968, for instance, the court
had held certain FCC regulations61 to be unconstitutional because they contravened the first amendment.6 2 The court at that time expressed the fear that
the personal attack rule would cause the Government to unreasonably burden
the freedom of the press in disseminating views on controversial issues of public
importance, since the regulations would inhibit licensees from providing coverage
of controversial issues."3 The court also mentioned that the vagueness of regulations would contribute to the reluctance of licensees to discuss controversial
issues of public importance."
of the scope of discretion entitled to the licensee." NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1120 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). The FCC has itself acknowledged that its role in reviewing a licensee's decision is
limited. In 1974 the FCC indicated that "governments [sic] role is limited to a determination
of whether the licensee acted reasonably and in good faith." Handling Public Issues Under
the Fairness Doctrine, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1974). The D.C. Circuit has described the procedure
by stating "the FCC's function becomes that of correcting the licensee for abuse of discretion, as
our function on judicial review is that of correcting the agency for abuse of discretion. NBC v.
FCC, 516 F.2d at 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis supplied). The Ninth Circuit concurred
with the Seventh Circuit as well, stating:
a court's role is limited to deciding whether the Commission's order is unreasonable or in contravention of statutory purpose. In making such a determination a
court is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of the administrative
officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers.
Neckritz v. FCC, 446 F.2d 501, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1971), citing American Tel. & Tel. v. United
States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936).
60 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The Court went on
to say that "[it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee." Id. at 390.
This suggests that the courts should not allow the licensees too much discretion.

61 47 C.F.R. § 73.678 (1975).
62 Radio & Television News Directors' Ass'a v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1020 (7th
Cir. 1968).
63 Id. at 1012. The court stated that "[t]he rules pose[d] a substantial likelihood of inhibiting a broadcast licensees' dissemination of views on political candidates and controversial issues of public importance." Id. The court indicated that the inhibition stemmed, in
part, from the substantial economic and practical burdens of complying with the requirements
of the regulations.
64 Id. at 1016. The court stated that the FCC's rules were too vague because they lacked
standards precise enough to enable a licensee to ascertain whether he is subject to the rules'
obligations. That court concluded that "[When a licensee considers the vagueness of the rules,
the mandatory and pervasive requirements of the rules, and the threat of suffering serious
sanctions for noncompliance with them, it is likely that he will become far more hesitant to

engage in controversial issue programming or political editorializing." Id.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.'5 The Court held that "the fairness doctrine and its
component personal attack and editorializing regulations were a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority." 6 The Court felt that the possibility
of stifling debate was speculative67 and for that reason rejected the rationale of
the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court responded to the first amendment
challenges to the regulations by stating:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than

there are frequencies to allocate it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual
68

to speak, write, or publish.

With Red Lion, the fairness doctrine has received constitutional validity. The
Seventh Circuit's decision in Polish American Congress indicates that it will now
uphold the fairness doctrine without reservation.
Conclusion
Although the Seventh Circuit refused in Polish American Congress to overturn the decision of the licensee to deny his facilities to the Polish Americans for
the purpose of replying to an alleged controversial issue of public importance,
this does not imply that the court is insensitive to claims raised under the fairness
doctrine. The court stated that its holding in Polish American Congress "should
not be read to preclude the future success of a similar petition."69 Indeed the
court speculated that if a future controversy did arise over the desirability of
broadcasting Polish jokes, then a complainant might well be successful.7"
The Polish American's complaint was deficient in the Seventh Circuit's view
because it did not contain a controversial issue of public importance; therefore,
the licensee's good faith determination to deny reply time was upheld. While
the court did not adequately explain why it found the complaint deficient, its
opinion reveals several areas where, given certain factual situations, the court
might hold for the complainant. If a change in the nation's social climate produces more intense ethnic hostility, the desirability of broadcasting Polish jokes
might trigger application of the fairness doctrine. Less dramatically, legislative
resolutions might become grounds for proving the existence of a controversial
issue of public importance, especially if the legislative history indicates that substantial public debate existed. Thirdly, an apology by a licensee coupled with an
invitation to reply might be interpreted as the licensee's recognition that the
fairness doctrine has been triggered. While the Polish American Congress court
held that an apology by itself did not raise a fairness doctrine issue, 1 it did not
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 388.
520 F.2d at 1256.
Id.
Id. at 1255.
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comment upon what effect an invitation to reply might have. It would be at
least difficult for a future licensee who had originally offered reply time to assert
later that no controversial issue of pfiblic importance was present.
Beyond the merits of a fairness doctrine complaint, however, the procedural
aspects of such a complaint have significance. Both the FCC and the courts allow
themselves only a circumspect role; theirs is essentially a reviewing function. The
licensee's abuse of discretion becomes, therefore, the core issue in these forums. A
fairness doctrine complaint must be keyed to this issue in order to have the FCC
or the courts fully entertain it.
Bruce Meagher
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

-

SECTION

404

-

DELIVERY BY AN

BASIS

TAXPAYER OF A SECURED INTEREST-BEARING DEMAND PROMISSORY NOTE TO THE TRUSTEES OF A QUALIFIED EMPLOYEE PROFIT-SHARING
PLAN DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PAYMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF § 404 (A) (6)

ACCRUAL

OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.

Don E. Williams Company v. Commissioner
Section 401(a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction,
within limitations, for employer contributions to a qualified employee profitsharing plan. Yet § 404(a) (6) states that contributions by accrual basis taxpayers are deductible only if payment occurs by the last day of the taxable year,
or not later than the tax return filing deadline for the taxable year.'
Presently, defining the word "payment" for purposes of § 404(a) (6) has
proved problematic.2 Specifically, controversy is centered on whether delivery of
a promissory note to an employee benefit trust by an accrual basis employer constitutes payment within the meaning of § 404(a) (6). The Tax Court has consistently denied the deduction for this form of contribution, essentially because

a promissory note is not a cash equivalent,3 while the Third,4 Ninth,5 and Tenth'
Circuit United States Courts of Appeals have allowed deductions for promissory
notes contributions. Recently, however, the Seventh Circuit, in Don E. Williams
Co. v. Commissioner,7 reversed this more liberal trend among the United States
Courts of Appeals by disallowing a deduction for a contribution in the form of

a secured promissory note.
1

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (6) provides:
TIME

WHEN

CONTRIBUTIONS

DEEMED

MADE.-For

purposes

of

paragraphs

(1), (2), and- (3), a taxpayer shall be deemed to have made a payment on

the last day of the preceding taxable year if the payment is on account of such taxable
year and is made not later than the time prescribed by law for filing the return
for such taxable year (including extensions thereof).
2 Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 570 (Supp. 1971).
3 Don E. Williams Co., 62 T.C. 166 (1974); Wasatch Chem. Co., 37 T.C. 817 (1962);
Time Oil Co., 26 T.C. 1061 (1956) ; Slaymaker Lock Co., 18 T.C. 1001 (1952) ; Logan Eng'r
Co., 12 T.C. 860 (1949).
4 Sachs v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1953).
5 Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958).
6 Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963).
7 527 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1975).
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The Seventh Circuit's decision is significant not merely because it differs
with three other circuits, but also because its effect may be contrary to one of the
primary purposes of § 404(a). The denial of a § 404(a) deduction under these
circumstances may decrease the amount of contributions to employee benefit
plans. If the policy sought to be accomplished by allowing deductions for contributions to employee plans is to encourage contributions, this result is obviously
undesirable.
Furthermore, the court's reasoning may be suspect. First, the court did not
deal with the apparent similarities between the practical effects of a cash payment
and payment by the delivery of a promissory note. Second, a more astute rationale for the decision in Williams could be that the court should not encourage
the practice of an employer borrowing from an employee benefit trust that lacks
a truly independent trustee.8
Don E. Williams Company is an accrual basis taxpayer. The trustees of its
profit-sharing plan are its bank and its three principal shareholders-officers. 9
Within the taxable year, it accrued a liability on its books for a contribution to
its qualified plan. Within the allowable time for filing the return, the company
delivered an interest-bearing secured demand note to the trustees of the profitsharing fund in satisfaction of this liability. Secured by collateral consisting of
stock in the company and the interests of two of the shareholders in the profitsharing plan, the note was additionally guaranteed by the officers and principal
shareholders of the company." The value of the collateral, combined with the
net worth of one of the guarantors, was stipulated to exceed the face value of the
note.
Prior Case Law
Logan Engineering Co." represents the Tax Court's initial reluctance, in
1949, to allow a profit-sharing contribution deduction for the delivery of a
promissory note to an employee trust. The delivery of unsecured interest-bearing
negotiable time and demand notes to the trust by Logan Engineering Co., an
accrual basis taxpaper, was argued to constitute payment for purposes of §
23(p) of the 1939 Code" because the notes were essentially indistinguishable
from a check, and thus effectively a cash equivalent. The court, however, rejected this argument by formulating a tenuous distinction between the natures
of a check and a promissory note. Payment by check, the court said, is "a conditional payment" which, upon the presentment and payment, became absolute
and related back to the time when the checks were delivered;3 on the other
hand, the court stated that a promissory note was "a mere promise to pay."' 4
The Logan court also concentrated on the particular phraseology employed
by Congress in § 23(p) as compared to other deduction provisions of § 23. The
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

See text accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
62 T.C. 166, 167.
Id.
12 T.C. 860 (1949).
Section 23(p) of the 1939 Code isthe statutory predecessor of § 404 of the 1954 Code.
12 T.C. at 867. See also Estate of Modie J. Spiegel, 12 T.C. 524 (1949).
Id.
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court employed what can be termed a "restrictive language" rationale. It stated
that when the broader scope of a deduction was intended in § 23, the words
"paid or incurred" and "paid or accrued" were used. 5 Accordingly, the court
held that since § 23(p) used merely the word "paid" rather than "paid or incurred" or "paid or accrued," the section was more restrictive and only allowed
a deduction for contributions actually paid in cash."
Supporting this conclusion is the legislative history of § 23 (p). The report
of the Ways and Means Committee on the Revenue Revision Act of 1948 states
with respect to § 23 (p) (1) (E) :" "An employer on the accrual basis of accounting may under existing law deduct contributions actually paid within the first 60
days of the subsequent year."'" This language, the court reasoned, placed cash
and accrual basis taxpayers on an equal footing with regard to contributions to
employee trusts.' 9 Hence, the court held that a deduction is not permitted unless

an actual cash payment is made within the prescribed time period, notwithstanding the accounting method used by the taxpayer."
In 1952, the Tax Court, in Slaymaker Lock Co.,2 reinforced its Logan
Engineeringdecision. It held that the delivery of a negotiable unsecured demand
promissory note to a profit-sharing trust again did not constitute payment for
§ 23 (p) purposes. The court cited Logan Engineering and employed essentially
the identical rationale.2 2
Intending to bolster the Logan rule, the Slaymaker court created an additional distinction between a check and a promissory note. The court stated
that a check requires "no further affirmative action" on, the part of the drawer,"
while a promissory note does require further effort by the promissor before payment is consummated.2" Moreover, the court noted that the promissor may not
have sufficient funds to make payment when requested. 5
These apparently sound rationales, however, are suspect for three reasons.
First, since the note was negotiable in Slaymaker, the trust may have been able
to secure cash with the same ease it takes to cash a check. All the holder would
be required to do is sell the note to a third party. Second, the demand feature of
the note also makes it simple to obtain cash payment; the holder must only request
payment from the drawer. Third, because of this ease in obtaining cash due to
the note's negotiability and demand features, the concept of "further affirmative
action" is not apposite.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was similarly unpersuaded by the Tax
15 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 23(a)(1)-(2), 23(b), and 23(c).
16 12 T.C. at 866-67.
17 Section 23(p) (1)(E) of the 1939 Code is the statutory predecessor of § 404(a) (6) of
the 1954 Code.

18
19

H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1948)
12 T.C. at 867.

(emphasis supplied).

20 The court also stated that the ordinary and usual meaning of the word "paid" is to
liquidate a liability into cash. Id. at 866. See also P. G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148
F.2d 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 732 (1945).
21 18 T.C. 1001 (1952).
22 See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra.

23 18 T.C. at 1007.
24 Id.
25

Id.
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Court's reasoning when it reversed Slaymaker in Sachs v. Commissioner."
Relying on several analogous areas, the court discussed the application of its
decision in Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner." In Miller, the taxpayer
was deemed to have "paid" its president's salary by the delivery of its negotiable
demand notes; thus, the corporation was entitled to deduct the face amount of
the notes from its gross income pursuant to § 24(c) (1) of the 1939 Code.2 8
The Sachs court also considered decisions holding that the delivery of a check
within the taxable year constituted payment for the purpose of various other
Code sections. 9 Significantly, this portion of the court's analysis lies not in discussing the form of the payment, but rather the timeliness of the payment.
More importantly, the Third Circuit clearly stated that the words "payment" or "paid" as used in the statute do not mean "in cash." The court
equated the delivery of a check with the delivery of a negotiable demand note
payable at a bank. The rationale for its conclusion ostensibly is that a check
and this type of promissory note are functional equivalents because each can be
reduced to cash with the same amount of effort-presentment to a bank.
Finally, the Sachs court found the Logan Engineering restrictive language
rationale to be without merit. The court held that although § 23(p) (1) (E)
was limited to the word "paid," as opposed to "paid or incurred" or "paid or
accrued," the Miller decision indicates that cash is not the only acceptable form
of payment when merely the word "paid" is used in a statute. The court stated:
"The asserted distinction does not avoid the sweep of the Miller case, however,
since there, too (24(c) (1) ), the single word 'paid' was used.""
Time Oil Co." and Wasatch Chemical Co.," decided in 1956 and 1962
respectively, represent the Tax Court's continued adherence to the Logan
Engineering rationale. In Time Oil, the taxpayer contributed two promissory
notes, payable on demand, to its profit-sharing trust; the court, nonetheless,
summarily disallowed a deduction pursuant to § 23(p) based on its decisions in
Logan Engineering and Slaymaker Lock. Similarly, in Wasatch Chemical, the
taxpayer delivered its five-year promissory notes to its profit-sharing trust and was
also denied a § 4 04(a) deduction on the strength of Logan Engineering and
Slaymaker Lock. Yet in Wasatch, the Tax Court placed considerable emphasis
on the fact that the promissory notes were not demand notes but were five-year
notes. " It concluded that time notes were more disparate to cash than demand
26 208 F.2d 313 (3dCir. 1953).
27 164 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 861 (1948), rev'g 7 T.C. 729
(1946).
28 This section is the predecessor of § 267 of the 1954 Code. The Second and Sixth
Circuits similarly construed the word "paid" within the meaning of § 24 (c) (1). Commissioner v. Mundet Cork Corp., 173 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1949); Celina Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
142 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1944); Musselman Hub-Brake Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 65
(6th Cir. 1943).
29 208 F.2d at 315. See Dick Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1953)
(contributions to employees pension trust); International Bedaux Co., Inc., 17 T.C. 612
(1951) (dividends paid credit); Estelle Broussard, 16 T.C. 23 (1951) (charitable contributions); Estate of Modie J. Spiegel, 12 T.C. 524 (1949) (charitable contributions).
30 208 F.2d at 315. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-121 (1970).
31 208 F.2d at 316.
32 26 T.C. 1061 (1956).
33 37 T.C. 817 (1962).
34 Id. at 820.
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notes because time notes are more dissimilar to checks than demand notes.
The Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals adopted positions entirely
consistent with the Third Circuit's Sachs decision in reversing Time OiP5 and
8 The Wasatch Chemical
Wasatch Chemical."
decision, however, significantly
supplemented the Sachs rationale in its discussion of Colorado National Bank
of Denver." There, the Tax Court had held that a contribution to a pension
trust under § 404 may be paid by a conveyance of real estate to its trustees. The
court stated:
A payment need not be cash and even a debt can be paid in property if
the debtor is willing to accept the property as payment. There is no reason
why a contribution to a pension trust could not be made in property and
still be deductible.3 8
The Court of Appeals in Wasatch construed the Colorado National Bank case
and the above statement to mean that a transfer of something of value is recognized as payment for § 404 purposes. Therefore, the court held that since the
time note in Wasatch had a definite value and its delivery brought about a
significant change in the legal relationship of the parties, it constituted payment
for purposes of § 404.39
Don E. Williams Company
Neither the Seventh Circuit" nor the Tax Court4 1 in Don E. Williams considered the Sachs, Time Oil, or Wasatch Chemical cases to be persuasive. Essentially the Court of Appeals, with Chief Judge Fairchild writing for the court,
relied on the rationales of Logan and its progeny. The court stated that cash and
accrual basis taxpayers are to be treated the same for the purpose of § 404(a)."z
In support of this conclusion, the court cited Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1 (c) :
Deductions under section 404(a) are generally allowable only for the
year in which the contribution or compensation is paid, regardless of the
fact that the taxpayer may make his returns on the accrual method of accounting... This latter provision is intended to permit a taxpayer on the
accrual method to deduct such accrued contribution or compensation in the
year of accrual, provided payment is actually made not later than the time
prescribed by law for filing the return for the taxable year of accrual (including extensions thereof), ... s
35
36

258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958).
313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963).

37

30 T.C. 933 (1958), acquiesced in 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 3.

38 30 T.C. at 935.
39 Two federal dstrict court cases have followed the Sachs, Time Oil and Was.atch
Chemical rationales: Advance Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D.
Ill. 1972); Steele Wholesale Builders Supply Co. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.
Tex. 1963).
40 527 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1975).
41. 62 T.C. 166 (1974).
42 Except that accrual basis taxpayers have the additional grace period provided in §
404(a) (6) in which to make the payment to the trust.
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(c) (1956) (emphasis supplied).
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The portion of this section of the regulations that provides for deductions of payments "actually made" is similar to the excerpt from the Ways and Means Committee report cited in the Logan case. 4 Indeed, the court in Williams also cited
that report and its "actually paid" language in support of this position."
The Court of Appeals and the Tax Court also distinguished the Sachs
decision based on a peculiarity of commercial law. Under Pennsylvania law, at
issue in Sachs, the bank at which a note is payable is required to pay the note
upon presentment.4" Payment must be made automatically out of the maker's
account. Pennsylvania thus adopted a version of Uniform Commercial Code §
3-121, Alternative A (hereinafter referred to as UCC):
A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is the
equivalent of a draft drawn on the bank payable when it falls due out of
any funds of the maker or acceptor in current account or otherwise available for such payment.4 7
On the other hand, under Illinois law, at issue in Don E. Williams, a note that
states it is payable at a bank does not authorize the bank to make payment;"
Illinois adopted a version of UCC § 3-121, Alternative B: "A note of acceptance
which states that it is payable at a bank is not of itself an order or authorization
to the bank to pay it."4 In jurisdictions that have adopted Alternative B,50 the
note is treated as merely designating a place of payment, as if the instrument were
made payable at the office of an attorney.51 The bank's only function is to notify
the maker that the instrument has been presented and to ask for instructions;
in the absence of instructions, the bank is still not authorized to pay.52 Therefore,
the Court of Appeals and Tax Court reasoned that such a note is not a cash or
check equivalent.
It is questionable whether the court's reliance on its interpretation of
§ 3-121 is persuasive. Since neither the Tax Court nor the Ninth or Tenth
44 See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
45 The court also cited cases holding that the delivery of a note is not a cash equivalent.
Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940); Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 140 (1931); Cleaver v.
Commissioner, 158 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 849 (1947). See also
Jenkins v. Bitgood, 101 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 636 (1939).
In a footnote, the court further stated that Congress has frequently used the phrases
"paid or incurred" and "paid or accrued" in Code sections in which cash or cash equivalent
payment is not needed for accrual basis taxpayers. The court cited §§ 163(a), 164(a),

174(a) (1), 175(a), 212, and 216(a) as examples. 527 F.2d at 651.
46 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-121 (1970).
47 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-121, Alternative A [hereinafter cited as UCO].
48 ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 26, § 3-121 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
49 UCC § 3-121, Alternative B.
50 The following 29 jurisdictions have adopted Alternative B or slight variations of it:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. UCC REP. SERv. (State Correlation).
The following 23 jurisdictions have adopted Alternative A or slight variations of it: Alaska,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
51 UCO § 3-121, Official Comment.
52 Id.
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Circuits in Time Oil and Wasatch considered it,5" they contribute to the doubt
about using § 3-121 as a salient factor for disallowing a deduction. Moreover,
additional criticism is found in Tax Court Judge Irwin's dissent in Williams; 4
he clearly indicated that the UCC should not be applied. 5 Most importantly, §
3-121 is arguably not relevant to the question because it does not weaken the
contention that a promissory note, under certain circumstances, may be a cash
equivalent. This is true notwithstanding the fact that the jurisdiction in question
may have adopted Alternative B, or that the note is not payable at a bank. For
example, the note may be readily convertible into cash because it is negotiable,56
payable on demand," secured,5 or guaranteed.5
The Seventh Circuit also cited "practical considerations" for its narrow
construction of the § 404(a) payment requirement. It stated that one advantage
to their holding is that valuations of the notes would not be required. At the
same time, however, the court admitted that such valuations are required when
property is contributed to a profit-sharing trust. Yet no justification was offered
by the court for allowing deductions for property contributions, which also require valuations, and prohibiting deductions for promissory note contributions.
The court might respond by stating that such a rule of administrative convenience is justified because of its interest in the prevention of entangling the
federal courts with difficult and imperfect valuation decisions. This response,
however, will provide little solace to a company believing that the delivery of a
promissory note constitutes payment for purposes of § 404(a) (6).
Perhaps a better rationale for the Williams decision is one that focuses on
the trustees' lack of independence. As noted, three of the four trustees of Don
E. Williams Co. were the principal shareholders of the company." In addition,
some of these shareholders had interests in the collateral and each personally
guaranteed the note.6 1 Although the court's reasoning did not indicate that
significance was given to these facts, they may nevertheless have had an effect on
the court's decision. Due to this assimilation of the company's shareholders and
the fund's trustees, the possibility existed that the trustee shareholders might not
have been ready, willing, or able to demand payment or otherwise transform the
note to cash. Therefore, the essential cash equivalence and the deduction were
effectively destroyed.
It is also noteworthy that two Tax Court judges dissented in Williams, thus
marking the first break by the Tax Court from its adherence to the Logan rule.
Judge Quealy dissented on the ground that since three Courts of Appeals have
reversed the Tax Court, the Tax Court should acquiesce on this issue. 2 Judge
53 Neither court considered § 3-121 or pre-UCC statutory counterparts, although the
Wasatch Tax Court opinion did give some significance to the fact that the note was not
payable at a bank. 37- T.C. at 820.
54 62 T.C. at 172-73.
55 See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
56 See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
57 Id.

58 Id.
59
60
61
62

Id.
See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
Id.
62 T.C. at 173.
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Irwin, on the other hand, offered four reasons for his dissent."3 First, he believed
that the delivery of the notes constituted a cash equivalence. Second, he stated
that the notes are property in the hands of the holders and, thus, such a contribution is deductible under the ColoradoNational Bank of Denver rationale. Third,
as previously indicated, he wrote that the UCC should have no application in
federal income tax questions because it traditionally deals with only state law
matters. 4 Fourth, and possibly most persuasive, he narrowly construed the payment requirement of § 404(a) : The legislative history of the section only requires
payment, not cash payment.
Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Don E. Williams and the Tax Court's
position in Logan, Slaymaker, Time Oil, and Wasatch are problematical primarily because they fail to recognize that a promissory note may take on many
of the important characteristics of a check. Depending on the circumstances and
the terms of the note, the obligations may very well be a cash equivalent. The
validity of this conclusion is especially genuine when the note is negotiable, or as
in Williams, is payable on demand. Assuming there are no questions with respect
to the maker's solvency, the delivery of a negotiable or demand note may be
readily transformed into cash: the holder merely need sell the note or immediately demand payment.6"
Further, if the note is secured or guaranteed, it is more likely that the note
should be construed as a cash equivalent. UCC § 9-503 provides in part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to
take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated
by the secured
66
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Thus, if a secured note is delivered and the maker defaults, under this self-help
provision the trustee may be readily able to obtain possession of the collateral and
transform it to cash. Arguably then, the effect of § 9-503 is to make such a note
a functional equivalent to cash. 7 In addition, if the note is guaranteed, it may
likewise be a cash equivalent because the guarantor would be liable, depending
on the guaranty terms, to satisfy the obligation upon default of the employer
maker.
Finally, the property argument advanced in the Tax Court dissent by Judge
63 Id. at 172-73. Cf. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
64 Id. at 172.
65 It is noteworthy that this reasoning has been used for some time in the constructive
receipt of income area. See, e.g., Lavery v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1956);
Charles F. Kahler, 18 T.C. 31 (1952); Rev. Rul. 68-126, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 194; 3.
CHOMMiE, TnE LAW OF1FEDERAL INCOME TAxATIoN § 82, at 229 (2d ed. 1973).

66 UCC § 9-503.
67 See generally J. WHITE & R.

SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

26 (1972).
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Irwin in Williams is also well considered. As stated above, Judge Irwin considered the delivery of a note to be property in the hands of the holder of the note
and thus a deductible contribution because the delivery of property to a profitsharing trust is sufficient payment for purposes of § 40 4 (a).68 This assertion is
persuasive because, if the policy of § 404(a) is to have the trust receive an item
of value, it makes no difference whether a note, check, cash, or tangible property
is delivered to the trust. Simply stated, if a note has a definite value, there is no
consequence to allowing the deduction.
Joseph L. Baldino

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION--SECTON 7805-AN OUTSTANDING IRS
ACQUIESCENCE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE IRS FROM ACTING IN CONTRAVENTION

OF THE ACQUIESCENCE; SECTION 451-THE CLAim OF RIGHT DOCTRINE IS
APPLICABLE EvEN THOUGH THE TAXPAYER EXECUTES

AN OBLIGATION TO

REPAY TIIE FUNDS RECEIVED UNDER A CLAIM OF RIGHT.

Quinn v. Commissioner
Howard Quinn was chairman of the board of directors of Beverly Savings &
Loan Association (Beverly). His wife, Charlotte, was also a director and the
senior vice-president. Mr. Quinn leased real property to Beverly, and he suggested to the directors that Beverly prepay rent in order to take advantage of his
5 % discount offer. Before the directors decided the matter, Howard fraudulently
obtained a check in the amount of $553,166 from Beverly for the rent prepayment The directors demanded repayment from Howard by a certain date,
yet Howard had repaid only $53,166 by the date; he gave a $500,000 note,
secured by his personal shares in Beverly for the remainder. The Quinns, cash
basis taxpayers, filed a joint return for the year 1973. None of the rent prepayments were included in their taxable income. However, they did acknowledge the transactions on their return, stating that they believed the prepayments,
fraudulently secured, constituted a loan, and were thus not includible in gross
income.
The IRS disagreed with this contention. The Service relied on the "claim
of right" doctrine, which requires that any amount received by a taxpayer under
a legitimate claim of ownership is includible in gross income. The Service viewed
the subsequent surrender of the claim and the simultaneous recognition of the
obligation to repay the funds as inconsequential.
The Tax Court, in affirming the IRS,2 only briefly discussed the Service's
claim of right doctrine argument. This was due to Howard's concession that he
was taxable on the $500,000 received from Beverly. Consequently, the Tax
68

See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.

1 Howard was later indicted and convicted of fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1970) as
a result of these transactions. United States v. Quinn, 398 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

393 U.S. 983 (1968).
2

Howard B. Quinn, 62 T.C. 223 (1974).
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Court focused instead on Charlotte's claim of protection under the innocent
spouse provisions of § 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code.' Relying on that
provision, Mrs. Quinn attempted to avoid liability for the tax due on the
$500,000 by claiming that she signed the joint return totally ignorant of the transactions between Howard and Beverly. The Tax Court, however, similarly found
this contention to be without merit and ruled that the $500,000 was includible.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court," it focused on different issues. The court summarily dismissed Charlotte's
appeal of the Tax Court's ruling with respect to § 6013. It concentrated instead
on two different questions, the first of which was not initially raised by the
Quinns in the Tax Court.' The two issues before the Seventh Circuit were: (1)
whether the Commissioner is precluded from asserting that the advance prepayment is taxable because of an acquiescence in an opinion contrary to his
present position; and (2) whether the claim of right doctrine requires the recognition of the rent prepayment as income in the year received even though
Howard Quinn executed a note documenting his obligation to repay the funds.
As regards the first issue, the Quinns argued that Willis W. Clark6 was controlling since the IRS never withdrew its acquiescence to that decision. On the
second issue, the Quinns contended that the recognition of the obligation to repay
exempted the funds from inclusion in gross income.
Neither contention persuaded the appellate court. The Seventh Circuit
held that the prior IRS acquiescence was not a bar to allowing its claim of
taxability of the rent prepayments in the year the note was executed. Moreover,
the court applied the claim of right doctrine in finding that the $500,000 was
taxable in the year received.
Reliance on Outstanding IRS Acquiescences
The Seventh Circuit correctly determined that the IRS's practice of stating
their acquiescence or nonacquiescence to a Tax Court decision is designed to aid
their own officers and agents in dealing with similar issues.! This practice is not
intended to aid taxpayers in planning prospective transactions.8 Indeed, the
sole function of an acquiscence is to offer guidelines for Service personnel. Thus,
as publications intended for internal use only, acquiescences are not binding on
either the taxpayer or the Commissioner.9
As indicated previously, the Quinns' reliance on the Service acquiescence to

3 INT. R V. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e) provides that a spouse who signs a joint return
may be relieved of liability for an amount which was omitted from the return if she establishes
that she did not know of, and had no reason to know of, the omission. Since Howard conceded the includibility of the funds, the Quinns argued the applicability of § 6013.
4 Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975).
5 Id. at 621.
6 Willis W. Clark, 11 T.C. 672 (1948), nonazcq. 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 5; acq. 1953-1 Cums.
BULL. 3.

7 524 F.2d at 621.
8 A warning to this effect is published at the beginning of each Cumulative Bulletin.
See, e.g., 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 3.

9

5 P-H 1976 FED. TAX-s

41,361.
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Willis W. Clark proved unpersuasive to the Seventh Circuit."° Clark; a case involving facts similar to Quinn, held that the taxpayer was entitled to exclude
the amounts received under the claim of right. Since this acquiescence was
neither modified nor rescinded by the Service at the time of the Quinn transactions, the Quinns reasoned that the Service was barred from acting in contravention of its previous acquiescence. The Seventh Circuit found this reasoning
unpersuasive and permitted the Service to litigate the issue of includibility despite
the Quinns' claim of detrimental reliance.
The court was persuaded by the Service's argument that § 7805 of the Code
authorizes Service action in contravention of previous acquiescences. Section
78051" empowers the Commissioner to prescribe any rule or regulation including
acquiescences needed for enforcement of internal revenue laws. These positions
may be executed or repealed retroactively without public notice. Nor does §
7805 provide for the protection of good-faith taxpayers who have relied on
retroactively withdrawn Service statements. Thus, the Seventh Circuit properly
concluded that the Service acted within the scope of its § 7805 authority in
retroactively revoking its acquiescence to the Clark decision.
Although the Seventh Circuit adhered to the majority rule on this question,
the court recognized the possibility of circumstances that could make it unconscionable for the Commissioner to prevail. 2 Indeed, the court suggested that
there are circumstances which make it advisable for the Service to make formal
withdrawals of acquiescences. 5 However, the Quinns simply failed to show that
their situation warranted the application of the unconscionability exception.
Noting that the Quinns failed to raise the detrimental reliance argument in the
Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit presumably believed that the taxpayers were not
aware of the IRS acquiescence in Clark until the appeal of their case.
The Seventh Circuit also properly recognized the nonbinding character of
acquiescences by emphasizing that the tax laws are established by the legislature
and not by administrative action. 4 The Commissioner's acquiescence in an erroneous decision of the Tax Court, such as the Seventh Circuit considered

10 The Seventh Circuit does not present a detailed discussion of Clark. Instead, it attacks
the leading case which supports the Clark rationale. Discussion of the Quinn court's analysis
of this point is presented at text accompanying notes 31-43 infra.
11 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805 provides:
(a) AUTHORIZATIN.-Except where such authority is expressly given by this
title to any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department,
the Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by
reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.
(b) RnTROACTIViTY OF REGULATIONS OR RuLrGS.-The Secretary or his
delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating
to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.
(C) PREPARATION AND DISTRIUTION OF REGULATIONS, FORMaS, STAMPS, AND
OTHER MATTERS.-The Secretary or his delegate shall prepare and distribute all the

instructions, regulations, directions, forms, blanks, stamps, and other matters pertaining to the assessment and collection of internal revenue.

12 524 F.2d at 623.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 622.
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Clark, 5 cannot by itself bar the United States from collecting a tax due under a
proper interpretation of the law." If this were permitted, federal tax legislation
would be subordinated to administrative procedure.
There are two additional reasons supporting the Quinn court's rationale that
the acquiescence is not binding. First, congressional intent and the likely resolution by the courts of questions regarding the Commissioner's discretion in retroactively revoking acquiescences is clearly stated in the Supreme Court's decision
in Dixon v. United States." In ruling that the Commissioner did not abuse his
discretion by retroactively revoking an acquiescence, the Supreme Court stated:
This principle is no more than a reflection of the fact that Congress, not
the Commissioner, prescribes the tax laws. The Commissioner's rulings have
only such force as Congress chooses to give them, and Congress has not given
them the force of law.' 8
Clearly, then, an expression of the Commissioner's assent or nonassent does not
supersede congressional legislation. Secondly, taxpayers are provided with notice
of the exact nature of an acquiescence sufficient to apprise them of the likelihood
of retroactive retraction. Judicial decisions and the introductions to the Cumulative Bulletins within which IRS acquiescences appear admonish taxpayers of the
impropriety of relying on outstanding acquiescences. 9 Hence, taxpayer contentions of equitable estoppel are seldom persuasive."0
Thus, Quinn stands for the proposition that it is unsafe to rely on IRS
acquiescences. Moreover, private letter rulings are available to alert taxpayers
of the Service's position. 2 Since these rulings are expressly intended for that
15 By refuting Clark's leading offspring, United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th
Cir. 1954), the Seventh Circuit presumably found Clark incorrectly reasoned. See note 10,
supra.
16 Id.

17

381 U.S. 68 (1965).

18 Id. at 73.
19 See note 8, supra.
20 4 P-H 1976 FED. TAcis T 33,933, 33,949, and 33,952. This discussion should not,
however, lead to the conclusion that the Commissioner's discretion on this point is unlimited.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that there may be circumstances which would make it unconscionable for the Commissioner to prevail. 524 F.2d at 623. Further, numerous cases
demonstrate the judicial willingness to delimit the Commissioner's discretion when used discriminatorily. See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960), and International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
21 Acquiescences and letter rulings are only two types of publications issued by the
Service. Other pronouncements, such as Treasury Regulations and Treasury Decisions, have
been given the force of law. But unlike acquiescences and letter rulings, they are not issued to
individual taxpayers; instead, they are published in the Federal Register. J. CrHommiE,
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATIO
§ 4 (1968).
The function of an acquiescence is explained in the text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
Letter rulings, as described in Rev. Proc. 67-1, 1967-1 Gum. BuLL. 5, are issued by the
National Office in response to individual taxpayers' requests for a decision on past or contemplated transactions.
"Determination Letters" are issued by District Directors in response to taxpayers' requests
for a ruling. These letters, however, are generally limited to rulings based on principles and
precedents previously announced by the National Office. J. CGoMmis, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION § 4 (1968). The National Office retains exclusive jurisdiction over prospective transactions and novel issues.
The Quinns neglected to request either a private letter ruling or a determination letter,
and chose to rely on an outstanding acquiescence. In view of the nature of Service acquiescences
and the availability of Service opinions through other types of pronouncements, this was not
a prudent election.
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purpose, and outstanding acquiescences are not so intended, it is advisable for
taxpayers to seek rulings in all questionable situations. If the IRS still intends to
acquiesce in the matter then the taxpayer will have current support for acting
accordingly.
Claim of Right Doctrine
Although Quinn restates the prevailing view with respect to the acquiescence question, it conflicts with other circuits in its ruling on the claim of right
issue. The Seventh Circuit chose not to follow previous decisions dealing-with
this matter in the Second,22 Sixth,2" and Ninth24 Circuits. Instead, the court
ruled that under the claim of right doctrine the recognition of an obligation to
repay a sum of money received under a claim of ownership does not render the
receipt excludible from gross income.
The claim of right doctrine requires that any funds received under a claim
of right without restriction as to their disposition are includible in gross income:
it is only necessary that the taxpayer have a bona fide claim to the funds at the
time of receipt.25 Thus, Quinn's application of the doctrine so as to include the
funds in gross income at the time of receipt is proper even though the claim to
the funds was subsequently determined to be invalid.26
Yet there is disagreement among the courts of appeals concerning the effect
of a renouncement of the claim in the same year the funds were received.
Decisions conflicting with Quinn" hold that a renunciation within the same
taxable year in which the funds were received renders the amount excludible from
gross income." Quinn, however, presents a minority view on this issue. The
court maintained that a renunciation has no effect on includibility because the
existence of a bona fide claim at the time of receipt is the determinative factor;
the claim's existence for the entire tax period is inconsequential. 9
To best understand the ;Quinn rationale, it is essential to understand the
difference between the cash and accrual methods of accounting."0 The accrual
basis of accounting requires the recognition of income at the time the right to
receive the funds is secured; it requires the recognition of liabilities when the
obligation to repay arises. The cash basis, on the other hand, requires the recognition of income only when there is actual or constructive receipt of funds;
expenses are deductible only when an actual cash distribution is made.
The Quinn court's recognition of the difference between the cash and accrual methods distinguishes that case from other cases that have decided the
question. United States v. Merrill,1 the leading case in opposition to Quinn, is
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31

Frelbro" Corporation v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir. 1963).
Lashell's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1953).
United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
Id. at 424.
See notes 22-24, supra.
3 P-H 1976 FED. TAXEs If 20,207.
Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940).

Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e) (1973).
United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297.
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suspect because it ignores that distinction. In Merrill, the taxpayer, as the
executor of his wife's estate, erroneously made overpayments of executor's fees
to himself in two consecutive tax years. Prior to the close of the second tax year,
the erroneous overpayments were discovered and the taxpayer recognized a
liability on his books for both amounts. The Ninth Circuit held that the original
payment was received under a claim of right and was properly taxed in the first
year. With respect to the second overpayment, the court held that the recognition during the second year of the obligation to repay exempted the funds from
inclusion in gross income in that year. The fact that the taxpayer was on the
cash basis was ignored by the court. Instead, the Ninth Circuit improperly
reasoned that since the purpose of the claim of right doctrine is the avoidance
of the necessity of IRS mediation of conflicting claims between taxpapers, the
doctrine is not applicable when the taxpayers solve the dispute themselves. 2
3
This reasoning is incorrect since North American Oil,"
the Supreme Court
decision creating the claim of right doctrine, did not state that the avoidance of
Service mediation of taxpayer claims was the reason for the doctrine. Hence, it
was improper for the Ninth Circuit to create an exception to the claim of right
doctrine simply because that circumstance did not exist.
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions have bolstered the Merrill rationale. 4
The common thread running through those cases is the recognition that within
the tax year the taxpayer's net worth has not increased due to the accrual of a
corresponding liability. Therefore, the circumstances existing during the entire
tax period, rather than the mere existence of the claim of right at the time of
receipt, is the relevant consideration in those cases. 5 Thus, since the taxpayer
increased his liabilities by an amount equal to the increase in his assets, these
courts were reluctant to tax him on the full amount.
Despite the acceptance of the Merrill rationale by those courts, the Seventh
Circuit in Quinn, finding Merrill to be incorrectly decided," refused to adopt its
exception to the claim of right doctrine. Quinn persuasively refutes Merrill by
attacking the two authorities on which the Ninth Circuit relied." The first was
a questionable 1924 Board of Tax Appeals ruling, Carey Van Fleet."' The application of that case is curious since it was decided prior to the Supreme Court
decision in North American Oil. The facts in Van Fleet suggest that it would be
decided differently under the claim of right doctrine as previously described. 9
In Van Fleet, a cash basis taxpayer received funds as a result of a mutual
mistake for services he never rendered. Both parties recognized the mistake, but
they agreed that the funds would be repaid only if the services were not sub32 Id. at 304.
33
34

286 U.S. 417 (1932).
See, e.g., J.W. Gaddy, 38 T.C. 943 (1962), in which the Tax Court recognized the

legitimacy of the Merrill exception but -did not apply it to those facts. See also Charles Kay
Bishop, 25 T.C. 969 (1956).
35 The Tax Court in Gaddy stated: "The claim of right doctrine and the exception ...
in the Merrill case are both in essence predicated upon the principle of requiring taxpayers to

account on the basis of an annual accounting period." 38 T.C. at 949.
36 524 F.2d at 624.
37

Id.

38 2 B.T.A. 825 (1925).
39 See discussion of the claim of right doctrine at text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
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sequently rendered. The Board of Tax Appeals recognized that funds received
by a cash basis taxpayer are normally includible in gross income in the year of
receipt. However, the court concluded that the existence of a mistake of fact
exempted the funds from inclusion under normal cash basis principles. In
contrast, the claim of right doctrine would require the inclusion of the funds. A
factual determination that the funds were received under a claim of ownership
and without restriction as to their disposition supports the applicability of the
doctrine. Subsequent recognition of a mistake of fact and of an obligation to
repay are inconsequential."
The second authority cited by Merrill was Curran Realty Co., Inc. v. Commissioner.4 ' Quinn found Curran equally unpersuasive because Curran focused
on the accounting procedures used by the taxpayer and did not address the same
issues that North American Oil decided. Curran dealt merely with the proper
method of making adjusting entries to accrual basis accounts and ignored the
issue of includibility.42
A closer scrutiny of Curransuggests that it was properly disregarded by the
Seventh Circuit in Quinn. In Curran, the taxpayer and his wife owned all the
stock of a lessor corporation and of the lessee corporation. The lessor operated on
the accrual basis, and made adjusting entries in its accounts to record a reduction in rent payments received from the lessee. The court's opinion focuses only
on the propriety of those accrual adjustments," and thus gives little support for
Merrill's exception to the claim of right doctrine.
Quinn proffers a stricter interpretation of the claim of right doctrine than
Merrill. In Quinn, the court held that any amount received during the year
under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition is includible in
gross income. Thus, the Seventh Circuit placed emphasis on the existence of a
claim of right at the time of receipt rather than on the subsequent recognition of
the obligation to repay the rent overpayment. For this reason, Quinn better
comports with the policy of the claim of right doctrine that all funds received
under a claim of ownership are includible in gross income in the year received.
The execution of the note by the Quinns was not the equivalent of a cash basis
disbursement. Therefore, the mere signing of a promissory note was not sufficient
to constitute a cash basis expense; consequently, the recognition by the Quinns of
their obligation to repay did not create a legitimate exclusion. To the extent that
Merrill holds to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found it incorrectly reasoned.
Additional support for the Quinn rationale is provided by § 446(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.44 This section requires that income shall be computed
40

286 U.S. 424.

41 15 T.C. 341 (1950).

42 Indeed, the one-page opinion provides only a brief discussion of this question and does
not provide the support inferred by Merrill.

43
44

15 T.C. 341.
REv. Coua or 1954, § 446 provides in part:
(a) GENERALR uLE--Taxable income shall be computed under the method of

INT.

accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in
keeping his books.
(b) ExcEpTxoNs.-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary
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under the method of accounting on which the taxpayer regularly computes his
income. Since the Quinns were on the cash basis, and the cash basis records
income at the time of receipt of the funds, the rent prepayment that they
received was includible. To allow them to exclude the funds because of a subsequent accrued liability is abhorrent to the principles of cash basis accounting.
Further support for this conclusion is found in § 451(a)." This section
requires that any item of gross income is includible in the year in which it is
received, unless under the method of accounting used, such amount is to be
properly accounted for in a different period. Clearly, proper cash basis accounting does not permit this; it requires inclusion in the year in which the
funds were received. Hence, since the Quinns were cash basis taxpayers, the
Seventh Circuit correctly applied this concept and held the rent payments includible.
Despite its satisfactory resolution of the claim of right question, Quinn
appears problematic. Since the taxpayer is taxable on funds received under a
claim of right even though he recognized an obligation to repay them, he may be
required to pay tax on money over which he does not have dominion and control. Thus, under the Quinn rationale, it is possible that a taxpayer may be taxed
even though no economic benefit has accrued to him.
This problem is mitigated, however. There are decisions holding 6 that
amounts repaid are deductible in the year of repayment if the taxpayer is on the
cash basis; or if the taxpayer is on the accrual basis, the amounts repaid are
deductible in the year in which the liability becomes fixed. Thus, since the
Quinns are cash basis taxpayers, they may deduct amounts actually repaid by
them.4"
Moreover, § 1341 of the Code provides for a tax computation formula that
alleviates the harshness of the claim of right doctrine by permitting the taxpayer
who actually repays funds received under a claim of right to compute his tax on
an alternative basis.4 8 This alternative computation may result in a significantly
or his delegate, does clearly reflect income.
(c) PERMISSIBLE METHODS.-Subject to the provisions of subsections (a) and
(b), a taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the following methods of
accounting(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) an accrual method;
(3) any other method permitted by this chapter; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
45 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 451(a) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The amount of any item of gross income shall be included
in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless,
under the method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such amount is to
be properly accounted for as of a different period.
46 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1958).
47 The Quinns were allowed a $53,166 deduction for the amount actually repaid to
Beverly.
48 INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 1341 provides in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-If(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or
years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such
item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established
after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not
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reduced tax liability. As the Quinn court noted, 9 this relief provision was not
present in the 1939 Code under which Merrill was decided; and its inclusion in
the 1954 Code mitigates the rigors of the doctrine, thus rendering the Merrill
exception nugatory."
Conclusion
There is little likelihood of a decision in contravention of Quinn with respect
to the question of the taxpayer's reliance on an outstanding acquiescence. All
courts that have decided the issue are in agreement with Quinn on that point
and there appears no valid reason to dispute its holding that a taxpayer is not
entitled to rely on an outstanding acquiescence in planning prospective transactions.
However, it is not clear whether Quinn will affect decisions in other circuits
with respect to the claim of right issue. At least three other circuits have already
adopted the Merrill exception,5 1 even though the same principles of law and
theories of accounting basis examined in Quinn were available for consideration
by those courts. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the interpretation of the claim
of right doctrine expressed in Quinn should be adopted by all courts deciding
the question.
John E. Glennon

FEDERAL STATUTES-HoBBs

ACT-EXTENSION OF HOBBS ACT TO PURELY
INTRASTATE EXTORTION ACTIVITIES

United States v. Staszcuk
In late 1970, William Harris planned to construct an animal hospital on
property he owned within the thirteenth ward of Chicago. At that time,
however, the intended site for the hospital was zoned so as not to permit such construction. As a result Harris approached Al C. Allen, known as the "zoning
man," and sought his help in effectuating the required zoning changes; in so
doing, Harris paid Allen $5,500.00. In turn, Allen approached the then alderman for the thirteenth ward, Casimir Staszcuk; shortly thereafter a rezoning
have an
(3)
then the tax
following:
(4)
(5)

unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; and
the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000,
imposed by the chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the
the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
an amount equal to(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction,

minus

(B) the
provisions of
which would
thereof) from

49 524 F.2d at 625.
50 Id.

51

See notes 20-22 supra.

decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding
prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years)
result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion
gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).
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proposal for the questioned piece of property went before the City Council.
Several months after the initial meeting between Staszcuk and Allen, the latter
paid Staszcuk $3,000.00. On that same day the rezoning proposal was subjected to a public hearing at which Staszcuk, at least impliedly, manifested support for the change. A short time after the hearing the Council announced its
decision in favor of the proposed change, thus affording Harris the opportunity
to construct his hospital as planned. Although advancing to the point of accepting construction bids from several contractors, Harris, for some reason, failed to
go through with the hospital construction. Instead, Harris improved his property
in a manner that did not require the zoning change. Nevertheless, Staszcuk was
indicted for a violation of the Hobbs Act for extortion involving interstate commerce.'
At the trial, testimony was presented which sought to prove that had the
hospital been built according to plan, it would have required construction
materials obtainable only from out-of-state. It was on this testimony that the
Government sought to provide the basis for a nexus between defendant's conduct
and interstate commerce. Based on this connection the jury was able to find
Staszcuk guilty of violating the Hobbs Act. A three-judge panel of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, originally hearing the appeal, reversed the conviction,
concluding that the relation between the extortionist's activity and interstate
commerce was too tenuous. Finally, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reheard
the case, and reversed the decision of the panel, affirming the District Court's
conviction.2
The Hobbs Act, under which Staszcuk was convicted, is an amended version
of the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.' Essentially, this amended version
provides that "[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects commerce" 4 by extortion "shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both." 5 Extortion is defined as "the obtaining of
property from another,"' with his consent "either through the use of actual or
threatened force or fear, or under color of official rights." 7 While the existence of
extortion was obviously essential to Staszcuk's conviction, the facts clearly supported the jury's finding on that issue. However, the more significant issue raised
by this case was whether extortion was properly within the ambit of federal
control. As is common among federal criminal statutes, the definition of the
substantive offense incorporates a jurisdictional provision requiring a connection
between the extortion and interstate commerce; thus, absent such an interstate
commerce nexus, the extortion would be purely local in character and only within
the prohibitory power of the state.
The issues presented in Staszcuk concerned both of the substantially different
requirements found in the jurisdictional provision of the act: the first of the two
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975).
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) (1970).
Id.
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requirements is that the criminal activity "obstructs, delays, or affects"' commerce; the second is that it must so obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce.' The court in a somewhat confusing use of authority, failed to adequately
distinguish and answer whether these jurisdictional requirements were satisfied.
Instead, it appeared to express a novel extension of the Act so as to include extortion of noninterstate commerce, yet attempted to do so, at least partially,
through traditional considerations.
A classical Hobbs Act violation would involve a demand for money, made
with some threat of force or violence directed against someone engaged in interstate commerce. When the demand is not met, the threat is carried out with a
resultant obstruction or delay in interstate commerce. For example, the destruction of an interstate transporter's carriers. Yet the facts of the present case reveal
a different situation. Although clothed in more subtle circumstances, a demand
and threat were present here. However, the demand was met, such that the
threat never became a reality which could in turn obstruct or delay any aspect of
commerce. Additionally, the commerce which was involved in this case, never
reached the level of interstate. Despite this last fact, the court still managed to
find a sufficient basis for applying the Act.
While the Act has traditionally been applied to situations in which the
demand has been met, such that no actual obstruction or delay results, the

Seventh Circuit's expansion of the Act's coverage to a completely intrastate transaction is unique. The court attempts to justify this expansion in two ways.
First, the court applies traditional concepts associated with the Hobbs Act and
is able to find a sufficient interstate connection, despite the true nature of the
transaction. Secondly, and more importantly, the court is in fact expanding the
meaning of the Act to coincide with the broadest scope of congressional power
permissible under the commerce clause, despite limitations on such power which
exist in the form of the jurisdictional provision of the Act itself. Thus the two
major issues raised by this case are: the applicability of the Hobbs Act, as traditionally interpreted, to the actual situation presented here; and the general power
of Congress to reach intrastate transactions such as those involved here, and
further, whether the Hobbs Act was the appropriate vehicle for this novel
expansion.
The first issue the court considered was the scope of the Hobbs Act with
respect to activity that does not in fact obstruct or delay anything. Concentrating
on the first element of "obstruct, delay, or affect," rather than the required
presence of interstate commerce, it is clear the court correctly applied the statute.
In Staszcuk there was no actual obstruction or delay of anything since timely
payment was made by Harris; thus all his activity continued without obstruction.
While the Hobbs Act speaks in terms of actuality-extortion which in fact
obstructs or delays-it also prohibits those activities which only "affect" commerce. In other words, if the extortion involves activity which has the potential
to obstruct or delay commerce, then such activity can be said to "affect" commerce within the meaning of the statute. The broad reading given the term
8

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970).

9

18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (1970).
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"affect" by the court in this case, so as to include activity which only potentially
obstructs or delays commerce can be justified in two ways. The court had the
option of relying on the actual inference provided by the statutory language, or
referring to prior courts' interpretations of the Act's historical purpose. The fact
that the statute explicitly includes the substantive offense of extortion as well as
attempted extortion supports reliance on the actual language. Extortion, by its
very nature, usually results in no actual effect on commerce; the extortionist's
demands are met by the victim and the threat is never carried out. Attempted
extortion, however, primarily involves a failure by the victim to meet the
demands imposed upon him and, as a result, the threatened act becomes a reality;
at that point commerce is actually obstructed or delayed. Thus by the statute's
inclusion of both offenses, as the court noted, the "inference is inescapable that
Congress was as much concerned with the threatened impact of the prohibited
conduct as with its actual effect." 10 It was the threat, therefore, as much as its
physical manifestation which was the center of congressional attention.
The Seventh Circuit chose to rely, however, on prior judicial interpretations
of the Act's scope rather than on its own interpretation of the actual language
of the statute. Earlier courts recognized, in considering this statute, that it was
the intent of Congress to premise the Hobbs Act on the full extent of congressional authority under the commerce clause." From this recognition of the Act's
power base, courts have willingly interpreted the coverage of the Act so as to give
full effect to the permissible scope of congressional power.' Thus, it is universally
recognized that "Congress has the power to deal with extortion or attempted
extortion actually or potentially affecting interstate commerce."" In United
States v. Stirone,4 the Supreme Court expressed its understanding of the scope of
the Act in this regard as follows. If, as a result of carrying out the threats made
against the victim's business, that business (which was interstate in nature) had
been interrupted, then interstate commerce would naturally have slackened. As a
result, the jury was entitled to find that interstate commerce was saved from
such a "blockage" by compliance with the extortionist demands; thus the very
fact that interstate commerce needed to be "saved" was sufficient evidence of
the effect of the activity. 5 "It was to free commerce from such destructive
burdens that the Hobbs Act was passed."' 6
Clearly then the Act extends its sanctions to any activity which has the
potential to affect interstate commerce. However, the jurisdictional provision of
the statute additionally requires that the effect, be it potential or actual, be on
some element of interstate commerce, or at least have some relation thereto. The
truly significant issue presented by Staszcuk evolves from the rather unusual
factual situation presented; as a result of a voluntary discontinuance of plans to
engage in a form of interstate commerce, no such actual commerce was ever
10

517 F.2d at 57.
11 Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
12 United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Ci. 1967); Hulahan v. United States, 214
F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1954); Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1941).
13 214 F.2d at 445.
14 361 U.S. 212.
15 Id. at 215.
16 Id.
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involved. Thus the novel consideration is whether the Act's scope is so broad as
to extend to a particular activity which, though itself intrastate in nature, because
it is part of a larger class of activities which when considered as such a class are
generally of an interstate character, or whether the Act is limited only to a
particular act which is itself of an interstate nature. Although not expressly
recognizing its decision as such, the court spoke in terms strongly intimating acceptance of this former proposition, yet it equally implicitly demonstrated its
doubts as to such an approach. Thus the decision rests on an unclear doctrinal
foundation.
Before continuing it is important to note that the "potential effect" cases
which were previously discussed are not applicable to this issue, yet the Seventh
Circuit failed to note this. Clearly, from the facts of those cases, though not from
the court's opinion in Staszcuk, the "potentiality" by which the Act in the past
has been extended is limited to the effect of the activity, and not the existence
of an interstate commerce connection. In other words, while the courts have
readily accepted the expansion of the Hobbs Act to include activities which only
have the potential to affect interstate commerce, the Act has not, until now, been
extended to situations in which intra, not inter, state commerce exists, on a similar
rationale that the potential for interstate commerce was sufficient. Closest
perhaps to the situation presented here is that found in United States v. Hyde."7
That case involved completed extortion of several companies, some of which were
not actually engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the extortion. Addressing the need for interstate commerce, the Fifth Circuit noted:
Neither the statute nor the constitution requires that the company be
engaged in an interstate transaction at the moment of the extortion to support federal jurisdiction. A reasonable reading of the statutory language
"in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects" interstate commerce is
that it includes preventing the establishment of an organization that will
engage in such commerce. 8
However, the companies involved did in fact participate in some form of interstate commerce within a year of the extortion demands, a fact known to the court
and presumably influencing its consideration of any factor of potential interstate
commerce. The facts evolve similarly in each of the other cases cited by the
Seventh Circuit dealing with potentiality under the Hobbs Act; in each instance
some element of actual interstate commerce is involved and thus provides an
adequate jurisdictional basis for application of the statute. Thus, while it may
be presumed that the court is not relying on these cases for supporting an extension of the Act's scope, yet the court's-position is unclear on the matter.
In another reference the court intimated the basis upon which it was apparently relying in an attempt to extend the application of the Hobbs Act so as
to include intrastate activity. The, court noted that since the activity which
prompted the statute is marketwide, and not strictly of local character, its
17
18

448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 836.
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evaluation of both the intent of Congress and its power to implement that
intent, requires more than a consideration of a consequences of the particular
transaction disclosed by this record; it requires an identification of the consequences of the class of transactions of which this is but one example. 19
Thus the language employed by the court indicates its application of the
"class of activities"2 test, an offshoot of the cumulative effect doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn.2 Wickard involved the
constitutionality of a marketing penalty imposed by the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938.22 The defendant in the case had sowed and harvested an amount
of wheat in excess of his quota under the Act, and thus a penalty was imposed on
him, despite the fact that the excess wheat was intended solely for private consumption. The defendant farmer's contention was that congressional power did
not extend to purely intrastate activity where the effect on interstate commerce
was, at best, minimal. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the
Supreme Court found that congressional regulatory authority did extend to any
local activity exerting a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and the mere
fact
that appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by
itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others
23
similarly situated, is far from trivial.
Therefore, although the defendant's retention of the excess wheat for personal
consumption was by itself too trivial to "substantially effect" interstate commerce
by lowering the overall demand for wheat in the market, federal jurisdiction was
not completely foreclosed. The court found it sufficient that the combined effect
of such actions by all persons similarly situated would result in the requisite substantial effect; each individual case brought before the court need not show substantiality, it was adequate the showing could be made with respect to the class
as a whole.
On similar grounds the Supreme Court upheld civil rights legislation in the
early 1960's. Most notable was the Court's conclusion affirming the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196424 in Katzenbach v. McClung.25
The Court reiterated the Wickard doctrine to counter contentions that the individual actions prohibited by the Act had no substantial effect on interstate
commerce. The only questions26 the Court need answer with respect to such
congressional classifications are:, (1) whether there was a rational basis for the
congressional conclusion as to effect, and (2) whether the selected means were
reasonably appropriate to attain the congressional purpose. If those questions are
19 517 F.2d at 58.
20 Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
21 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
22 Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
23 317 U.S. at 127-28.
24 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (b) (2) (1970).
25 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
26 379 U.S. 241.
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affirmatively answered, the Court need only determine whether the particular
activity is part of that class. From this doctrinal basis there has evolved recognition of congressional regulatory power in instances where there is no effect on
interstate commerce (as opposed to the de minimus situations in Wickard and
Katzenbach) because no proof of an actual interstate relation is required.
This broader version of the doctrine, which is specifically alluded to by the
Seventh Circuit in Staszcuk, is best exemplified by a recent Supreme Court case
testing the constitutionality of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 196827
(Loansharking Act). The emphasis under this formulation is not on a series of
transactions combining to form a cumulative substantial effect on interstate commerce. Rather the concern is with establishing a class of activity as being within
the ambit of federal control, since this is sufficient to eliminate the need for similar
proof as to each particular transaction within that class. In Perez v. United
States28 the defendant had been convicted under Title II of the Loansharking
Act for his extortionate credit activities, although they were purely intrastate in
nature. The thrust of the defense was the inadequacy of federal power to extend
to a particular activity which was itself no way actually tied in with interstate
commerce. Unlike the Hobbs Act, the Loansharking Act does not contain a
jurisdictional provision requiring affirmative proof of a nexus between the
activity involved and interstate commerce; rather the Act explicitly extends to
all loansharking activity." Employing the "class of activities" rationale the Court
upheld the Act. In so doing the Court referred to the standard in Wickard and a
series of similar cases as support for its proposition ,that "[w]here the class of
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power to excuse as trivial, individual instances of the class."2 "
Thus, where the connection with interstate commerce exists in relation to
the entire class of activities, there is no requirement for the particular transaction
composing a part of that class to be so related to interstate activity. The nexus
between the class as a whole and such commerce is transmitted to each element
comprising that class. For proof of the class nexus the Supreme Court turned to
the legislative findings and purpose set out in the Act. Basically these findings
concluded that loansharking, as a whole, aids organized crime, and since organized crime affects interstate commerce, all loansharking must affect commerce
as well, despite the lack of actual proof for each and every occasion. 1 As a result
of these legislative conclusions, the Court conceded congressional power over
individual activities although purely intrastate in nature. A gap does exist in the
congressional report in that there is no indication as how the purely local intrastate extortionate credit activity aids interstate crime or affects interstate commerce. But the gap is clearly not fatal since the Supreme Court adopted the same
conclusory approach when it stated: "In the setting of the present case there is a
27 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970).
28 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
29 "Even where extraordinate credit transactions are purely intrastate in character, they
nevertheless directly affect interstate and foreign commerce." Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, § 201, 82 Stat. 159 (1968).
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402 U.S. at 154, citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968).
See 49 Tzx. L. REv. 568 (1971).
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tie-in between local loansharks and interstate commerce."' 2 Yet it too failed to
divulge this tie-in.
It seems, however, that the Court's tolerance of this expansion of federal
regulation into traditionally state concerns is based on more than just the explicit
findings of the Congress as to the connection. As has been pointed out by several
authors, 3 the key to the Perez decision probably lies in the "inherent difficulty in
establishing a connection between the loanshark and organized crime,"" thus
necessitating the regulation of all loansharking in order to insure inclusions of that
loansharking activity which is in fact a burden on interstate commerce. The acceptance of such over-inclusion is clearly established: "[W]hen it is necessary in
order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to
be prevented it may do so." 5
As noted previously, the Seventh Circuit makes reference to its consideration
of a similar approach in defining the scope of the Hobbs Act." Although more
implicit than explicit, it seems that such reasoning is the basis of the court's conclusion that ". . . the commerce element of a Hobbs Act violation-the federal
jurisdictional fact-may be satisfied even if the record demonstrates that the
extortion had no actual effect on commerce."" Thus, the court stated that jurisdiction is satisfied by "showing a realistic probability that an extortionate transaction will have some effect on interstate commerce."" Assuming that this is the
thinking underlying the Seventh Circuit's decision, then clearly the commerce
clause power attributed to Congress to control purely intrastate activities exists;
the issue becomes whether the statute itself harnesses such power.
While the Perez case established the scope of congressional power in this
regard, it is dependent upon each particular statute for implementation. It is the
extent to which Congress manifested its intent as to the scope of the Hobbs Act
in the jurisdictional provision that forms a basis for distinguishing it from the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. The Loansharking Act is explicitly extended
to intrastate activities, "9 the result of congressional findings as to a sufficient class
nexus with interstate commerce incorporated expressly into the act itself. The
Hobbs Act, on the other hand, is similar to most older federal criminal statutes in
that it incorporates into its provisions a jurisdictional element requiring specific
proof in each case. Without proof of such an effect in each particular enforcement .case under the act, all the elements of the crime are not present. Thus,
despite various earlier court interpretations attributing to the Act the full scope of
congressional power, application of the statute is limited as a result of the drafting
technique. Concededly the legislative history of the Hobbs Act shows a purpose
parallel to that of the Consumer Credit Protection Act since both are concerned

32
33
ARiz.
34
35
36
37
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402 U.S. at 155.
Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-the Federalization of Interstate Crime, 15
L. Rv. 271 (1973); 49 Tsx. L. Rnv. 568 (1971).
49 TEx. L. REv.568, 573 (1971).
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927).
517 F.2d at 58.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
See note 22, supra.
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with controlling racketeering."0 However, even if the court could base an extension of the Act on legislative history inconsistent with the face of the statute,
there is no congressional finding supporting a nexus even between the class of
regulated activities as a whole and interstate commerce. Doubtlessly this deficiency inthe statute's drafting, as well as its supporting history, is due, at least in some
part, to the narrower recognition given the scope of the commerce clause power
at the time of the Act's creation, but the fact cannot change the Act's effect.
Thus, any attempt to apply a "class of activities" test to the Hobbs Act to avoid
the need for actual proof in particular instances is not only without justifiable
support, but is also unanticipated.
Despite this apparent attempt by the court to apply the "class of activities"
test, the court proceeded to review the actual evidence of the case to determine an
actual interstate commerce connection. 1 It is to this end the court points out
that the jurisdictional inquiry "must focus on the situation at the time of the
offense."'4 2 On that basis the court held that the jury could find a sufficient interstate commerce connection if it determined that at the time of the extortion, there
was a likelihood that interstate movement of goods would thereafter occur. The
court said:
The evidence concerning the interstate parties! plans and expectations, and
the contractors testimony about the need to use out-of-state components 4to3
build an animal hospital in Illinois were all relevant to the commerce issue.
Thus, the effect of the court's conclusion is that interstate commerce exists and
therefore the Hobbs Act applies, if the victim merely intefnded to engage in some
activity requiring interstate involvement; an intention to act is equivalent to the
act itself and carries with it the identical consequences.
Criticism of this decision by the Seventh Circuit rests on the opinion itself,
more so than on the Court's ultimate decision. Indeed, while it appears that the
court itself recognized the importance of the intra/interstate commerce issue
raised by the facts of this case, 4 ' it failed to clearly support its approach to the
problem. The court only intimates the possible applicability of "potential effect"
cases on the second issue; at least it does nothing to dissuade an observer of its
consideration of their applicability. Stronger though is the court's use of
language reflecting the suitability of the "class of activities" test. Thus by intimating the applicability of this approach, the court is presumably extending the
act so as to require no actual proof of an interstate conviction in each instance of
enforcement under the Act. Then, adding to the confusion, is the court's finding
of an actual interstate commerce conviction in this case-a finding totally unnecessary if the Perez standard does accurately apply. Perhaps the court, while
intending such an extension of the act, was cautious and felt it necessary to
enploy both the traditional as well as the modem commerce formulations. In any
40

S. PUe. No. 532, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1974).
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Id.
517 F.2d at 55.

41 517 F.2d at 60.
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event the lack of a clear controlling basis for its ultimate conclusion renders the
case of questionable precedential value.
Finally, a somewhat peripheral issue raised by this case is the desirability,
apart from the rationale, of the ultimate conclusion. The "class of activities" test,
as applied in Perez and as suggested in Staszcuk, represents perhaps the latest
examples of federal encroachment on areas of traditionally state concern. Recent
years have seen a considerable increase in the scope of federal power, particularly
that premised upon the interstate commerce clause. Some of that has been
undeniably necessary, such as governmental attempts to insure basic rights to all
citizens; other extentions of power have been less so. It would appear that application of federal power under the Hobbs Act in the Staszcuk case falls into the
latter category. Whether based on the "class of activities" approach, or on the
actual nexus which the Seventh Circuit considered sufficient, the need, as well as
the justification for federal control is severely strained. With this demise of effective constitutional limitations on congressional power, the only real check on
further governmental encroachment is political. Perhaps Professor Stem was
correct in noting: "Since Congressmen and Senators come from the state and are
usually not anxious to impinge unduly on local prerogatives, there may be little
reason to fear that Congress will undermine local authority without good
cause." 45 But, in any event, the latest interpretations of the scope of the commerce power render it practically limitless, and the burden is on Congress to
exercise it wisely.
John Gaal
LABOR

LAW-EXERCISE OF AN EXCEPTION TO A NO-STRIKE CLAUSE PRIOR TO

ARBITRATION

CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF A UNION'S

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AGREEMENT.

Western Publishing Co. v. Local 254, Graphic Arts Int'l Union
In this decision,1 the Seventh Circuit has indirectly addressed the sensitive
area of the labor injunction. While Western does not directly consider the injunction issue as it was not raised on appeal, it does implicitly sanction the ready availability of a labor injunction, in establishing a new procedure to promote labor
arbitration. Western requires an arbitration hearing as a prerequisite to a union
strike under an exception to a "no-strike" clause in a collective bargaining agreement. It is in the enforcement of this dictate that the Seventh Circuit becomes
enmeshed in the controversial area of the labor injunction. Without the availability of an injunction to prohibit work stoppage prior to arbitration, the Seventh
Circuit's directive of preliminary arbitration is virtually ineffective. Yet, as will
be shown, the ready availability of the injunction will, ironically, defeat the objective of the Western case, the promotion of arbitration. If the inference that the
Seventh Circuit indirectly sanctions liberal use of the labor injunction is accurale,
45

Stern, supra note 33, at 283.

1 522 F.2d. 530 (1975).
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then the analysis and reasoning of the decision must be closely scrutinized.
The collective bargaining agreement controlling the conduct of Western and
Local 254 contained both no-strike and arbitration provisions.' An exception to
the no-strike provisions allowed the union to refuse to handle struck work.3 On
April 3, 1973, a strike at Western's Missouri plant forced Western to shift the
publication of the magazine, Easyriders,to the Racine, Wisconsin, plant.' Realizing that the publication of this magazine might arguably be considered struck
work,' the company delayed production for discussion with the union.6 These conversations, held between May 8 and May 14 of 1973, were deemed fruitless by the
company, and on May 14, the Easyriderwork was assigned.' The union refused
to handle the work, and on the afternoon of May 14 the company filed an action
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, seeking injunctive relief
and damages 8 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
union on the damages issue, and correspondingly denied injunctive relief.9 On
appeal, the company raised only the issue of damages."0 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court, finding the union in breach of the arbitration clause
of its collective bargaining agreement.1 The court ruled that before the union
could exercise its right to refuse to handle "struck work," the disputed character
2
of the work had to be arbitrated.
The court, however, could not grant damages to the company since damages
were not ascertainable until the nature of the work at issue was resolved. The
company would not have incurred any damage if arbitration determined that
the union was authorized under the "no-strike" exception to cease work. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the work stoppage was authorized.1
Ostensibly then, Western held that an exception to a "no-strike" provision
in a collective bargaining agreement may not be exercised prior to an arbitration
concerning the validity of this exercise. The district court decision indicates that
this is not an established principle. Indeed, the district court was so confident
that the failure of the union to arbitrate prior to its work stoppage did not constitute a breach of the "no-strike" provision, that the court summarily dismissed
the case against the union."s In so ruling, the court declared: "It should be
noted, . .. that employee members could refuse to perform the alleged struck
work pending the outcome of a grievance arbitration test case without fear of
violating the 'no-strike' provision."1 "
2
3
4
5
6
7

Id. at 531 n.2.
Id. at 531 n.3.
Id. at 531.
Id.
Id.
Id.

8 Id. at 532.
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Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Id.
381 F. Supp. 445 (1974).
Id. at446.

1200

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[July 1976]

Western seeks more than requiring a union to arbitrate. Union liability
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act already provides for specific
performance or damages if a union wrongfully refuses to arbitrate." Thus, these
sanctions provide some assurance that a union will eventually arbitrate. Western,
however, seeks to enforce arbitration prior to a strike, prohibiting prearbitration
strikes. In prohibiting strikes prior to arbitration, the courts have recourse to
§ 301 damages or injunctions, provided a narrow set of circumstances is met.
Damages are awarded under -§301 only for actual loss incurred by the employer. 8
Thus, by breaching its collective bargaining agreement by striking prior to arbitration, the union must pay for the damages caused by strikes not authorized under
"no-strike" exceptions. However, subsequent arbitration must be pursued to
determine if the exception was properly exercised. If the exercise was proper, then
the employer has suffered no damage as the union was within its contractual rights
to refuse to work. As noted by the Western court:
The Company has suffered no damage, however, unless it is also ascertained
that "Easyriders" was not struck work, and therefore a job that members of
the Union were required to perform. The district court did not reach that
question and, consequently, we remand for a determination of thaf issue. 9
Prior to Western the union was faced by the same possibilities; if subsequent
arbitration proved that the union improperly stopped work, it had breached its
collective bargaining agreement thereby incurring § 301 liability for strike damages. Naturally, prior to Western, unions would weigh the prospect of damages
versus the probability of an arbitration victory in considering the viability of a
strike. Unions would rarely order a strike unless they were confident of winning
at arbitration, consequently incurring no damage liability. Inasmuch as the
damage sanction is the same post-Western as it was pre-Western, i.e. liability
for actual loss, it is difficult to see how § 301 damages will encourage preliminary
arbitration. Post-Western, a union will still call a strike when it is confident of
winning the arbitration.
Moreover, unions do have a substantial incentive to dis6bey preliminary
arbitration orders. An immediate strike by the union will preserve its right to
strike under the "no-strike" exception; these exceptions involve very specific issues,
and the right to strike must be exercised immediately to prevent mootness. For
example, in the Western case, the Easyriderwork may have been completed before arbitration proceedings determined that the union had a right to strike. Thus,
unions will exercise their "no-strike" exceptions prior to arbitration because, "...
it would be too late to apply a decision in its favor to work already performed
while awaiting the outcome of the arbitration process." 2 Inasmuch as the
union would not call the strike unless it was confident of arbitration success, it
is difficult to see that Western's treatment of § 301 damages will create any new
incentive for foregoing prearbitration strikes.
17 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);,United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
18 Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, 181 F. Supp. 809 (1960).
19 522 F.2d at 533.
20 Id.
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An injunction, as opposed to damages, would compel prestrike arbitration.
If its strike were enjoined, continued refusal by the union to arbitrate would
mean continued work by the union without recognition of its "no-strike" exception. Because of the nature of the "no-strike" exceptions, the opportunity for
exercise of the exception is fleeting; therefore, continued refusal to arbitrate by
the union may effectively destroy the right to strike exception.
Despite the apparent necessity of a readily available injunction to implement
the dictates of Western, the Seventh Circuit cites Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770,21 to the effect that injunctive relief is not appropriate
as a matter of course.22 Boys Markets held that an injunction will issue in a labor
case only in a narrow set of circumstances.2" Thus, if Western follows the Boys
Markets dictate, injunctions will rarely issue to prohibit strikes. Since Boys
Markets was decided prior to Western's directive of preliminary arbitration, the
narrow circumstances in which Boys Markets would allow an injunction were not
determined with regard to preliminary arbitration. Boys Markets, though, did
dearly restrict the issuance of an injunction to instances of unions economically coercing employers to forego arbitration. Accordingly, if courts sympathetic
to Western's rationale faithfully follow Boys Markets, the few cases in which injunctions will be allowed will preclude effective implementation of Western's
expanded arbitration requirement.
The significance of Western, then, is found in the Seventh Circuit's citation
of NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs, Parts and Garage Employees, Local 926,4 as precedent for requiring arbitration prior to an exercise of
a right to strike exception. 5 Western was explicit in its intention to cite NAPA
solely for this proposition. Nonetheless, it is significant that NAPA enforced its
preliminary arbitration dictate by issuing an injunction prohibiting prearbitration
strikes. Since Boys Markets would allow an injunction only where the union was
using the strike as an economic truncheon to dissuade the employer from pursuing
arbitration, NAPA necessarily stands for an expansion of the grounds upon which
an injunction may issue in a labor dispute.2" Thus, the citation of NAPA by
Western raises the question of whether Western endorses NAPA's expansion of
the grounds for issuing a labor injunction. The fact that the adoption of NAPA
would make Western's arbitration requirement enforceable lends credence to the
conclusion that Western endorses NAPA. To understand the nature and significance of this expansion, it is necessary to review the history of the injunction in
labor law.
21 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
22
The Union's arguments apparently do contain the underlying assumption that we
must evaluate these equitable considerations because it follows from the fact that the
contract first requires arbitration that an injunction to enjoin the work stoppage
automatically follows. But that is not necessarily the case. As stated in Boys Markets,
supra, at 253-254, 90 S. Ct. at 1594:
Nor does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate
as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance.
522 F.2d at 533.
,23 398 U.S. 235, 253 '(1970).
24 502 F.2d 321 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
25 522 F.2d 530, 532 (1975).
26 502 F.2d 321, 330 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
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Availability of Injunctions'in Labor Disputes
Early in the history of the labor movement, injunctions served as an effective
means for employers to blunt labor's most effective weapon, the strike." Courts
readily assented to these injunctions as the strikers were seen as a menace to
society. With the advent of labor's rise to respectability, the strike became
recognized as a basic right of labor.29 Consonant with this recognition, injunctions became more difficult to obtain. Finally, this policy of restricting injunctions
became codified with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."0 Section 104 of
the Act strips the federal courts of the power to issue injunctions in labor disputes. " This congressional policy to discourage injunctions soon clashed with
another congressional policy. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 authorized suits in federal courts for violations of labor-management
agreement." The policy behind this section of the Act was to support binding
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements." As damages for a breach
of a binding arbitration clause are awarded only when and if the employer shows
actual loss, it was inevitable that an employer would seek to enjoin a union from
striking over an arbitrable issue.
COMMERCE CLEARING HousE, LABOR LAW CouasE § 501, at 1054 (23d ed. 1976).
Id.
National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
Issuance of restraining orders and injunctions; limitation; public policy.
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with
the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary
or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this
chapter.
Anti-Injunction Act (Norris-LaGuardia Act) § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
31
Enumeration of specific acts not subject to restraining orders or injunctions.
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or
in concert, any of the following acts:
(a). Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment; ....
Anti-Injunction Act (Norris-LaGuardia Act) § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
32
Suits by and against labor organizations
(a) Venue, amount and citizenship
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a) 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
33
Declaration of purpose and policy
It is the policy of the United States that -

27
28
29
30

(b) The settlement of issues between employers and employees through collective
bargaining may be advanced by making available full and adequate government facilities for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage
employers and the representatives of their employees to reach and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions, and to make all
reasonable efforts to settle their differences by mutual agreement reached through
conferences and collective bargaining or by such methods as may be provided for in
any applicable agreement for the settlement of disputes; ....
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 201(b), 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (1970).
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In SinclairRefining Co. v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court was faced with this
clash of congressional policy. 4 On the employer's side was the congressional
policy favoring arbitration; on the union's side was the congressional policy of
prohibiting the use of injunctions in labor disputes. The Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the policy resident in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Although a court could
find that a union had breached its collective bargaining agreement and compel
specific performance of the arbitration clause, the Supreme Court held that a
court could not enjoin a union from striking during the arbitration proceedings. 5
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act did not amend the NorrisLaGuardia Act so as to allow an injunction where a union had violated a binding
arbitration clause.
This decision did not contemplate the misuse of the strike as a means of
circumventing the arbitration process. With injunctions prohibited, a union
could strike and exert sufficient economic coercion to dissuade management from
seeking judicial compulsion of arbitration. In just such a case, the Supreme
Court reviewed and overruled Sinclair. In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court
allowed an injunction to issue only when a collective bargaining agreement contained a mandatory arbitration procedure, the strike to be enjoined was over an
arbitrable grievance, and both parties were contractually bound to arbitrate the
underlying grievance.3' Boys Markets expressly noted the unusual circumstances
of its exception to the Norris-LaGuardia injunction prohibition."'
Subsequent to Boys Markets, the courts were circumspect in the application
of the Boys Markets exception. However, recent cases have sought to broaden
the Boy Markets exception to increasingly favor arbitration, making injunctions
more readily available in labor disputes. Typical language in these cases is exemplified by the following interpretation of Boys Markets in NAPA:
Boy's Markets . . . holds in essence that where a matter has been made

arbitrable by the terms of a contract between the union and the company,
an injunction may be issued to enforce this method of settling controversies
between the parties.8 8

This interpretation of Boys Markets subtly expands the exception formulated by
that case. The NAPA interpretation of Boys Markets would allow an injunction
whenever, .....a matter has been made arbitrable by the terms of a contract...,,31
rather than only where the union is seeking to coerce the employer to avoid
arbitration.
In NAPA, the union had the right to honor primary picket lines. The
34 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
35
At the most, what is involved is the question of whether the employer is to be allowed
to enjoy the benefits of an injunction along with the right which Congress gave him
in § 301 to sue for breach of a collective agreement. And as we have already pointed
out, Congress was not willing to insure that enjoyment to an employer at the cost of
putting the federal courts back into the business of enjoining strikes and other related
peaceful union activities.
Id. at 214.

36 398 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1970).
37

"Our holding in the present case is a narrow one." Id. at 253.

39

Id. at 323.

38 502 F.2d 321, 323 (1974).
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company was struck by a different union from a plant affiliated with the company.40 The union refused to cross the second union's picket lines, declaring them
to be "primary picket lines."4 The company sought injunctive relief under the
Boys Markets exception so as to end the work stoppage and force a crossing of the
picket lines.4" In Boys Markets, on the other hand, the dispute between the union
and employer was whether specific work had to be performed.by union personnel.
Despite a mandatory arbitration clause and "no-strike" provision in the contract,
the union struck. The strike was clearly illegal, as there was no applicable "nostrike" exception available. The distinction, then, between NAPA and Boys
Markets is that in Boys Markets the cause of the strike was an arbitrable issue; in
NAPA, the strike was not called because of the union's disagreement with the
company over an arbitrable issue, but because of the existence of the picket line.
The union was not applying economic coercion on the company to avoid arbitration, rather the union was merely exercising what it saw as its right to engage
in a work stoppage. As noted in the dissent to NAPA:
The work stoppage was not begun, nor was it continued because of the
union's disagreement with the Company over the arbitrable issue; that is,
over its right to engage in a work stoppage. As a result, no concession that
the Company could have made on this issue would have helped end the
walkout. That goal could be attained by the Company only if it resolved its
dispute with Local 110 and thus caused that union to remove its picket line.43
The dissent continued by noting:
Since this is true, the work stoppage could have exerted no pressure upon the
Company to give up its fight on the arbitrable issue and forego arbitration
since resolution of the arbitrable dispute prior to arbitration would have
brought nothing in return: the work stoppage would have continued in any
event."4

In short, although the work stoppage in NAPA involved an arbitrable, issue, it
was not the result of an arbitrable issue. Without the underlying policy of enhancing arbitration, it is difficult to see how NAPA can justify the expansion of
Boys Markets. Boys Markets sought to end circumvention of the arbitration
process.45 NAPA extends this exception to a situation where the arbitration process is not threatened by strike.
Western is like NAPA in that complete capitulation by the employer that
the Easyrider work was struck work would have only authorized the strike under
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 326 '(dissenting opinion).
Id.
Mhe very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts, or
other self-help measures. This basic purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is
no immediate, effective remedy for those very tactics that arbitration is designed to
obviate.
398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
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a "no-strike" exception. In no manner would it have halted the union's work
stoppage. Therefore, Western could not allow an injunction under the original
Boys Markets criterion but only under the expansion of this criterion as provided
by NAPA.
This expansion of the criterion on which an injunction may be issued in a
labor dispute may have the practical effect of destroying the right to strike as
provided by an exception to a "no-strike" provision. Theoretically,,an injunction
lirohibiting a work stoppage prior to arbitration would not destroy the right to
strike, but would merely delay the exercise of that right until arbitration had
been concluded. In actuality though, this injunction may, at times, result in
management's hesitancy to bring the case to arbitration. Conceivably, an employer may have everything to gain from avoiding arbitration, as he has obtained
everything he wants from the injunction; he only risks losing if he proceeds to
arbitration."
Of course, it might be argued that granting an injunction merely transposes
the parties that seek to avoid arbitration. Prior to Western, a union would delay
arbitration as long as it deemed a strike advantageous. Commencement of arbitration could mean a victory for the employer and a directive to go back to work.
Now, rather than have the union reluctant to arbitrate, management is the party
seeking to avoid arbitration. This transposition is precisely the problem with the
NAPA approach, as it is less supportive of arbitration to have the employer rather
than the union reluctant to arbitrate. Unions have the prospect of paying damages for their work stoppage every day prior to arbitration. Thus, there is some
incentive for the unions to seek arbitration, while management has no corresponding incentive. Therefore, the management may be able to delay'arbitration until
the controversy at issue has been t6rminatedY' In Western, for instance, an ijunction would have the effect of forcing 'the union to complete the Easyrider
magazine. By the time all the'employer's subterfuges had been surmounted, the
work may well have been completed. Even if the employer sought arbitration'in
good faith, the time consuming arbitration proceedings would preempt the "nostrike" exception. Arbitration cofild only award the union the, empty right to
strike against work that had already been completed.
Moreover, despite the ability of a district court to prohibit excessive delay
with its equitable powers, the practical effectiveness of these powers is questionable. Because they are equitable powers, there is no firm standard by which they
are to be applied in such situations: In"short, though equitable powers are eventually effective, they are not expeditious. As noted by'the dissent in:NAPA:
"... We do not feel that there is any reasonable way that a district court can
use this power to prevent significant delay when that goal is sought by one of
48
the parties.1

46
47
48

502 F.2d 321, 327 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 329 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 328 (dissenting opinion).

.
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Therefore, the trend as exemplified by NAPA and similar cases . may, at
times, have the practical effect of abrogating the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition
against labor dispute injunctions, at least where "no-strike" exceptions are involved.
Readily available injunctions compromise the union's position. This is
reminiscent of the early years of the labor movement and one might inquire into
the cause of this setback. Nominally, the motivating factor for this reversal is
the advancement of arbitration." As has been demonstrated, the cause of arbitration may actually be retarded by the substitution of the employer for the
union as the party reluctant to engage in arbitration. The result of NAPA and
its expansion of Boys Markets is to rob the union of its ability to exercise its collective bargaining agreement no-strike exceptions, while discouraging the best
hope for ending labor disputes, arbitration. It would seem a wiser decision to
read Boys Markets as a truly narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia antiinjunction policy which only allows an injunction to issue where the dispute is
over an arbitrable issue.5" Such an exception is intelligent: it prohibits unions
from using economic coercion to bypass arbitration, forcing an employer to capitulate rather than properly submit the issue to binding arbitration.
Impact of Western
Western then, seeks to require a union to arbitrate an issue termed arbitrable
by the collective bargaining agreement before it engages in a strike. Such a prearbitration strike, if the arbitration board eventually found for the company,
would result in "... . an unnecessary resort to force.. . ."" However, as a practical matter, this dictate of the Seventh Circuit means nothing unless it is enforceable by an injunction. Thus, there is good reason to believe that the Western
court in realizing this fact intended to endorse NAPA and its brethren. In establishing its requirement of arbitrationprior to strike, Western cites both NAPA
and Wilmington Shipping Co. v. InternationalLongshoremen's Assoc., Local
1426." These cases conclude that if the basis of a "no-strike" exception is an
arbitrable issue, the union must arbitrate prior to ceasing work. More importantly, however, both of these cases upheld the issuance of an injunction against the
union,"4 thus exemplifying the need for injunctions to support "prior arbitration"
dictates.
Finally, in fairness to the Seventh Circuit, its citing of Boys Markets for the
proposition that injunctive relief is not appropriate in every strike concerning an
arbitrable issue55 indicates that the court does not intend to totally disregard the
49 Monongahela Power Co. v. Local No. 2332, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
484 F.2d 1209 (1973); Pilot Freight Carriers v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 497 F.2d 311 (1974); Barnard College v. Transportation Workers Union of America, 372 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Inland Steel Co. v.
Local No. 1545, United Mine Workers of America, 505 F.2d 293 (1974).
50 502 F.2d 321, 323 (1974).

51

398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970).

52
53
54
55

522 F.2d 530, 532 (1975).
86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974).
522 F.2d 530, 532 n.6 (1975).
See note 19 supra.

[Vol. 51:981]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

1207

policies behind allowing injunctions only in limited circumstances. Nevertheless,
assuming that the Seventh Circuit will seek to make Western an effective dictate,
the Seventh Circuit will practically endorse an expansion of the grounds for
issuing a labor dispute injunction. It is ironic that a case that seeks to promote
prior arbitration may have the effect of discouraging that very policy.
William I. Brooks, III
SECURITIES REGULATION-SEcTON 16(b)

-

10 PERCENT BENEFICIAL

OWNERSHIP MUST EXIST PRIOR TO AN INITIAL PURCHASE FOR LIABILiTY TO
ATTACH

Allis ChalmersMfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Industry, Inc.'
Seeking to acquire a controlling interest in Allis Chalmers, Gulf & Western
on May 7, 1968 publicly announced to all Allis shareholders that pursuant to a
registered exchange offer, it would purchase 3,000,000 shares of Allis common
stock,2 which comprised more than 10 percent of Allis' outstanding stock.' This
acquisition was completed in late July. Shortly thereafter, Gulf & Western purchased an additional 248,000 shares of Allis stock from Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
in exchange for 496,000 unregistered Gulf & Western warrants.4 The closing
date for this transaction was September 30, 1968. On the very day the Oppenheimer exchange was closed,5 Gulf &Western met with White Consolidated Industries, Inc., to discuss the possible sale of Gulf & Western's Allis holdings. On
December 6, 1968, Gulf & Western sold its entire Allis holdings to White for a
considerable profit.s
Allis quickly countered and brought suit to recover this profit, claiming that

1 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), 44 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1976) (on the liability
issue); cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976) (on the damages issue).
2 Under the proposed offer, Allis shareholders would receive for each share of Allis common stock the following: (a) $11.50 in cash, (b) $12.50 principal amount of a 6 percent
subordinate 20 year nonconvertible debenture, and (c) 9/10 of a 10 year registered warrant
to purchase G&W common stock at $55.00 per share. Id. at 339.
3 During June 30, 1968 and December 31, 1968 there were between 10,364,103 and
10,410,292 shares of Allis common stock issued and outstanding. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 372 F. Supp. 570, 573 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
4 Oppenheimer received a guaranteed warrant price. See 527 F.2d at 339.
5 The court noted:
On September 13, 1968 Allis-Chalmers chairman Stevenson had on his own initiative
met with Bludhorn and Judelson of Gulf & Western and had, according to his
recollection at trial, told them that things did not look good for Allis-Chalmers. He
refused to quantify the bad news for the Gulf & Western representatives in response
to their specific questions, but he clearly disclosed to them his personal negative
evaluation of the situation at Allis Chalmers. Stevenson's notes for this meeting
reflected his belief at that time that the Gulf & Western people were "getting nervous"
about their block of stock in Allis-Ohalmers. At trial, Stevenson testified that he
"had the feeling right then [at the September 13, 1968 meeting] that they were thinking about disposing of it."
Id. at 339-40 n.4.
6 Gulf & Western received from White 250,000 unregistered shares of White common
stock plus $20,000,000 in cash and 180 day promissory note at 8.5 percent interest in the face
amount of $93,680,000. Id. at 340.
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it resulted from the use of inside information.' After the district court found
Gulf & Western liable for the profits realized from its purchase and sale of all
3,248,000 shares,8 the Seventh Circuit, reversing in part, held that § 16(b) liability attaches only when a party has insider status prior to the initial purchase or
sale. Since Gulf & Western lacked any. § 16(b) insider status prior to its initial
purchase, the profits realized from the sale of the 3,000,000 shares were considered beyond the reach of the statute.9 However, Gulf & Western was held
liable for the profits realized from the sale of the additional 248,000 shares, since
that purchase was made after Gulf & Western had achieved insider status."
The Seventh Circuit further held that in determining the profit realized under
§ 16(b), the unsecured corporate note received by Gulf & Western should have
been valued at face amount rather than at the lower fair market value at the
time of sale; therefore, the district court also erred in its damage computation."
To better understand Allis, an analysis of § 16(b) is in order. Section
16(b)' " seeks to deter short-swing speculation by corporate insiders with access
to information concerning their corporation unavailable to the rest of the investing public.' To lessen the burden of proving actual misuse, § 16(b) contains
a conclusive presumption that any insider who bought and sold securities within
a six month period traded on the basis of inside information. Thus, insiders may
be divested of profits 5 realized from a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of
7 15 U.S.C. § 78(P) (b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as § 16(b)]. Section 16(b)
provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information which may have been
obtained by [a] beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months. ...
shall inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director,
or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months ....
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of
the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection.
8 372 F. Supp. at 576.
9 527 F.2d at 349.
10 Id. at 351-52.
11 Id. at 352. This comment, while touching on the damages issue, will focus primarily
on the court's analysis of the liability issue, i.e., the time when insider status is required.
12 See note 7, supra.
13 See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Securities Co., 96 S. Ct. 508, 516 (1976);
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 411 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1973); Reliance
Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading
Under the Securities and Exchange Act (pt. 1), 66 HARv. L. Rav. 385, 386 (1953).
14 An insider within the coverage of § 16(b) can be defined as "Ee]very person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percentum of any class of any equity,
security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 78(g) of
this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security..." Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(P) (a) (1970).
Although a beneficial owner must be a greater than 10 percent holder to come within
the provisions of § 16, the phrase "10 percent holder" will be used throughout this comment
as a convenient, shorthand method of describing the kind of statutory insider.
15 The courts have consistently followed a 'lowest-in-highest-out" method of calculating
profits realized under § 16(b). Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). The lowest-in-highest-out method has been described as follows:
"[AI11 such transactions producing profits result in recovery, and any transaction producing
losses during the same period may be ignored subject only to the limitation that a purchase or
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their issuer's stock where both the purchase and sale took place within a six month
period, notwithstanding the absence of actual possession or use of insider information.e Yet while it is clear from the language of § 16(b) that its application
is limited to three classes of individuals, "7 problems have arisen regarding the
time at which statutory insider status is necessary as a prerequisite to liability.
Most of the cases involving beneficial owners, as was the situation in Allis,
involve the question of insider status at the time of the first of two transactions
occurring within a six month period. The critical issue is whether § 16(b) takes
into account the transaction that makes a person a 10 percent beneficial owner."
Cases have focused on the specific statutory exemption providing that "[t]his
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial
owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and
purchase, of the security involved ... '. ." 9 The phrase "at the time of" is susceptible to at least two distinct interpretations--"prior to" and "simultaneously
with"-both of which narrow the statute's applicability by specifying the time of
accrual of beneficial owner status in terms of the original purchase. 0 Therefore,
depending on the interpretation adopted, a purchaser must be a beneficial owner
either "prior to" or "simultaneously with" the transaction in question. Since
the statute imposes liability only where a statutory insider participates in a complete purchase-sale scheme, this distinction is crucial.
Stella v. Graham-PaigeMotors21 was the first decision construing the language of § 16(b)'s exemptive provision.2 2 Graham-Paige disclaimed liability,
arguing that the words "at the time of" meant "prior to" and not "simultaneously
with" the purchase and sale, and thus liability attached only on trades made
after a party became a 10 percent owner. A divided Second Circuit, rejecting
this argument, held that simultaneously with a purchase of more than 10 percent
to become an insider, 16(b) applies and any sale within six months of that date
is subject to its coverage. 3 Subsequent cases in the Second Circuit have uni-

sale of a given number of shares may be matched only once against a transaction of the opposite
character." R. JENNINGs & H. MARSH, SECuRImEs REGULATION CASE AND MATERALmS 1312
(3d ed. 1972).
16 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). See also Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 854 (1970); Gratz v. Glaughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1041 (2d ed. 1961).
17 See notes 7, 14 supra.
18 Loss, supra, note 16 at 1060.
19 15 U.S.C. § 78 (P) (b) (1970). While § 16(b) is applicable to directors, officers, and
beneficial owners, the exemption provision applies only to beneficial owners. See Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1958).
20 Although both interpretations narrow the statute's applicability, the "simultaneously
with" construction severely limits the impact of the exemptive provision. See JENNINGS & MARSH,
supra, note 15 at 1265.
21 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (motion for summary judgment); 132 F. Supp. 100
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.),-cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
22 See Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 1, 19-20
(1934), for an early recognition of the problem.
23 232 F.2d at 300-01.
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formly followed Stella, 4 and its rule was adopted by most of the cases in other
circuits in which the question arose.2"
In Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost McKesson, Inc.,2" however, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Stella approach and held that the purchase by which
an outsider first achieves 10 percent beneficial owner status may not be considered
for purposes of § 16(b) liability.27 Basing its decision largely on legislative history, the court reasoned that Congress intended § 16(b) to reach only those
beneficial owners who both bought and sold on the basis of inside information,
which is presumptively available to them only after they become statutory insiders."5 Consequently, the "prior to" construction of the statutory exemption
would not subvert the purpose of § 16 (b) but would rather be in accord with it. "
It was against this conflicting background of previous judical interpretations,
that the Allis court determined whether the purchase by which one becomes a
10 percent beneficial owner is within the scope of § 16(b). While agreeing with
Provident that for liability to attach one must be a beneficial owner prior to the
initial transaction, the Seventh Circuit rejected Provident's analysis as conceptually erroneous.3 " Based on its own reading of the legislative history of § 16(b),
the court determined that the statute was designed to prevent speculation based
on abuse of inside information associated with a specific two-part unitary transaction" consisting either of a purchase and subsequent sale or sale and sub24 See, e.g., Perine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F.2d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1974); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 355-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1157, 1161 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974); Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 157 (2d
Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582 (1973); Kahansky v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Co., 184 F. Supp. 90, 94 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). The Stella rule is codified in the proposed Federal Security Code. ALI Federal Securities
Code § 1413 (c) comment 6 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
25 Accord, Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611, 615, 618 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918,
922-24 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972) ; contra Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W. R. Stephens Investments Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
This case was, however, impliedly overruled by Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434
F.2d 918, 922-24 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
26 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976). The Supreme Court, in
Provident, thus sets to rest the debate concerning the meaning of the exemption provision in
§ 16(b) in favor of the "prior to" construction.
27 Id. at 614.
28 Id. at 608-14.
29 The court went on to clarify its holding stating that the "prior to" interpretation should
not be applied to a transaction which is not an initial purchase but in reality a repurchase or
a closing transaction. Rather, in the context of such transactions, "at the time of" should be
interpreted to mean "simultaneously with" (id. at 614-15); thus creating a "chameleonic"
definition of the simple phrase "at the time of." See Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf &
Western Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335, 346 (7th Cir. 1975).
30 527 F.2d at 346.
31 The initial draft of § 16(b) stated:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any [beneficial owner]
(1) To purchase any such registered security with the intention or expectation
of selling the same security within six months; and any profit made by such person
on any transaction in such a registered security extending over a period of less than
six months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
or expectation on his part in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased for a period exceeding six months. Hearings on S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97,
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 15, at
6430 (1934) (emphasis added).
Id. at 347.
The court then concluded that the differences between the initial draft of § 16(b) and
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sequent repurchase, and that Congress did not intend § 16(b) to apply to every
separate purchase or sale to which some use of inside information is a theoretical
possibility.12 Accordingly, the court adopted the following method of determining
the application of § 16(b) :
The question is whether one in a position of presumed access to inside information, that is, a director, officer, or a 10 percent shareholder of a corporation, combined a purchase and sale of his company's stock, in any order,
within a period of six months, thereby producing a profit. If the answer is
yes, the profit is attributable33 to the short-swing transaction and must be
returned to the corporation.
Thus, one who is an outsider prior to the initial stage of the two-part unitary
transaction lacks the prerequisite preexisting position of presumed access to inside
information necessary to trigger the conclusive presumption that a coordinated
short-swing transaction based on inside information has taken place.34
Although the court reached its result independently of the exemption clause,
it made clear that its construction of § 16(b) is consistent with the clause. Indeed, since the language of the clause" is that of limitation and not of expansion,
it is unlikely that the clause was meant to extend coverage beyond that originally
intended." Furthermore, since Congress has deemed a short-swing purchase and
sale to be a single transaction, 7 § 16(b) does not require a court to examine
each component of the short-swing transaction separately. Thus, the exemption
clause requires a determination of beneficial ownership only prior to the initial
purchase or sale," a conclusion consistent with the court's interpretation.
the finalized version of the section indicate that Congress intended the entire transaction to be
examined to determine if there existed a potential for speculative abuse. Thus, the purchase
and sale transaction is deemed not to be two transactions, but two component parts of a single
unitary transaction. Id. at 347.
32 Id. at 348.
33 Id. at 347.
34 Id.
35 15 U.S.C. § 78 (P) (b) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
...This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and
purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
36 527 F.2d at 348.
37 See note 31 supra.
38 The court's rationale is as follows:
Nothing in the legislative history or the generally accepted purpose of section
16(b) would suggest a reason for requiring a beneficial interest at the time immediately before or after the closing component of a short-swing transaction. Possession
of more than a 10% interest at this late stage could in no way relate to the possibility of speculative abuse, since any speculative plan would be formulated prior to
the opening purchase or sale, as we have indicated. Furthermore, requiring a beneficial interest in connection with the closing component encourages a dual-meaning
approach to the words "at the time of," as evidenced by the opinion of the Ninth
Circuit in Provident. 506 F.2d at 614. Such a dual-meaning approach defies rational
justification in terms of legislative intent, and makes the words themselves almost
meaningless. Moreover, in a limited class of cases, such a requirement would allow a
careful insider to speculate with 16(b) impunity. Thus, where a beneficial owner
anticipated a downward market, he could sell his entire interest and buy back only
9.9% within six months. With regard to this transaction he would never have been
a beneficial owner at the time of the repurchase regardless of how the words "at the
time of" might be construed, and yet as to that transaction he would have satisfied
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As Allis demonstrated, Congress intended § 16(b) to create a special remedy
applicable only in a limited situation;"9 it did not intend § 16(b) to provide a
general remedy for all insider abuses.4" To prevent an unfair imposition of liability,
the statute's harsh conclusive presumption of liability should be strictly construed
to apply only to those who can reasonably be expected to be in a position to have
access to inside information.41 By setting out the three classes of statutory insiders
and referring to information obtained by virtue "his relationship,"4 Congress
has established access derived from insider status as the only relevant access for
§ 16(b) purposes. One can hardly have such access before achieving such status.
Therefore, a court must focus on the time prior to the initial transaction in determining if a person is within the scope of § 16(b).
Additional support for this construction of § 16(b) is found in the recent
Supreme Court case of Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Securities Co.4" In
Foremost the Court held that, in a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner
must account for profits only if he was a beneficial owner before the purchase.As in Allis, the Court looked to the legislative intent behind § 16(b) for guidance
in determining if the initial transaction was within the scope of the statute. Relying on the exemptive provision, the Court determined that the phrase "at the
time of" must be construed to mean prior to the time when the decision to purchase is made; consequently, the initial purchase by Provident was beyond the
scope of § 16(b). Thus, based on the legislative history of § 16(b) and on the

both section 16(b) presumptions: a) he initiated the transaction when he was an
insider, giving rise to a presumption of access to inside information; b) he completed
the transaction within six months, giving rise to a presumption that he used inside
information to coordinate the sale and repurchase.
Id. at 348 n.13.
39 See Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Hearings
on H.R. 4344, H.R. 5065, and H.R. 5832 Before the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1255 (1942) (statement of SEC Commissioner Ganson
Purcell) :
The Commission is, of course, aware that section
16(b) is only a partial deterrent to
breaches of trust by officers, directors, and principal shareholders. The potentialities
of abuse of fiduciary obligations by these corporate insiders are infinite. No complete
catalog could ever be made of all the ways in which confidential corporate information
can be put to profitable use. It would be virtually impossible to draft a statute that
would defuse and prohibit all the variations by which officers, directors, or principal
shareholders can profit from their trust. It seems to the Commission that the Congress
was eminently wise in seeking to deal with the problem by expressly prohibiting only
the most prevalent form of the abuse of inside information-trading designed to take
quick profits from short-term market fluctuations.
40 A more general remedy for insider abuses is provided by rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.
10(b)-5 (1975). Rule 10(b)-5, however, requires a showing that the person has in fact misused
inside information. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 495
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
41 See Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6556 (1934).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78(P) (b) (1970). The preamble of the statute states:
For purposes of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer . .
43 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976), aff'g Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506
F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974).
44 Id.at 519.
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Supreme Courts anialysis, it would appear that Allis was correct in its holding."
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the exemption clause
requires one to be a beneficial owner only prior to the initial transaction appears
consistent with the language of the statute requiring a court tc treat the shortswing purchase and sale as one transaction.4 6 Rather than viewing the components
of the short-swing transaction as separate occurrences, § 16(b) requires the court
to examine the total. transaction to determine if the insider dealings involved a
potential for speculative abuse. This construction of the exemption provision is
superior to Provident's confusing bifurcated approach which provided a "simultaneously with" interpretation of "at the time of" as applied to the closing
transaction.4"
Allis, then, is significant for two reasons. First, the -result was reached independently of the exemption provision. Through its focus on the scope of §
16(b), the court has freed the analysis of the time when insider status is required
from the strictures of the exemption clause, which is limited to beneficial owners.
This shift in focus potentially narrows the application of § 16(b) by making it
possible to argue that initial transactions by directors and officers should likewise
be excluded from § 16(b)." Second, the Seventh Circuit's reinterpretation of

the exemption clause removes much of the confusion initiated by the Provident
bifurcated approach.
The significance of Allis for future decisions, of course, must be judged in
light of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Foremost-McKesson v. Provident
Securities Co. 9 Allis and Foremost are in general agreement in holding that "at
the time of," as used in the exemption, requires beneficial owner status prior to
the initial step of a short-swing transaction. Allis' broader implications concerning its application to a case where a director or officer makes an initial transaction
before obtaining insider status, however, remain unanswered. The Supreme
45 See Hecker, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: An Analysis of the Time
When Insider Status is Require'd; 24 KAN. L. Riv. 255 (1976); Note, Beneficial Owner's
Liability for Short-Swing Profits: judicial Construction of Section 16(b)'s Exemption Provision,
9 LoYoLA L. REv. 175 (1976); Note, Is the Purchase by Which One Becomes a Ten Percent
Beneficial Owner a Statutory Purchase Within the Meaning of Section 16(b)?, 7 RUToRSCAM. L.J. 104 (1975).
46 This interpretation, however, was criticized by Judge Stevens who stated:
Although I voted against a rehearing en banc because I agree with Judge Swygert's
basic conclusion that the fact of critical importance is-the controlling person's presumed access to inside information at the time of his -decision either to buy or to
sell, I do not agree with his reading of the clause making § 16(b) inapplicable to "any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved. .. " I think the word
"both" refers to both times, that is, the time of purchase and the time of sale, rather
than to both a purchase-sale and a sale-purchase. The word "or" in the clause, as
well as the Supreme Court's holding in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,
404 U.S. 418, require this reading. This reading is not contrary to Judge Swygert's
holding because Gulf & Western was a controlling person both at the time of its purchase of the 348,000 [sic] shares and also at the time of its sale of those shares.
527 F.2d at 341 n.5. See also Hecker, supra note 45, at 278 n.128.
47 506 F.2d at 614-15. -See also Note, Beneficial Owner's Liability for Short-Swing Profits:
Judicial Construction of Section 16(b)'s Exemption Provision, supra note 45 at 184, 188,
190-91. Such an analysis requires the court to make an independent determination of the status
of the party at the time of the closing transaction, which is apparently contrary to express language of § 16(b).
48 See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
49 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976).
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Court failed to intimate its view concerning the Seventh Circuit's broader analysis
when deciding Provident, although it did expressly acknowledge the court's approach.5" Nevertheless, regardless of the category of the insider, no one could
possess the prohibited intent unless he was an insider prior to the initial transaction. Based on this criterion, Allis' broader implications appear correct, and
should be followed.
Joseph V. Rizzi

IV. Federal Statutes and Government Regulation
LEGAL PROFESSION

STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY
SATISFY THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASsIsTANcE OF COUNSEL

REQUIRED

TO

United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey
Matthews v. United States
United States v. Jeffers
The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 1 In Powell v. Alabama2 the Supreme Court expanded the sixth amendment guarantee from the bare right to counsel to the right to effective assistance
of counsel. Then in Gideon v. Wainwright' the Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment was applicable to the states. An additional constitutional source
of the right to effective assistance of counsel is the fourteenth amendment due
process clause which was relied upon by the Court in Avery v. Alabama.'
Although the Supreme Court has firmly established a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, it has only tangentially considered the appropriate
standards for evaluating the effectiveness of counsel. Until recently the Seventh
Circuit applied the "mockery of justice" standard in reviewing claims of incompetent counsel.' Under the mockery standard, counsel was judged ineffective
50

Id. note 16 at 515.

1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
3 372 U.S. 335 (1964).
4 308 U.S. 444 (1940). In Avery the Court held that the defendant had not been denied
his constitutional right of counsel with the accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation at trial.
5 See, e.g., United, States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Ingram, 477 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1972);
Johnson v. United States, 422 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Dilella, 354 F.2d
584 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Bella, 353 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1965); United States
ex rel. Weber v. Ragan, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 809 (1949); United
States ex tel. Feeley v. Ragan, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948); Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989
(7th Cir. 1941).
The United States Courts of Appeals have gradually shifted away from the "mockery of
justice" standard just overturned in the Seventh Circuit by United States ex reL Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975). The first step was taken by the Fifth Circuit in
MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), where the court said: "We interpret counsel
to mean not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight but counsel
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." Id. at 599. The
Fifth Circuit has occasionally reverted to the mockery standard, see Brooks v. Texas, 381
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only if his performance rendered the trial a complete sham or mockery of justice.
In United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, ' the Seventh Circuit adopted

a new standard under which counsel was deemed incompetent if he failed to
provide minimum professional representation. This new standard was applied
and interpreted by the Seventh Circuit in two subsequent cases, Matthews v.
United States' and United States v..Jeffers8 Although the new Seventh Circuit
standard was stated in broader and more liberal language than the mockery of
F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967), but the MacKenna opinion is still the leading Fifth Circuit case
on the issue.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court in Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), was the first circuit to adopt the minimum standards test. In Bruce, the court
wrote that the test is whether counsel "lacked the minimum standards of competency necessary
to satisfy appellants' constitutional rights to counsel." Id. at 118.
The Fourth Circuit has developed an even broader test for measuring ineffectiveness of
counsel. A 1968 decision, Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968), established stringent
standards: (1) counsel should be appointed promptly, (2) counsel should be afforded reasonable
time to prepare, (3) counsel must confer with his client without undue "delay and as often as
necessary to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable, (4) counsel must conduct
appropriate investigation. Additionally the court noted, "An omission or failure to abide by
these requirements constitutes a denial of effective representation of counsel unless the state,
on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of the precepts is shown can establish a
lack of prejudice thereby." Id. at 226.
The Sixth Circuit has most closely aligned with the Fourth Circuit. A dual standard was
established by the Sixth Circuit in Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
The court said firstly: "we hold that the assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering effective assistance" and secondly,
"defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in
the criminal law, and must conscientiously protect his client's interest." Id. at 696. Finally,
Beasley held that, "defense counsel must investigate all apparently substantive defenses available to the defendant and must assert them in a proper and timely manner." Id. at 696.
The Third Circuit recently retreated from a broader standard like that of the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits to a minimum standards test similar to that of the District of Columbia Circuit.
In Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1970), the court said: "the standards of
adequacy of legal services as in other professions are the exercise of the customary skill and
knowledge which normally prevail at the time and place." Id. at 736.
Of the remaining five circuits, some show strong adherence to the mockery standard, while
others waiver. The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all continue to apply the mockery
standard.
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1974),
articulated its standard: "the representation must be so woefully inadequate as to shock the
conscience of the court and make the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice." Id. at
1333. Yanishefsky was cited as controlling as recently as in United States v. Ortega-Alvarez,
506 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1974).
The Ninth Circuit has also continued to abide by the mockery standard. In a 1975
decision, United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1975), the court wrote: "This coirt
will not reverse a judgment of conviction unless a defendant's representation has been so inadequate as to make his trial a farce, sham, or mockery of justice." Id. at 524.
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit wrote in Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d 240 (10th Cir.
1973) that "it cannot be said that the representation was perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a
pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference or preparation." Id. at 242-43.
The First Circuit, while continuing to rely on the mockery standard, see Moran v. Hogan,
494 F.2d 1220 (1st Cir. 1974), indicated in a 1975 opinion, Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503
(1st Cir. 1975), that it may be considering a reassessment of the mockery standard. In
Dunker the court was specifically asked to overturn the mockery standard, but rather than
take such a step the First Circuit said the case could have been decided under either a mockery
standard or a more liberal standard. Thus, by failing to base its holding on the current standard
the First Circuit may have implicitly rejected it.
The Eighth Circuit continues to uphold the mockery standard, but in a 1974 case,
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974), there is language indicating that a
reassessment is near. The court wrote: "It was not intended that the mockery of justice
standard be taken literally, but rather that it be employed as an embodiment of the principle
that a petitioner must shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness." Id. at 214.
6 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975).
7 518 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1976).
8 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1976).
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justice test, its future impact must be assessed in light of the Matthews and
Jeffers opinions, and with reference to alternative standards which can provide
the court with an opportunity to create more comprehensive and helpful guidelines.
The New Seventh Circuit Standard: Minimum
Professional Representation
In United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey,9 the Seventh Circuit broadened the rule governing the requirements of a criminal defendant's constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. The new test, as enunciated by the
Williams court, focuses on whether the defendant has been deprived of "legal
assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation.""0
The circuit court, in overturning the district court's finding that the fourteenth and sixth amendment guarantees had not been denied, noted that the
lower court decision had been reached under the stricter "mockery of justice"
standard.1" The circuit court held that the petitioner had alleged sufficient
grounds to establish a denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's specific allegations stated that trial counsel's inexperience, lack of sufficient time for investigation and preparation, failure to present any evidence suggesting a defense, and failure to warn him that in taking the stand his previous
criminal record would become admissible as evidence denied him his sixth
amendment guarantee."2 The circuit court acknowledged that under the prior
"mockery of justice" standard, these allegations presented a "close case";s
however, under the new test of minimum professional competency, the grounds
were clearly sufficient to show a denial of petitioner's constitutional rights. 4
Thus, the Williams decision on its face purports to liberalize the standard of
legal competence, making it easier for a defendant to establish a denial of his
constitutional right to competent counsel.
The Williams decision, in comparison to many earlier Seventh Circuit cases,
is certainly more liberal in defining judicial standards for evaluating claims of
incompetency of counsel. Under the "mockery of justice" standard, the court
had indicated that even a sufficient showing of counsel's incompetency would
not "vitiate the trial unless on the whole the representation is of such a low caliber as to amount to no representation." ' 5
9 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975).
10 Id. at 640.
11 Id. at 641.
12 Id. at 637-38.
13 Id. at 638.
14 Id. at 640.
15 United States ex reL Feeley v. Ragan, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948). The
most extreme example of the impossible burden of proof which is placed upon a defendant to
establish a denial of his constitutional rights is found in the court's opinion in Pelley v. United
States, 214 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955). Petitioner made a
collateral attack on his conviction for violations of federal sedition laws. The petitioner cited
17 substantial errors and admissions to establish the incompetency of his trial counsels. Id. at
601. Petitioner further alleged the existence of a conspiracy between his chief counsel and the
prosecutor to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Petitioner offered to prove the existence
of the conspiracy through evidence that the prosecutor had threatened to deport the chief
defense counsel's alien wife unless he cooperated in obtaining a conviction. The Seventh
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These earlier cases suggest that an accordingly strict application of the
"mockery of justice" standard would have precluded relief for the defendant in
the factual context present in Williams.
However, an examination of more recent cases decided under the "mockery"
standard indicates that Williams did not signal a sharp departure from current
Seventh Circuit decisions on competency of counsel. Although based on a different standard, the Williams case is consistent with the 1974 Seventh Circuit
"mockery" standard decision, United States v. Miller.'" The alleged incompetency in Williams and Miller was based upon trial counsel's lack of sufficient
time for adequate investigation and preparation. Both courts found the allegations sufficient to establish a denial of petitioner's constitutional rights.
The petitioner in Williams had alleged several grounds of incompetency of
his appointed counsel, but the Seventh Circuit's opinion emphasized the factor
of counsel's insufficient time for preparation and investigation. 7 In Williams,
petitioner's initial counsel, Mr. Bradley, was appointed three days prior to trial.
However, he was continually engaged in a different trial throughout the threeday period and was unable to interview the petitioner; on the first day of the
petitioner's trial Mr. Bradley indicated that he would be unable to appear in
court the following week. The court then appointed another attorney, Mr.
Cohan, as substitute counsel. Despite this last minute change, the newly appointed
counsel failed to request a continuance and the trial proceeded as scheduled. 8
The petitioner cited the late appointment and counsel's conspicuous lack of sufficient preparation for trial as evidence of his denial of competent counsel. The
Seventh Circuit in Williams refused to apply a general presumption of incompetency to all untimely appointments of counsel. 9 The presumption of competency traditionally arises from the fact that the attorney is a member in good
standing of the state or local bar; it is a rebuttable presumption which the defendant may overcome by a strong showing of specific evidence to the contrary.20
Yet the actual impossibility of adequate preparation and investigatiori by
petitioner's counsel troubled the court in this case.
The circuit court opinion indicated that the question of incompetency based
upon allegations of untimely appointment is clearly dependent upon the specific
factual context of the case. The court enumerated those factors which are relevant in assessing a -claim of incompetency on the ground of untimely appointment: "Much depends on the nature of the charge, of the evidence susceptible
of being produced at once or later by the defense, and of the experience and
capacity of defense counsel." 2' The court examined these factors and noted that
the crime charged, burglary, was a felony, that trial counsel was completely surCircuit, in applying the "mockery of justice" standard, found that even if all of petitioner's
factual allegations were accepted as true, he still did not make out a case sufficient to warrant
setting aside his conviction. Id. at 601-02.

16
17
18

508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974).
510 F.2d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id.at 635-36.

19

Id. at 639.

20 See United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragan, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 1949); United
States ex ret. Feeley v. Ragan, 166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1948); Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d
989, 992 (7th Cir. 1941).
21 Id.
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prised by the appearance of the prosecutor's two key witnesses, that trial counsel
totally failed to pursue several obvious sources of information, and that counsels
lack of experience was reflected by his performance. On the basis of these factors
the court concluded that petitioner's counsers actions were sufficiently below the
expected professional standards of competence to constitute a denial of the petitioner's constitutional right of effective assistance of counsel.
The defendant in United States v. Miller 2 also argued untimely appointment of trial counsel. Defendant's counsel had been appointed two days prior
to trial, and the defendant had requested a continuance on the grounds that his
attorney had not had sufficient time to prepare for trial or interview his client.
The district court denied the motion but on appeal the Seventh Circuit court held
that the untimely appointment of counsel and the failure to grant the continuance
resulted in a denial of the defendant's right to competent counsel.
The Miller opinion is consistent with Williams in focusing upon the actual
impossibility of sufficient preparation and investigation by defendant's attorney
that resulted from the late appointment of counsel. The Miller court concluded
that under the factual circumstances petitioner's counsel could not be expected
to perform the numerous tasks involving preparation and investigation that are
necessary to ensure adequate representation of counsel between appointment
and trial.2
The court's analysis in both Miller and Williams centered on the factual
context that surrounded the untimely appointment of counsel. In both cases the
court concluded that the late appointment had actually prevented trial counsel
from having sufficient time to investigate and adequately prepare for trial. However, the Miller court applied a stricter standard than the Williams test of minimum professional competency in assessing the impact of the trial counsel's inadequate investigation and preparation. The Miller court, quoting Supreme Court
dictum from Avery v. Alabama" as its authority, asserted that denial of opportunity for adequate consultation and preparation by appointed counsel could
convert the appointment of counsel into a sham, or merely "formal compliance"
with a defendant's constitutional rights. 5 The use of such a "sham" standard,
in addition to the court's finding of an abuse of discretion by the district court
in denying the motion for a continuance, indicates that the Miller court placed
a heavy burden of proof on the petitioner to establish the incompetency of his
counsel. The Miller court's standard of review seems to be a different albeit
more progressive verbalization of the Seventh Circuit "mockery of justice" test.
Certainly, the Miller court's language suggests that the accused had to show substantially more than a denial of minimum professional competency in order to
gain a reversal of the conviction.
Thus, the Miller and Williams courts reached the same conclusion of a
denial of the right of effective assistance of counsel while applying substantially
different standards of review to similar factual situations. This is significant,
since it suggests that the result in Williams probably would not have been any
22 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974).
23 Id. at 451.
24 308 U.S. 444, 448 (1940).
25 United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1975).
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different if the stricter Miller standard of review had been applied. This casts
doubt upon the proposition that the new Seventh Circuit standard of minimum
professional competence as enunciated by Williams is substantially more liberal
than the previous standard; Miller suggests that petitioner's allegations in Williams may have produced a clear case of mockery under the more modem version
of the mockery standard as the circuit court had concluded." Although the
Williams standard is cast in broader language than the "mockery of justice" test,
it may not produce any radically different results in its actual application.
Limitations on the Williams Standard of Minimum
Professional Representation
1. Matthews v. United States
The better measure of the future impact of the new Seventh Circuit standard
for evaluating competency of counsel as established by Williams is found in two
subsequent Seventh Circuit cases, Matthews v. United States27 and United States
v. Jeffers,"s which interpreted and applied the "minimum professional competency" test. An examination of the court's holdings in Matthews and Jeffers
is necessary to determine the full scope of the presumably broader Williams
standard, and to identify those factors which the Seventh Circuit court may
employ as limitations on the Williams court's expanded concept of incompetency
of counsel.
In Matthews v. United States"9 the petitioners alleged incompetency of
counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction for conspiracy to engage in election fraud. Petitioners' principal grounds for incompetency were that trial counsel
was overworked, represented too many clients at the same time, and lacked
adequate time for trial preparation. The circuit court gave but cursory attention
to the petitioners' specific claims: that their attorney interviewed each of them
for less than an hour, that 10 days in advance of trial he was unsure that he
would remain in the case, that he did not produce any evidence or call any witnesses favorable to the petitioners since he had anticipated a guilty plea up to
the moment of trial, and that he was representing all five codefendants in petitioners' trial as well as 25 other defendants in five separate'similar cases at the
same time.3 0
The Matthews court concluded that none of these allegations were inconiistent with the minimum standards of professional representation as required by
Williams." Although the Matthews court used the new Seventh Circuit standard
of competency, it did not follow the Williams opinion in its analysis of the petitioners' allegations. In fact, Matthews placed a limitation upon the Williams
rationale by beginning its consideration of petitioners' charges with the presumption that trial counsel was competent; the burden of demonstrating the
26 United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1975).
27 518 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1975),
28

520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975).

29
30
31

518 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1246.
Id.
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contrary was placed on the petitioners.3 2
The presumption of competency was used in earlier Seventh Circuit decisions as an essential element of the "mockery -of justice" standard. But the
more recent Seventh Circuit cases applying the mockery standard appeared to
have abandoned the presumption, making no mention of it in their analysis. 3
Instead, the circuit court automatically would make an independent examination
of the record in light of the defendant's specific allegations, in order to arrive at
its own determination on the issue of competency. Since the vitality of a pre:
sumption of competency had diminished under the stricter mockery standard,
it is even less appropriate under the broader test of minimum professional competency.
The Williams court not only failed to assert a presumption of competence,
but also suggested a contrary proposition. The court asserted that the facts alone
in that case put the court on "inquiry" as to the effectiveness of the attorney
there. 4 The Williams court refused to follow the example of other circuits, such
as the Fourth and Sixth, which presume incompetency in every case of untimely
appointment of counsel.3 5 But the Williams court did concede that the particular
facts of the case raised a duty on the part of the court to carefully scrutinize the
record to determine the actual effectiveness of counsel.3" The Williams court,
in acknowledging its affirmative duty of inquiry into the attorney's effectiveness,
implicitly rejected a presumption of competency which would place a heavy
burden of demonstrating incompetence on the accused. Thus, the Matthews
court's use of a presumption of competency is inconsistent with and constitutes
a limitation upon the liberal standard of competency as articulated in Williams.
The heavy burden of proof which the presumption of competency places upon
petitioners obviously undermines the less demanding standards established by the
Williams court.
It can also be argued that the Matthews court's use of a presumption of
competency is inconsistent with the very nature of the Constitution's guarantee
of the effective assistance of counsel. This conclusion is suggested by the Supreme
Court's unequivocal statement in Avery v. Alabama"' that "where denial of the
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel is asserted, its peculiar sacredness
demands that we scrupulously review the record." '
A second limitation on the Williams court's rationale is implicit in the
Matthews decision. The court in Matthews was careful to point out that petitioners' attorney was privately retained, in contrast to appointed counsel in
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Robinson. 502 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ingram, 477 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1973): United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317 -(7th Cir. 1972); Calhoun v. United States,
454 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1019 (1972); United States v. Radford,
452 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Johnson, 422 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1970).
34 510 F.2d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1975).
35 The Fourth and the Sixth Circuits apply a presumption of incompetency to every case
of untimely appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.
1974); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1968).
36 510 F.2d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1975).
37 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
38 Id. at 447.
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Williams. 9 Although the Matthews court did not directly address this point; it
is clear that the counsel was retained and not appointed bore heavily on the
court's conclusion that counsel was competent. The Matthews court professed
that it was disturbed by petitioners' allegations that counsel was too busy with
other work to provide effective assistance of counsel. Yet the couit peremptorily
dismissed the validity of petitioners' argument by taking judicial notice that the
criminal bar is overworked and that maniy of the busiest attorneys are the most
effective. 40 This casual treatment of the petitioners' serious- allegation of counsel's

insufficient preparation suggests that, since counsel was of their own choosing,
the court had little sympathy for petitioners' complaints. Moreover, the Matthews
court followed a number of earlier Seventh Circuit cases decided under the
mockery of justice standard in stating that "an accused cannot proceed to trial
with counsel of his own choice and then later claim a denial of due process chargeable to the state because of errors committed by counsel." '4 This rule, however,
has been suspended where retained counsel is so inadquate and incompetent as
to virtually
deprive the defendant of representation and reduce the trial to a
2
4

sham.

The propriety of the distinction made in Matthews between competency of
retained and appointed counsel was squarely rejected by the Williams court when
it stated that an accused, "whether represented by his chosen counsel, or a public
agency, or a court appointed lawyer, has the constitutional right to an advocate
whose performance meets minimum professional standard."4 Thus, the distinction between retained and appointed counsel which the Matthews court at
least implicitly recognized constitutes a second limitation on the broad scope of
the Williams standard of competency.
A final limitation on the Williams standard that is imposed by the Matthews
opinion concerns the weight that should be given to the actual merits of the
defendant's case in deciding a question of competency of counsel. The Matthews
court rejected the allegation that counsel failed to produce any evidence or witnesses favorable to the defendants, since there had been no showing that such

39 Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975).
40 The Williams court made a similar observation that, "many lawyers have the facility,
skill, and panache which makes them ready instanter to champion a defendant who summons

them at the twelfth hour." UnitedStates ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 639 (7th

1975). However, the Williams court did not dismiss the petitioner's allegations merely on the
basis of this broad generalization, but proceeded to examine in detail the actual effectiveness
of the attorney in that case. Id. at 639-41. The Matthews court, in contrast, never went
beyond the generalization, to examine the actual facts supporting the petitioners' allegations.

41 Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 976, 979 (7th Cir. 1948). See also United States ex rel.
Feeley v. Ragan, 166 F.2d 976, 979 (7th Cir. 1948); Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 993
(7th Cir. 1941) (contra).
42 See United States v. 'Carr, 459 F.2d 16 (7th Cir. 1972); Wilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir. 1969); Lunce v. Overlade, 417 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957); Pelley v. United
States, 214 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragan, 166 F.2d 976
(7th Cir. 1948).
43 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975).
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evidence did exist or could have been discovered by an investigation." The court
stated that the defendants had admitted to the attorney that they were indeed
guilty as charged and that in such a case counsel would have no duty to prepare
evidence for a defense.45 The court further stated that its conclusion that petitioners' claims of incompetence were insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing was buttressed by the court's independent familiarity with the record derived
from prior appeal.46 In essence, the Matthews court evaluated the merits of the
defendants' case on the basis of the evidence on the record and its prior knowledge of the case, and concluded that competency of counsel was not a concern
since the prosecution's evidence strongly supported the defendants' guilt.
In assessing competency of counsel, earlier Seventh Circuit opinions have
given considerable weight to the court's impression of the defendant's guilt."
One opinion went so far as to say that when the known facts overwhelmingly
point towards the defendant's guilt, the attorney has a duty to society not to seek
to overthrow the facts by false testimony or by practices which are within the
knowledge of the experienced lawyer but outside the ken of the novice.' The
Matthews court echoed this conclusion when it stated that if the defendants were
guilty as charged, then counsel had no duty to investigate for witnesses or evidence
to the contrary.4 9 Although the Matthews court was correct in its admonition
against false and perjured testimony, its conclusion is still incorrect because it is
premised upon pure speculation and inference that the defendants are guilty.
The Williams court exposed the danger that is inherent in such speculation
when it discredited the district court's attempt to infer the petitioner's motives in
seeking immediate trial, since such an inference was unsupported by evidence in
the record." But the strongest rejection of the Matthews rationale is found in
Powell v. Alabama,"' where the Supreme Court asserted:
It is not enough to assume that counsel thus precipitated into the case
thought there was no defense, and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court could say5 2what
a prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to facts.
In fairness to the Matthews court it must be admitted that there is substantial
value in referring to the merits of a case in evaluating the quality of the legal
44 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975). It is significant to note that the Williams court
did place some emphasis upon the proven existence of evidence which would have been discoverable by the petitioner's attorney if sufficient time had been allowed for investigation. The
court specifically referred to the fact that one of the petitioner's codefendants, Alonzo Brock,
who was not interviewed by the petitioner's attorney, had a story exculpating the petitioner.
510 F.2d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1975). It is hard to assess how much weight was given to this
undiscovered evidence by the Williams court in reaching its conclusion that counsel was incompetent.
45 518 F.2d at 1246.
46 Id. at 1247.
47 See United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1974); Calhoun v. United
States, 454 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1971); Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941).
48 Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1941).
49 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975).
50 510 F.2d 634, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1975).
51 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 60 (1970) (Harlan,
.J., dissenting).
52 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932).
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representation that the defendant received.5" However, as Powell points out, a
court's speculation on the merits is not an adequate substitute for a thorough
investigation of the facts of a case-an essential aspect of the accused's right to
effective assistance of counsel. The Matthews court's disposition of petitioners'
claims seems on balance to be too perfunctory and not reflective of sufficient
inquiry into the facts which surrounded the petitioners' allegations.
2. United States v. Jeffers
The Williams standard of professional competency was also interpreted and
applied by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Jeffers.54 The defendants, in
an appeal from a conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine,
claimed a violation of their sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel. The Jeffers case raised an unusual kind of competency issue since it was
conceded that the defendants' retained counsel was competent in all respects
except in his failure to cross-examine a key prosecution witness.5 s It is difficult to
extract the Jeffers court's analysis on the competency question, because it is
inextricably linked to the pervading question of a conflict of interest on the part
of defendants' counsel. In Jeffers the defendants' attorney failed to complete a
thorough cross-examination of one of the prosecutor's key witnesses on the ground
that there was a conflict of interest. Defendants' attorney asserted that the witness
was a former client of his firm and he was thus restricted in his cross-examination
by the possibility that it might involve privileged information. The trial court
ruled that the information disclosed by the attorney revealed no conflict of interest; the attorney was directed to proceed with his cross-examination. The
attorney's several motions for leave to withdraw from the case were denied. The
attorney asked a few introductory questions of the witness, but then stated that
he could not continue because of the conflict of interest. He thus failed to complete the cross-examination.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the defendants' conviction, ruling that the
trial court's determination that there was no conflict of interest was correct and
that the attorney's failure to complete the cross-examination did not constitute a
violation of the defendants' right to competent counsel. Since the question of a
conflict of interest on the part of the defendants' attorney in Jeffers is a distinct
aspect of competency, requiring separate treatment, it is not by itself relevant to
a consideration of the meaning and application of the Williams standard of
53 The court in United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1974), convincingly
stated the rationale supporting the consideration of the merits of a defendant's case in evaluating his claim of incompetency of counsel:
But where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel, present and, participating
throughout the proceeding, the strength of the case may at least repel the temptation
to conclude that the fact of conviction itself demonstrates that counsel was ineffective.
The defensive strategy and its lack of success must be evaluated in the light of the
strengths and weaknesses of the offense, and the "quality of legal representation cannot
be abstractly measured without reference to the merits of a defendant's case .
United States ex rd. Testemark v. Vincent, 496 F.2d 641, 643 (2d 'air. 1974).

502 F.2d at 896.
54 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975).
55 Id. at 1263.
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competency. 56 But regardless of the correctness of the Jeffers court's finding of
no conflict of interest, the fact remains that a key prosecution witness was not
effectively crossexamined. The question of whether the failure of the attorney,
for whatever reason, to conduct a thordugh cross-examination violated the defendants' right to effective assistance of counsel is directly related to the court's
adherence to the standard of minimum professional competency established in
Williams.
The problem with the Jeffers decision does not derive from the court's conclusion that defendants were not deprived of their constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. Under a proper application of the Williams standard of
competency, this conclusion is probably correct. However, the Jeffers court's
reasoning and analysis in reaching that conclusion are troublesome. Initially, the
Jeffers court acknowledged that a failure to cross-examine constituted-an arguable
ground for a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel."7 Logically,
the next step should have been a consideration of the sufficiency of the defendants' claim in light of the court's acknowledged adherence to the Williams
standard of incompetency. However, the Jeffers court never reached this step;
nor did it evaluate the attorney's failure to cross-examine under the Williams
standard of competency."8 The Jeffers court bypassed these central issues to make
its determination entirely on the basis of waiver and lack of prejudice in the
record. Thus the Jeffers court might have reached the correct conclusion, but
it evaded the central issues of incompetency. It is unfortunate that the court
chose to base its decision on alternate grounds which may serve to limit the
liberalization of incompetency standards under the Williams decision.
The Jeffers court refused to evaluate the effect of the attorney's failure to
fully cross-examine because the record did not show that such a failure prejudiced
the rights of the defendants. 9 This prejudice requirement seems to derive from
earlier Seventh Circuit decisions applying the harmless error ruleO to cases where
the alleged incompetency of counsel was based upon a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1l
However, it is not clear under Supreme Court decisions that the prejudice
requirement is appropriate where the defendant claims a denial of the right to
competent counsel. Certainly the prejudice requirement places a heavier burden
of proof on the defendant who claims incompetency of counsel. Jeffers suggests
56 A number of cases have established that the defendant's right to competent counsel
includes the right to the undivided loyalty and faithful devoted service of his attorney. See
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942);
Wilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1970).
57 520 F.2d at 1266.
58 The Jeffers court states at one point that "the fact that an attorney is unable to pursue
one line of inquiry does not mean, however, that the defendant is receiving inadequate representation." 520 F.2d at 1265. But the court never followed through on this thought since it
never reached, the issue of whether the defendants actually received inadequate representation.
59 520 F.2d 1245, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1975).
60 The harmless error rule requires a showing that there is a reasonable possibility that the
error complained of prejudiced the defendant by contributing to his conviction. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Ingram, 477 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dilella, 354 F.2d 584 (7th Cir.
1965); United States v. Bella, 353 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1948) ; United States ex rel. Feeley v.
Ragan, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
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that regardless of whether the Williams standard eases the defendant's burden
of establishing a denial of the right to competent counsel, he still faces the onerous
requirement of showing that he was prejudiced by such a denial. Despite the
Supreme Court prescription of a general harmless error rule, the Court has intimated that certain constitutional rights are so fundamental that their denial is
inherently prejudicial. Justice Stewart, concurring in Chapman v. California,
specifically indicated that the right to counsel is an example of such a fundamental right;6 2 as support for this proposition he cited Glasser v. United States."
In Glasser,the defendant claimed a violation of his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. The specific grounds for the denial concerned a conflict of
interest on the part of defendant's attorney which, inter alia, prevented the attorney from cross-examining one of the prosecution's witnesses. The Supreme Court
held that the effect of the conflict of interest was to deny the defendant his right
to assistance of counsel. The Court stated: "The right to have the assistance
of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."'" This language suggests that the prejudice requirement is not applicable where the constitutional denial is one of effective assistance of counsel.
Waiver was the second basis for the Jeffers court's conclusion that defendants' constitutional guarantee of competent counsel was unimpaired.6 5 The
court found that the defendants' attorney waived their rights to further crossexamination by: (1) maldng no offer of proof as to the substance of the possible
cross-examination; (2) making no further effort to get another attorney to crossexamine; and (3) making the statement-even if for incorrect reasons--that
he had no further cross-examination. 6 Although the Jeffers court was careful to
say that defendants waived only the right to further cross-examination," the practical effect of the court's holding was to say that the defendants' attorney waived
their right to effective assistance of counsel. Since the defendants' only basis for
alleging incompetency was the attorney's failure to cross-examine, by waiving the
basis of that allegation, the right to cross-examination, they actually waived their
right to competent counsel. The Jeffers court affirmed this conclusion when it
stated:
Arguably, therefore, his client's constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel was violated when he [the attorney] declined to heed the courts
[sic] directive to conduct a full cross-examination notwithstanding his partner's former relationship with Berry. We are persuaded, however, that the
defendants waived their right to have Berry subjected to further crossexamination. 8
62 386 U.S. 18, 43 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). This isalso suggested in Justice
Harlan's dissent in Chapman, id. at 52.
63 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
64 Id. at 76.
65 520 F.2d 1256, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1975).
66 Id. at 1267.
67 Id. at 1266. The general topic of waiver and the right to counsel isdiscussed inGrana,
The Right to Counsel: CollateralIssues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1208
(1970).
68 520 F.2d 1256, 1266 (7th Cir. 1975).
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The Jeffers court's use of waiver analysis is contrary to the Supreme Court's
command in Glasser that "[t]o preserve the protection of the Bill of Rights for
hard-pressed defendants, we indulge every reasonable presumption against the
waiver of fundamental rights."6 In Glasser, the Court found that although the
defendant had acquiesced to representation by his attorney throughout the trial,
the defendant had never affirmatively waived the objection to his attorney's conflict of interest that he had initially advanced.70 This analysis is equally valid in
the Jeffers case, since the defendants repeatedly advanced their initial objections,
in the form of the attorney's motions for leave of court to withdraw as counsel,
to further representation by their attorney.7 The Jeffers opinion indicated no
evidence of any subsequent affirmative waiver of these objections by the defendants; therefore, under Glasser the defendants' mere acquiescence is insufficient
to overcome the strong presumption against waiver of competent counsel.
The Jeffers finding of waiver, though squarely in conflict with the presumption against waiver of effective assistance of counsel, was not a crucial error
in the case, since defendants' attorney probably would have been found competent under the Williams standard of minimum professional representation.
However, a similar use of waiver by the courts could effectively frustrate the purposes behind the broader Williams standard of competency. If an allegedly incompetent attorney can waive all the specific grounds for a defendant's claim of
incompetency on behalf of his clients, then the guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel becomes meaningless. It is the very purpose of the presumption against
waiver to protect the fundamental right to competent counsel from such invasions.
Therefore, this protection of the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel should not be defeated by the analysis utilized by the Jeffers court.
Both Matthews and Jeffers, in interpreting and applying the new Williams
standard of competency, used a number of concepts to limit its broadening effect.
An examination of other Seventh Circuit decisions suggests two other concepts
which may further curtail the scope of the Williams standard. The first concept
is that of trial tactics. Traditionally, Seventh Circuit courts have been reluctant
to find incompetency where the defendant's allegations concerned the attorney's
professional judgment in his use of trial strategy.7 2
Unless a strong showing is made that conduct of counsel virtually deprived
defendant of a trial, matters of trial conduct and tactics adopted pursuant
to defendant's counsel's professional opinion on the merits
of the case should
73
not be subjected to a critique by a court of Appeals.
The court's deference to an attorney's professional judgment is based on a
69 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942). This presumption against waiver of
the right to effective assistance of counsel was also stated by the Supreme Court in Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
70 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
71 520 F.2d 1256. 1260-62 (7th Cir. 1975).
72 See, e.g., United, States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United States v.
Radford, 452 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dilella, 354 F.2d 584 (7th Cir.
1965); United States v. Bella, 353 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1965); Pelley v. United States, 214
F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Ragan, 178 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1949); United
States ex rel. Weber v. Ragan, 176 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1949).
73 United States v. Bella, 353 F.2d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 1965).
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desire to avoid second-guessing counsel in an area where there are no objective
standards. 4 As one court noted, it is doubtful whether any attorney could mentally review his performance in a trial without finding a number of mistakes or
omissions. 5 Although this is a legitimate policy, it can be carried to an extreme.
While a minimal number of tactical mistakes should not constitute incompetency,
when the mistakes become so numerous that the counsel's performance falls
below the minimal level of professional representation, then the attorney must
be deemed incompetent. The difficulty is in recognizing when common errors
turn into incompetence. Clearly the concept of trial tactics may be used to sanction a considerable amount of attorney misconduct which would otherwise be
considered incompetence under the Williams standard.
A second concept that tends to limit Williams is the circuit court's practice
of giving great deference to a trial court's finding of competency. 6 This practice
is premised on the legitimate assumption that the trial court, which had firsthand
observation of the attorney's conduct, is in the better position to assess his competency.17 There is a danger that the circuit court may give the trial court's
findihg too much weight by ignoring any evidence on the record which may support a conclusion of incompetence. One Seventh Circuit decision remedied this
problem by deferring to the trial court on matters of "historical fact," while
making its own assessment, based on such facts, of the fundamental fairness of
the petitioner's conviction with such counsel.' This approach is a practical answer to the danger that circuit courts will give too much weight to a trial court's
conclusion of competency.
Beyond Williams: Proposed Remedies in the Form of a
New Comprehensive Standard
The new Seventh Circuit standard only addresses the question of whether
or not counsel served effectively. This leaves unanswered the more fundamental
questions of how to redress the wrong of incompetency and how to prevent its
recurrence.
Traditional remedies have been available through direct appeal or collateral
relief, primarily habeas corpus petitions.7 ' The effectiveness of these remedies is
limited by the heavy burden of proof that accompanies them. A habeas corpus
petition will not be granted unless the defendant can affirmatively demonstrate
that the constitutional violation affected the outcome of his trial." Thus, not
1
only must he overcome the burden of presumed competency cited in Matthews,"
but he must also show that because of incompetency the trial's outcome was
affected.
The pressures of this dual burden indicate that the courts have been gener74
75
76
Dowd,
77
78
79
80
81

United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragan, 176 F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 1949).
Pelley v. United States, 214 F.2d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 1954).
See United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragan, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949); Achtien v.
117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941).
United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragan, 176 F.2d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 1949).
Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 1957).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
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ally unwilling to grant collateral relief when ineffective assistance of counsel is
before them. Commentators suggest two reasons for this judicial reluctance:
(1) a hesitancy to cite fellow lawyers for ineffective assistance, and (2) a concern over opening a floodgate of litigation from convicted defendants.8 2 This
reasoning is far from convincing when it results in denying a remedy to a defendant whose constitutional rights have been abridged. Thus, a method for making
the traditional remedies more responsive in ineffective counsel cases must be
considered.
The traditional remedies could be more effective if a violation of the right
to effective representation of counsel was deemed to be such a fundamental right
that any violation of this guarantee would automatically allow a habeas corpus
petition.
No case has suggested this, but the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California 3 laid the foundation for such a rule by stating that "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated
as harmless error."'" The Chapman Court noted one such right that, when
abridged, can never be harmless error is the right to counsel as enunciated in
Gideon v. Wainwright. 5 Since the right to effective counsel has been labelled as
tantamount to the right to counsel,86 the Chapman holding could logically extend
the proposition that denial of counsel cannot be harmless error to include the
proposition that the denial of effective counsel cannot be harmless error. The
Chapman reasoning supports such an enlargement, since a trial without effective
counsel clearly impinges upon the fairness of the judicial process as much as a
trial without counsel.
Unfortunately, the traditional remedies do not go to the questions of redress
and prevention. Habeas corpus is a retrospective remedy which when granted
months or even years later has little deterrent effect on an attorney who had
rendered the ineffective assistance. Similarly, it does little to redress the defendant's injury other than to offer him a new trial.
None of the 1975 Seventh Circuit cases which established a new standard
for determining incompetency have taken any steps to propose additional relief.
The only prospective attempt to eliminate ineffective assistance of counsel in the
Seventh Circuit was in Achtien v. Dowd,"7 where the court wrote: "We assume
that a court in appointing counsel for one charged with a felony should take
many things into consideration. He should consider the existence or absence of
friends, the age and experience of the accused, and the seriousness of the
charge .... ," The court there was attempting to suggest a formula for appointing counsel that would match counsel with client. Although the proposal may
have been sound, it was never followed by the Seventh Circuit. The value of
deterrence and the necessity for redress are clear; the Seventh Circuit should
82 Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from
Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rav. 927, 959 (1973).
83 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
84 Id. at 23.
85 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
86 See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
87 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941).
88 Id. at 992.
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therefore attempt to fashion relief that combines both features.
An initial step would be vigorous enforcement of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. As Chief Judge Bazelon wrote: "Our vaunted Code of Professional
Responsibility has not served as a means of policing the quality of defense counsel." 89 Generally, courts have refused to use the Canons except as a touchstone
0 where the attorney did not
of criticism. An example is Turner v. Maryland,"
confer with his clients until 10 minutes before trial. The court held that counsel
was effective, but criticized him for not upholding the spirits of the Canons.91
If every petition for collateral relief that was granted based on ineffective representation of counsel was referred to the state grievance committee, the Canons
would become an influential means of deterring incompetent assistance.92 If
this procedure was initiated, lawyers who failed to meet the minimum standards
of Williams might be subject to suspension, and even disbarment.
The second proposal which undoubtedly would have serious ramifications
for the appointed criminal defense bar is the possibility of civil suits seeking damages for ineffective counsel. Traditionally these suits have been barred under
the theory of governmental immunity. 3 The best Seventh Circuit statement of
the rationale for this prohibition is found in Arensman v. Brown. The court
there cited three reasons why the immunity exists in the Seventh Circuit: (1) to
satisfy the public, these officers must have freedom from civil suits; (2) to avoid
a floodgate of litigation; and (3) to force defendants to seek the adequate remedy
at law.9 4 Without explicitly so ruling, the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics95 has begun to reject
governmental immunity when constitutional rights have been violated.
The reasons for withdrawal from the strict concept of governmental immunity are clear when cast in the light of a defendant who is barred from suit. Governmental immunity precludes a defendant who has been convicted without the
assistance of effective counsel and who may have suffered incalculable damages
through years of imprisonment from asserting any claims for compensatory relief.
It has been suggested that an expansion of the right to sue for damages when
federal agents violate the fourth amendment, as proclaimed in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,"' should be
extended to violations of the sixth and fourteenth amendments where ineffective
counsel is at issue.97
In Bivens the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that federal narcotics agents
had violated the fourth amendment by conducting an illegal search of his home.
Plaintiff sought monetary damages for his resulting mental suffering, embarrass-

89 Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. Rav. 1, 17 (1973).
90 318 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1963).
91 Id. at 854.
92 The referral would only apply if the ineffective assistance resulted from an attorney
and was not the court's fault.
93 Barr v. Matteo. 360 U.S. 564 (1969).
94 430 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1970).

95 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
96 Id.

97 See Bines, supra note 82.
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ment, and humiliation." Both the district court99 and the circuit court 100 dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action; the Supreme Court
reversed. The Bivens holding is limited to civil suits for violation of the fourth
amendment, but some of the Court's reasoning is applicable by analogy to ineffective counsel cases. Justice Brennan's majority opinion suggests that any time a
legal right is violated and there is a jurisdictional statute which allows the suit,
then the federal courts may use any remedy available to correct the wrong.''
The sixth amendment, as amplified by Powell v. Alabama, °2 includes a guarantee
to defendants of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, if the
right to effective representation of counsel is denied a defendant, he should be
afforded every redress available, including damages.
One commentator has suggested that a damage action against an ineffective
lawyer is even more compelling than one against an agent violating the fourth
amendment.
The exclusionary rule, a conviction-oriented remedy for unlawful searches,
operates more swiftly than habeas corpus, the conviction-oriented remedy
for ineffective representation. The exclusionary rule operates at the outset
of a trial rather than at its conclusion, and the earlier the sanction, the
greater its deterrent effect. Thus, while there is some chance police investigators and prosecutors react personally to the sting of lost evidence, it is
doubtful a lawyer feels anything but defensive
when his conduct comes under
10 3
attack months or years after the event.
Thus, the damage suit may provide the deterrent effect that is lacking in a
petition for habeas corpus.
Although the traditional remedies, the ethical canons, and the civil damage
suits all offer a degree of deterrence in developing remedies for ineffective representation of counsel, the courts should consider a more positive solution. Chief
Judge Bazelon has made two such proposals: (1) certification for criminal
lawyers, and (2) appointment of public defenders by an independent body.'"'
Certification would ensure that every criminal lawyer would possess fundamental knowledge, training, and experience. Without this requirement the likelihood of uneven preparation for criminal defense work will continue. Of course,
certification involves the provision of methods to achieve the required expertise.
This can be accomplished through continuing legal education, service as cocounsel
to provide experience, and an expanded role for law schools.
Appointment of attorneys by an independent body would ensure that pressure to relax the defense in the interests of time could not be exerted on a lawyer
by the judge that selected him as defense counsel. This is especially crucial where
lawyers depend on judicial appointments for their livelihood. An independent
98

403 U.S. 388, 389-90 (1971).

99

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718 (2d

Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
100 Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12
(E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
101 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).

102
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body offers the autonomy to develop certain standards for competency with the
added leverage of future appointments to ensure their enforcement.
The most effective tool for preventing ineffective representation of counsel
would be one that combines the deterrent effects of the traditional remedies and
damage suits with the positive effects of licensing and special appointment. A
comprehensive standard for determining ineffective counsel provides such a
balance. The standards would be positive because they would inform counsel of
the exact expectations of conducting effective criminal defense work. Likewise,
the standards would serve as a deterrent because the courts would be more likely
to enforce the existing deterrent measures when the enforcement process is directly
related to the standard.
One recommendation made by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 0 5 proposes that each criminal defense attorney receive a checklist from the court reminding him of the steps necessary for preparation of an
adequate defense. 6 The list's complexity, however, would make it difficult for
attorneys to rely upon it and courts to administer it as an overall standard."'
The highly respected ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal justice'ss offer a more complete and workable set of standards than
any court has yet enunciated. These proposed standards are a refinement of
relevant sections of the ABA Standards. Hopefully, these standards will offer
more guidance to lawyers than Williams does now but without the complexity
of the unrefined ABA Standards and the Maryland court's proposal.
The ABA Standards include:
1) The accused's counselor must serve his client to the utmost of his learning
and ability. 0
2) The lawyer should seek to determine all relevant facts known to the accused:10
3) It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt
and degree of guilt or penalty. 1
4) The lawyer has a duty to keep his client informed of the developments in the
case and the progress of preparing the defense. 2
5) The lawyer should inform the accused of his rights forthwith and take all
necessary action to vindicate such rights."'
105 This report was prepared by Judge Rosel C. Thomsen and is noted at 36 F.R.D. 277,
327 (1965).
106 Id. at 338-41 (1965).
107 The proposed plan by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
has over seventy specific checks that should be made by defense counsel.
108 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPILATrON, (1974).
109 ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 1.1(b) (1971).
110 Id. at 3.2(a).
III Id. at 4.1.
112 Id. at 3.8.
113 Id. at 3.6(a).
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6) The trial lawyer's responsibility includes presenting appropriate 14motions, after
verdict and before sentence to protect the defendant's rights.1
7) The lawyer should take whatever steps are necessary to protect defendant's
right of appeal."-'
8) Once a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused his duties
and obligations are the same whether he is privately retained, appointed by
the court or serving in a legal aid and defender system." 6
9) The lawyer should not accept more employment than he can within the spirit
of the Constitution mandate for speedy trial and the limits of his capacity to
give each client effective representation." 7
This checklist can be weighed by a court against the relevant facts in each
case. If a significant number of the provisions have been breached, it would be
prima facie evidence that the defendant received ineffective representation of
counsel. This is not to suggest that by violating a single provision an attorney
would be deemed ineffective. Rather, the courts should use this standard as
more an analytical tool and less a mechanical test for determining ineffectiveness.
If the ABA Standards had been applied in Williams it would point to a clear
violation of the right to effective representation of counsel. The counsel there,
by failing to inform his client of the consequences of taking the stand, did not
serve his client to the utmost of his learning and ability." 8 The ramifications of
testifying are so fundamental that any lawyer who neglects to warn his client of
them must be held to fall short of a standard of competence. Counsel failed to
conduct investigations that would have produced all the relevant facts;19 nor
did he take all the necessary actions (moving for a continuance) to vindicate his
client's rights. 2 ' Thus Williams demonstrates exactly how the new standard
would work.
The Matthews case, like Williams, involved a number of clear violations of
the ABA Standards. Certainly the attorney in Matthews could be cited for taking
more work than he could effectively handle. 2' Likewise he made no attempt to
determine all the relevant facts through thorough investigation.'22 The ABA
Standards also note that counsel, whether retained or appointed, has the same
duties and obligations. 2 This standard would seem to suggest that retained
counsel has no "immunity" from charges of ineffectiveness merely because he
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I. at 8.2(b).
Id. at 3.9.
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was hired by the defendant. 2' The Matthews court was quick to note that
counsel was retained, which may have influenced the court to find his representation effective. Thus, if the more exacting ABA Standards are applied to Matthews the decision seems to be in error.
United States v. JefferS 2 5 offers the best test of the ABA Standards. As
noted, in Jeffers the Seventh Circuit seemed to be groping for reasons to explain
why counsel effectively represented his client. Initially the court stated: "The
record before us unambiguously demonstrates that Cohen satisfied these requirements." But later, Judge Stevens wrote: "Cohen (the attorney) misjudged his
ethical responsibilities, but the fact remains that an important witness was not
thoroughly cross-examined. Arguably, therefore, his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel was violated. ..

."

This apparent contradiction

seems to leave the court in a quandary, searching for a solution. The court then
argued, unconvincingly, that the entire question was rendered moot by defendant's waiver of the right to effective counsel. This judicial hedging could have
been avoided by the application of the ABA Standards. The Standards suggest
that counsel served competently. The attorney kept his client informed by warning of the possible conflict of interest. Similarly, the attorney continued to crossexamine despite his conviction that a conflict of interest existed. The attorney
did preserve the defendant's right to appeal and, in fact, argued for him before
the Seventh Circuit. There is no suggestion in the Jeffers opinion that counsel
controverted any other standards. Therefore, if the ABA Standards are applied
the judicial machinations of Jeffers are avoided.
To suggest that the ABA Standards provide a panacea for the judicial controversy surrounding the ineffective assistance of counsel is far too presumptuous.
However, the application of the ABA Standard to Williams, Jeffers, and Matthews demonstrates that it is at least a hopeful suggestion to the problem and
worthy of judicial consideration.

The establishment of a new standard for evaluating claims of incompetency
by the Williams court is a significant change for the Seventh Circuit. The Williams standard of minimum professional representation appears to lessen the
burden of proof on the defendant to establish counsel's incompetency. The Williams language indicates that the defendant no longer needs to show that his
counsel was so totally incompetent as to constitute a mockery of justice. However, as the Matthews and Jeffers courts indicate, the effect of this broad and
liberalized standard may be seriously confined through the use of a number of
traditional limiting factors, such as a presumption of competency and the harmless error rule.
Although the Williams decision attempted to effect needed change in the
area of incompetent counsel, its approach did not involve remedying or prevent124 Earlier court decisions refused to cite retained counsel for incompetency reasoning that
the attorney served as the client's agent and all the acts of the agent (attorney) were imputed
to the principal.

125 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975).
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ing the problem. The traditional remedies of habeas corpus and direct appeal
do not provide adequate deterrence against ineffective representation. The refined ABA standards offer attorneys thorough guidelines to aid them in providing
the fullest measure of effective representation for their clients. In addition, they
provide the courts a workable tool for realistically assessing an attorney's competency.
The Seventh Circuit's new standard reflects a concern for improving the
quality of representation of criminal defendants. The proposed ABA Standards,
which offer a, more realistic and concrete set of guidelines for both courts and
attorneys, would more effectively implement this concern.
Michael T. Bierman and Joanne M. Frasca

LEGAL

PROFESSION-SPEEcH--ABA

AND

LOCAL

CoURT

ISCIPLINARY

RULE'S STANDARDS FOR PROHIBITING ATTORNEY COMMENTS ON PENDING
INVESTIGATIONS OR LITIGATION VIOLATE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer
The conflict between fair trial and free speech is not new to our legal
system; yet, despite its traditional presence, it is an area in which many problems
remain unresolved. The extent to which the right to a fair trial justifies restrictions, in the form of court and bar association disciplinary rules, on an attorney's
speech concerning that trial until recently lacked a definite answer. Such a response was presented by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer.'
Plaintiff, the Chicago Council of Lawyers, and various individual attorneys,
originally brought this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf
of themselves and all other attorneys practicing before the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They argued that Rule 1.07 of the
District Court's Local Criminal Rules' and Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the ABA's
1 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (opinion by Swygert, J., with Wyzanski, J., concurring
and Castle, J., dissenting in part).
2 Local Criminal Rules for the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois:
1.07 Public Discussion by Attorneys of Pending or Imminent Criminal Litigation
(a) It is the duty of the United States Attorney, or a lawyer or law firm not to
release or authorize the release of information or opinions which a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication, in connection
with pending or imminent criminal litigation with which he or the firm is associated,
if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with a fair
trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
(b) With respect to a grand jury of other pending investigation of any criminal
matter, the United States Attorney or a lawyer participating in or associated with
the investigation shall refrain from making any extrajudicial statement which a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication, that goes beyond the public record or that is not necessary to inform the
public that the investigation is under way, to 'describe the general scope of the investigation, to obtain assistance in the apprehension of a suspect, to warn the public
of any dangers, or otherwise to aid in the investigation.
(c) From the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest warant, or the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment in any criminal matter until the commencement of
trial or disposition without trial the United States Attorney, or a lawyer or law
firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall not release or authorize the
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Code of Professional Responsibility' were, in addition to being unconstitutionally
release of any extrajudicial statement which a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication, relating to that matter and concerning:
(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments, or other charges of

crime), or the character or reputation of the accused, except that the lawyer or
law firm may make a factual statement of the accused's name, age, residence, occupation, and family status, and if the accused has not been apprehended, the United
States Attorney may release any information necessary to aid in his apprehension or
to warn the public of any dangers he may present;
(2) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by
the accused, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make any statement;

(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or the accused's refusal or failure
to submit to an examination or test;
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses, except that the
lawyer or law firm may announce the identity of the victim if the announcement is
not otherwise prohibited by law;
(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or a lesser offense;
(6) Any opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the
case or the evidence in the case.
The foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the United States Attorney, or a
lawyer or law firm during this period, in the proper discharge of his or its official

or professional obligations, from announcing the fact and circumstances of arrest
(including time and place of arrest, resistence, pursuit, and use of weapons), the
identity of the investigating and arresting officer or agency, and the length of the
investigation; from making an announcement, at the time of seizure of any physical
evidence other than a confession, admission or statement, which is limited to a
description of the evidence seized; from disclosing the nature, substance, or text
of the charge, including a brief description of the offense charged; from quoting or
referring without comment to public records of the court in the case; from announcing the scheduling or result of any stage in the judicial process; from requesting

assistance in obtaining evidence; or from announcing without further comment that

3

the accused denies the charges made against him.
(d) During the trial of any criminal matter including the period of selection of the
jury, no United States Attorney or lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall give or authorize any extrajudicial statement or interview, relating to the trial or the parties or issues in the trial which a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication, except that
the United States Attorney, or lawyer or law firm may quote from or refer without
comment to public records of the court in the case.
(e) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of any criminal
matter, and prior to the imposition of sentence, the United States Attorney, or a
lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall refrain from
making or authorizing any extrajudicial statement which a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if there is a reasonable
likelihood that such dissemination will affect the imposition of sentence. (Amended
effective March 9th, 1971).
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal
matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the offense
and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other matters
and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal
matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commencement of the
trial or disposition without trial, make or participate in making an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests, indict-
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vague and overbroad,- unduly restrictive of an attorney's first amendment right
to freedom of speech. The defendants consisted of two groups: those alleged to
partake in the enforcement of these rules,' and a class of intervening defendants
composed of attorneys regularly engaged in the representation of criminal clients
before the district court. After the Executive Committee of the district court
ments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by
the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure
of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the
merits of the case.
(0) DR 7-107 (B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid in
his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of
the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other than
a confession, admission or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or law
firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make
or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to the
trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to
interfere wtih a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter
and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the
prosecution or defense shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public communication and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(G) A- lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not 'during its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than
a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective
witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure
of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as
required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matters reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.
4 The constitutional principles concerning vagueness and overbreath are so basic to any
system of law that they warrant little discussion here. Generally, rules which restrict an individual's first amendment freedoms must be clear, precise and narrow. The purposes of such
requirements are simply to ensure that each individual is able to easily identify his particular
conduct in reference to the rule's proscriptions, and to guard against restrictions which extend
beyond that which is essential to the interest sought to be protected. Further discussion on
this issue is withheld until consideration of the specific provisions of each rule, and then appears as required.
5 This refers to the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, the
Marshall for the District Court, and the Clerk of the District Court. 522 F.2d at 247.
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granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action,'
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for relief consistent with its opinion.
Search for a Constitutional Standard
In reviewing the appellate court's holding, it is interesting to note the
initial rejection of plaintiffs' argument refuting the notion of competition between
these two basic rights. The court stated that while ideally, perhaps, the right to
free speech and the right to a fair trial are capable of peaceful coexistence,
pragmatically, some conflict between the two is inevitable.' Referring to the
Supreme Court decision in Estes v. Texas,' where the right to a fair trial was
recognized as "the most fundamental of all freedoms,"' the seventh circuit noted
that
[c]onsequently, when irreconcilable conflicts do arise, the right to a fair trial,
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to criminal defendants and to all
persons by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, must take
precedence over the right to make comments about pending litigation by
lawyers who are associated with that litigation if such comments are apt
to seriously threaten the integrity of the judicial process.10
These opening remarks appeared to indicate a preferred position for the sixth
amendment right; however, the remainder of the opinion is not wholly supportive of this preference.
As a prerequisite to determining the position of these two rights in relation
to each other, the court considered, and dismissed, the contention that the
questioned court rules constituted prior restraints." The court then set about to
1974)
6 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill.
7 522 F.2d at 248.
8 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
9 381 U.S. at 540.
10 522 F.2d at 248 (emphasis added).
11 As noted, the first substantive issue handled by the court was a rejection of the
classification of the noncomment rules as prior restraints. The importance of such a classification lies in the fact that prior restraints, unlike other speech restrictions, are inherently
suspect and thus come before the court with a "heavy presumption' against their validity.
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). In the process of this
determination the court conceded the existence of an important similarity between the court
rules and the notion of prior restraints: both are punishable by the courts contempt power.
This permissible use of the contempt power, according to the Seventh Circuit, is an essential
characteristic attributed to prior restraints and is cited as one of the basic factors which
serve to distinguish these restraints from statutory enactments tending towards the same end.
Despite this basic congruency, the court was able to find sufficient grounds on which to distinguish the court rules from prior restraints. In general, this court cited as the critical point
of distinction the varying procedures available for challenging the two types of restrictions.
More specifically, however, the court focused on the differing court functions which provided
the underlying basis for each of those procedures.
Basically, a court can be perceived as functioning in two capacities: one adjudicative,
the other legislative. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 113 (7th Cir. 1971). By the very nature
of the former role, the court is restricted to a determination of the relative rights of the
parties before it. Assuming the requisite power to adjudicate, the court makes its determination on the basis of facts currently relevant. The legislative role, on the other hand, is characterized by court adoption of much broader rules, in an attempt to control general, rather
than specific situations. As such, these enactments are based primarily on anticipated facts and,
consequently, are likely to have their greatest effect on persons not before the court at the
time of their acceptance. Clearly, then, prior restraints which are premised on particular

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[July 1976]

investigate the substantive constitutional issue before it. However, to sufficiently
analyze the adequacy of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bauer, it is necessary to
review the historical development of the clear and present danger standard and
its relation to the exercise of free speech.
The clear and present danger test, as a standard for determining under what
circumstances the first amendment guarantee of free speech might be impinged,
was announced in Schenck v. United States. 2 Schenck had been convicted of
violating the Espionage Act of 1917 by urging resistance to the draft. In his
appeal to the Supreme Court he claimed that his speech had been within the
protective confines of the first amendment. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court, stated that not all speech is constitutionally protected, and that
[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent.' 3
facts confronting the court, are issued pursuant to the court's adjudicative role. Contrastingly,
court rules of conduct, generated as preventative measures based on predicted situations, arise
out of a court's legislative functioning.
The court views this distinction as a rational basis for requiring different challenge
procedures for enactments formulated under each role. As a creation of its adjudicative function, a court issued prior restraint is not challengeable collaterally, but requires direct action.
Walker v. City -f Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). In other words, the constitutionality of
a prior restraint must be raised on an appeal directly contesting the issuance of the order; the
unconstitutionality of the order is not itself a defense in a contempt proceeding for its violation. A different rule is reasonably applicable, however, with regards to general rules enacted
pursuant to a court's legislative role. In paralleling the functions of a legislature, the court
should receive treatment accordingly. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d at 114. Violations of its enactments, therefore, should be subject to the same manner of challenge available in situations
involving statutory violations. Basically, this allows the assertion of a court rule's invalidity
as a permissible defense in an action for its violation. In adopting this position, the Seventh
Circuit apparently views the ability to collaterally challenge no-comment rules as a sufficient
safeguard against the dangers inherent in summary contempt proceedings, thus warranting
elimination of the "heavy presumption" against their validity. But even the Seventh Circuit
limited the application of its parallelism argument. Although justifying removal of this
particularly rigorous standard, the court did not feel the direct-collateral challenge distinction
was sufficient to raise court rules to a position of total parity with statutory enactments. Thus,
rather than accepting the extreme position of presuming their validity, the court indicated its
intention to view the rules under a somewhat vague standard resting between these extreme
positions. The court states: "Thus, while we do not begin our examination with a 'heavy
presumption' against validity, we are aware of the fact that these court rules must endure even
closer scrutiny than a legislative restriction." 522 F.2d at 249.
Noting that the Supreme Court has made it "abundantly clear" that review of contempt
proceedings will differ from review of statutory violations, the district court went to the
extreme of the Seventh Circuit and presumed the validity of the rules. According to the lower
court, such a presumption was justified by the prior legislative deliberations. Thus, the court
reasoned, "[ijn view of the extensive deliberations which preceded the promulgation of the
challenged rules . . . , it is evident that they must be judged by standards analogous to those
applied to legislative action." 371 F. Supp. at 693-94. The "extensive deliberations" mentioned by the court refer to the various studies preceding recommendation of the rules. See,
ADVISORY COMMIITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FRE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS

RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, (Ap-

proved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE]; Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System, Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D.
391 (1968); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CIT OF NE-w YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF PRESS AND
TRIAL, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1967).

12
13

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
249 U.S. at 52.

FAIR
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While this standard has been repeated in a variety of cases, Bridges v. California 4
has become the leading application of the clear and present danger standard at
least in terms of its original formulation.
Bridges involved the conviction of a union official for contempt of court,
based upon certain statements he made which were printed. Originally, Bridges
telegrammed the Secretary of Labor sharply criticizing a federal court's handling
of a major labor dispute. In effect, the telegram threatened a strike if any attempt
were made to enforce the judgment of the court. While a motion for a new
trial was pending, the contents of the telegram were published in a local newspaper, whereupon Bridges was convicted of contempt, the judge citing his speech
for having "'tended' to interfere with justice." 5 In reversing the conviction, the
Court, per Justice Black, stated:
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger' cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished. Those
cases ... do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of
Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits
any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be taken
as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society will allow.16
Thus, the Court unequivocally stressed the value of free speech by erecting a
standard prohibiting its restriction except in only the most critical situations.
Five years later, in Pennekamp v. Florida," the Supreme Court reiterated
its reluctance over free speech limitations. Certain editorials, appearing in the
Miami Herald, criticized the administration of criminal justice in certain cases
then pending before the Circuit Court. Both the editor and the paper were found
guilty of contemptuous behavior. The Supreme Court, relying primarily on
Bridges, declared that only comments which presented a clear and present danger
to some legitimate interest of government, in this case the administration of
justice, could be curtailed or punished. The Court went on to note that the
"essential right of the courts to be free of intimidation"' 8 did not exist in a
vacuum and must be "consonant with a recognition that freedom of the press
must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible with the supremacy of
order."' 9 Thus while recognizing the importance of protecting a fair and
orderly administration of justice, the Court concluded that freedom of public
comment should "weigh heavily"2 against the mere tendency of such comment
to interfere with this administration. Despite this decision's emergence in the
midst of a period that rigorously applied the clear and present danger test, there
was considerable recognition of the right to a fair trial. The Court's preference in
this case for first amendment rights should be viewed against the contemporane14
15
16
17
18
19

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
314 U.S. at 278.
314 U.S. at 263 (footnotes omitted).
328 U.S. 331 (1946).
328 U.S. at 334.
Id.

20 Id. at 347.
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ous surfacing of the "preferred position" for free speech. 1 While this preference
dealt with the presumptive invalidity of legislation restrictive of first amendment
rights, and therefore not directly related to the fair trial issue, the doctrine did
reflect the general attitude of the Court towards the first amendment. Consequently, since the Court later shifted its preference to the fair trial right, it is
reasonable to assume it lessened its restrictive standard concerning free speech
accordingly.
The last case of the trilogy which seemed to firmly implant the clear and
present danger test in constitutional law, presented an essentially identical situation. Again the controversy revolved around a contempt conviction resulting
from published statements extremely critical of judicial action in a pending case.
In Craig v. Harney,22 Justice Douglas not only reaffirmed the need for a clear
and present danger test as applied in the earlier Bridges and Pennekamp cases,
but clothed the standard in even stronger language:
The fires which [the language] kindles must constitute an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must
not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil. 23
The conviction was reversed; the comments, though false and sharp, failed to
constitute the requisite danger to the fair administration of justice.
Although the cases discussed above concerned the interaction of free speech
and the need for a fair and orderly administration of justice, their facts are
broader than the narrow situation presented in Bauer.24 While these cases
establish the general standard applicable to cases dealing with restrictions on the
first amendment right, the more confined conflict between the attorney's right
of free speech and the right to an impartial trial (clearly within the broader
notion of "fair administration of justice") is a more difficult question. The
21 The "preferred position" notion first appeared in United States v. Carolene Products,
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938). It was first supported by a majority of the Court in
Thomas v. Collings, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).

22
23

331 U.S. 367 (1947).
Id. at 376.

24 Despite the fact that a different factual situation is present here, it is in no way clear
what the present status of the clear and present danger test is. In 1951 the court retreated,
somewhat, from the hard-line approach it had "traditionally" taken with regards to the application of the clear and present danger standard. While retaining its name, the standard
underwent a substantial transformation in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
There the Court upheld the conviction of 11 Communist Party leaders for conspiring to teach
and advocate the violent overthrow of government. Citing to the lower court's formulation by
Judge Learned Hand found in 183 F.2d at 212, Chief Justice Vinson repeated: "In each case
... [courts] must ask whether the gravity of 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 341 U.S. at 510. Thus, what
was once condemned for its imminence was there allowed because of its improbability. That
the danger might occur immediately is not in itself sufficient, but that it is probable to occurat any time-is. For a more complete view of the development of the clear and present
danger standard from Schenck to Dennis, see Garfinkel & Mark, Dennis v. United States
and the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 475 (1951); and Mendelson,
Clear and Present Danger from Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 312 (1952).
This was not the Supreme Court's only divergence from the original rule in Schenck, or
its only fluctuation in stating the appropriate standard- For a substantial list of cases noting
other "offshoots" of the theory, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas,
J., concurring); and the majority opinion in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal.

Rptr. 235, 240-41 (1973).
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Supreme Court dealt with this narrower issue, though somewhat indirectly, in
the celebrated case of Sheppard v. Maxwell. 5
Sheppard stands as the prime example of the conflict which can result from
the competing nature of first and sixth amendment rights. Confronted with a
massive accumulation of prejudicial publicity, from the pretrial stage through
the course of the trial, the Supreme Court was forced to reverse Sheppard's
murder conviction." Apparent throughout the opinion was the Court's concern
with the role of the trial judge in ensuring a fair and orderly trial. Of particular
importance to the present issue was the Supreme Court's comment as to the
specific need for court control over counsel as an available means of preventing
prejudicial leaks:
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect
their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. .

.

. Collaboration

between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a
criminal trial is not only subject27 to regulation, but is highly censurable and
worthy of disciplinary measures.
The problem's solution, according to Justice Clark, laid not in controlling the
means of publicity, the news media, but in controlling the various sources.28
Although the Court in Sheppard failed to specify what speech limitations would
be tolerated to protect the judicial process, the thrust of the Court's command
was clear. And the Court did indicate its position indirectly, by citing approvingly
to State v. Van Duyne.29
In Van Duyne, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in interpreting Canon
20, an ABA Canon of Professional Responsibility dealing with attorney comments,"5 declared:
The courtroom is the place to settle the issue and comments before or during
the trial which have the capacity to influence potential or actual jurors
to the possible prejudice of the State [or the defendant] are impermissible."1
It seems apparent that by incorporating the Van Duyne position in Sheppard,
the Supreme Court was materially retreating from its former application of the
clear and present danger test. At least where attorneys were involved, potential
prejudice would be recognized as permissible- grounds for speech restrictions.
While this may not have signaled the death of this doctrine in general, it certainly
attested to its inappropriateness in view of the particular circumstances. In light
of this specific reference to Van, Duyne, as well as its reversal of Dr. Sheppard's
conviction, Sheppard arguably calls for a lesser standard than that enunciated
25

384 U.S. 333 (1966).

26 The lower court's decision was reversed on due process grounds, 384 U.S. at 362, 363.
27 Id. at 363.
28 Id. at 361, 362.
29 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
30 ABA CANONS OF PaoFassroNAL ETHiCS No. 20 provides that: "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the
Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be
condemned."
31 43 N.J. at 389; 204 A.2d at 852 (emphasis added).
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by Bridges, Pennekamp and Craig. The Court found, from both a constitutional
and a practical viewpoint, that imposing greater restrictions on the press was
unreasonable. Rather, the answer to the problem centered on the lower court's
ability to adequately control those persons standing in a fiduciary relationship to
the court 2 and thus charged with safeguarding its functions-the attorneys. It
would be unlikely to conclude that the Court recognized the nature of the
problem and the special relationship yet advocated a solution which historically
had proven itself inadequate. The attitude of the Court recognized the need
for more reasonable standards by which to safeguard the integrity of its work.
Consistent with this attitude is an approach implemented previously by
several courts. In fact, the application of a different restriction standard for
attorneys predates Van Duyne in re Sawyer,3 a Ninth Circuit decision, expressly
rejected the appropriateness of the clear and present danger test. Commenting
on the validity of this standard, the court declared:
How could we accept the notion that before a lawyer in the very same case
could be disciplined his voice would have to rise to a mighty cacophony
reaching the point of causing the audience (a clear and present danger) to
march on the courthouse, or to set up such a howl that the judge would be
terrified? Maybe for others, but not for counsel of record.3 4
Although the resulting conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court on other
grounds, without ever reaching the applicability of the Bridges standard, Justice
Frankfurter, in dissent, noted that:
An attorney actively engaged in the conduct of a trial is not merely another
citizen. He is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the35machinery
of justice, "an officer of the court" in the most compelling sense.
As such, the standards effecting the attorney's speech will necessarily differ from
those imposed upon others.
In more recent years, other courts have noted the applicability of a lesser
standard in validating restrictions on extrajudicial comments by attorneys
associated with pending trials. The clearest of these is the Tenth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Tijerina,0 involving two contempt convictions for
violation of a pretrial order which prohibited a wide range of comments by
counsel and witnesses of each side.
The order rested on the existence of a
"reasonable likelihood that [such comments] prior to trial ' would hinder the
32
33
34
35

36
37

ABA ADvsORY COMMITTEE, supra note 11, at 77.
260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
260 F.2d at 199.
360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (dissenting -opinion).

412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).

The order -prohibited comments relating to the
. . . jury or jurors in this case, prospective or selected, the merits of the case, the
evidence, actual or anticipated, the witnesses or rulings of the court. This Order does
not apply to statements made, evidence given, or pleadings filed in this action.
Of course, all proceedings in the action are and will continue to be public and
matters of public record.
Id. at 663, n.1.
38 Id. at 663.
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impaneling of an impartial jury, thus tending to prevent a fair trial. The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the order was constitutionally impermissible because it failed to observe the clear and present danger standard set forth
in Bridges. After initially distinguishing the earlier "danger cases" on the fact
that they were not directed to the issue of pretrial order violations, the court
stated:
We believe that reasonable likelihood suffices. The Supreme Court has
never said that a clear and present danger to the right of a fair trial must
exist before a trial court can forbid extrajudicial statements about the trial 9
In support, the court referred to the clear dictate of Sheppard concerning the
trial judge's responsibility to exercise that control necessary to assure a fair trial."0
In Younger v. Smith," the California Court of Appeals also rejected the
applicability of the clear and present danger test when juxtaposed to the right
to a fair trial. In denying a writ of prohibition sought against a trial court order
restricting attorney comment based on the "reasonable likelihood" that such comment would result in the denial of a fair trial, the appellate court indicated the
practical inadequacy of the clear and present danger standard. The California
court rejected the traditional standard due more to its irrelevancy than to its
restrictiveness. The court noted that in approving the clear and present danger
standard in Bridges, the Supreme Court had been impressed with the "practical
guidance"" 2 afforded by this "working principle.14 3

However, the Younger

court felt that the standard had ceased to be of "practical guidance." Since the
responsibility of the court remained to restrain speech from impairing the right
to a fair trial, "the test [was] irrelevant" 44 and therefore warranted abandonment. The court acutely assessed the basic deficiency of the clear and present
danger standard to be its requirement that trial judge "palm off guesswork as
finding.1 45 Under the danger standard, the trial court is mandated to limit
speech restrictions only to those situations where the threat of impartiality is
serious and imminent. Since this is a time-consuming determination damage
often occurs even though the restraint eventually issues." The absurdity of such
a requirement is evident particularly at the pretrial stage, where to require a
court to find that future publicity creates a clear and present danger before it
even knows where the trial is to be held, is to "demand impossible feats of
clairvoyant fact finding." ' In contrast, the "reasonable likelihood" standard
adopted here allows the court to consider, as a totality, the varied contingencies39
40
41
42

Id.
Id.
30
Id.

at 666.
at 667.
Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973).
at 162, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 241.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 162, 163, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 241.

45

Id. at 164, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 242.

46 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Compliance
with the standard as phrased there might realistically result in considerable prejudice in fact
before any restraint would issue. That excerpt intimates restraint only on speech the prejudicial
nature of which is without any doubt.
47 30 Cal. App. 3d at 164, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
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which by their very nature are not subject to recognition under the dear and
present danger standard-that might adversely affect the fair administration of
justice. A court is permitted to issue its order in accordance with the practical
notion of preventative action mandated by Sheppard."
The Seventh Circuit faced in Bauer the dilemma of choosing between two
arguably supportable positions. It could have followed the earlier danger cases,
recognizing an almost unassailable position for freedom of speech. And although
possibly tainted by the recent pronouncement in Estes regarding the primacy of
the fair trial right, some contemporaneous support for this position does exist.
Alternatively, the court could have chosen to reflect the more current trend of
cases, attempting to implement the dictates of Sheppard. In either event, the
court's decision would clearly be important as an attempt at concrete formulation of the attorney's role in the judicial process.
Ultimately, despite the broader recognition of the fair trial right by contemporary courts, the Seventh Circuit followed the Supreme Court cases requiring application of the clear and present danger standard. While Judge
Swygert spoke only briefly on this important issue in the Bauer case, he referred,
for substantive support of the court's conclusion, to In re Oliver 9 and Chase v.
Robson.5" The earlier Chase case dealt with a pretrial court order" limiting
permissible comments by the defendant and trial counsel on a "reasonable likelihood" standard. 2 In the Oliver case, the factual situation was more squarely on
point with Bauer. At issue was a "Policy Statement" promulgated by the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, requiring virtually a blanket
prohibition on attorney comment on pending litigation." Additionally, the
restriction was absolute in that comments were prohibited without reference to
any standard which might have limited its effect. In both instances the circuit
court saw fit to demand the more stringent test, and as a result struck down the
court enactments." Each of these cases summarily accepted the Craig reason48 "But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the core lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception." 384 U.S. at 363.
49 In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971).
50 Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
51 The court order prohibited
. . . counsel for both the Government and the defendants, as well as each and every
defendant herein [from making or issuing] statements, written or oral, either at a
public meeting or occasion or for public reporting or dissemination in any fashion,
regarding the jury or jurors in this case, prospective or selected, the merits of the
case, the evidence, actual or anticipated, the witnesses, or the rulings of the court.
Id. at 1060.
52
(2) Public utterances by parties or counsel which a criminal matter is pending are
not compatible with the concept of a fair trial since such conduct creates a reasonable
likelihood of prejudicial outside influences upon the trial....

Id.
53

The members of the bar of this court are reminded that they as well as Judges should,
in accordance with the Canons of Judicial and Legal Ethics, refrain from commenting on and attempting to explain through any source of news media, action
taken or anticipated in pending litigation. . . . Violations of this policy by any
member of the bar of this court would be subject to discipline....
452 F.2d at 112.
54 The opinion in the Chase case did not accurately represent the usual clear and present
danger test. The court concluded that to be subject to restriction the speech must either
create a clear and present danger of a serious or imminent threat to the administration of
justice, or (a lesser standard) a reasonable likelihood of a serious and imminent threat. This
conclusion by the court is apparently the result of confusion. The court cites Craig v. Harney,
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ing;55 thus by implication, the Bridges-Pennekamp-Craigseries of cases can be
5
assumed to have been deemed controlling by the court in Bauer.
However, there are basic factual differences between the Bauer case (and
Oliver) and the earlier danger decisions which the circuit court failed to recognize as warranting deviation from the stricter standard. Perhaps somewhat
superficial is the distinction previously noted,5 " under similar circumstances, by
the Tenth Circuit in Tijerina. There the court pointed to the fact that the
Bridges-Pennekamp-Craigcases were not directed towards the violation of pretrial orders, but rather dealt with contemptuous comments made absent specific
restrictions. Although the Tenth Circuit did not make the attempt, it is conceivable to justify the application of a less protective test in the pretrial order
cases, and similarly, where court rules exist, since specific notice of what is considered contemptuous behavior is available. Yet absent prior notice, the contempt citations become analogous to ex post facto enactments and the vagueness
inherent in lack of notice situations warrants greater restrictions on the use of
power to avoid judicial abuse.
A more substantial distinction, though, focuses on the class of persons sought
to be restricted under each of the factual situations. The Bridges-PennekampCraig line of cases dealt solely with situations involving "third party" contempts;
the Court was delineating standards applicable to speech restrictions on individuals not intimately involved with the judicial process. On the other hand,
the restrictions under consideration in Bauer were expressly limited to attorneys
connected with the particular case.
Three reasons justify a distinction between attorney and nonattorney comments. The first, previously noted, is the special "fiduciary relationship" which
exists between attorneys and the judicial process.5" Unlike private citizens, the
attorney is expressly charged with safeguarding the administration of justice,
and thus has a unique duty to see that its integrity is upheld, even at the expense
of restrictions on his own, otherwise constitutional, conduct. The second reason
can be attributed to the position accorded the legal profession by the remainder
of the citizenry. Even the Seventh Circuit recognized this consideration in
Bauer. The court noted that attorney comments are frequently the source of
331 U.S. 367 as authority for the former standard. Rowever, that case does not create a new
aspect of the traditional test; it merely rephrases the court's holding in Bridges. See text

accompanying notes 14-20 supra. Thus clear and present danger is actually synonymous with
a serious and imminent threat, and there is no reason to combine the two phrases. Similarly,
the latter standard cited by the court is the result of a misunderstanding of United States v.
Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661. That case stands for a total rejection of the cear and present danger

test, not its combination with a reasonable likelihood standard. See text accompanying notes
36-40 supra. Despite this confusion, the thrust of the opinion is directed towards recognition
of a traditional clear and present danger standard. The misconception apparently continues
to linger on the Seventh Circuit court, evidenced by the suggested resort to the "reasonable
likelihood of a serious and imminent threat!' standard by Judge Castle in his dissenting opinion
in Bauer. 522 F.2d at 261.
55 In Oliuer, the court noted the direct applicability of the Craig "serious and imminent"
formulation to the case then at bar, and cited to Chase as added support for the acceptance
of this doctrine in the Seventh Circuit. 452 F.2d 114.
56 As noted previously, see text accompanying notes 22-23 supra, Craig was directly based
on the Supreme Court decisions in Bridges and Pennekamp; thus by adopting Craig, the court
is impliedly adopting its authority.
57 See supra note 36.
58 See supra note 32.
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prejudicial publicity because they are thought to eminate from a "wellspring of
'
reliable information."59
Undue weight is accorded such pronouncements. Thus,
the practical realities of the situation warrant the exercise of closer control to
ensure fundamental fairness.
The final reason is perhaps the strongest justification for distinguishing the
cases due to the parties involved. In nonattorney situations, the importance of
public comment has been widely recognized as an effective check on judicial
abuse of power, and the hesitancy to restrict this check is considerable. However,
the rules in Bauer did not foreclose the only real forum available to the restricted
party; public comment is but one method by which the attorney can contest
what he believes to be injustice. By removing just one method of comment,
rather than the sole effective method, the limitations imposed on the attorney
are not as serious as similar restrictions on the rest of the public. As Justice
Frankfurter noted:
[The attorney] does not lack for a forum in which to make his charges of
unfairness or failure to adhere to principles of law; he has ample chance
to make such claims to the courts in which he litigates. 0
Lacking definite Supreme Court pronouncements, the Seventh Circuit was
free to choose either of the two alternatives discussed. Despite its verbal commitment to Estes in recognizing that fair trial-free speech conflicts be resolved in
favor of the fair trial right, the court's use of the clear and present danger
standard signifies an opposite commitment in fact. Recognizing its full potential,
the clear and present danger standard can be fairly characterized as placing the
right of free speech in a position second only to an absolute right. Cognizant of
the importance of free speech, the court's decision in Bauer perpetuates its
exalted position, but only at the potential expense of the right to a fair and
impartial trial.
Application of the Selected Standard
In adopting the requirement of the clear and present danger test, the court
necessarily found the reasonable likelihood standard of the rules to be inappropriate. However, the court recognized the general need for regulation in
this area, and concluded that it would be constitutionally permissible to establish
a set of "guidelines" to delineate those areas in which comments would be
presumed to pose a "serious and imminent threat to the fair administration
of justice."' An individual charged with violating these guidelines could prove
that the questioned comment did not in fact pose such a threat, but the presumption would be weighed against him. In an attempt to salvage some utility
from the rules before it, the court stated that by replacing the reasonable likelihood standard with the clear and present danger test, the district court and ABA
rules might adequately constitute such permissible presumptions. Yet before
59
60
61

522 F.2d at 250.
360 U.S. at 668.
522 F.2d at 251.
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accepting the adequacy of these rules the court proceeded to examine each
provision to ensure it represented a valid basis for speech limitation.
Both the district court and ABA rules consist of a criminal section in which
various types of comments are restricted according to the stage of the criminal
process which is involved. Additionally, the ABA rules contain a provision dealing with civil litigation. The various aspects of the criminal framework will
62
be considered here in detail.
Rule 1.07(b)"3 deals with the investigatory stage of the process, including
both grand jury and other pending investigations. Basically, extrajudicial comments which may reasonably be subject to dissemination by public communication are prohibited with the exception of statements in the public record; comments necessary to inform the public of the investigation, its scope, possible
dangers, and similar comments necessary to aid in the investigation. This particular prohibition extends to all attorneys "participating in or associated with"
the investigation. While the court appreciated the uniqueness of this particular
stage of the criminal process, 4 it was concerned with what it believed to be
excessive restriction. The most acute problem was the confusion as to the scope
of persons affected by Rule 1.07 (b). With respect to nongovernment attorneys,
the court found the "participating in or associated with" standard so vague as
to make it virtually impossible to determine at what point of interaction with the
investigation the restriction became effective.65
Similarly, the scope relative to subject matter was too broad; even such
innocuous comments as denying any wrongdoing by the client were prohibited.
The court accurately pointed out that when these scope considerations were
coupled with the practical realities involved, it made this particular provision,
at least as applied to nongovernment attorneys, of questionable validity. There
is clearly less than a clear and present danger that any comments at this time
62 The court states:
Local Rule 1.07 and DR 7-107(A)-(E) are substantially the same except that there
is no counterpart to Rule 1.07(a) which is a general introductory section indicating
that lawyers should make no public statements which would have a "reasonable
likelihood" of interference with a fair trial or prejudice. We assume that this
section or one like it would never be cited by itself as a basis for an alleged violation, since there are specific sections with particularized restrictions covering all
phases of "pending or imminent criminal litigation."
522 F.2d at 252 n.9.
Thus, reference in the text will generally be made only to the local rules.
63 For the text see supra note 2.
64 The uniqueness of this stage is cited by the court:
While no one will have been formally charged with a crime, there may be great
interest in the news media in the subject of the investigation. With new developments
constantly occurring the potential for prejudicial publicity is considerable. Moreover,
since these are no formal court proceedings pending there is no opportunity to
obtain a specific pre-trial order limiting out-of-court statements, we can at least note
that the mere statement that a particular individual is the subject of a grand jury
investigation can have serious ramifications. The secrecy of grand jury proceedings
must be strictly maintained.
522 F.2d at 252.
65 As to this issue the court poses 3 questions incapable of answer under the rule:
Does it cover attorneys representing witnesses before a grand jury? What about attorneys for individuals or corporations who are rumored to be the subject of an investigation? How much interchange with the prosecutors need they have before they
become "associated with" the investigation?
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would impair judicial administration. The reasoning is grounded on anticipation
of those comments likely to be made by a defense attorney prior to formal changes
being assessed against his client. Thus, this provision not only suffers from
vagueness, but overbreath as well.
The court, however, felt that the same infirmities did not plague the rule
when applied to prosecuting attorneys. Understandably, practical considerations eliminate the vagueness problem. On the prosecutorial side due to the
limited number of attorneys involved with each case, any contact usually signifies intimate association. Thus, from the prosecution's viewpoint, the vagueness
question devolves to the existence of any involvement, rather than to its degree.
As to overbreath, the court first noted that prosecuting attorneys have superior
access to and can more easily divulge prejudicial information. Moreover, in addition to their detailed knowledge of the specifics of the investigation, there is no
client interest compelling prosecutorial silence as to their existence. Unlike the
attorney representing nongovernmental interests, the prosecutor's risk of prejudicial impact from premature comment is slight. Therefore, some express
regulation is necessary to curtail seriously prejudicial comments by the Government. While a need for a rule was not doubted in this case, the scope of the
present one remained questioned. The court concluded that although the scope
of this rule might cause problems for prosecutors by denying them the opportunity to publicly justify their actions, such is required by the "competing
interests" of the first and sixth amendments. Despite the broad language employed, the ABA restriction was apparently intended to be limited in application
to prosecuting attorneys. The ABA advisory committee which formulated the
rule similarly recognized the unique position of the prosecutor's office, and stated
that "the recommendation is designed to prevent prosecuting attorneys participating in the investigation" from making damaging remarks."8
Subsection c of Rule 1.07"7 focuses on comments between arrest and the
commencement of trial, or other disposition. Similar to Rule 1.07(b), these
restrictions are placed on attorneys, "associated with" the prosecution or defense,
making extrajudicial comments that may reasonably be expected to receive
public dissemination. The problem with vagueness under subsection a is not
present at this stage since the participants on either side have been narrowed to
the point where their involvement is clearly established. At this stage, the possible prejudicial effects of the comments prohibited are so great as to clearly
outweigh any public interest in being apprised of such information. The court
envisaged a problem only with regards to 1.07 (c) (6), due to its broadness.
In particular, that section prohibits opinions as to the "merits of the case."
The court felt that this provision would conceivably prohibit general statements
by an attorney as to the inequity of a particular statute or court rule or procedure,
if they were in any way related to the case at bar. The court required, however,
that abstract statements which refrain from reference to the pending case be
excluded from prohibition; thus, only those opinions expressly connected to the
trial were prohibited. The court justified this distinction by noting that at this
66
67

ABA

ADvisoRY Comiwunm,
For text see supra note 2.

supra note 11, at 85.
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stage the attorney not only had a unique hold on the public's attention but also
enjoyed the unusual position of critically examining a rule or law. The combination of these two factors, to the Seventh Circuit's way of thinking, offered an
important opportunity for an attorney to effectuate constructive change, by
drawing somewhat latent defects to the public's attention. Yet by requiring that
the statements be in the abstract, this benefit was felt to be at low cost to the
impartiality of the trial. Thus, the court required for adoption of this rule "a
gloss on the word 'merit' reflecting [its] concern." ' The basic problem with the
court's approach to this issue is its failure to adequately recognize the inherent
difficulty in separating an attorney from his client. This is particularly true when
the trial is one of such notoriety as to afford the attorney involved the public's
attention necessary to effectuate the useful purpose. The court does not go far
enough in acknowledging that "it may not always be possible to differentiate
the abstract from the specific.""9 It is naive to assume that statements made in
the course of a criminal proceeding of such public importance to generate the
anticipated attention will be regarded as made "in the abstract," despite the
general language used to frame them.
In similar form, Rule 1.07 (d)o prohibits comment during the trial, including the period of jury selection. The court determined that under application of
the clear and present danger test, the speech restrictions were constitutionally
sound. It is fairly clear that this is the stage most susceptible to prejudicial
publicity and thus requires the most stringent control."
The last section dealing with criminal trials, Rule 1.07(e), 2 prohibits comment from the time of trial completion until sentencing. Even based on a clear
and present danger standard, the court felt that insulation of the judge from
extrajudicial comments was an insufficient basis to support this restriction. At
this stage, there is little need that any extrajudicial comments be made regarding
factual matters from attorneys involved in the case since the judge, in his sentenc68
69

522 F.2d at 255.
Id. at 253.

70 For text see supra note 2.
71 The court did consider two related arguments presented by plaintiffs. Initially, plaintiffs
argued for an exception for cases in which the jury is sequestered. The predicate of this
assertion was the isolation of the trier of fact. This assumes a prefection in sequestration which
is theoretical; the possibility always exists that unauthorized materials, in one form or another,
may reach the sequestered jury. Additionally, the possibility exists that a trial judge may alter
his decision in the course of a trial and subsequently release a sequestered jury. Thus the
court correctly rejected that position. The second contention advanced argued that the rule
should not be applied to bench trials for an out of court comment "could never be presumptively said to pose a serious and imminent threat of interference with a fair trial when the
trier of fact is a life-tenured judge." 522 F.2d at 256. In reply, the court first noted that

while judges are "supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate," they are
also human and may, consciously or unconciously, be swayed by extrajudicial comments.
522 F.2d at 256, citing to Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) (discussed in text accompanying notes 22 & 23 supra). A secondary influence on the court's decision to reject this
contention was based on the state's right to protect the reputation of the judicial process.
Despite the lack of actual influence such comments might have on a judge, if independently the
court's conclusion coincides with the demands of the comments, the process is in the potential
position of being seriously questioned.
A state may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by the public under these
circumstances that the judge's action was in part a product of intimidation and
did not flow only from the fair and orderly working of the judicial process.
522 F.2d at 256.
72 For text see supra, note 2.
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ing discretion, is able to consider most any factor they wish to bring to his attendeterminations free of public pressure, the life-tenure of judges was considered
tion.73 While the rule might be justified on the need for judges to reach sentence
a sufficient safeguard against the possibility of this particular interference."4 The
75
court eliminated Rule 1.07 (e) completely.
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer presented the Seventh Circuit with
an ideal opportunity to resolve the basic conflict between free speech and fair
trial. The court could have reviewed the questioned rules in a legislative manner similar to that under which they were originally evoked.7" However, the
court was asked to treat the issues, despite the case's lack of concrete facts, as a
ccase" or "controversy." Perhaps recognizing the need for definitive action,
the court complied by rendering a holding which will constitute precedents
influencing future courts. The Seventh Circuit's invocation of the clear and
present danger test under these circumstances indicates the relative weight
attributed by this tribunal to the right of free speech. Concededly, the court did
73 522 F.2d at 257.
74 Id.
75 Local Rule 1.07 is expressly limited in scope to the various stages of the criminal
process; Local General Rule 8, however, incorporates DR 7-107(0), and thus extends some
similar prohibitions to civil litigation. For text of the rule, see supra note 3. The court
initially notes that the import of this distinction between civil and criminal litigation results
in the fact that "mere invocation of the phrase 'fair trial' does not as readily justify a restriction on speech when we are referring to civil trials." (The court elaborated on this notion
by referring to the fact that the sixth amendment requires an impartial jury in criminal cases,
while the seventh amendment merely guarantees a trial by jury in civil cases.) 522 F.2d at 258.
There was a second major factor which influenced the court's consideration of the rules
pertaining to civil litigation: the time element. The civil trial restrictions apply to the
entire process of "investigation or litigation." Because of the extent of permissible discovery,
lengthy statutes of limitations, and extended appeals, such blanket restrictions have the
potential to seriously limit speech for years. The Seventh Circuit also considered a third element-the very nature of certain civil litigation-as bearing heavily upon its ultimate determination. As to this point, the court noted that often civil litigation is commenced on
behalf of the public, exposing "the need for governmental action or correction." 522 F.2d at
258. Thus, the matters involved are such that they are of legitimate public concern, and
frequently, the involved attorney is the only articulate voice available. In reviewing these rules
then, the court felt it must be "extremely skeptical about any rule that silences that voice."
522 F.2d at 258.
In light of these three considerations the court concluded that to hold the five areas of
comment set out in the rules as presumptively prohibited would be constitutionally impermissible. Subsection (1) of the rule deals with evidence relevant to the case. The courts
concern here was that in the course of an investigation, an attorney might acquire information
as to a less than acceptable level of government operations in certain areas. In such instances,
revelation of such practices would be impermissible if possibly constituting evidence. As a
hypothetical, the court cites to an airplane crash case in which the attorney discovers unsafe
flight practices being condoned by a government regulatory agency. In balancing the various
interests involved, the court holds that the need for public knowledge outweighs any interest in
preserving the "laboratory conditions of a civil trial." 522 F.2d at 258.
Similarly with regards to the other areas covered by the rule, the court appears to be
focusing primarily on those elements of time and nature. As to restrictions on comments concerning the "character, credibility or criminal record" of witnesses, the court points out that
in many instances comments on such issues are of relevant concern to the public. In particular, where public officials are involved, the public's right to be informed outweighs the
remoteness of impartiality which would require attorney silence for what could be years. The
prohibition as to attorneys' comments on their "opinions of the merits!' finds even less favor
with the court. The concern here centers on the removal from the public forum of perhaps the
most informed viewpoint on the subject until a time in the future when the issue involved may
no longer be of great concern. The net result is a continuation of the double standard
historically applied in the civil-criminal dichotomy into the area of conflict between free
speech and fair trial.
76 See Judge Wyzanski's concurring opinion, 522 F.2d at 259.
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express some recognition of preference for the fair trial right, but the practical
effect of its holding was not so constructed. The restricted party's burden, inherent in the danger standard, makes one wonder whether it is a sufficient safeguard for the fair trial right. The last explicit major use of the clear and present
danger standard by the Supreme Court was more than 14 years ago. Even then,
the court noted that:
[I]t is important to emphasize that this case does not represent a situation
where an individual is on trial; there was no "judicial proceeding pending"
in the sense that prejudice might result to one litigant or the other by illconsidered misconduct aimed at influencing the outcome of a trial...
Moreover, we need not pause here to consider the variant factors that would
be present in a case involving a7 petit
jury. Neither Bridges, Pennekamp nor
7
Harney involved a trial by jury.
Since that decision, several other courts faced with situations similar to Bauer
have not found the application of the danger test constitutionally required. The
controversy, clearly significant to the public and the profession, demands a current, authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court.

John Gaal
LEGAL PROFESSION-THE

RIGHT TO

RECOVER ATTORNEY

FEES

AND

THE NEW SEVENTH CIRCUIT STANDARDS OF AN IDENTIFIABLE FUND AND A
SMALL GROUP OF BENEFICIARIES.

Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Commission
Townsend v. Edleman
Burbank v. Twomey
Swanson v. American Consumer Industries Inc.
Historically, federal courts have denied successful litigants any recovery of
attorney fees.' Although continuing debate as to the evolution of this "American
Rule"' still exists, it was apparently fashioned from the attitude of rugged individualism that prevailed in the colonial courts, where legal disputes were to be
handled by the individual himself. Since retaining a lawyer was considered a
luxury, the courts were quick to hold that legal fees were not recoverable.
Yet as the legal system developed, the "American rule" posed a number of
problems. With increasing social complexity lawyers became a necessity. Litigative
77 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
1 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
2 See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REv.
792 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 202 (1966).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

1252

(July 1976]

skills became recognized as essential for the securing of rights. Further, plaintiffs
could not really be made whole if attorney fees were not included in their recovery. Finally, since the public was unable to recover attorney fees -for prorooting meaningful governmental reform or for redressing statutory or constitutional wrongs, such suits were discouraged under the "American rule." Accordingly, these historical changes forced the courts to develop a number of exceptions
to the strictness of the traditional rule. These exceptions included: (1) the equitable powers exception; (2) the private attorney general exception; (3) the bad
faith exception; and (4) the common benefit exception.
In 1975, the recovery of attorney fees through these exceptions underwent
substantial reform. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society' rejected both the equitable powers and the private
attorney general exceptions as impermissible limitations upon the "American
rule." In Alyeska, a group of environmentalists had sought to enjoin construction
of the Alaska pipeline. Once the merits of the case had been resolved, the plaintiffs
sued for attorney fees. In reversing the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia,- the Supreme Court held that recovery of attorney fees was controlled by
Congress, and that the courts had no power to award attorney fees either through
their own equitable powers or through the private attorney general exception.'
Thus in the wake of Alyeska, plaintiffs will be forced to rely upon the common benefit theory for recovery of attorney fees. Yet in five 1975 cases the
Seventh Circuit accepted the common benefit exception only under limited circumstances. This conservative approach is exemplified by two new requirements
for proving a common benefit exception: (1) there must be created a fund before
a party can recover, and (2) the class of beneficiaries must be small and identifiable before any recovery of attorney fees will be allowed. An analysis of these
Seventh Circuit cases will suggest that through the imposition of these two requirements the court has succeeded in confining, without full doctrinal development, the common benefit exception.
The Necessity of a Fund
The common benefit exception for recovery of attorney fees provides that
the plaintiff who sues on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and recovers either monetary or nonmonetary benefits can be reimbursed for his attorney fees from the class members who benefited from the success of his action.'
Although allowing the common benefit exception to operate without recovery

3

421 U.S. 240 (1975).

5

421 U.S. at 259-62.

4

Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

6 See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882); Sprague v. Ticonic Nal Bank, 307
U.S. 161 (1939); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. Inc., 396 U.S. 375; Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S.

1 (1973).

Generally, a fund is made available by the recovery of damages in a civil suit. But the
existence of a fund and its origin become more difficult to conceptualize when the plaintiffs
are stockholders of a defendant corporation. It is not the purpose of this comment to analyze
these conceptual problems but merely to expose the Seventh Circuit ramifications of a fund
and recovery of attorney fees under the common benefit theory.
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of a monetary reward is a relatively recent trend,7 Supreme Court decisions have
never suggested that the common benefit exception is operable only upon the
existence of a fund, as several 1975 Seventh Circuit cases have held.
The Seventh Circuit first hinted at requiring a fund prior to recovery of attorney fees under the common benefit exception in Satoskar v. Indiana Real
Estate Commission.' In Satosktr the plaintiff had successfully challenged the
constitutionality of an Indiana statute that precluded aliens from receiving real
estate licenses,9 a nonmonetary benefit, but he had failed in his attempt to recover
attorney fees. Satoskar appealed the denial of attorney fees on several grounds,
including the common benefit exception. The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's complaint because the earlier suit had not created a judgment fund, holding
that "[a]ny benefit to resident aliens of Indiana was theoretical and not reducible
to monetary figures."10 Implicit in this statement is the requirement that a fund
must exist before attorney fees would be recoverable, since the specific language
refers to the necessity of a monetary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit was more forthright in its requirement of a fund in
1 1 Townsend involved a class action
Townsend v. Edleman.
filed by plaintiffs to
recover payments from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) that
had been wrongfully withheld. The Seventh Circuit rejected claims for retroactive relief, and similarly rejected attempts to recover attorney fees. Plaintiffs
did not seek recovery of attorney fees through the common benefit exception, but
the Townsend court, in dicta, offered a fuller rationale for the necessity of a fund
than did the Satoskar court. The Townsend court wrote'that "[i]n the present
case plaintiffs did not press their claim for attorneys fees on this rationale
[common benefit] undoubtedly because there existed an open-ended group
of
2
beneficiaries with no distinct pool of funds created by the litigation ....,1
The last decision in the trilogy of cases requiring a fund is Burbank v. Twomey.' There the plaintiff, an inmate at the Illinois State Prison, filed a complaint
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against certain prison policies. These
policies were changed after the filing of the suit, and the complaint, together with
the request for attorney fees, was dismissed for mootness. On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, Burbank argued that he had provided a common benefit to all other
Illinois prisoners. Again the court relied on the rationale it had employed in both
Satoskar and Townsend-that the plaintiff had sought recovery of attorney fees
without the existence of a fundk--to deny his contention.
However, consistent application of these three decisions was undermined By
the Seventh Circuit decision in Swanson v. American Consumer Industries Inc.15
Swanson involved a suit by the minority shareholders of Peoria Service Company
7 The practice was initiated by the Supreme Court in Sprague v. Ticonic Natl Bank,
307 U.S. 161 (1939), some 50 years after the Court's first common benefit case, Trustees v.

Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
8
9

517 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1975).
Indiana Real Estate Comm'n v. Satoskar, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).

10 517 F.2d at 698.
11 518 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1975).
12

13
14
15

Id. at 123.

520 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 749.
517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975).
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to recover attorney fees from a fund created by earlier successful litigation." In
the initial suit the defendants had been adjudged to have employed materially
misleading proxies in promoting a merger between Peoria Service Company and
the defendant, and the plaintiffs were awarded a substantial judgment. Applying
the common benefit exception, the Swanson court here approved the plaintiffs'
claim for attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit held that the expense of the suit
should be borne by those benefitting from the action.' There is a certain consistency between Swanson and the Satoskar, Townsend, and Burbank line of
cases, for clearly there was a fund in Swanson, since the minority shareholders had
recovered monetary damages from the corporation. Thus the requirement of a
preexisting fund for recovery under the common benefit theory was held appropriate. Nevertheless, there is an underlying inconsistency in the Swanson courts'
reasoning. In its opinion, the Swanson court baldly embraced Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite, Inc." as its sole authority for granting the award of attorney fees under
the common benefits theory. 9 This reliance on Mills is confounding, and casts
doubt upon the other Seventh Circuit cases that view a fund as a prerequisite for
the recovery of attorney fees.
Mills, like Swanson, involved a suit challenging a corporate merger that
sought to set aside the merger because of materially misleading proxies. In addition, the Supreme Court was asked to award attorney fees to the plaintiffs despite
the lack of a definite fund. Faced with the difficult dilemma of deciding whether
an award of attorney fees would be proper under the common benefit theory
(although no fund existed) the Court noted 0 that in Trustees v. Greenough,2
the first decision to employ the common benefit theory, the Supreme Court did
not feel restricted to awarding attorney fees only where a fund existed. The Mills
Court also turned to another Supreme Court decision,22 Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,2" which had similarly held that a fund was not a necessity for a recovery. In Sprague, plaintiff had won her claim to the proceeds of some bonds.
The results of this suit also allowed 14 others similarly situated to claim relief.
There was no fund created by the suit in Sprague, but the Court nevertheless
chose to award attorney fees, reasoning that the plaintiff had created a precedent
24
from which other plaintiffs would be allowed to recover their share of the bonds.
Thus, consistent with the precedent of Greenough and Sprague, the Mills
Court clearly held that an existing fund was not a prerequisite for recovery under
the common benefit theory. In the words of Justice Harlan: "The fact that the
suit has not yet produced, and may never produce a monetary recovery from
which the fees could be paid does not preclude an award based on this ratio-

16 Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973). In this
case the Seventh Circuit said: "[Blut cognizant that pecuniary benefit is not the sole criterion
for the award of attorneys' fees." Id. at 521.
17 517 F.2d at 560.
18 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
19 517 F.2d at 560.
20 Id. at 392-93 n.17.
21 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
22 396 U.S. 375, 393 (1970).
23 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
24 Id. at 167.
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nale."25 The inconsistency between Swanson and Satoskar, Townsend, and Burbank is thus clear. In its opinion applying the common benefit exception, the
Swanson court chose to rely upon Mills where the Supreme Court had held that
a fund was not a requirement of recovery. This decision stands in sharp contrast
to the Seventh Circuit cases of Satoskar, Townsend, and Burbank, where a fund
was specifically required.
There are a number of possible explanations for the Swanson court's reliance
on Mills. It is necessary to assess these possibilities in response to an anticipated
use of the common benefit exception following the Alyeska: decision. First, it is
arguable that the Seventh Circuit intended to distinguish Swanson, where apparently no fund was necessary for recovery (although one did in fact exist) from
Satoskar, Townsend, arid Burbank, where a fund was necessary. This conclusion
is at best doubtful, since the Burbank opinion itself approvingly relied upon
Swanson."8 Assuming that the Seventh Circuit was cognizant of the inherent
conceptual conflict of these cases, the Burbank court undoubtedly would have
made some attempt to explain or distinguish Swanson. Second, it might be suggested that the Swanson court was attempting to redefine or limit the scope of the
Mills holding; this, however, is unlikely, since the Swanson court had employed
language from Mills which was central to that case's holding."z A third conclusion is that Swanson is a judicial aberration and the Seventh Circuit clearly
meant that a fund was necessary for recovery. None of these conclusions suggests
any real solution to the inconsistent posture of the Seventh Circuit which can be
extracted from Swanson.
It could be argued that since Swanson was decided prior to Satoskar and
Townsend, the more recent expressions of the Seventh Circuit should control.
This suggestion is suspect because Satoskar and Townsend were decided only
four days after Swanson, certainly not a sufficient length of time to effect any
-shift in the court's thinking. Burbank was handed down two months after
Swanson, but the Burbank court chose to rely upon Swanson rather than distinguish it.
The Seventh Circuit's development of this inconsistent doctrine with respect
to the necessity of a fund for recovery under the common benefit exception apparently stems from an improper application of the holding in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society." An analysis of pre- and post-Alyeska Seventh
Circuit cases supports this conclusion.
The only 1975 pre-Alyeska case concerning the common benefit exception
was Indiana State Employees Association Inc. v. Boehning.29 In Boehning, the
plaintiff claimed that she had been improperly dismissed from her job without a
due process hearing; she sought damages, an injunction, and attorney fees. The
Seventh Circuit, prior to the Alyeska decision, denied her claim for attorney fees
under the common benefit exception because of the lack of a class of beneficiaries.
Although there was no fund, the court did not base its holding on this factor."
25
26
27
28
29
30

396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
520 F.2d at 749.
517 F.2d at 560.
421 U.S. 240 (1975).
511 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 839.
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In fact, the Boehning court never even discussed the requirement of a fund, which
was of central importance to the Seventh Circuit holdings in Satoskar, Townsend,
and Burbank. The comparison of Boehning with Satoskar underscores the shift
of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning on common benefit cases after Alyeska. Both
Boehning and Satoskar had plaintiffs who sought to enforce their constitutional
rights, both involved suits against government agencies, both failed to recover
a fund, and both resulted in a denial of attorney fees. Boehning, a pre-Alyeska
decision, rejected the request for fees because of the inappropriateness of the
class. Satoskar, a post-Alyeska decision, rejected the request not only for want
of a well-defined class but also for lack of a fund,3 a ground Boehning neglected.
It is striking that such a pivotal element of all the post-Alyeska cases is absent in
the one pre-Alyeska decision. Thus, the Satoskar court and the other courts
reaching fund-related decisions most likely read Alyeska to require a fund for
recovery. This conclusion offers the best hope for reconciling the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Boehning and the post-Alyeska cases.
If the Seventh Circuit has interpreted Alyeska to mean that a fund must
be required before a litigant can recover attorney fees under the common benefit
exception, that interpretation must be questioned. The Supreme Court has continued to rely on Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, Inc.," and its companion cases for
the proposition that no fund is necessary to invoke the common benefit exception.
Even the Alyeska Court noted that the common benefit exception had been properly applied in cases like Mills and Sprague." The Supreme Court also cited with
approval Hall v. Cole," the most recent pre-Alyeska Supreme Court case holding
that a fund was not a necessary prerequisite to recovery of attorney fees under
the common benefit theory. In Hall, the plaintiff, expelled from a union for
openly criticizing union policy, sought, in addition to injunctive relief, damages
and attorney fees. The district court granted the injunction and ordered reinstatement, but did not allow damages."" Despite its failure to create a fund by
refusing the request for damages, the district court did allow the claim for attorney fees. 6 The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects,' as did the Supreme
Court," which reasoned from Mills that a fund was not necessary for recovery
of attorney fees. In addition, the Hall Court held that if some benefit, even
though nonmonetary, was extended to a class of people, an award of attorney
fees was appropriate. Justice White wrote that "to the extent that such lawsuits
contribute to the preservation of union democracy, they frequently prove beneficial not only in the immediate impact of the results achieved but in their implications for the future conduct of union affairs." ' " Hall clearly demonstrated a
reaffirmation of the Mills and Sprague holdings that a fund is not necessary for
recovery of attorney fees. The continued viability of Mills, Hall, and Sprague is
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

517 F.2d at 698.
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
421 U.S. at 256-57.
412 U.S. 1 (1973).
Cole v. Hall, 35 F.R.D. 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
Id. at 8.
Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965).
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 9.

[Vol. 51:981]

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

1257

unquestionable in light of the Alyeska Court's reliance on these decisions.'
Unless it was merely coincidental, the Seventh Circuit's imposition of the
requirement of a fund to recover attorney fees appears to be a judicial response
to the Supreme Court's mandate in Alyeska that attorney fees should only be
awarded to successful plaintiffs in narrowly defined situations. Upon a close
reading of Alyeska and its concomitant cases, such a reaction can only be described as unwarranted.
Several other circuits have confronted the issue of whether a fund is a prerequisite to recovery of attorney fees under the common benefit exception. The
Fifth Circuit, in its post-Alyeska cases, reached a conclusion similar to Satoskar,
Townsend, and Burbank. In Wallace v. House,41 a group of black citizens
brought suit, claiming a deprivation of civil rights in a local election. The district
court granted them attorney fees by reasoning that a substantial benefit was
rendered to local citizens by the suit, which had overturned an illegal election
system.4 2 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's award of attorney fees by citing Mills and Sprague and arguing that fees could not be granted
unless a fund existed."3 As noted earlier, however, both Mills and Sprague apparently held that a fund is not necessary before recovery of attorney fees is proper.4" Apparently the Fifth Circuit applied the same improper gloss to these cases
as did the Seventh Circuit, yet the Fifth Circuit did not provide the doctrinal
development that lends the cases to thorough analysis.
Both the Fourth" and Sixth46 circuits were asked to award attorney fees
based on the common benefit exception and both, in post-Alyeska decisions, refused to award the fees. In each case the court chose to reject the claims for fees
without reason or analysis.
The District of Columbia Circuit has adopted a more reasoned reading of
the cases, suggesting in National Treasury Employees v. Nixon"" that a fund was
not necessary for recovery of attorney fees. In Nixon, the plaintiffs were a class
of employees who had sought and recovered retroactive back pay improperly
impounded by former President Nixon. However, in awarding back pay the district court denied the claim for attorney fees. The District of Columbia Circuit
court reversed, reasoning that there was a properly defined class of beneficiaries
from the litigation and that a fund did exist for awarding the attorney fees.'
Although these facts would have firmly supported an award of attorney fees
under the new Seventh Circuit requirement with respect to the necessity of a fund,
the court expanded on its holding by discussing the court control that must exist
over a recovery before the attorney fees would be recoverable. The Nixon court
relied upon Mills to demonstrate that judicial control was not a prerequisite,
arguing that "the [Mills] court held that minority shareholders should be reim40

See note 33 supra.

41 515 F. 619 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Handler v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 519 F.2d
273 (5th Cir. 1975).
42 Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 1192 (W.D. La. 1974).
43 Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 636 (5th Cir. 1975).
44 See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
45 Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1975).
46 Machinists Lodge Local 1194 v. Sargent Indus., 522 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1975).
47 521 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
48 Id. at 320-21.
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bursed for the costs of establishing a violation of the securities laws even though
the suit might never produce a monetary recovery."49 Thus, it becomes apparent
that the District of Columbia Circuit has adopted a policy that would allow
recovery of attorney fees under the common benefit exception without requiring
judicial control of an existing fund. Careful attention must be given to the court's
language that suggests that courts need not exercise control over any recovery,
monetary or nonmonetary, to recover under the common benefit exception.
Thus a visible split is emerging in the circuits on the issue of the necessity of
a fund for recovering attorney fees. A thorough reading of the cases demonstrates
that the Seventh Circuit has unnecessarily concluded that a fund is indispensable
before recovery of attorney fees will be allowed. Hopefully, the Seventh Circuit
will reevaluate this issue and adopt the more reasoned District of Columbia approach in Nixon.
The Necessity of a Small and Identifiable Class
It has been shown that courts are in disagreement over what kind of recovery
is necessary before the common benefit exception will operate to award the successful plaintiff reimbursement of his attorney fees. An equally perplexing question is what type of class must exist for the plaintiff to recover his attorney fees.
In the earliest case employing the common benefit exception-Trustees v.
Greenough5 0 -the plaintiff was suing for "himself and other bondholders."" The
next application of the common benefit theory came in Central Railroad &
Banking Co. v. Pettus," where the plaintiff brought suit to impose liens on property which had been purchased by other railroad corporations. The suit was
successful, and attorney fees were awarded under the authority of Greenough.
A fund or benefit was clearly created for the class of litigants in Pettus, but the
Supreme Court did not establish class-size requirements as a prerequisite to recover attorney fees. In its only reference to the class size, the Pettus Court wrote
that "[t]hose creditors resided in several States, and their claims aggregated a
large amount. Cooperation among them was impracticable.""3 As in Greenough,
the Pettus Court set no specifications for class size and identifiability.
In recent Supreme Court decisions preceding Alyeska, the size of the class
was not determinative of grants of attorney fees. In Mills, the plaintiffs were
minority shareholders suing derivatively to set aside a merger. The Mills5 Court
awarded attorney fees despite the absence of a fund.5 5 Similarly, the Court did
not view the class size as controlling its decision; rather, the Court gave cursory
treatment to the issue of class size and identifiability, even though it noted that
the minority shareholders controlled over 300,000 votes. In Mills as in Pettus,
the Court engaged in a vague description of the class but did not characterize
the group's size as significant or in any way determinative.
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
105 U.S. 527 (1882).
Id. at 528. The Court's opinion did not mention the actual number of the class.
113 U.S. 116 (1885).
Id. at 123.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Inc., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
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Hall v. Cole5" is yet another example of the Supreme Court's pre-Alyeska
lack of concern for the class size of the beneficiaries. Hall involved a plaintiff who
sought injunctive relief, in addition to damages and attorney fees, after he had
been expelled from a union for criticizing union policy. The Supreme Court
affirmed the award of attorney fees despite the absence of a fund,5" choosing to
particularize the benefit as a vindication of all union members' rights. It stated:
"When a union member is disciplined for the exercise of any rights protected by
Title I, the rights of all members of the union are threatened. And, by vindicating
his own right, the successful litigant dispels the chill cast upon the rights of
others." Thus, the class of beneficiaries in Hall was not merely the plaintiff
but rather all members of the union. The clear import of the Court's language
is that this suit protected the Title I rights of the entire labor movement, which
certainly exceeds the bounds of a small and identifiable group.
The policy considerations behind the Hall decision were impressively noted
in the Second Circuit's decision in Cole v. Hall. The court there saw a far ranging impact for a large group of beneficiaries in its decision, contending that
"[t]hese benefits to the union and the labor movement would-be lost in most instances without the discretionary authority in courts to grant counsel fees." 59
The court further argued that to refuse "to award counsel fees in cases such as
this would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic pur860
pose.
As illustrated, the pre-Alyeska litigation for recovery of attorney fees paid
little heed to the size or constituency of the class of litigants seeking relief. However, a footnote in Alyeska changed all of this. There the Supreme Court wrote
that
[In this Court's common fund and common benefit decisions, the class of
beneficiaries was small and easily identifiable. The benefits could be traced
with some accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the costs
could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those benefitting. 1
Thus, it was this language that was quickly seized upon by the Seventh Circuit
and was used as a justification to deny claims for attorney fees under the common
benefit exception.
In Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Commission62 plaintiff sued on behalf of
all resident aliens of Indiana, claiming that a state statute which prohibited them
from receiving real estate licenses was unconstitutional. Despite his success on the
merits, the Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's claim for attorney fees on two
grounds-lack of an existing fund"3 and lack of a definite class. In rejecting the
claim for fees on the latter ground the Satoskar court posited that, "[T]he
[Alyeska] Court also noted the limits of the common fund and common benefit
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

412 U.S. 1 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
412 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
Cole v. Hail, 462 F.2d 777, 780 (2d Cir. 1965)
Id. at 780.
421 U.S. 240, 264-65 n.39 (1975).
517 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 8-10 supnra.

(emphasis added).
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justification for awarding attorneys fees: that in all the cases upholding awards
on that basis the class of beneficiaries was small in number and easily identifiable." 64 The Satoskar court's reliance on Alyeska, however, appears to be misplaced, for the class in Alyeska was deemed to be the general public and the Court
was justifiably concerned with the difficulty of assessing the benefits of the Alyeska
litigation among 210 million Americans. The Alyeska class must be contrasted
with the class in Satoskar where the beneficiaries were resident aliens of Indiana.
Whatever the difficulty that might arise from locating all of the resident aliens of
Indiana, it is difficult to accept the fear that the administrative dilemma involved
would rise to the degree that so concerned the Supreme Court in Alyeska.
This narrow, literal interpretation of the Alyeska class requirements continued in two other 1975 Seventh Circuit cases-Townsend v. Edleman6" and
Burbank v. Twomey.6" Townsend involved a claim for monetary relief from
state officials who had improperly withheld AFDC benefits. The identifiable class
of litigants were all Illinois families who had been denied payments because their
children attended college rather than vocational school. The Seventh Circuit
again viewed this class as "an open ended group of beneficiaries" 6" and, in dicta,
relied upon Alyeska to reject the claim of attorney fees because the class did not
qualify as small and easily identifiable. In Burbank, plaintiff was an Illinois inmate who sought declaratory and injunctive relief from certain prison policies on
behalf of himself and all Illinois prisoners. The policies were changed, the suit
was dismissed for mootness, and the claim for attorney fees based on the common
benefit theory was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the familar dual
grounds of no fund and no identifiable class. With respect to the class, the court
wrote that "[T]his class and the benefit to each member is clearly too indefinite
to permit recovery under the common fund theory."6 It is not critical whether
the court decided to ground its holding on benefit or class, for both are questions
of definiteness. Thus in both Townsend and Burbank the court employed the
identical reading of Alyeska as it did in Satoskar. Classes of plaintiffs that can be
defined so as to include all Illinois families denied AFDC benefits because their
children were enrolled in college, or all Illinois prisoners, do not present the court
with the insurmountable problems in the allocation of attorney fees that the class
in Alyeska did. In Alyeska the Supreme Court determined that the general public
was too large and unidentifiable to administer an award of attorney fees. 9
Thus the Seventh Circuit has apparently misapplied the Supreme Court's
holding in Alyeska that a class must be small and identifiable for Alyeska's holding
regarding class size must be restricted to its particular facts that the class be
smaller than 210 million Americans. It is difficult to assess the effect this reading
will have on plaintiffs who seek to recover attorney fees, but it is clear that
through this interpretation of Alyeska a substantial narrowing of the already
weakened common benefit exception has occurred.
As noted with respect to the requirement of a fund for recovery under the
64
65

517 F.2d at 698.
518 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1975).

67
68
69

518 F.2d at 123.
520 F.2d at 749.
421 U.S. at 264-65 n.39.

66

520 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1975).
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common benefit exception, there has been a distinct split among the circuits. A
similar division is developing over the interpretation of the Alyeska Court's
requirement that the class of beneficiaries be small and easily identifiable.
& ' have each decided cases since Alyeska, but
The Fifth7 0 and Sixth Circuits
have not chosen to invoke the Alyeska requirement of a small and identifiable
class in their decisions. However, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that it will
require an identifiable class before recovery based on the common benefit exception will be allowed. In Wright v. Jackson,12 that court was presented with a case
that paralleled the Seventh Circuit case of Burbank v. Twomey. 3 Wright, a
federal inmate in Virginia, sought a revision in certain prison policies. The district court had awarded attorney fees, but the Fourth Circuit vacated the decision, reasoning from Alyeska that benefits were not conferred on "identifiable
individuals."74 The decision was thus reminiscent of the Seventh Circuit in
Burbank, where the court rejected the plaintiff's claim for attorney fees because
the class was too indefinite.
In sharp contrast to the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the District of Columbia Circuit has adopted a position the impact of which rendeis the Alyeska requirement of a small and identifiable class less effective in denying claims for
attorney fees. In National Treasury Employees v. Nixon," plaintiffs were 3.5
million employees who had been improperly denied a salary increase. The district
court denied all attorney fees grounded on the common benefit exception; the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Court wrote:

[Millions of federal employees tangibly benefitted directly because plaintiff
persevered in this litigation. Where the members of a distinct class of persons such as these federal employees, derive a significant sum of money from
the efforts of a few, it is only just to permit
the few to spread their reasonable expenses to all members of the class.76
The District of Columbia Circuit may have exceeded the mandate of Alyeska by
defining a class so large as 3.5 million. A class of this size poses many of the same
complex allocation problems that so worried the Alyeska Court.
It is apparent that neither the Seventh Circuit nor the District of Columbia
Circuit has reached a totally satisfactory solution to the issues of class size and
identifiability that are now required-by Alyeska. As noted, the cases that precede
Alyeska suggest that a class can be substantial and still qualify for recovery of
attorney fees. Similarly, the reservations that the Alyeska Court expressed about
class size and identifiability stemmed from a situation where the class was the
general public. Those fears are not present in the 1975 Seventh Circuit cases
considered here. Thus the Seventh Circuit should strive for a balance which
would allow recovery for a class similar to those of Mills and Hall without forging
70 Wallace v. House 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975); Handler v. San Jacinto Jr. College,
519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975).
71 2Machinists Lodge Local 1194 v. Sargent Indus., 522 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1975).
72 522 F.2d 955 (4thCir. 1975).

73
74
75
76

520 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1975).
522 F.2d at 957.
521 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 321.
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a rule that pays no deference to the Alyeska decision.
The rationale that supported the "American rule" for almost two centuries
has sagged under the pressures of a more complex legal system. Yet the question
of whether or not to support the "American rule" is not for the Seventh Circuit
to decide; that decision was left to Congress in the Supreme Court's Alyeska decision. The Seventh Circuit does, however, have an important jurisprudential
decision to make: whether to limit the "American rule" or to doctrinally revitalize it. If the court chooses to limit the narrowness of the rule, which its 1975 decisions suggest is not its intent, the court must relax the restrictive holdings of Satoskar, Townsend and Burbank. If on the other hand the court chooses to revitalize
the rule, which its 1975 decisions suggest is its intent, the court must eliminate the
doctrinal inconsistencies that accompanied its 1975 decisions. In making its decision the Seventh Circuit should look to the various policy considerations that
support the rule. A balance must be struck to both avoid opening the floodgates
of litigation and to preserve the independent spirit of the American legal tradition.
In either event, the issue of recovery of attorney fees is far too important to
Seventh Circuit litigants to remain in the confused state that presently exists.
Michael T. Bierman
V. STATISTICS*
PART I
BUSINESS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Calendar year 1975 was statistically the biggest in the history of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. There were more docketings,
and more terminations, in 1975 than ever before in the Court's history. As in
1973 and 1974, terminations exceeded docketings; thus the number of appeals
pending at the close of 1975 (757) was fewer than the number pending at the
beginning of the year (789). It is a real credit to the judges and their staffs that
this feat was accomplished in spite of the increased docketings.
The five attached tables show comparative figures for appeals docketed,
terminated, and pending in the Court for calendar years 1974 and 1975. The
statistics are also categorized to show the courts and federal agencies from which
the Court of Appeals business originated.
Tables I and IV show that 1,201 appeals were docketed in the Court during
1975, an increase of 72 (6 per cent) from 1974. There were 996 appeals from
district courts of the Circuit. This was 40 more than in 1974. There were 120
petitions for review or enforcement of decisions of federal agencies, an increase
* These statistics are taken from the report entitled "Report Of The Business Of The
Federal Courts Of The Seventh Judicial Circuit For The Calendar Year Ending December 31,
1975." This report is prepared annually and was submitted this year at the Twenty-Sixth
Annual Joint Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the Seventh Circuit and The Bar Association of the Seventh Federal Circuit, held May 10 through May 12, 1976 at French Lick,
Indiana.
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of 4 from 1974. There were 16 appeals from' the Tax Court, up from 9 the
TABLE I
DOCKETINGS IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DURING CALENDAR YEARS 1974 AND 1975
Appealed from:

1974 1975
Civil

1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 Per Cent of
Criminal Bankruptcy Totals Incr. Decr.

Northern Illinois
Eastern Illinois
Southern Illinois
Northern Indiana
Southern Indiana
Eastern Wisconsin
Western Wisconsin
Sub-Totals,
Appeals from
District Courts

405 418
31
33
30
29
41
35
76
69
48
59
8
21

145
22
31
49
33
21
7

105
36
15
75
32
30
10

634 669

308

303

14 24

3.25

554
55
66
91
104
69
17

536
69
51
111
108
89
32

956

996

116

120

3.4

9

16

78.0

48

69

43.8

1,129 1,201

6.4

25.5
22.7
22.0
3.8
29.0
88.2

Atomic Energy Commission
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Board
Civil Service Commission
Consumer Products and Safety Commission
Department of Interior
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Power Commission
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Trade Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Interstate Commerce Commission
National Labor Relations Board
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
Department of Labor
Department of Treasury
Department of Transportation
Sub-Totals, Review or Enforcement
of Orders of Federal Agencies
Tax Court of the United States
Original Petitions for Writs of Mandamus, etc.
GRAND TOTALS
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previous year. There were 69 original petitions filed during 1975, an increase of
21 from 1974.
Table II shows, among other things, that the Court of Appeals terminated
1,233 appeals during the year 1975. This represented an increase of 48 cases
TABLE II
APPEALS DOCKETED AND TERMINATED
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DURING CALENDAR YEARS 1960, 1965, 1970, 1974, AND 1975,
BY MONTHS
DOCKETED
1974

1975

August
September
October
November
December

98
71
92
76
109
88
111
94
88
100
84
118

105
87
95
100
108
110
98
114
99
105
94
86

TOTALS

1,129

1,201

1970

1974

1975

62
67
112
63
69
71
69
50
51
57
65
63

64
99
93
82
130
80
117
117
72
129
113
89

131
79
92
102
93
158
118
107
101
94
62
96

1,185

1,233

1960

1965

1970

January
February
March
April
May
June

July

TERMINATED
1960

1965

January
February
March

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
TOTALS

3 45

478
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from 1974. This is a 4 per cent increase. The high number of terminations
decreased the number of pending appeals for only the third time since 1966.
Table III indicates that the number of appeals pending at the close of 1975 was
757, a decrease of 32 cases (4 per cent) from 1974.
In addition to the foregoing appeals, there were 117 cases entered on the
miscellaneous docket. This was a decrease of 15 from 1974.
TABLE IV
DOCKETINGS IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1975
Appealed from:
Northern Illinois
Eastern Illinois
Southern Illinois
Northern Indiana
Southern Indiana
Eastern Wisconsin
Western Wisconsin

536
69
51
1il
108
89
32

Sub-Total, Appeals from District Courts
Civil Service Commission
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Power Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Interstate Commerce Commission
National Labor Relations Board
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
Department of Labor

1
16
2
2
2
19
7
63
5
2
1

Sub-Total, Review or Enforcement of Decisions
of Federal Agencies
Tax Court of the United States
Original Petitions for Mandamus, etc.
GRAND TOTAL

69

1,201
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Table V indicates that petitions for writs of certiorari from decisions of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit were filed in the Supreme Court of the
United States in 204 appeals during 1975. This is only a slight increase from the
200 such petitions filed in calendar year 1974. In 1975 the Supreme Court
denied or dismissed 191 petitions and granted 10 petitions. There were 81 petitions pending at the close of 1975.
The Court of Appeals appointed 193 members of the bar to represent
indigent litigants during 1975. The Court expresses its appreciation to these
attorneys for the professional services they have rendered, which have been of
benefit to their clients and the Court.
Four graphs are included with this year's report.
Graph A illustrates the growth of both filings and terminations in the Court
of Appeals since 1960. In only 5 of those 16 years has the Court been able to
terminate more appeals than it docketed. They were 1963, 1966, 1973, 1974,
and 1975.
Graph B illustrates the sources of the Court of Appeals case load in 1975.
The Northern District of Illinois was the chief source, being the origin of 536
appeals in 1975. That was 44.63 per cent of the Court's business. Administrative
agencies were the next largest source of business for this Court, with 120 appeals,
TABLE V
SEVENTH CIRCUIT CERTIORARI DATA
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1975
Petitions

Original
Adminis- Petitions
for
trative
Appeals MandamusTotals

Tax
Criminal Bankruptcy Court

Pending

Civil

Jan. 1, 1975

34

38

1

0

2

3

7a

85

91

1

4

8

15

204

1

0

10

Petitions
Filed
in 1975
Petitions
Granted
in 1975
-

0

9
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0
-

-

-

0
-

-

-

-

-

-

--...............................-------

Petitions
Denied
in1975
77
90
1
2
5
15
190
----------------------....................-----------------------------Petitions
Dismissed
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
in 1975
----------------------------------------------------........................
Petitions
Pending
33
38
1
2
4
3
81
Dec. 31, 1975
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or 10 per cent. There were 111 and 108 appeals from, respectively, the Northern
and Southern Districts of Indiana.
Graph C illustrates the number of appeals presented for oral argument and
the number of appeals terminated by slip opinions in the Court each year from

1960 through 1975. Appeals presented for oral argument grew from 228 to
807 in that period; opinions grew from 261 to 826 over that span. (This last
figure includes terminations by order under Circuit Rule 28 which became effective February 1, 1973.)
Graph A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
APPEALS FILED AND TERMINATED
1960

-

1975
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1,200,-

1,00
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Graph D illustrates the types of appeals docketed in the Seventh Circuit
during 1975. Of all the matters docketed, 82.9,per cent were appeals from
district court decisions. Of the total, 55.7 per cent, or 669 appeals, were civil in
nature. Criminal appeals accounted for 25.2 per cent, or 303 appeals. These two
areas constituted the bulk of the Seventh Circuit docketings. Original petitions
were a distant third, constituting 5.75 per cent of the Court's docketings.
PART II
BUSINESS OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
There were 44,911 cases of all types filed in the district courts of the Seventh
Circuit during calendar year 1975, which was 5,988 more than were filed in
those courts during calendar year 1974.
--

Graph B

SOURCES OF SEVENTH CIRCUIT BUSINESS
IN 1975
TOTAL APPEALS:

Tax Court-

1,201 (100%)

Original

16 (1.337%)

Petitions-

69 (5.75%)

Admi'nistrative Agencies-

120

Northern

(10%)

Western Wisconsin

32 (27 ) -

Eastern
Wisconsin-

89

(7.41%)

-

Southern

Idaa

)
108 (9;

Northern

Illinois

(44.63%)

Indiana-

119(9.24%)

/

Eastern

51.69
Southern Illilnois-

51 (4.25%)

Illinois-

(547W
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The district court which had the greatest number of case filings was the
Northern District of Illinois. It filed a total of 18,351 cases, an increase of 3,086
cases over 1974.
The district courts terminated 41,101 cases during 1975. That was an
increase of 7,546 cases (22.5 per cent) over the number terminated in 1974.
Graph C

NUMBER OF APPEALS ORALLY ARGUED BEFORE
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FROM 1960 THROUGH 1975
AND
NUMBER OF APPEALS TERMINATED BY OPINION
SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FROM 1960 THROUGH 1975
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The district court with the largest number of cases terminated was again the
Northern District of Illinois. It terminated a total of 14,846 cases, an increase
of 2,052 cases (13.8 per cent) over the previous year.
There were 36,353 cases pending in the district courts at the end of 1975.
This is an increase of 3,835 cases (11.8 per cent) over 1974. Thus, although the
district courts were able once again to increase their efficiency and productivity
in calendar year 1975, the greatly increased filings have resulted in the creation
of a greater "backlog" than ever.
The following tabulation shows comparative figures of cases of all types
filed, terminated, and pending in each of the district courts of this Circuit for
the calendar years 1974 and 1975.
Graph D

TYPES OF APPEALS DOCKETED IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN 1975
TOTAL:

1,201

(100%)

N.L.R.B.63 (5.2%)
Administrative Agencies

(Except N.L.R.B.)-

Tax Court-

/16

(1.3%)
Criminal Appeals-

Original Petitions-

69 (5.75%)

303 (25.2%)

Bankruptcy24 (2%)--

Civil Appeals-

669 (55.7%)
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The overall business of the district courts of the Seventh Circuit has been
divided, for the purposes of this report, into three categories: civil cases, criminal
cases, and bankruptcy cases. Tabulations showing detailed figures for 1974 and
1975 for each district court are attached, following a brief textual statement of
the most significant aspects of the statistics in each of those three basic categories.
CIVIL CASES
This tabulation shows that there were 8,736 civil cases filed in the district
courts of the Seventh Circuit during 1975, which was 773 (9.7 per cent) more
civil cases than were filed during 1974.
The district courts terminated 7,788 civil cases during 1975, an increase of
1,019 cases (15 per cent) over the number terminated in 1974.
The number of civil cases pending in the district courts at the close of 1975
was 9,286. This represents an increase of 959 cases (11.5 per cent) over 1974.
CRIMINAL CASES
The criminal case tabulation shows that there were 2,086 criminal cases
filed in the district courts during 1975, a decrease of 267 cases (11.3 per cent)
from 1974.
The district courts terminated 2,283 criminal cases during 1975, a decrease
of 84 (3.5 per cent) from the number terminated in 1974.
The number of criminal cases pending in the district courts at the close of
1975 was 1,390, 183 fewer (11.6 per cent) than pending at the close of 1974.
BANKRUPTCY CASES
A summary of the bankruptcy table shows that there were 34,086 bankruptcy cases filed in the-district courts during 1975, 5,479 more cases (19 per
cent) than in 1974.
The district courts terminated 31,027 bankruptcy cases during 1975, an increase of 6,608 cases (27 per cent) over 1974.
The number of bankruptcy cases pending in the district courts at the close
of 1975 was 25,677, an increase of 3,059 (13.5 per cent) over 1974.
In synopsis, civil filings, terminations, and "backlog" are up rather significantly; those same factors are all somewhat down in the criminal area; and they
are all at recent record high levels in the bankruptcy area.
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